The origins of this outfit
lie in the feudal set-up of Pakistani Punjab and politico-religious
developments in the Seventies and Eighties. Political and economic power
in Pakistani Punjab was a privilege of large landowners who were mostly
Shias, a minority as compared to the Sunni sect. Urban Punjab in contrast,
was a non-feudalised middle-class society and largely from the Sunni sect.
The Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP)
is reported to be an offshoot of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a
leading politico-religious Sunni Deobandi party. It was also reportedly
set up on behest of the Zia-ul Haq regime as part of efforts to build an
Islamic counter to pro-democracy forces ranged against the military regime
of the Eighties.
The SSP (initially known
as Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba) was established by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi,
Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesar-ul-Haq Qasmi and Maulana Azam
Tariq in September 1985 in an environment of increasing sectarian
hostility in Pakistani Punjab. In 1986 a violent anti Shia riot broke out
in Lahore. Following this there was a spate of assassinations of prominent
Sunni leaders including Ahl-e-Hadith leaders, Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer
and Maulana Habib ur Rehman Yazdani in 1987 and
Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ) leader Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini in
1988. In February 1990, one of SSP's founders Maulana Jhangvi was killed.
These assassinations deepened the spiral of sectarian violence though the
extent of SSP's involvement in not clear. Sunni violent organisations have
suspected Iran of aiding Shia extremists and in what is suspected to be an
act of retribution to Jhangvi's killing, Iran's Counsel General in Lahore,
Sadeq Ganji, was killed in December 1990.
By 1992, the SSP was
reported to have access to sophisticated arms and the ability to use them
even against law enforcement agencies. In June, a rocket launcher was used
by its activists in an attack that killed five policemen. In Punjab, 1994
was one of the worst years in terms of sectarian violence when such
incidents claimed 73 lives and more than 300 people were injured. Many of
these killings were the result of indiscriminate firing on people saying
their prayers. The SSP along with several other Sunni and Shia
organisations was suspected to have participated in this violence.
After a brief peace
brought about by a Milli Yakjeheti Council, a peace front set up involving
most sectarian outfits involved in the violence, 1996 again turned out to
be a violent year. The second half of the year was notable for the fact
that while the number of incidents fell, the average casualties in these
incidents rose. In one instance where SSP was suspected as the
perpetrator, ten people were killed in indiscriminate firing at a mourning
procession in Mailsi in Vehari district in July.
In January 1997, a bomb
blast at the Sessions Court in Lahore left 30 people dead, including the
then SSP chief Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi along with 22 policemen and a
journalist. As a swift reply, the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore was
attacked and set on fire, while in Multan seven people were shot dead
including the Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali Rahimi in the same month. In
September, five personnel of the Iranian armed forces who were in Pakistan
for training were killed.
The socio-economic
rationale for SSP's origin is explained largely from the economic profile
of Jhang, the home base of SSP. Located in a region that divides Central
from Southern Pakistani Punjab, Jhang still has a significantly high
proportion of large land holdings, leaving feudalism relatively
undisturbed. Most large landlords, who are Shias, dominate both society
and politics in the region. But, over the years, the area has developed as
an important mandi (market town) gradually increasing the power of
traders, shopkeepers and transport operators in the region. Seeking a
political voice and role, this class, largely from the Sunni community,
has been challenging the traditional feudal hold. The most serious
political challenge to the control of feudal interests has been
articulated in the form of violent sectarianism, with the formation of the
SSP. This has meant, however, that the contest for access to resources and
status and the competition for domination over the state apparatus is not
framed in terms of class divisions, or modernisation imperatives, but
confrontationist sectarian identities.
As in most areas affected
by violence, a major contradiction has risen. While a sizeable proportion
of traders and shopkeepers continue to fund the SSP in Jhang, most do not
believe in the violence associated with the party, rather it is now a
matter of buying security. Nevertheless, there is a decline in their
support for the SSP over recent years as a result of the economic
consequences of sectarian strife.
In 1996, protesting
against what they termed as the moderating nature of the organisations,
the more radical and extremist elements of the SSP walked out of the
outfit to form the Lashkar-e
Jhangvi, a group that only involves itself in sectarian violence. In
contrast, the SSP has always retained an explicit political profile too,
contesting elections and having been a constituent of a Punjab coalition
government. It has branches spread in all 32 districts of Pakistani Punjab
and reportedly has over 100,000 workers.
As with other sectarian
outfits in Pakistan, the SSP has chosen to lie low after the military coup
of November 1999. This lends credence to the hypothesis that SSP like
other sectarian and ethnic groups, indulge in violence only when a passive
state guarantees an environment of neutrality and even tacit support to
this violence. With a hardline stance being taken by the military regime
against internal violence within Pakistan, these organisations have chosen
to keep a low profile.
