Site hosted by Angelfire.com: Build your free website today!

   All titles
All countries
Africa/ME
Americas
Europe
World
Asia
Search
Archive
PDF version

 


Country Risk Service Syria 17 Nov 2000
Next update: 30 Mar 2001

At a glance--2001-02--Syria November 2000
OVERVIEW

Syria is in a period of transition as the new president, Bashar al-Assad, seeks to cement his position. While the succession was carried out with remarkable aplomb, doubts still remain about his medium- to long-term prospects. Limited economic reform has been undertaken, and while the prognosis is for such reform to continue, there will remain little prospect of fundamental change over the forecast period, particularly as policy initiatives will be subject to revision at the behest of the old guard as they seek to preserve their interests. On the positive side, continued strong oil-price assumptions will help large export revenue to generate trade and current-account surpluses over the forecast period.

Key changes from last month

Political outlook

There remains little expectation for the resumption of peace talks with Israel until domestic concerns are addressed, and even then Syria is unlikely to compromise on its demand for the return of all occupied land. In any case the upsurge in violence in the Occupied Territories will have lessened further any such prospects.

* The pressing challenge of managing a new political dynamic in Lebanon will continue to test Bashar's abilities.

Economic policy outlook

Political uncertainty still remains the leading factor determining the business climate.

* New expansionary fiscal measures have been announced, including a 25% increase in all public-sector salaries and a package to tackle unemployment.

Economic forecast

Inflation will increase slightly over the forecast period, fanned by an increase in government spending.

* Strong oil-price assumptions will see export revenue generate substantial trade and current-account surpluses in both 2000 and 2001.


Country risk ratings

Economic Economic Risk Overall Overall Political policy structure Liquidity ratings rating score risk risk risk risk November D 65 D C D D August D 68 D D D D


Short-term risk event
Syria is in a period of transition as the new president, Bashar al- Assad, seeks to cement his position. While the succession progressed smoothly, serious doubts persist as to whether Bashar, handicapped by military and political inexperience, will be able to survive as president.


Political risk
Bashar's position is at threat from members of the old guard who might perceive their vested interests or powerbase to be at risk. Much will depend on his ability to co-opt members of the "old guard" and offer patronage in return for their political loyalty. He will also need to deal effectively with opposition protests in Lebanon aimed at reducing Syrian influence.


Economic outlook
Policy initiatives will be subject to revision at the behest of the old guard, as they seek to preserve their interests. Growth will remain modest, held back by drought in 2000 and the prevailing political instability. Inflation will increase slightly over the forecast period, fanned by an increase in government spending.


Debt outlook
Debt-servicing concerns have eased, but the external debt stock will remain high as a percentage of GDP. Much of this-owed to the former Soviet Union-is unlikely to be repaid. A relatively strong external financial position will allow other payments to be met in full and on time.

Economic forecast summary

2000 2001 2002 Real GDP (% change) 1.5 2.4 2.6 Consumer prices (% change; av) 0.5 1.7 2.1 Exchange rate SŁ:US$ (av) 11.2 11.2 11.2 Current account (US$ m) Goods: exports fob 4,675 4,350 3,748 Goods: imports fob -3,586 -3,766 -3,950 Trade balance 1,089 585 -202 Current-account balance 1,278 818 2 % of GDP 7.8 4.9 0.0 External financing (US$ m) Financing balance 327 -97 -907 Total debt 22,897 23,147 23,420 Total debt service 685 680 617 Debt-service ratio, paid (%) 10.3 10.7 10.7 Debt-service ratio, due (%) 22.4 23.6 24.6


Structural review: Foreign debt
Syria's external debt profile is opaque, confused by inadequate data and dispute over the terms of debt contracted during the cold war to members of the communist bloc. The latest World Bank data suggest that total external debt stood at US$22.4bn at the end of 1998, classifying it as a severely indebted lower-income country. Syria has a history of default, which it has sought to resolve over the past few years, reaching forgiveness and rescheduling agreements on debt to the World Bank and France, and a preliminary accord with Germany. However, its debt of some US$12bn to the former Soviet Union-now claimed by Russia-remains unresolved. The ratification of the MEDA document in April 2000 has allowed for the release of fresh EU funds identified for Syria, while the expected rescheduling of US$1bn in debt to East Germany-claimed by Germany-in October should allow for Syrian access to official credit from the EU. The prospect of some debt forgiveness, conditional on a peace deal with Israel, now appears to be a remote prospect.Foreign debt


Structural review: Key policies
Syria's preoccupation with domestic security, and its experiments with "Arab socialism" have left economic policy inflexible and state- centred. While under Hafez al-Assad the process of economic reform lost its momentum, it remains to be seen whether the new initiatives of Bashar al-Assad will add impetus to calls for rapid economic reform. Efforts have been made to improve the investment climate-including reforms to investment laws, allowing foreign banks to establish themselves-and to introduce initiatives to improve the standard of living for ordinary Syrians. However, political and economic reform continues to be subject to revision at the behest of the "old guard"-in order to maintain their vested interests. The lack of transparency in the political sphere is reflected in economic practices: the authorities do not publish figures for foreign reserves, for example, and release no credible fiscal accounts.


Structural review: Economic structure
Agriculture remains the most important sector of the Syrian economy, directly generating around 30% of GDP, as well as driving a significant proportion of the services sector, which makes up a further 50% of the domestic economy. Agriculture is by far the country's largest single employer, and consequently the quality of each year's harvest has a marked impact on private consumption. The oil industry is also critical and has replaced agriculture as the main source of foreign-currency earnings. However, proven reserves are small, and with output declining it is widely expected that unless new resources are discovered, Syria will become a net oil importer within ten years. Private-sector development continues to be held back by rampant corruption and the paucity of local financial services. The government is negotiating a free-trade agreement with the EU under the Euro-Med programme, but opposition to reform has held back progress.


Structural review: Political structure
Following the death of Hafez al-Assad in June 2000, the transition of power was effected remarkably smoothly. However, doubts still persist as to the surety of Bashar al-Assad's position. Political power is focused on the president and the old guard of close advisors. Their rule ultimately rests on the power and effectiveness of the internal security services. Formal governing bodies such as the council of ministers (cabinet), the People's Assembly (parliament) and the ruling Baath Party have no power. There has been no serious opposition to the regime since the destruction of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood movement in the early 1980s.


Political risk outlook: Domestic politics
Syria's new president Bashar al-Assad has brought youth and vision to the country's leadership, something long desired, and notably absent from the later years of his father's rule. Although the 34-year-old has been in office for just a few months, already a modest breeze of reform is being felt in the country. This is evident in an incremental increase in political freedom-ranging from the release of political prisoners to improving access to the Internet. At an economic level, efforts are being made to improve the standard of living for ordinary Syrians, investment laws have been reformed, foreign banks are being invited to establish themselves and there is a draft law for the establishment of a stock exchange.

The new president has brought to office a group of like-minded young technocrats, seeking to develop his vision for the country, and modernise Syria. Yet despite his abilities and ambitions, Bashar is clearly not fully in control of Syria. He is surrounded by an array of political "strongmen", who he must co-opt to carry out even minor policy changes. These are men at the head of the military, security services and the Arab Socialist Baath party who were loyal advisors to his father, and individually control the levers of power. The policies of Bashar and his technocrat elite are filtered through these "strongmen", who in recent months have repeatedly toned down policy and limited implementation. In addition, at a lower level, Syria's creaking bureaucracy is unwilling to accept radical change.

The EIU expects Bashar to offer up a range of more liberal political and economic policies during the forecast period. These are likely to encourage modest political pluralism, a freer press, more private ownership, the development of capital markets and a more balanced relationship with Lebanon. However, at every step of the way, Bashar will find the political old guard impeding progress. He may continue to work within this framework over the forecast period, balancing his reform initiatives with the interests of the old guard to secure their support. Controlling politics in Syria is a complex business, weaving together the clan and sect loyalties of senior officials, and offering patronage in return for political loyalty. Bashar's emphasis on liberalisation and deregulation is clearly at odds with the existing system. Any attempt to dismantle it will provoke fierce resistance and therefore there is the possibility of conflict arising. Contingent on the strength of his domestic position, Bashar may take a gamble and seek to purge some of these figures. There is also the constant threat that some of these "strongmen" may decide to seize power for themselves, if for example they perceive a threat to their economic interests or their own powerbase brought about by reform. Ultimately, Bashar's best hope of surviving may be as a compromise figure. The Alawite military commanders are a fractious group and each may ultimately prefer Bashar as president to a rival's succession. Nevertheless, the ever-present fear of confrontation, and its implications, will lead to continued political uncertainty.


Political risk outlook: International relations
Addressing domestic concerns has been a priority for the new president since the death of his father in June. However, Bashar has begun to take his first tentative steps into foreign policy with visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in October, whilst receiving various heads of state and high level delegations from the US, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Germany and the EU to name a few. Meanwhile, the recent and sustained escalation in violence between Israeli forces and Palestinians has led to increased tensions in the Middle East. A wave of anti-American (as well as anti- Israeli) sentiment has manifested itself throughout the Arab world, including Syria, where demonstrations have taken place and the US embassy was attacked in September. These events have certainly put the peace process on hold and we do not now expect Syria to enter into peace talks with Israel over the forecast period. Since taking power, Bashar has shown no indication that he is willing to back-track on the territorial "red lines" that his father laid down, and in any case, with limited domestic authority, Bashar is currently not in a sufficiently strong position to consider entering into overt negotiations with Israel, which may ultimately require painful land concessions few senior political or security figures would be prepared to consider. A far more pressing concern is for Bashar to consolidate his domestic position.

Syria's other main foreign-policy concern, Lebanon, is almost seen as a domestic policy issue. Syria has politically dominated Lebanon for a decade, taking all foreign and defence policy decisions for the country, and approving all senior politicians. Under Hafez al-Assad, no opposition was allowed to Syria's dominant position in Lebanon. The arrival of Bashar has seen this policy ease slightly. Many within Lebanon resent Syria's presence and are calling for a withdrawal of its troops. These calls became more vocal, notably from Christian groups following the Israeli pull-out from south Lebanon in May. The parliamentary election held in Lebanon from late August to early September appears to have been surprisingly fair and a reflection of the will of the people-deeply disillusioned with a government that had failed to address Lebanon's mounting economic problems. The results which came as a complete surprise to most Lebanese have opened the way for the return of the former prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, who together with a loose coalition of candidates inflicted a heavy defeat on the government. These events were seen as a reflection of Bashar's influence who is clearly seeking to redraw his country's relationship with Lebanon. While the stance taken by Bashar towards Lebanon is yet to be firmly established, it appears that he wishes to play a less intrusive role than his father. It can thus be expected that over the forecast period Syria will ease its control over Lebanon and seek to steer the relationship towards a more state-to-state level. However, as with other issues, Bashar must maintain his credibility amongst the Damascus elite, and therefore cannot be seen to be acting weakly with regard to Lebanon. If there is any direct threat to Syria's position, for example, from the Lebanese Christian community, he will have to counter it using the same brutal methods frequently employed by his father. Failure to do so may risk his position at home.


Domestic finance & economic outlook: Domestic assumptions
Bashar is clearly the architect of the economic reform initiatives launched by the government of Mustapha Miro since it came into office in April. Attempts have been made to improve the investment climate-foreign banks have been invited to operate within the country's free economic zones, amendments have been made to simplify Investment Law No. 10 and it is now legal for Syrians to hold foreign currency. More recently a number of presidential decrees have been issued aimed at improving the livelihood of Syrians-an objective Bashar made a priority at his inauguration. These include a US$1.08bn initiative to tackle unemployment and a 25% increase to all public-sector salaries. Although a new cabinet is soon to be appointed-which we expect before the end of the first quarter of 2001-modest reforms are projected to continue over the forecast period, as long as Bashar remains in power. The old guard will, however, fight hard to maintain its privileges. Economic and political reform will continue to be filtered through these "strongmen", who in recent months have repeatedly toned down policy and limited implementation.

Bashar's anti-corruption drive will continue, although it can only be taken so far before it begins to impinge on the networks of nepotism and kickbacks at the heart of the Baathist system. For Bashar to challenge this system successfully, he would have to undertake a fundamental reworking of the political economy. He is unlikely to be in a position to effect such a change during the forecast period. However, the anti- corruption drive will remain as a useful mechanism to be used on a selective basis, although it is not clear how much of a positive effect it will have on the investment climate, given that it is perceived largely as a witchhunt hostile to those who do not support Bashar.


Domestic finance & economic outlook: International assumptions
Prospects for the world economy are good and our projections have been subject to some revisions since our previous report. World trade is forecast to increase by 10.4% in 2000, 8% in 2001 and 7.3% in 2002, although Syria will ultimately gain little from this because of its highly protective trade barriers and multitude of other restrictions-despite minimal moves being made to reduce them. Our forecast expansion of world food prices by 4.2% in 2001, and 10.1% in 2002 will aid agricultural exports, as long as winter rain levels are sufficient for a good harvest.

Our outlook for oil-Syria's most important export commodity and by far the most important factor for its economy-remains good. Prices have remained high despite repeated attempts by OPEC to stabilise them by increasing output in 2000. Since our previous report, OPEC has agreed to raise output on two separate occasions-by 800,000 barrels/day in September and by a further 500,000 b/d in October. In early September benchmark Brent Blend was trading above US$35/barrel, but has since fallen, and as of November 6th was trading at US$30.69/b. With demand in East Asia showing no sign of easing, oil prices will remain strong for the rest of 2000 and into 2001. In 2001 the gradual slowdown in the US economy, coupled with higher oil production, will dampen market sentiment, putting prices under downward pressure late in the second quarter, as rising output meets the seasonal weakening of demand. We have therefore revised our previous assumptions for benchmark Dated brent and now expect an average price of US$29.06/b for 2000, US$25.36/b in 2001 and US$19.13/b.in 2002.

Assumptions

2000 2001 2002 International assumptions OECD GDP growth (%) 4.1 3.1 2.7 World trade growth (%) 10.4 8.0 7.3 World oil price (US$/b) 29.1 25.4 19.1 Non-oil commodities (%) 2.3 6.2 6.5 DM:US$ (end-period) 2.20 1.94 1.79 „:US$ (end-period) 106.0 102.5 101.5 US$ 3-month commercial paper rate (%) 6.4 6.6 5.3 Domestic policy indicators Domestic interest rate (%) 7.0 7.0 7.0 Exchange rate SŁ:US$ (av) 11.2 11.2 11.2 Exchange rate SŁ:US$ (end-period) 11.2 11.2 11.2


Domestic finance & economic outlook: Oil assumptions
Syria's oil production has been falling in recent years (contrary to official estimates), as many fields discovered in the 1960's reach maturity. While it had been suggested that production would increase temporarily in 2001-before continuing its steady decline-this is dependent on the viability of new discoveries which are yet to be confirmed. According to monthly International Energy Agency (IEA) figures, the fall in production has become more evident since mid-2000. Output, which was static at 530,000 b/d between September 1999 and March 2000, fell to 500,000 b/d in September. We expect production to average 513,000 b/d in 2000, falling to 498,000 b/d in 2001 and 495,000 b/d in 2002.

With the country so acutely dependent on oil earnings, concern is growing about the outlook for the next decade, when reserves are expected to be exhausted. To counter these trends, the government has sought to squeeze more oil out of existing fields and look to new prospective developments. Additionally, at end-October it was announced that Iraq was to begin exporting 200,000 b/d of Basra light oil to Syria from mid-November for use in Syrian domestic refineries. Such a move would require approval by the UN sanctions committee, which is unlikely to be forthcoming. However, it remains possible that Syria could still import Iraqi oil outside of the UN oil-for-food program. Jordan currently receives between 70,000-90,000 b/d of crude oil from Iraq outside the program, but these transactions are tacitly approved by the Sanctions Committee. Any imports of Iraqi oil-which would be sold at a discounted price-would free-up a similar amount of Syrian oil that could then be used to boost falling export levels. However, until these developments are confirmed by Syria-and tangible proof is available-we remain reserved about factoring these changes into our forecasts.


Domestic finance & economic outlook: Fiscal policy
The opacity of fiscal policy is a characteristic of the country's political economy. However, there appear to have been some efforts made to improve budgetary transparency: the 2000 budget was released in record time (relatively speaking-the previous budget was released only a few days before the end of the fiscal year) and there are reports that fewer exchange rates were used when drawing up spending plans. This trend is likely to continue with the approval of the 2001 budget expected before the end of the year. However, the budget reveals little about the government's fiscal intentions other than random emphasis on one or two initiatives-detailed spending plans are not released and large chunks of oil revenue also appear to be missing from the accounts. The budget is nominally "balanced", but this is a function of government borrowing, the amount of which is not disclosed. Consequently, analysis and forecasting of fiscal policy is little more than a guessing game.

With world crude prices still at historically high levels, the government took advantage of this windfall in the third quarter of 2000 to launch several expansionary and apparently extra-budgetary fiscal packages. These included an increase to state-sector salaries of 25%, and a US$1.08bn initiative aimed at reducing unemployment by creating 440,000 jobs over the next five years. With oil prices expected to remain high in 2000-01, the government will be in a better position to afford its own spending plans. This positive outlook for oil prices, coupled with Bashar's need to win political support, should allow for the continuation or even expansion of current spending levels over the forecast period. However, even such general analysis should be treated with great caution, as it is impossible to tell what problems the absence of data may be obscuring.


Domestic finance & economic outlook: Monetary policy
The Syrian public's lack of confidence in its own banking system renders interest-rate manipulation an ineffective monetary tool. Consequently, money supply is more likely to be affected by interest-rate movements in neighbouring Lebanon, along with any Central Bank borrowing by the Syrian government. Money supply, which is also particularly influenced by government spending patterns-largely driven by oil prices-should see some incremental change as a result of the boost to current spending. Syria's multi-tier exchange-rate regime is likely to be maintained over the forecast period. However, we expect further convergence to occur between the "neighbouring countries" and black-market rates, moving towards parity by the end of the forecast period. The official rate of SŁ11.225:US$1 will be maintained for favoured importers, as will the comparably insignificant SŁ23:US$1 "customs rate".


Domestic finance & economic outlook: Growth prospects
Despite the positive oil-price assumption, we remain relatively bearish about Syria's growth prospects as a whole. This is a function of a number of factors, the most important and least tangible being political uncertainty. Bashar's position is still not secure and the threat of political upheaval cannot be ruled out. Whatever the political outlook holds, this uncertainty will limit private consumption, the principal component of GDP. Economic prospects for Lebanon-where an estimated 500,000 Syrian workers are employed-are, however, expected to improve over the forecast period following the change of government there. The return to office of the billionaire businessman, Rafiq al-Hariri, is expected to boost spending levels significantly and prospects for remittances from Lebanon are therefore expected to improve. Furthermore, given that Mr Hariri courted Syrian support for his re-election over the past two years, an increase in investment projects in Syria can be expected.

We therefore expect private consumption to increase over the forecast period, driven by high oil revenue, the subsequent increase in government spending and a high population growth rate. Investment spending will see some modest growth, as construction of a number of energy projects gathers pace. This will become more apparent in 2001-02. Crucially, however, as we no longer expect a peace deal with Israel to be in place over the forecast period, this will affect local consumption, with lower than expected tourist numbers and the postponement of spending on tourism infrastructure. Assuming relatively good harvests in the forecast period, the agricultural sector-affected by this year's drought-should see growth boosting exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables. A significant boost to export and import growth could be in prospect-dependent on whether Syria agrees to begin importing oil from Iraq-but until this is demonstrated these changes will not be factored into our forecasts. As a result of these factors, we expect the Syrian economy to grow by 1.5% in 2000, rising to 2.4% in 2001 and 2.6% in 2002.


Domestic finance & economic outlook: Inflation
While relatively weak GDP growth in Syria, and the current low level of capacity utilisation in the local economy, will help to keep inflationary pressures in check, increases in government spending, particularly to public-sector wages and the steady growth in global non- oil commodity prices may fan inflationary pressures marginally over the forecast period. According to new complete data from the IMF, prices contracted in 1999 by 2.7%, continuing the trend from 1998. We expect inflation to return in 2000, at little more than 0.5%, rising to 1.7% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002, as prices of imported industrial raw materials increase further and government spending feeds through to private consumption.

Growth and inflation (% real change)

2000 2001 2002 GDP 1.5 2.4 2.6 Gross fixed investment 1.0 2.0 3.0 Exports of goods & services 0.5 1.0 2.2 Imports of goods & services 1.5 1.9 1.9 Consumer prices (av) 0.5 1.7 2.1


Domestic finance & economic outlook: Exchange rates
The Syrian pound's black-market rate remained remarkably stable in the wake of the death of Hafez al-Assad; indeed the currency's US dollar value actually strengthened to around SŁ46-47:US$1, from SŁ50:US$1. This was counter-intuitive and hinted at intervention, either by the government or some other friendly state. According to some reports the black-market rate has now weakened slightly returning towards SŁ50:US$1. Nonetheless we are anticipating further convergence between the black-market rate and the "neighbouring countries" rate and assuming political stability, by the end of the forecast period the two rates should be at parity. However, the official rate of SŁ11.225:US$1 will be maintained for favoured importers, as will the SŁ23:US$1 "customs rate."


External finance & credit risk: Current-account outlook
According to the IMF, Syria's export performance in 1999 was slightly worse than we earlier anticipated, at US$3.46bn. The Fund also puts imports (cif) at US$3.83bn, which suggests that imports (fob) totalled US$3.25bn (in line with our previous estimate), giving a trade surplus for the year of US$210m. In line with revisions to our oil-price assumptions, we now expect oil revenue to generate US$2.98bn in 2000. Factoring in non- oil earnings, we expect overall exports to reach US$4.68bn. Oil earnings in 2001 are expected to fall slightly to US$2.6bn-as oil prices fall and Syria's domestic oil production continues to decline-dropping further to US$1.95bn in 2002 as oil prices fall below US$20/b. Non-oil earnings are expected to continue their modest recovery, as overall export earnings increase to US$4.35bn in 2001 and US$3.75bn in 2002. Import patterns are more difficult to anticipate, given historical volatility and the government's tendency periodically to squeeze import spending. However, we expect a steady increase in imports (fob) for 2000 to US$3.59bn, rising to US$3.77bn and US$3.95bn in 2001 and 2002, respectively. Taking these export and import trends into account, Syria should register a visible trade surplus of US$1.09bn in 2000-the highest since 1991-falling to US$585m in 2001. However in 2002, we expect the trade balance to fall into deficit-at US$202m-as import spending exceeds export revenue. It should also be noted that there is a large chunk of trade, mainly with Lebanon, but also with Turkey and Iraq, that is unrecorded. Putting a figure to this trade is futile, but the net outcome is thought to be strongly in Syria's favour.

Official invisible data are unreliable, rendering analysis highly problematic. In the absence of other comprehensive data sources, we have incorporated the Central Bank's figures into our historical series; on this basis, we expect Syria to record a current-account surplus of US$1.28bn (7.8% of GDP) in 2000, US$818m (4.9% of GDP) in 2001, falling to US$2m (0.01% of GDP) in 2002. Our considerable concerns over the reliability of historical data should be noted, as should our suspicion that there are large amounts of invisible flows that are not registered (we suspect, for example, that remittances from Syrian workers in Lebanon have been underestimated historically). All projections that draw on these data must therefore be treated with caution.

Current account (US$ m)

2000 2001 2002 Goods: exports fob 4,675 4,350 3,748 Goods: imports fob -3,586 -3,766 -3,950 Trade balance 1,089 585 -202 Services: credit 1,586 1,633 1,682 Services: debit -1,498 -1,468 -1,488 Services balance 87 165 194 Income: credit 351 350 350 Income: debit -944 -1,001 -1,061 Income balance -593 -650 -711 Current transfers: credit 700 725 725 Current transfers: debit -5 -6 -5 Current transfers balance 695 719 720 Current-account balance 1,278 818 2 % of GDP 7.8 4.9 0.0


External finance & credit risk: Financing requirement
Syria's financing position in 2000 and 2001 should move into a strong position. The prospect of large current-account surpluses in both years should see Syria register a financing surplus in 2000, with a small but easily manageable deficit projected for 2001. The current-account is projected to slip back to balance in 2002. The resultant financing requirement of US$907m would ordinarily put considerable pressure on Syria's external accounts, and would probably prove to be some way beyond its reach, given Syria's small reserves and limited access to international finance. However, most of Syria's scheduled principal repayments relate to disputed cold war debt owed to the former Soviet Union-claimed by its successor state, Russia. As a result, the bulk of its financing requirement will be met by a build-up in arrears, while its actual payments will only total some US$190m. Taking this into account, with actual payments of US$230m in 2000-including some US$140m of debt Syria has agreed to pay Japan following concerns over "erratic" repayments-and US$190m in 2001, Syria's financing position will be all the more positive. In any case, support through fresh disbursements at concessional terms from Arab Gulf governments, and an expected small increase in foreign direct investment will provide financing support should Syria require it. In addition to resources from the MEDA fund, access to official credit from the EU to finance projects is now also expected to be made available to Syria.

Concern still remains, however, about Syria's reliance on a narrow range of export commodities which leaves its trade account exposed to shifts in the volatile international markets, while its history of arrears and political isolation still restricts its access to other sources of international capital. Continued political uncertainty also encourages Syrians to leave their own hard-currency holdings abroad, creating a foreign payments profile that is opaque, inflexible, and vulnerable to domestic and external shocks. In addition, consistent failure to issue timely or reliable data lends to fears that Syria may be hiding a weaker external position than available figures suggest.

Financing (US$ m)

2000 2001 2002 Current-account balance 1,278 818 2 Principal repayments due -952 -916 -909 Financing requirement 327 -97 -907 Medium- & long-term debt inflows 100 150 175 Commercial bank loans 0 0 1 Official guaranteed loans 100 150 175 International bond issues 0 0 1 Net direct investment flows 125 175 196 IMF credit 0 0 0 Increase in interest arrears (if any) 84 88 90 Other capital flows (net) -1,207 -991 -247 Change in international reserves -150 -50 -26


External finance & credit risk: Debt outlook
Syria's debt position remains opaque, complicated by unreliable data, difficulty in obtaining information and a lack of transparency. Syria's external debt stock will continue to rise, driven largely by increases in interest arrears on outstanding debt owed to the former Soviet Union-much of which is disputed and is unlikely to be repaid. Syria has made periodic attempts to have this debt written off, on the grounds that the country concerned no longer exists, but so far without success. The prospect of some debt forgiveness-conditional on a peace deal with Israel-now appears to be a remote prospect. The visit of the German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, in October has brought some progress though; a preliminary accord-expected to be signed soon-was reached to reschedule debt totalling more than US$1bn owed to Germany (including the former East Germany) over a 20 year period, starting with a five-year interest-free grace period.

We expect Syria's external debt to total US$23.4bn by end-2002, as interest on arrears continues to rise. Syria's total debt service will reach US$685m in 2000, US$680m in 2001 and US$617m in 2002-the large majority of which will be interest payments on short-term debt. Syria will make payments on its non-disputed external debt, most of which is owed to official creditors and is long- or medium-term debt. Whereas Syria's debt service due as a percentage of export earnings is high, its actual repayments-which are small-will reach around 10% of its export earnings.

External debt (US$ m)

2000 2001 2002 Total foreign debt stock 22,897 23,147 23,420 of which: short-term debt 6,550 6,723 6,900 Total foreign debt service 685 680 617 Principal repayments 230 190 190 of which: official creditors 218 178 178 private creditors 12 12 12 Interest payments 455 490 426 of which: official creditors 75 85 86 private creditors 2 4 5 Total debt (% of GDP) 140.4 137.7 132.9 Debt-service ratio, paid (%) 10.3 10.7 10.7


External finance & credit risk: Specific investment risk
Despite the continuing potential for domestic instability in Syria, the scores for our specific investment risk ratings this quarter improve. Currency risk remains 'C' rated, but improves by 6 points from 50 to 44. This gain is largely in recognition of projected fiscal balance improvements-resulting from strong oil prices-which boosts the economic policy sub-component by 9 points from 51 to 42. The score for sovereign debt improves by 5 points from 65 to 60, moving it up from a "D" to a "C" rating. The rating for the economic policy risk sub-component also moves from a "D" to a "C" rating, again as a result of improved budgetary perceptions. The economic structure sub-component, however, deteriorates in score from 54 to 55, due to a drop in growth for export receipts in 2001-but this is solely a reflection of the drop in oil prices. Despite the decline in oil prices, they are still expected to remain relatively strong in 2001, providing continued restbite for Syria's external accounts. Any further improvement to the overall sovereign debt risk continues to be held back by the scale of Syria's debt and its history of default-although it appears that efforts are being made to resolve some of these issues.

Banking sector risk retains its "D" rating, but its score improves from 70 to 66 as commercial banks' foreign assets continue to improve on the back of trade and current-account surpluses, improving the means/spending ratio. Both the economic policy and economic structure risk sub-component scores improve, but any further advancement continues to be held back by the deep-seated structural problems of Syria's poorly developed, state-run banking sector. We remain as yet unconvinced by moves made to reform the banking sector, regarding them to be more cosmetic than fundamental and, while further reform is reported to be forthcoming, it is unlikely to result in major improvements regarding the sector's lack of independence, flexibility and transparency.

Specific investment risk ratings

Economic Economic Risk Overall Overall Political policy structure Liquidity ratings rating score risk risk risk risk Currency risk November C 44 D C C C August C 50 D C C C Sovereign debt risk November C 60 D C C D August D 65 D D C D Banking sector risk November D 66 D C D E August D 70 D C D E


External finance & credit risk: Risk ratings summary
Syria's overall risk score improves by 3 points, from 68 to 65, but stays within our "D" band. The economic policy risk component improves from a "D" to a "C" rating-largely as a result of revisions to our fiscal projections. Any major improvements to Syria's overall risk score largely depended on a peace deal with Israel and its related financial spin-offs. The upsurge in violence in the Occupied Territories in October and the continuing tensions in the Middle East have set back the peace process further. In any case a prospective deal between Syria and Israel was unlikely, given that Bashar's attention will be drawn towards consolidating his position domestically. Meanwhile, it is still too early to say what impact Bashar's commitment to reform will have, and what structural changes he will be able to implement. The prominence of Syria's traditional political elite-and the political economy they have fashioned-will not be easily overturned.

Risk ratings summary

Economic Economic Risk Overall Overall Political policy structure Liquidity ratings rating score risk risk risk risk November D 65 D C D D August D 68 D D D D


Quarterly indicators

Quarterly indicators

2000 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr

Exchange rate, (other rates apply; SŁ:US$) Average 11.23 11.23 11.23 End-period 11.23 11.23 11.23 Energy indicators Petroleum production ('000 b/d) 530 520 500 External trade (US$ m) Goods: exports fob - - - Goods: imports cif - - - Trade balance - - - Financial indicators (US$ m) Commercial banks' foreign assets - - - Commercial banks' foreign liabilities - - - Commercial banks' net foreign assets - - - Assets with BIS-reporting banks 14,267 - - Liabilities with BIS-reporting banks 527 - - IMF credit (net) 0 0 0 External bank loans - - - External bond issues - - -

1999 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr

Exchange rate, (other rates apply; SŁ:US$) Average 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 End-period 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 Energy indicators Petroleum production ('000 b/d) 540 540 537 530 External trade (US$ m) Goods: exports fob 689 814 980 978 Goods: imports cif 740 963 784 1,345 Trade balance -52 -149 196 -367 Financial indicators (US$ m) Commercial banks' foreign assets 23,045 23,823 25,079 25,458 Commercial banks' foreign liabilities 327 319 359 438 Commercial banks' net foreign assets 22,718 23,504 24,720 25,020 Assets with BIS-reporting banks 11,983 12,343 12,498 13,437 Liabilities with BIS-reporting banks 550 530 549 532 IMF credit (net) 0 0 0 0 External bank loans - - - - External bond issues - - - -

Symbols 0, 0.0 nil or negligible - not applicable or not available


Economic structure

Economic structure

1999(b) 2000(b) 2001(c) 2002(c)

GDP at market prices Nominal GDP (US$ m) 16,169 16,313 16,813 17,617 Nominal GDP (SŁ m) 743,787 758,550 790,229 828,009 Real GDP (SŁ m at 1985 prices) 666,977 676,831 693,311 711,516 Expenditure on GDP (% real change) GDP -1.5 1.5 2.4 2.6 Private consumption -2.5 1.5 3.0 2.5 Government consumption 1.2 5.0 3.0 2.0 Gross fixed investment(d) 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 Exports of goods & services -1.2 0.5 1.0 2.2 Imports of goods & services -1.0 1.5 1.9 1.9 Origin of GDP (% real change) Agriculture -7.5 1.0 3.0 3.0 Industry 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.5 Services 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.4 Ratios, GDP at market prices (%) Gross fixed investment/GDP 19.4 17.5 15.6 14.0 Exports of goods & services/GDP 31.2 30.9 30.5 30.3 Imports of goods & services/GDP 31.6 31.6 31.5 31.3 Gross national savings/investment 102.1 110.8 107.4 100.0 Ratios, GDP at factor cost (%) Agriculture/GDP 30.4 30.3 30.4 30.5 Industry/GDP 17.3 17.2 17.1 17.1 Services/GDP 48.0 48.2 48.1 48.0 Energy indicators Petroleum production ('000 b/d) 535(a) 513 498 495 Petroleum reserves (m barrels; end-period) 2,500(a) 2,500 2,500 2,500 Money supply (% change) M1 11.1(a) 15.0 11.0 7.0 M2 12.5(a) 14.1 10.4 7.0 Prices and exchange rates Interest rate (%; av) 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 Consumer prices (% change; av) -2.7(a) 0.5 1.7 2.1 Exchange rate SŁ:US$ (av) 11.225(a) 11.225 11.225 11.225 Exchange rate SŁ:US$ (end-period) 11.225(a) 11.225 11.225 11.225 Population and income Population (m) 16.11(a) 16.64 17.19 17.76 Population growth (%) 3.3(a) 3.3 3.3 3.3 Labour force (m) 4.41 4.55 4.68 4.82 GDP per head (US$) 1,000 980 980 990

1996(a) 1997(a) 1998(a)

GDP at market prices Nominal GDP (US$ m) 15,878 16,549 17,114 Nominal GDP (SŁ m) 674,817 731,471 775,786 Real GDP (SŁ m at 1985 prices) 612,896 628,148 677,173 Expenditure on GDP (% real change) GDP 7.3 2.5 7.8 Private consumption 4.2 -0.8 6.5 Government consumption 0.2 1.2 2.2 Gross fixed investment(d) 0.1 -5.0 3.3 Exports of goods & services 9.8 12.8 1.9 Imports of goods & services -3.9 -0.2 -6.3 Origin of GDP (% real change) Agriculture 17.9 -3.3 22.2 Industry 25.6 15.3 2.4 Services 2.4 0.9 1.9 Ratios, GDP at market prices (%) Gross fixed investment/GDP 24.2 21.3 21.0 Exports of goods & services/GDP 32.6 33.0 31.1 Imports of goods & services/GDP 39.0 34.5 31.5 Gross national savings/investment 100.6 103.5 100.4 Ratios, GDP at factor cost (%) Agriculture/GDP 30.1 28.5 32.4 Industry/GDP 15.7 17.7 16.9 Services/GDP 49.8 49.2 46.6 Energy indicators Petroleum production ('000 b/d) 610 570 550 Petroleum reserves (m barrels; end-period) 2,500 2,500 2,500 Money supply (% change) M1 7.0 6.9 8.1 M2 7.3 7.7 9.4 Prices and exchange rates Interest rate (%; av) 7.0 7.0 7.0 Consumer prices (% change; av) 8.3 2.3 -0.5 Exchange rate SŁ:US$ (av) 11.225 11.225 11.225 Exchange rate SŁ:US$ (end-period) 11.225 11.225 11.225 Population and income Population (m) 14.62 15.10 15.60 Population growth (%) 3.3 3.3 3.3 Labour force (m) 4.04 4.16 4.29(b) GDP per head (US$) 1,090 1,100 1,100

(a) Actual. (b) EIU estimates. (c) EIU forecasts. (d) No data on stockbuilding is available.


Foreign payments

Foreign payments

1999(a) 2000(b) 2001(c) 2002(c)

Current account (US$ m) Current-account balance 270 1,278 818 2 Goods: exports fob 3,806 4,675 4,350 3,748 Goods: imports fob -3,452 -3,586 -3,766 -3,950 Trade balance 354 1,089 585 -202 Services: credit 1,547 1,586 1,633 1,682 Services: debit -1,552 -1,498 -1,468 -1,488 Services balance -5 87 165 194 Income: credit 356 351 350 350 Income: debit -899 -944 -1,001 -1,061 Income balance -543 -593 -650 -711 Current transfers: credit 466 700 725 725 Current transfers: debit -2 -5 -6 -5 Current transfers balance 464 695 719 720 Financing (US$ m) Financing requirement -694(b) 327 -97 -907 of which: principal repayments due -964(b) -952 -916 -909 Medium- & long-term debt inflows 100(b) 100 150 175 Inward direct investment 91 130 180 200 Outward direct investment -15(b) -5 -5 -4 Net direct investment flows 76(b) 125 175 196 Inward portfolio investment (net of fc bonds) - - - - Outward portfolio investment(d) - - - - Net portfolio investment flows - - - - IMF credit 0(b) 0 0 0 Increase in interest arrears 79(b) 84 88 90 Increase in principal arrears 794(b) 722 726 719 Other capital flows (net) -505(b) -1,207 -991 -247 Change in international reserves (- indicates increase) 150(b) -150 -50 -26 International reserves (US$ m) Total 1,929(b) 2,079 2,129 2,155 Foreign-exchange reserves 1,900(b) 2,050 2,100 2,125 Gold, national valuation 29 29 29 30 Commercial banks' foreign assets 25,458 26,094 26,746 27,415 Commercial banks' foreign liabilities 438 175 166 158 Commercial banks' net foreign assets 25,020 25,919 26,580 27,257 Months of import cover 4.6(b) 4.9 4.9 4.8 Ratios (%) Current-account balance/GDP 1.7(b) 7.8 4.9 0.0 Trade balance/GDP 2.2(b) 6.7 3.5 -1.1 Exports of goods & services/imports of goods & services 107.0 123.1 114.3 99.9 Exports of goods/exports of goods & services 71.1 74.7 72.7 69.0 Imports of goods/imports of goods & services 69.0 70.5 71.9 72.6 Services balance/GDP 0.0(b) 0.5 1.0 1.1 Income balance/GDP -3.4(b) -3.6 -3.9 -4.0 Current transfers balance/GDP 2.9(b) 4.3 4.3 4.1 Memorandum items (US$ m) Flow of export credits 17(b) 16 22 22 Capital flight -703(b) -1,290 -1,076 -333

1996(a) 1997(a) 1998(a)

Current account (US$ m) Current-account balance 81 483 59 Goods: exports fob 4,178 4,057 3,135 Goods: imports fob -4,516 -3,603 -3,307 Trade balance -338 454 -172 Services: credit 1,833 1,604 1,795 Services: debit -1,555 -1,489 -1,481 Services balance 278 115 314 Income: credit 534 421 389 Income: debit -1,017 -1,006 -995 Income balance -483 -585 -606 Current transfers: credit 630 504 525 Current transfers: debit -6 -5 -2 Current transfers balance 624 499 523 Financing (US$ m) Financing requirement -978 -651(b) -864 of which: principal repayments due -1,059 -1,134 -923 Medium- & long-term debt inflows 168 104 63 Inward direct investment 89 80 80 Outward direct investment -15 -25 -45(b) Net direct investment flows 74 55 35(b) Inward portfolio investment (net of fc bonds) - - - Outward portfolio investment(d) - - - Net portfolio investment flows - - - IMF credit 0 0 0 Increase in interest arrears 189 154 179 Increase in principal arrears 983 773 827 Other capital flows (net) -487 -459(b) -265(b) Change in international reserves (- indicates increase) 51(b) 25(b) 25(b) International reserves (US$ m) Total 2,129(b) 2,104(b) 2,079(b) Foreign-exchange reserves 2,100(b) 2,075(b) 2,050(b) Gold, national valuation 29 29 29 Commercial banks' foreign assets 16,084 19,819 22,780 Commercial banks' foreign liabilities 471 248 325 Commercial banks' net foreign assets 15,613 19,571 22,455 Months of import cover 4.2(b) 5.0(b) 5.2(b) Ratios (%) Current-account balance/GDP 0.5 2.9 0.3 Trade balance/GDP -2.1 2.7 -1.0 Exports of goods & services/imports of goods & services 99.0 111.2 103.0 Exports of goods/exports of goods & services 69.5 71.7 63.6 Imports of goods/imports of goods & services 74.4 70.8 69.1 Services balance/GDP 1.8 0.7 1.8 Income balance/GDP -3.0 -3.5 -3.5 Current transfers balance/GDP 3.9 3.0 3.1 Memorandum items (US$ m) Flow of export credits -236 -59 17 Capital flight -458 -194(b) -1,582(b)

(a) Actual. (b) EIU estimates. (c) EIU forecasts. (d) No figures are available.


External trade

External trade

1999(b) 2000(b) 2001(c) 2002(c)

Goods: exports fob (US$ m) Total 3,464(a) 4,255 3,959 3,411 of which: crude petroleum 1,929 2,975 2,600 1,948 cotton - - - - textiles - - - - fruit & vegetables - - - - Services: credits (US$ m) Tourism receipts 947 966 1,013 1,062 Goods: imports cif (US$ m) Total 3,832(a) 3,985 4,184 4,389 of which: machines & equipment 1,586 1,642 1,675 1,708 metals & metal products 1,102 1,153 1,176 1,211 transport equipment 519 545 556 584 foodstuffs 522 506 481 516 Volume and prices (%) Export volume of goods -1.2 0.5 1.0 2.2 Import volume of goods -1.0 1.5 1.9 1.9 Export prices 21.3(a) 22.2 -7.9 -15.7 Import prices -0.6(a) 2.5 3.0 2.9 Terms of trade (1900=100) 54.6(a) 65.2 58.3 47.7

1996(a) 1997(b) 1998(b)

Goods: exports fob (US$ m) Total 3,999 3,916(a) 2,890(a) of which: crude petroleum 2,541 2,157 1,325 cotton 355 360 366 textiles 277 378 380 fruit & vegetables 171 247 273 Services: credits (US$ m) Tourism receipts 1,206 1,004 1,195 Goods: imports cif (US$ m) Total 5,380 4,028(a) 3,895(a) of which: machines & equipment 1,168 1,368 1,518 metals & metal products 970 1,020 1,070 transport equipment 525 555 535 foodstuffs 437 417 442 Volume and prices (%) Export volume of goods 9.8 12.8(a) 1.9(a) Import volume of goods -3.9 -0.2(a) -6.3(a) Export prices 2.2 -13.2(a) -27.5(a) Import prices 18.8 -25.0(a) 3.2(a) Terms of trade (1900=100) 55.1 63.7(a) 44.8(a)

(a) Actual. (b) EIU estimates. (c) EIU forecasts.


Trends in foreign trade

Trends in foreign trade

1999(b) 2000(b) 2001(c) 2002(c)

Main destinations of exports (% share) Germany - - - - Turkey - - - - Italy - - - - Lebanon - - - - France - - - - Main origins of imports (% share) Ukraine - - - - Germany - - - - Italy - - - - Turkey - - - - Principal exports (% share) Crude petroleum 55.7 69.9 65.7 57.1 Cotton - - - - Textiles - - - - Fruit & vegetables - - - -

1996(a) 1997(a) 1998(a)

Main destinations of exports (% share) Germany 14.0 13.0 13.7 Turkey 9.3 8.1 12.7 Italy 17.5 17.5 11.8 Lebanon 6.9 7.4 9.1 France 9.6 11.7 8.9 Main origins of imports (% share) Ukraine 8.4 13.1 15.6 Germany 6.2 5.5 6.4 Italy 8.1 6.7 6.2 Turkey 7.3 6.0 4.8 Principal exports (% share) Crude petroleum 63.5 55.1(b) 45.8(b) Cotton 8.9 9.2(b) 12.7(b) Textiles 6.9 9.7(b) 13.1(b) Fruit & vegetables 4.3 6.3(b) 9.4(b)

(a) Actual. (b) EIU estimates. (c) EIU forecasts.


External debt stock

External debt stock

1999(b) 2000(b) 2001(c) 2002(c)

Foreign debt stock (US$ m) Total 22,727 22,897 23,147 23,420 Public medium- & long-term 16,343 16,347 16,424 16,520 Private medium- & long-term 0 0 0 0 IMF 0(a) 0 0 0 Short-term 6,384 6,550 6,723 6,900 of which: interest arrears 2,234 2,318 2,406 2,496 official creditors 2,091 2,175 2,262 2,352 private creditors 143 143 144 144 Ratios (%) Total debt/exports of goods & services 398.1 343.7 365.2 405.2 Total debt/GDP 140.6 140.4 137.7 132.9 International reserves/total debt 8.5 9.1 9.2 9.2 Debt per head (US$) 1,411 1,376 1,346 1,319 Net debt (US$ m) Total 20,798 20,818 21,018 21,265 Ratios (%) Net debt/exports of goods & services 364.3 312.5 331.6 367.9 Net debt/GDP 128.6 127.6 125.0 120.7 Medium- and long-term debt (US$ m) Total 16,343 16,347 16,424 16,520 Official creditors 15,235 15,262 15,339 15,441 Bilateral 14,599 14,699 14,849 15,024 Multilateral 636 563 490 417 Private creditors 1,108 1,085 1,085 1,079 Memorandum items (US$ m) Export credits 414 431 452 474 Principal arrears 9,031 9,753 10,478 11,197 Official creditors 7,913 8,545 9,181 9,811 Private creditors 1,118 1,207 1,297 1,386 Debt owed to BIS banks (US$ m) Total 705(a) - - - 0-1 year 410(a) - - - 1-2 years 2(a) - - - over 2 years 293(a) - - - Memorandum items (US$ m) BIS banks' undisbursed credit commitments 59(a) 100 100 - Crossborder liabilities of BIS-reporting banks - - - -

1996(a) 1997(a) 1998(a)

Foreign debt stock (US$ m) Total 21,420 20,865 22,436 Public medium- & long-term 16,698 16,254 16,328 Private medium- & long-term 0 0 0 IMF 0 0 0 Short-term 4,722 4,611 6,107 of which: interest arrears 1,822 1,976 2,155 official creditors 1,685 1,838 2,011 private creditors 137 138 144 Ratios (%) Total debt/exports of goods & services 327.3 343.1 421.8 Total debt/GDP 134.9 126.1 131.1 International reserves/total debt 9.9(b) 10.1(b) 9.3(b) Debt per head (US$) 1,465 1,382 1,438 Net debt (US$ m) Total 19,291(b) 18,761(b) 20,357(b) Ratios (%) Net debt/exports of goods & services 294.7(b) 308.5(b) 382.7(b) Net debt/GDP 121.5(b) 113.4(b) 118.9(b) Medium- and long-term debt (US$ m) Total 16,698 16,254 16,328 Official creditors 15,553 15,138 15,208 Bilateral 14,523 14,420 14,499 Multilateral 1,030 718 710 Private creditors 1,145 1,116 1,120 Memorandum items (US$ m) Export credits 439 380 397 Principal arrears 6,637 7,410 8,237 Official creditors 5,727 6,447 7,218 Private creditors 910 963 1,020 Debt owed to BIS banks (US$ m) Total 476 391 695 0-1 year 150 104 469 1-2 years 11 42 39 over 2 years 315 245 187 Memorandum items (US$ m) BIS banks' undisbursed credit commitments 171 186 179 Crossborder liabilities of BIS-reporting banks 9,128 10,309 11,812

(a) Actual. (b) EIU estimates. (c) EIU forecasts.


External debt service

External debt service

1999(b) 2000(b) 2001(c) 2002(c)

Foreign debt service (US$ m) Total paid 539 685 680 617 Medium- & long-term debt 247 307 279 281 Official creditors 234 293 263 264 Private creditors 13 14 16 17 IMF debits & charges 0 0 0 0 Short-term debt (interest only) 292 378 401 336 Total due 1,412 1,490 1,494 1,425 Ratios (%) Debt-service ratio, paid 9.4 10.3 10.7 10.7 Debt-service ratio, due 24.7 22.4 23.6 24.6 Debt service paid/GDP 3.3 4.2 4.0 3.5 Principal repayments (US$ m) Total paid 170 230 190 190 Medium- & long-term debt 170 230 190 190 Official creditors 159 218 178 178 Private creditors 11 12 12 12 IMF debits 0(a) 0 0 0 Total due 964 952 916 909 Interest payments (US$ m) Total paid 369 455 490 426 Medium- & long-term debt 77 77 89 90 Official creditors 75 75 85 86 Private creditors 2 2 4 5 IMF charges 0 0 0 0 Interest on short-term debt 292 378 401 336 Total due 448 538 578 516 Ratios (%) Interest paid/debt service paid 68.5 66.4 72.1 69.0 Interest paid/exports of goods & services 6.5 6.8 7.7 7.4 Interest due/exports of goods & services 7.8 8.1 9.1 8.9 Interest paid/GDP 2.3 2.8 2.9 2.4 Memorandum items Effective interest rate (%) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Effective maturity (years) 96.0 71.1 86.0 86.4

1996(a) 1997(a) 1998(a)

Foreign debt service (US$ m) Total paid 254 564 341 Medium- & long-term debt 124 426 176 Official creditors 111 412 168 Private creditors 14 13 8 IMF debits & charges 0 0 0 Short-term debt (interest only) 130 138 165 Total due 1,427 1,491 1,347 Ratios (%) Debt-service ratio, paid 3.9 9.3 6.4 Debt-service ratio, due 21.8 24.5 25.3 Debt service paid/GDP 1.6 3.4 2.0 Principal repayments (US$ m) Total paid 76 362 96 Medium- & long-term debt 76 362 96 Official creditors 65 350 91 Private creditors 12 11 5 IMF debits 0 0 0 Total due 1,059 1,134 923 Interest payments (US$ m) Total paid 178 203 245 Medium- & long-term debt 48 64 80 Official creditors 46 62 77 Private creditors 2 2 3 IMF charges 0 0 0 Interest on short-term debt 130 138 165 Total due 367 356 424 Ratios (%) Interest paid/debt service paid 70.0 35.9 71.9 Interest paid/exports of goods & services 2.7 3.3 4.6 Interest due/exports of goods & services 5.6 5.9 8.0 Interest paid/GDP 1.1 1.2 1.4 Memorandum items Effective interest rate (%) 0.3 0.4 0.5 Effective maturity (years) 219.3 46.2 169.5

(a) Actual. (b) EIU estimates. (c) EIU forecasts.


Data sources & definitions
Sources

Central Bank of Syria, Quarterly Bulletin

Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract; Statistics of the Foreign Trade of Syria

Notes including exceptions to standard definitions in the CRS Handbook

Sectoral output: based on constant market prices

Industrial production: excludes construction

Exports fob: data in the Foreign payments table are on a balance-of- payments basis; data in the External trade table are on a customs basis

All GDP US dollar calculations are derived from an EIU estimate exchange rate rather than the official rate











©The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2001. All rights reserved.
©Technology by: www.eLogic.com
Online privacy policy
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .....