What is the place of
Euro-groups in Liberal Intergovernmentalism?
Moravscik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalist theory (LI) takes liberalism as a basis for national preference formation (for interstate negotiation) and assumes private individuals and voluntary associations with autonomous interests, interacting in the civil society, the most fundamental actors in politics.[1] However, interest groups’ influence on the agenda setting of interstate bargaining and the supply (outcome) in LI seems to be underestimated.
Agenda setting constitutes the pre-negotiation phase, which Moravcsik seems to neglect. Instead of conceptualising the pre-negotiation phase as the phase where governments can determine what should actually be on the EU agenda and how problems should be framed, Moravcsik goes straight to the negotiation phase. By taking policy problems as a 'given', Moravcsik runs the risks of disregarding the agenda setting phase, which could heavily affect the outcome of the actual negotiation game.
In Moravcsik’s theory, interest groups are represented on European level via a member state’s government and national bureaucracy. But empirical evidence shows that lobbying the government is only one of 4 ways to influence European-level decision-making. Interest groups can also access the decision-making process and thus affect the negotiation outcome by
1. Representation in the Economic and Social Committee
2. Direct lobbying the Commission, which has an important role in defining the agenda of negotiation
3. Lobbying via Euro-groups (interest groups active on European level).
Some 100.000 persons work in EU affairs full time.
Around 500.000 if one include part-time EU Actors (congress organizers,
publishers, journalists, language services).[2]
At present there are thought to be approximately 3 000 special interest
groups of varying types in Brussels, with up to 10 000 employees working
in the lobbying sector. Within this total there are more than 500 European
and international federations (whose constituent members belonging to national
associations number more than 5 000). In addition, there are 50 offices
in
The above figures indicate that interest representation has shifted from national level to European, and the agenda of interstate negotiation is defined not only by governments. There are at least 3 explanations for the shift:
1. The Commission is strong enough to affect the outcome of negotiation
2. Representation of domestic groups’ interests via national officials is ineffective.
3. The domestic interest groups are dissatisfied with the outcome.
The increasing number of Euro-level interest groups and the Commission’s openness to the interest groups’ views favours the first explanation: “It [the Commission] wants to consult groups on the widest possible basis.” [4]
The second and the third explanations are supported by the fact that
for over half a century, democratic governments in
The ineffectiveness of interest representation through government leads interest groups to search for other ways of lobbying, including the Euro-level. One of the most successful lobbies has been the COPA (Committee of Agricultural Organizations). COPA’s officials regularly meet the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development in order to discuss the general development of the Common Agricultural Policy and the market situation, as well as specific issues of particular importance (such as the annual farm price review). Meetings with other Commissioners and with the Commission President are arranged whenever the need arises.[6]
This affluent group, which represents less than 1.5% of the electorate of the European Union, and which employs less than 4.5% of the EU work force, has been particularly effective in lobbying at the European Commission. Commission policy proposals have resulted in this minuscule group benefiting from agricultural programmes, which spent in excess of 65% of the European Union's central budget during the last 20 years. Now this same group continues to benefit from in excess of 50% of the central EU budget.[7]
Contrary to LI propositions, interest groups are represented not only via member state’s government. The increasing number of Euro-groups, which carry their activities at European level and the Commission’s openness to lobby groups’ views, indicate that lobbies play important role in the agenda-setting of interstate negotiations and indirectly affect the outcome. Besides, nationally underrepresented interest groups such as COPA, choose European level for lobbying, thus bypassing the national level. Though the Euro-level interest groups don’t have seats in the Commission or in the Council of Ministers, they are increasingly important players in the interstate bargaining not at the level of national preference formation but at European level of lobbying. The Euro-level interest groups are the demanders, just as national governments.
[1] Moravcsik, Andrew 1993. Preferences
and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist
Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 31, No 4.
[2] http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/468931-933?11&1011=boutus1 Accessed on
[3]
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgc/lobbies/communication/groupint_en.htm Accessed on
[4] http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgc/lobbies/approche/apercu_en.htm Accessed on
[5] http://www.acmfo.org/ped/economic.htm Accessed on
[6] http://www.copa.be/en/copa_objectifs.asp Accessed on
[7] http://www.acmfo.org/ped/economic.htm Accessed on
