The White House already had tried to keep secret the members of Cheney’s energy task force, presumably because it consisted only of corporate anti-environmental officials. Bush also tried to classify the embarrassing memos warning of terrorist attacks prior to September 11. And only as a result of an executive order was Bush able to classify presidential papers dating back to the Ronald Reagan, George Herbert Bush, and Bill Clinton administrations.

Initially, the White House tried to portray Enron’s financial troubles as a distant and even technical matter. Only after months of protest did the White House finally turn over more than 2,100 pages of subpoenaed documents related to contacts with Enron officials.

The documents were turned over to the Governmental Affairs Committee, but only after the committee issued a subpoena on May 22. Chairman Joseph Lieberman promised to protect the material by imposing “extraordinary security precautions” -- including keeping it in a locked room fitted with an alarm. (New York Times, June 5, 2002)

Under an agreement with the White House, only a limited number of the committee’s staff had access to the room, and those who did were compelled to sign confidentiality agreements. The Enron documents -- 1,745 pages from Bush’s office and 432 documents from Cheney’s -- initially was made available at the White House for inspection and review by the committee staff. (New York Times, June 5, 2002)

The Bush administration maintained that there was no evidence that Enron appealed to White House officials during its financial crisis. But the records indicated a White House cover-up. Subpoenaed documents revealed that the White House communications office sought to minimize the damage to financial markets and to the Bush administration. White House counsel Karen Hughes talked to press secretaries throughout the executive branch about how to handle news media calls about the company. Weeks before that, Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten had spoken to an assistant treasury secretary about how Enron’ failure could affect the energy and financial markets. Furthermore, the administration said that Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill and Commerce Secretary Donald Evans had rebuffed Enron’s requests for help, according to the subpoenaed documents. (New York Times, June 1, 2002; Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

One document revealed the deep ties between the Bush administration and Enron, including three phone conversations between Ken Lay and Bush’s senior adviser, Karl Rove. Documents also showed that the administration was clearly worried about the potential impact of Enron’s collapse as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The White House was involved in a series of e-mail and conference call consultations that included the Council of Economic Advisers, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

The White House report suggested that Bush administration officials became deeply concerned about the public relations and financial fallout of the Enron debacle. Lawrence Lindsey, Bush’s chief economic adviser, said in a February note to Congress, included in the chronology, that he and his staff “increased the intensity of our monitoring of the energy and financial markets in an effort to assess the potential systemic impacts, if any, of Enron’s failure.” (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

Nothing in the report refuted the White House’s contention that no official did anything or suggested doing anything to bail out Enron. White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales said in a letter accompanying the chronology that he has identified no case in which Enron approached anyone in the White House “seeking help in connection with its financial difficulties prior to bankruptcy.” He said that the communications in the chronology “reflect only appropriate and responsible actions by government officials.” (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

CONGRESS BLAMES THE SCE. In October, the Governmental Affairs Committee, led by Senator Joseph Lieberman, concluded that Enron’s collapse was due to the inability of the SEC to see early signs of the company’s financial abuses. The committee found a “systemic and catastrophic failure” by those charged with protecting investors -- including stock analysts, credit rating firms, and the SEC. (New York Times, October 8, 2002)

Some of the harshest criticism was directed at the SEC, whose chairman, Harvey Pitt, had been accused of not being aggressive enough in rooting out corporate wrongdoing --although many of the shortcomings highlighted in the committee’s report dated to before Pitt took over as chairman in August 2001.

“The SEC, with its relatively small staff, does not, and is not set up to, directly perform many of the tasks necessary to root out corporate fraud,” the report said. In a list of suggested reforms, the report recommended that the agency dramatically upgrade its oversight of corporate finances, possibly including performing random corporate audits. (New York Times, October 8, 2002)