TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u
Paul Taylor argues that consociational theory was reflected in the European Union (EU) of the mid-1990s. Making reference to the four features of consociationalism as described by Lijphart (grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy), he makes a conclusion that “modified intergovernmentalism, in the special form of consociationalism, was… the most persuasive image of the European Union in the mid-1990s…
” When applying consociationalism to the feature of proportionality, Taylor finds that especially staffing of the Commission and the voting in the Council of Ministers reflect consociational theory. But he skips one of the central institutions of the EU – European Parliament (EP).
In this study I focus on the European Parliament in the light of the proportionality principle of consociationalism and argue that it has a limited applicability.
Lijphart, describing the four basic principles of consociation, defines proportionality as follows:
“Proportionality serves as the basic
standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and the
allocation of public funds. It contrasts sharply with the winner-take-all
character of majority rule. As far as political representation is concerned,
two extensions of proportionality entail even greater deviations from
majority rule and give
special protection to small minorities: the overrepresentation of small
minorities and parity representation. They are particularly useful alternatives
to proportionality when a particular society is divided into segments of highly
unequal size.”
As regards the EU, it is assumed that the segments, which Lijphart uses in his theory, are the member states, which “focus on their internal affairs rather than the relations among themselves” and where “relations among them are carried out by elites and decisions by them [are] results of agreements and coalitions.”
The European Parliament is a directly elected political body, members of which represent the citizens of the member states, i.e. the segments. According to the consociational theory, the number of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represented by each state should be proportional to the populations of the respective state. The MEPs of particular state should serve the interest of the national electorate, since, as one of the main arguments of consociationalism prescribes, segments are strongly defined by social cleavages. Moreover, elections should remain as a ritual, because the cleavages already display the result prior to the election.
In the EP we can observe consociational principles concerning to the proportionality. Indeed, the number of MEPs of each state is roughly proportional to the population of the respective state and smaller states as Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg etc. are overrepresented, just as consociational theory suggests:
|
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE EP BY COUNTRY |
POPULATION OF THE MEMBER STAES |
|||
|
COUNTRY |
Number of seats |
Percentage of total seats (%) |
Percentage of total population (%) |
Population |
|
Belgium |
25 |
3,99 |
2,72 |
10.213.000 |
|
Denmark |
16 |
2,56 |
1,41 |
5.313.000 |
|
Germany |
99 |
15,81 |
21,96 |
82.083.000 |
|
Greece |
25 |
3,99 |
2,81 |
10.533.000 |
|
Spain |
64 |
10,22 |
10,53 |
39.394.000 |
|
France |
87 |
13,90 |
15,63 |
58.966.000 |
|
Ireland |
15 |
2,40 |
0,97 |
3.744.000 |
|
Italy |
87 |
13,90 |
15,39 |
57.610.000 |
|
Luxemburg |
6 |
0,96 |
0,11 |
429.000 |
|
Netherlands |
31 |
4,95 |
4,16 |
15.760.000 |
|
Austria |
21 |
3,35 |
2,16 |
8.082.000 |
|
Portugal |
25 |
3,99 |
2,66 |
9.980.000 |
|
Finland |
16 |
2,56 |
1,37 |
5.160.000 |
|
Sweden |
22 |
3,51 |
2,37 |
8.854.000 |
|
United Kingdom |
87 |
13,90 |
15,75 |
59.247.000 |
|
TOTAL |
626 |
100 |
100 |
375.368.000 |
But the distribution of MEPs in 8 political groups shows the diversity among the members of the same nationality:
|
COUNTRY |
POLITICAL GROUPS |
Total |
|||||||
|
PPE-DE |
PSE |
ELDR |
Verts/Ale |
GUE/NGL |
UEN |
EDD |
NI |
||
|
Belgium |
6 |
5 |
5 |
7 |
|
|
|
2 |
25 |
|
Denmark |
1 |
2 |
6 |
|
2 |
1 |
4 |
|
16 |
|
Germany |
53 |
35 |
|
4 |
7 |
|
|
|
99 |
|
Greece |
9 |
9 |
|
|
7 |
|
|
|
25 |
|
Spain |
28 |
24 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
|
|
1 |
64 |
|
France |
20 |
22 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
3 |
9 |
12 |
87 |
|
Ireland |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
|
6 |
|
|
15 |
|
Italy |
35 |
16 |
8 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
|
10 |
87 |
|
Luxemburg |
2 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
6 |
|
Netherlands |
9 |
6 |
8 |
4 |
1 |
|
3 |
|
31 |
|
Austria |
7 |
7 |
|
2 |
|
|
|
5 |
21 |
|
Portugal |
9 |
12 |
|
|
2 |
2 |
|
|
25 |
|
Finland |
5 |
3 |
5 |
2 |
1 |
|
|
|
16 |
|
Sweden |
7 |
6 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
|
|
|
22 |
|
United Kingdom |
37 |
29 |
11 |
6 |
|
|
2 |
2 |
87 |
|
Total |
233 |
179 |
53 |
45 |
44 |
22 |
18 |
32 |
626 |
PPE-DE: Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats
PSE: Group of the Party of European Socialists
ELDR: Group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party
Verts/ALE: Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE/NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
UEN: Union for Europe of the Nations Group
EDD: Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities
NI: Non-attached
A MEP represents his nation and, at the same time, a political division with the MEPs from other member states. This duality of representation means that cleavages between the member states - the segments – are not strongly defined at the level of the EP. The situation of diversity in the EP on the ground of political groups differs from the composition of the Council of Ministers and the Commission, where cleavages are stronger defined.
According to the above observations a following conclusion can be made:
The proportionality principle of the consociational theory has limited applicability to the EP, because of the political diversity among the MEPs of a particular member state. The MEPs from a particular state have divergent political views, which may lead to the deformation of the proportionality principle based on the populations of the member states– the segments. Instead of 15 segments, there may appear 8, according to the number of the political groups.
The post-Cold War conditions and the evolution of the EU as a distinct entity on international arena necessitate a clear strategy towards the countries of the former Soviet
Union. This necessity lies on the following main interrelated reasons:
· “Soft” security concerns
· Trade relations
· Central and East European Countries / New Independent States distinction
The Collapse of Communism caught the European Community by surprise. The Council specified four criteria for determining whether an associated country was ready for membership.
1- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
2- Existence of a functioning market economy.
3- Capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.
4- The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
The geographical proximity of the region brings problems such as nuclear safety, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, environment, organized crime and local wars, which generally constitute “soft” security concerns. With the eastern enlargement, which will extend the current boundaries of the EU closer to the countries of the former Soviet Union (or even behind the boundaries as regards the Baltic states), the problems will become even more important. The relations between the New Independent States (NIS) and the EU are developing in the direction of greater economic interdependence.
The CEEC and NIS distinction is an important one, it differentiates between countries likely to the subject to ‘ever closer association” and those (the NIS) where the development of ‘second generation’ Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) is in progress but
relations are unlikely to develop beyond this stage in foreseeable future. This point means that there should be a different strategy towards the NIS. Thus, taking into account the importance of the above stated main reasons; the EU is directly interested in economic as well as political stability of the region, and any lack of well defined and well-pursued strategy may result in serious negative consequences for the EU.
To a great extent, all above described issues have been reflected in the common strategy of the EU towards the NIS. For each country of the former Soviet Union the Commission has adopted Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for the period 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme for the period 2002-2003. The CSPs provide the strategic framework within which EC assistance will be given. It sets out European Commission co-operation objectives, policy response and priority fields of co-operation based on a thorough assessment of policy agenda and political and socio-economic situation of each country. The National Indicative Programme sets out the response in more detail, highlighting programme objectives, expected results and conditionality for Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of Independent States (Tacis) in the priority areas of co-operation for 2002-2003.
PCAs are the main framework, which provide for trade liberalization and closer relations, as well as on a CSFP Common Strategy, aimed at strengthening the strategic partnership with NIS and addressing common challenges on the European continent. It also offers a perspective for future deeper integration. Tacis is the main financial instrument supporting the implementation of the PCAs, assisting the NIS in the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, the consolidation of a market economy and the strengthening of administrative capacity linked to the implementation of the agreements.
As already mentioned, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe differ from each other. Thus, at the periphery of the World War II, some countries notably the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic states, did have flourishing market economies. EU should provide financial help to producers on both sides of the former Soviet Union countries either to move technologically more sophisticated sectors of the economy or to modernize their existing factories. All these require a mixture of financial aid and training but the programmes are in place and only need intensifying.
It can be concluded that EU is highly interested having the former Soviet Union countries as stable, predictable partners. The region is moving through transition period, restructuring its economy, establishing democratic principles etc., success of which is directly related to the EU’s involvement, especially in the field of financial assistance. The EU’s strategy towards the region needs to be clear in the definition of its objectives and it should be consistent with the strategies of the Member States.
Bretherton Charlotte and Vogler John (1999). The European Union as a Global Actor. New York: Routledge. p. 143.
European Commission. URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/index.htm Accessed on 15 November 2002
European Commission. Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2003. Russian Federation. URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/csp/index.htm Accessed on 10 November 2002
Taylor, Paul 1996. The European Union in the 1990s. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 96.
Paul Taylor researched the EU of the mid-1990s. I used the data related to the EP of 2002. The time difference seems to have little importance in this study since the composition of the EP remained roughly the same.
Lijphart, Arend (1979). Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links. Canadian Journal of Political Science, XII: 3, September. p. 501.
Çakır, Armağan Emre (1996). Consociationalism: Its Origin, Meaning and Application. Öneri, Issue 4, p. 175-176.
Ibid. p. 173.
The data on the composition of the EP is retrieved from WWW URL: http://www.europarl.eu.int/home/default_en.htm Accessed on 17 March 2002
For the consociational structure of the Commission read Hooghe Liesbeth (1998). Consociationalists or Weberians? Top Commission Officials on Nationality. WWW URL: http://www.arena.uio.no Accessed on 17 March 2002.
