Fifteenth Judicial District
6190 Skyway
Paradise, California
(530) 877-1265
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
DIVISION ____________
___________ TERM
|
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. APPELLANT / PETITIONER Accused and Aggrieved Party Against THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, By their Attorney, Michael
L. Ramsey, District Attorney for the County of Butte Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) COUNTY OF BUTTE, Butte
County Consolidated Court System, “Superior Court”, Gerald Hermansen “Judge” Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) Ms. Susan Sloan, A.K.A. a
fiction “SUSAN SLOAN” by her attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, District Attorney
for the County of Butte Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1
THROUGH 500 Respondent(s)/Contemnors
(Undefined) |
CASE No._____________ (3RD APPEL.
No. C 037374) (Sup.Ct. No. CM 010607) (Sup.Ct.
No. CR 25413) (Muni Ct. No. P 3747) COMPLAINT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE(S) SECTION 270 “Willful Failure
to Provide” and SECTION 166(a)(4) “Contempt” [AND OTHER LAWS THERETO] [HABEAS CORPUS] (Common Law) Date: ________ Time: ________ Dept: ________ |
Comes Now, the accused and
greatly aggrieved party in this matter, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., approaching
this lawful judicial powers court in good faith and supplicating this tribunal
and Almighty God for justice and the law in this matter and seeking palpable
remedy at law in the first instance.
To the Superior Court of the State of California, City and County of San Francisco, TO its Presiding Justices and Associate Justices, GREETINGS:
County of San Francisco ]
] Affirmed.
State of California ]
In the matter of the
application of Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. ]
For a Writ of Habeas Corpus. ] Complaint at Law
]
The nature of this action is thereby lawfully
stated by this document which is brought in the judicial department of the
state of California government under Article III of the Constitution of
California (1849) and the common law as declaratory under the published
California Civil Code Section 22.2 “The common law of England, so far as it is
not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or
the Constitution or the laws of this State is the rule of decision in all the
courts of this State.” [N.Y. Code Civ.
Proc. § 2012 (Birds. Rev. Stat. (1896) p. 1388 § 7).] as a writ of right and perfect right for your
Petitioner/Appellant, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., the accused and greatly aggrieved and damaged party in this
matter.
NOTE: Article 2559, § 28. No writ of Habeas Corpus shall be dissolved for defect of form,
if it sufficiently appear therefrom in whose custody or under whose restraint
the party imprisoned or restrained is, the officer or person detaining
him. An Act Concerning the Writ
of Habeas Corpus--[Passed April 20th, 1850]
This writ of habeas corpus consists of four parts inclusive:
(a)
Writ of Habeas Corpus
(b)
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(c)
Affidavit in Support of Habeas Corpus
(d)
Order for Writ of Habeas Corpus to Issue.
(And other ancillary documents contained hereto)
FORMAL PROCEDURAL NOTICE IN LAW
“But if it be found that the court had no jurisdiction to
try the petitioner, or that in its proceedings his constitutional
rights have been denied, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 178; Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572; In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274,
285; In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 758; Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131
U.S. 176, 182; In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257; Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 467. (Bowen v. Johnston
(01/30/39) 306 U.S. 19, 59 S. Ct. 442, 83 L. Ed. 455)
I
NATURE
AND CHARACTER OF THE PARTIES
APPELLANT/PETITIONER
1.) Your
Appellant and Petitioner Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. is the accused and greatly
aggrieved and damaged party in this matter, who has original jurisdiction in
this matter as his status is that of a White Christian Male Adult of the age of
majority, not an incompetent; nor embarrassed by Amendment the XIV of the
Constitution for the United States, a common law Citizen of the State of New
York, a member of the posterity[2]
of this nation of “we the people,” a superior free people who is a man about
the land, a human being living and traveling on the landmass[3]
thereof; who has against his will and over his lawful authority and consent
thereto, been unlawfully abducted and/or kidnapped into the State of California[4]
and has been held hostage thereto without due process of law, under color of
law and under color of authority, and thereby comes under this courts lawful jurisdiction.
a.) That
said Appellant/Petitioner is in his own proper person a human being,
representing himself as his own counsel, In Propria Persona Sui Juris.
b.) That
said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. does not spell or capitalize his name any other
way, shape or form, and any other spelling or capitalization is a fiction and
not me, and must be expunged from the record in this matter, as I have a right
to bring this matter in my exact legal appellation.
c.) That
your Appellant acting as his own counsel has personal knowledge of these
matters contained within this Constitutional Challenge against Penal Code §§
270 and/or 166(a)(4) and that he has been personally and egregiously damaged
and effected by the continuing bad-faith actions of respondent’s in this matter
who are in direct insolence to the concise rule of law[5]
as enumerated by the Constitution of California (1849) [Adopted by the
Convention, October 10, 1849; Ratified by the people, November 13, 1849;
Proclaimed, December 20, 1849.]
2.) The
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, is
in fact a court of the state of California, and not in any ‘territory’ or
“federal district’—and is in fact, the organic court as lawfully established by
statute in 1861 shall be Concurrent with and Equivalent to with “coextensive
jurisdiction with the district courts of the union state of California” as
created in Article VI, Section 1, Constitution for California of 1849, see:
Stats. 1861.
Your
Petitioner Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., in Propria persona,
sui juris, the accused and aggrieved party in this matter, unlawfully and
unconstitutionally restrained of his liberties by the above-named
respondent’s; is a natural born, free white citizen of Queens County, state
of New York, and thereby a state Citizen and American Citizen within the
original meaning of the Constitution for the united States of America
1787-1791, NOT welfare enumerated, and is not a “PERSON,” SUBJECT, or CITIZEN
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution for the
United States of America, under the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256. Petitioner is an ordinary white Christian
male inhabitant, a member of the posterity of this country, a human being,
living at peace, about the land, during a time of profound peace, who
honourably served his country with honor and distinction during the Vietnam Era
War, in the United States Marine Corps[6],
and who at all times been a law abiding citizen, a taxpayer, acting in his own
person and status as mandated at law.
Your
petitioner, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. is now, and at all times in this action
have been, one of the people of New York, a citizen of state, defined in
Article VII Constitution of New York, April 20, 1777, and specifically not
welfare enumerated; in propria persona sui juris and not pro se, not pro per; living on the Land within the boundaries
of Woodside, Queens county, in New York, one of the united states of America by
an act of Congress; with express and explicit reservation of all Unalienable,
Vested Natural, Inherent, and common Law Rights, whether enumerated or not in
the Constitution for the State of New York, 1777, or the Constitution for the
state of California of 1849, and prior to being a citizen of New York, at all
times in this action, as accused was one of the people of California, a citizen
of state, defined in Article II Constitution of California of 1849, and
specifically not welfare enumerated; in propria persona sui juris and not PRO SE, living on the Land within
the boundaries of Butte county, in California, one of the united states of
America by an Act of Congress at 9 Stat. 452; with express and explicit
reservation of all Unalienable, Vested Natural, Inherent, and common Law
Rights, whether enumerated or not in the Constitution for the State of
California of 1849 and I AM NOT “ROBERT LINDSAY CHENEY, JR.” [all capital
letters[7]]
a fiction, and I appear before the above mentioned court by Special Appearance,
in propria persona, in flesh and blood without alter ego, sui juris, and am
unlawfully being restrained of my liberty by the respondents in this action,
(presently the California Department of Corrections under fraud “parole”) under
VE IT ARMIS, under duress of continued imprisonment for no crime, of extortion
for a fraud labeled as “Child Support” of an alleged thirty-eight thousand
dollars of which I do not nor ever have owed or was obligated to, by the COUNTY
OF BUTTE, through its attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, et al., (Jack Schafer, Brad
Rundt, Daniel T. Nelson, etc.) in overt collusion with their surrogate
contemnor “Judges” of the Butte County Consolidated Court(s), known as the
“Superior” and “Municipal” courts, clothed under color law authority, using
color of law and others unknown and unnamed.
3.) Windsor
Scott Cheney is in fact, Petitioner’s
son, age 19, Born on October 31, 1982 in Chico, California, and is a
White Christian Male Adult of majority, an emancipated minor since on or about
April 1, 2000, and was in the State of Nevada for all acts and/or omissions
committed by said RESPONDENT’S in this matter, was a residence thereto, and
comes under this courts jurisdiction.
Said son Windsor Scott Cheney was in fact, unlawfully abducted kidnapped
from his Father, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. on or about February 15, 1985 which
gives rise to this claim of unconscionable “contract(s)” and/or acts and/or
omissions which give rise to this claim of Respondent’s acting insolently, in
direct contravention to the concise rule of law
II
RESPONDENT’S
Respondents in this matter factually are:
1.)
Michael L. Ramsey, et als. (and his
deputies and assign’s), are bonded as required by the Statute of California
passed February 28, 1850, “An Act Concerning the Official Bonds of Officials,”
who was fraudulently acting in both his professional and personal capacities
within the COUNTY OF BUTTE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, as one of the people of
California, a citizen of state, defined in Article II Constitution of
California 1849, and specifically not welfare enumerated; in propria persona,
sui juris, living on the Land within the boundaries of Butte county, in
California, one of the united states of America by an act of Congress at 9
Stat. 452; with express and explicit reservation for all Unalienable, Vested
Natural, Inherent, and common Law Rights, accountabilities and responsibilities
whether enumerated or not in the Constitution for the state of California, is
committing all acts and/or omissions in this matter as the Butte County
District Attorney (a public servant) for all his acts and/or omissions in this
matter, was a resident therein, and thereby comes under this courts
jurisdiction.
2.)
THE COUNTY OF BUTTE, was an incorporation
or undefined fiction whom was present in the COUNTY OF BUTTE, STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, and was acting in both its professional and personal capacities for
all its acts and/or omissions in this matter, and was resident therein, (as a
public servant) and thereby comes under this courts jurisdiction.
3.)
The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
was an incorporation or undefined fiction whom was present in the COUNTY OF
BUTTE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and was acting in both its professional and
personal capacities for all its acts and/or omissions in this matter, (as a
public servant) and was resident therein, and thereby comes under this courts
jurisdiction.
4.)
Ms. Susan Sloan, a.k.a. SUSAN SLOAN, an
incompetent person[8] was a natural born person residing
within the COUNTY OF BUTTE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and was acting in both her
professional and personal capacities in this matter for all acts and/or
omissions in this matter, and was a resident therein, and thereby comes under
this courts jurisdiction.
5.)
John and Jane Does 1 through 500 were
joinder parties to this matter by act and/or omission, and either natural born,
fictitious, or corporate entities, corporations, organizations, state agents,
state actor, state or federal or third party agencies, not bonded as required
by the Statute of California passed February 28, 1850, “An Act Concerning the
Official Bonds of Officials,” and were acting in both their personal and
professional capacities in this matter (as public servant(s)), and were
resident or had business within the COUNTY OF BUTTE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA in
this matter, and thereby come under this courts jurisdiction.
6.)
All respondents are the alleged real party in interest, but are
in fact, undefined and unknown entities acting under
pretense and overt fraud under color of law and under color of authority who
have suffered no damage whatsoever.
7.)
Your petitioner, Robert Lindsay; Cheney
Jr. (by that name and spelling only—and no other) has been factually driven
into indigency due to the continued, illegal and unlawful acts and/or omissions
by respondents in this matter. Petitioner
has been unlawfully incarcerated, kidnapped by public officials, falsely
arrested without warrant on or about December 28, 1999, unjustly imprisoned,
and maliciously prosecuted without due process of law, over his will and
against his consent and has been constantly unlawfully restrained of his
liberty from that point onward, and without your petitioner having it within
his power to confront his accuser’s at lawful trial, and without being lawfully
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the venue, the
jurisdiction and the real party of interest; was falsely and maliciously and
unlawfully forced into a tribunal which was only held to find my guilt for no
crime at law, in a court without jurisdiction; without probable cause; and prior
to the alleged hearing and without evidence presented at lawful trial.
8.)
No lawful warrant did issue or was
presented at any time to your petitioner by respondents in accordance with the
concise rule of law, and as mandated by their oath of office. No supporting affidavits, verification, or
subscription nor grand jury indictment as
mandated by the concise rule of law was ever used to bring me to trial,
in overt contravention to the rule of law, and over my continued objections and
against my consent. No qualifying
signature of Appellant/Petitioner is upon any valid or lawful instrument and/or
claim held by respondent’s in this matter.
[*NOTE: All “California Codes,” contained within
this document are hereby iterated and displayed only as they are declaratory of
the public law or common law of this state notwithstanding the flags or other
adornments of this court.]
III
QUESTIONS
PRESENTED
The following questions are relevant to the
issue as to the lawfulness of the conviction from which petitioner seeks relief
and reparations in the instant case:
1.)
Has the California Legislature unlawfully
acquiesced or assisted in the subjection of the sovereignty of the rightful
citizens of California to the municipal power of the United States Congress
(found in Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17, U.S. Const.) directly be its legislation, or
indirectly through agencies created for that purpose, which ultimately led to
the unlawful acts and/or omissions of respondents in this matter, and the
resultant fraudulent conviction from which your petitioner hereby seeks relief?
2.)
Can the respondent’s in this matter,
through the COUNTY OF BUTTE, by their
various unlawful acts and/or omissions in this matter and unclean hands,
base these fraudulent acts and/or omissions based on published Penal Code § 270
“Failure to Provide” and/or § 166(a)(4) “Contempt of Court” using their
positions of power under color of law, and color of authority to use the courts
of the COUNTY OF BUTTE, as an organized crime syndicate in which to usurp your
petitioner’s natural born, common law, constitutional and/or civil rights?
3.)
Can the respondent’s in this matter,
through the COUNTY OF BUTTE, by their
various unlawful acts and/or omissions in this matter and unclean hands,
overcome the obligation of contract between my son and I for me to be my son’s
father?
4.)
Can the respondent’s in this matter,
through the COUNTY OF BUTTE, by their
various unlawful acts and/or omissions in this matter and unclean hands,
overcome the obligation of contract between my son and I as Father and son; and
thereby allow me to defend my life, liberty and property and his concomitant
secured liberty that: “All men are by nature free and independent and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursing
and obtaining safety and happiness”?
5.)
Can the respondent’s in this matter, use
an unconscionable contract, vitiated by fraud by way of inducement; null and
void in ab initio, as a foundational basis to use published Penal Code § 270
and/or 166(a)(4) under color of law, under color of authority as a basis to
usurp your petitioner’s natural born, common law, constitutional and/or civil
rights?
6.)
Can the respondent’s in this matter, use
the socialist doctrine (and/or Feminist Doctrine) “In the Best Interests of the
Child” as a supporting basis in which to usurp and controvert the concise rule
of law, to the detriment of your petitioner; as enumerated by the Constitution
for the state of California 1849, and/or the Constitution for the state of New
York, 1777, and/or the Constitution for the united States (1787-1791)?
7.)
Can respondent’s unlawfully and overtly
kidnap my child, then usurp my rights to the care, custody and control of my
own child Windsor Scott Cheney, and thereby using fraudulent acts and/or
omissions clothed under color of law, under color of authority, place me into
an unlawful obligation, and/or “special obligation”, and/or debt, and/or
“special debt”, in overt violation of the concise rule of law as enumerated by
the Constitution for the state of California 1849, and/or the Constitution for
the state of New York, 1777, and/or the Constitution for the united States
(1787-1791)?
8.)
Has the STATE OF CALIFORNIA and/or
respondents in this matter violated the concise rule of law and your
petitioner’s natural born, common law, constitutional, and/or civil rights by
derogating the concise rule of law to obtain “Title IV-D” Welfare remuneration
scams and/or schemes?
9.)
Can the STATE OF CALIFORNIA and/or
respondent’s in this matter prosecute a matter in the courts of California
without lawful jurisdiction?
10.)
Has your petitioner’s foundational
constitutional right to have a lawful Bill of Particulars answered as a matter
of substantive due process of law in order to inform me of the nature and cause
of the accusation been derogated by respondent’s in this matter by their
insolent acts and/or omissions clothed under color of authority, under color of
law in direct violation of the concise rule of law?
11.)
Has respondent’s the lawful authority to
establish a Claim of Action based upon their own unlawful acts and/or
omissions in overt arrogance to the rule of law as mandated by their
oaths of office and the concise rule of law as mandated by the Constitution of
the United States (1787-1791), and the Constitution for the state of California
1849, and the Constitution for the state of New York, 1777?
12.)
Can respondent’s, in conspired collusion,
in overt insolence and in direct arrogance to the concise rule of law, kidnap
your petitioner from his home at 51-15 43rd Avenue, Queens County,
in the state of New York then ‘claim’ it was “extradition”?
13.)
Has the respondent’s in this matter the
right to manufacture crime against your petitioner in direct violation to their
oath of office, and in overt and conspired violation to the concise rule of law
as defined and mandated by the Constitution of the United States (1787-1791),
and the Constitution for the state of California 1849, and the Constitution for
the state of New York, 1777?
14.)
Has the respondent’s in this matter the
right to unlawfully arrest your petitioner in direct violation to their oath of
office, and in overt and conspired violation to the concise rule of law as
defined and mandated by the Constitution of the United States (1787-1791), and
the Constitution for the state of California 1849, and the Constitution for the
state of New York, 1777?
15.)
Has the respondent’s in this matter the
right to maliciously prosecute your petitioner in direct violation to their
oath of office, and in overt and conspired violation to the concise rule of law
as defined and mandated by the Constitution of the United States (1787-1791),
and the Constitution for the state of California 1849, and the Constitution for
the state of New York, 1777?
16.)
Has the respondent’s in this matter the right
to falsely imprison your petitioner in direct violation to their oath of
office, and in overt and conspired violation to the concise rule of law as
defined and mandated by the Constitution of the United States (1787-1791), and
the Constitution for the state of California 1849, and the Constitution for the
state of New York, 1777?
17.)
Has the respondent’s the enumerated
authority to prosecute an action without grand jury indictment against your
petitioner in direct insolence and arrogance to the respondent’s oath of
office, and in direct violation to the concise rule of law as enumerated and
mandated by the Constitution of the United States (1787-1791), and the
Constitution for the state of California 1849, and the Constitution for the
state of New York, 1777?
18.)
Have the respondent’s the enumerated
authority under the concise rule of law as mandated by the Constitution of the
United States (1787-1791), and the Constitution for the state of California
1849, and the Constitution for the state of New York, 1777, to arrest your
petitioner without a lawful warrant?
Without probable cause? Not
supported by affidavits? With no
Governor’s Warrant? In direct
contravention to their oath’s of office and the aforementioned concise rule of
law??
19.)
Have the respondent’s the enumerated
authority under the concise rule of law as mandated by the Constitution of the
United States (1787-1791), and the Constitution for the state of California
1849, and the Constitution for the state of New York, 1777, to arrest your
petitioner with published California Penal Code §
270 which Legislative Appellation is only a misdemeanor, the right to convert the law into a felony?? In direct contravention to their oath’s of
office and the aforementioned concise rule of law??
20.)
Has the sovereignty of the petitioner
been encroached upon, abrogated, or derogated in favor of legislative powers
exercised in excess of the lawful enumerated limits of the Constitution of the
United States (1787-1791), and the Constitution for the state of California
1849, and the Constitution for the state of New York, 1777?
21.)
Who inherently owns my son, Windsor Scott
Cheney? Can respondent’s usurp my
lawful authority and ownership of my own son, Windsor Scott Cheney in direct
arrogance and in violence to the concise rule of law as mandated by the
Constitution of the United States (1787-1791), and the Constitution for the
state of California 1849, and the Constitution for the state of New York, 1777?
22.)
When has California and/or respondent’s
agreed to the foundational precepts of feminism over the concise rule of law as
established and enumerated by the Constitution for the state of California
1849, and/or the Constitution for the state of New York, 1777, and/or the
Constitution for the united States (1787-1791) and your petitioners natural
born, common law, constitutional, and/or civil rights as a father to his own
son Windsor Scott Cheney?
23.)
When has California and/or respondent’s
agreed to the foundational precepts of socialism (through the embodiment of
feminism) over the concise rule of law as established and enumerated by the
Constitution for the state of California 1849, and/or the Constitution for the
state of New York, 1777, and/or the Constitution for the United States
(1787-1791) and your petitioners natural born, common law, constitutional,
and/or civil rights as a father to his own son Windsor Scott Cheney?
24.)
Can Respondent’s be bought off by Federal
funding; State funding, and/or third party funding(s); whose sole intent is to
impress an oppression against “we the people” in order that they may get
financial remunerations from or by or through direct or indirect Title 42
U.S.C. Section 651-666 “Title IV-D” welfare funding?
25.)
Has the common law jurisdiction of the
original California State Constitution of 1849, which was founded upon the
concise principle under Article I, Section 1 that “All men are by nature free
and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property; and pursing and obtaining safety and happiness,” been usurped in
favor of respondent’s acts and/or omissions committed under color of law and
under color of authority?
26.)
Why have the courts of the State of
California reneged on and/or abrogated the concise rule of law, which allows a
“lawful excuse” as enumerated by the legal appellation of published California Penal Code §
270 and as mandated by the concise rule of law as enumerated in the
Constitution of California, as well as the Constitution for the United States
(1787-1791)?
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED AT LAW
The following constitutional provisions are
relevant to adjudication of the instant action for habeas corpus relief.
Constitution for the
United States of America:
“WE
THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America.” (Preamble)
“…To establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States;” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 4)
“…To
constitution Tribunals Inferior to the supreme Court;” (Article
I, Section 8, Clause 9)
“…To
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States,
and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which same shall be, for the Election of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;-- And” (Article
I, Section 8, Clause 17)
“To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” (Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18)
“The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” (Article
I, Section 9, Clause 2)
Powers Prohibited, Absolutely,
1.
"No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation;
grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill
of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,
or grant any title of nobility." [ARTICLE I, SECTION 10]
“The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority; --to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and
Citizens of another State;-- between Citizens of different States,-- Between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” (Article
III, Section 2, Clause 1)
AMENDMENT THE FIRST: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.”
AMENDMENT THE FOURTH: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.”
AMENDMENT THE FIFTH: “No person shall be
held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation[9].”
AMENDMENT THE SIXTH: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”
AMENDMENT THE SEVENTH: “In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the
rules of common law.”
AMENDMENT THE EIGHTH: “Excessive bail shall
not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”
AMENDMENT THE NINTH: “The enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”
AMENDMENT THE TENTH: “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”
Constitution for the
state of California (1849):
ADOPTED
BY THE CONVENTION, OCTOBER 10, 1849; RATIFIED BY THE PEOPLE, NOVEMBER 13, 1849;
PROCLAIMED DECEMBER 20, 1849
“We,
the people of California, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to
secure its blessings, do establish this Constitution.”
“All
men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; and pursing and obtaining safety and
happiness.” (Article I, Section 1.)
“All
political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the
people; and they have the right to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it.” (Article
I, Section 2.)
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require its suspension.” (Article I, Section 5)
“Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted, nor
shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.”
(Article I, Section 6)
“No
person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
(except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of militia when in actual
service, and the land and naval forces in time of war, or which this state may
keep with the consent of the Congress in time of peace, and incases of petit
larceny under the regulation of the legislature.) unless on presentment or
indictment of a grand jury; and in any trial in any court whatever, the party
accused shall be allowed to appeal and defend in person and with counsel, as in
civil actions. No persons shall be
subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor shall he be
compelled, in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” (Article
I, Section 8)
“All
laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” (Article
I, Section 11)
"The military shall be subordinate to the civil
power. No standing army shall be kept
up by this state in time of peace; and in time of war no appropriation for a
standing army shall be for a longer time than two years." (Article I, Section 12)
"No person shall be imprisoned for a debt in
any civil action, on mense or final process, unless in cases of fraud; and no
person shall be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace."
(Article I, Section 15)
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this
state." (Article I, Section 18)
"The legal right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons and things to be seized."
(Article I, Section 19)
"This enumeration of rights shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people."
(Article I, Section 21)
"Section 1.
The powers of the government of the state of California shall be divided
into three separate departments: the legislative, the executive and judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
(Article III)
“Judges
shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the
testimony and declare the law.” (Article VI, Section 17)
“The style of all process shall be “The people of the
state of California;” and all prosecutions shall be conducted in the name and
by the authority of the same.” (Article
VI, Section 18)
Constitution of California 1993-1994:
[Constitutional Rights—Rights Reserved]
Sec. 24. “Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personal present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this State in a manner consistent with the United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States.
This
declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by
the people. (Article I, Section 24)
[Oath of Office]
“Sec. 3. Members of the legislature and all public officers and employees, executive, legislative, and judicial, except such inferior officers and employees as may be by law exempted, shall before they enter upon the duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation.
“I, ____________________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.
“And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means; that within the five years immediately preceding the taking of this oath, (or affirmation) I have not been a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of he State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means except as follows:
(If no affiliations, write in the words “No Exceptions”
and that during such time as I hold the office of
___________________________________ I
will not advocate nor become a member of any party or organization, political
or otherwise that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful
means.”[10] (Article XX, Sec. 3)
Constitution for the State of New York:
The Constitution for
the state of New York (1777) states in pertinent part:
“We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us.”… “He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation.”…
V
Writ Of HABEAS CORPUS
(NOTE: This Habeas Corpus cannot be denied for any
defect in form!!!!)
[SEE: 2556, §
28, AN ACT CONCERNING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Passed April 20, 1850)]
HABEAS
CORPUS, remedies. A writ of habeas
corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who grants the same, and
sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of
the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue
the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his
restraint, commanding him to produce such person at a certain time and place,
and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or restraint.” Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary, (1859), Vol. I, p. 573.
“It is a writ of
ancient origin, and is now regarded as the greatest and most important remedy
known to the law.” 39 CJS §427.
A Writ of
Habeas Corpus is a Latin legal phrase, meaning: “That you have the body.” It is a writ directed to the person who is
unlawfully detaining and/or restraining another of that person’s liberty. It is known as “the great writ” and directs
the captor to produce the body at a certain time and place “to bring forth the
body” with the day and cause of his caption, commitment and detention, and to
bring both the person and writ to a lawful judge, sitting in a tribunal to test
the legality of the commitment of that party so restrained.
It’s
history is lost in antiquity. It was
first in use before, but the first royal recognition of it is found in the
Magna Charta. It was guaranteed to our
English ancestors by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and was often referred to
as one of the “dearest birthrights of Briton’s”. It came to our shores as a part of our inheritances as Americans
from our forefathers as a free peoples, and
as a guaranteed birthright to all American citizens. The great writ of habeas corpus is the most famous writ in the
law; and, having for many centuries been employed to remove illegal restraint
upon personal liberty, no matter by what power imposed. It is often called the great writ of
liberty.
“It takes its name
from the characteristic words it contained when the process and records of the
English courts were written in Latin: Præcipimus tibi quod corpus A B in cusodia
veatra detentum, ut dicitur, una cum causa capionis et detentionis suæ,
quocunque nominee idem A B censeatur in eadem, Habeas coram nobis apud Wesim.
Dec. ad subjiciendum et recipiendum ea duæ curis nostra de eo ad tunc et ibidem
ordinary constigerit in hac parte, etc.
There
were several other writs which contained the words habeas corpus; but they were
distinguished from this and from one another by the specific terms declaring
the object of the writ, which terms are still retained in the nomenclature of
writs: as, habeas corpus ad respondenum,
ad testicficandum, ad satisfaciendum, ad prosquendum, and ad faciendum et recipiendum, ad deliberandum
at recipiendum.
This
writ was in the like manner designated as habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum; but, having acquired in public
esteem a marked importance by reason of the nobler uses to which it has been
devoted, it has so far appropriated the generic term to itself that it is now,
by way of eminence, commonly called The Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The
date of its origin cannot now be ascertained.
Traces of its existence are found in the Year Book 48 Ed.
III 22; and it appears to have been familiar to, and well understood by, the
judges of the reign of Henry VI. The
ancient writ of de odio et atia and de homine relegvando furnished a remedy in
particular cases. In its early history
it appears to have been used as a means of relief from private restraint. The earliest precedents where it was used against the crown are in the reign of
Henry VII. Afterwards, the use of it became
more frequent, and in the time of Charles I, it was held an admitted
constitutional remedy; Hurd, Hab. Corp. 145; Church, Hab. Corp 3. In writing of procedure in the thirteenth
century the work which throws so much new light upon the early history of
English law, says; “Those famous words habeas
corpus are making their way into the divers writs, but for any habitual use
of them for the purpose of investigating the cause of imprisonment we must wait
until a later time.” There is also a
reference to what is termed the use of habeas
corpus “at one time a part of the ordinary mesne process in a personal
action,” also referred to as “the Bractonian process which inserts a habeas corpus between attachment and distress,” which (habeas corpus between a little later seems to disappear. No other allusion is made to the subject: 2
Poll & Maitl. 551, 591.
W.W.
Howe (Studies to the Civil Law 54) who is as earnest in tracing the fountains
of English law to a Roman source, as the writers last quoted are indisposed to
do so, says on the subject: “The
presence to the Pandects of every important doctrine of habeas corpus is an interesting fact, and suggests that the
proceeding probably came to England, as it did to Spain, from the Roman
law. There is no evidence so far as I
have been able to discover, that the process was of British or Teutonic
origin. It is fully described in the
forty-third book of the Pandects. The
first text is the line from the ‘Perpetual Edicts,’ ‘ait prætor : quem liberum
dolo malo retines, exibitas.’ The
prætor declares: produce the freeman whom you unlawfully detain. The writ was called the Interdict or order
‘de homine libero exhibeas.’ After
quoting this article of the Edict, the compilers of the Pandects introduced the
commentary of Ulplan to the extend of perhaps two pages of a modern law book,
and the leading rules which he derives from the text are law, I believe to-day
in England and America. Thus he says:
‘This writ devised for the preservation of liberty, to the end that no one
shall detain a free person. The word
freeman includes many, whether sui juris, or under the power of another. For we only consider this: Is the person free? He who does not know that a freeman is
detained in his house is not in bad faith; but as soon as he is advised of he
fact he become in bad faith. The prætor
says exhiteas (produce, exhibiti) to exhibit a person is to produce him
publicly so that he can be seen and handled.
This writ may be applied for by any person’; for no one is forbidden to
act in favor of liberty.’ And to this commentary of Ulplan the
compilers also add some extracts from Venuleius, who, among other things says:
“A person ought not to be detained in bad faith for any time; and so to delay
should be granted to the person who thus detains him.’ In other words, a writ
of habeas corpus should be returnable
and heard intanter. It seems certain
that this writ might have been applied for in Britain during the four centuries
of Roman occupation, at least when not suspended by a condition of martial law;
and after the restoration of the Christian Church in the seventh century, and
the occupation of judicial positions by bishops and other learned clerics
familiar with such procedure, it is not unreasonable to assume that it was revived
and took its place in English law.”
After
the use of the writ become more common, abuses crept into the practice, which
in some measure impaired the usefulness of the writ. The party imprisoning was at liberty to delay his obedience to
the Great writ, and might wait till a second and third were issued before he
produced the party; and many other vexatious shifts were practiced to detain
state prisoners in custody; 3 Bla. Com. 135.
Greater
promptitude in its execution was required to render the writ efficacious. The subject was accordingly brought forward
in parliament in 1668, and renewed from time to time until 1679, when the
celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Car. 11, was passed. This act has been made the theme of the
highest praise and congratulations by British authors, and is even said to have
“extinguished all the resources of oppression.” Hurd Hab. Corp. 93; Church, Hab. Corp 37.
As
the act is limited to cases of commitments for “criminal or supposed criminal
matters,” every other species of restraint of personal liberty was left in the
ordinary remedy at common law, but, doubts being entertained as to the extent
of the jurisdiction of the judge to inquire into the truth of the return to the
writ in such cases an attempt was made.
In 1757, in the house of lords, to render the jurisdiction more
remedial. It was opposed by Lord
Mansfield as unnecessary, and failed, for the time, of success. It was subsequently renewed, however; and
the act of 56 Geo. III, c 100 supplies in England, all the needed legislation
to cases no embraced by the act of 21 Car. II.; Hurd on Hab. Corp.
The
English colonists in America regarded the privilege of the writ as one of the
“dearest birthrights of Britons:” and sufficient indications exist that it was
frequently resorted to. The denial of
it in Massachusetts by Judge Dudley in 1659 to Rev John Wise, imprisoned for
resisting the collection of an oppressive and illegal tax, was made the subject
of a civil action against the judge, and was, moreover, denounced as one of the
grievances of the people in a pamphlet published in 1689 on the authority of
“the gentleman, merchants and inhabitance of ‘Boston and the county
adjacent.” In New York in 1707 it
served to effect the release of the Presbyterian ministers Makemie and Hampton
from an illegal warrant of arrest issued by the governor, Cornbury, for
preaching the gospel without license.
In New Jersey in 1710 the assembly denounced one of the judges for
refusing the writ to Thomas Gordon, which, they said, was the “undoubted right
and great privilege of the subject.” In
South Carolina in 1692 the assembly adopted the act of 21 Car. II. This act was extended in Virginia by Queen
Anne early in her reign, while in the assembly of Maryland in 1725 the benefit
of its provisions was claimed, independent of royal favor, as the “birthright
of the inhabitants.” The refusal of
parliament in 1774 to extend the law of habeas
corpus to Canada was denounced by
the continental congress in September of that year as oppressive, and was
subsequently recounted in the Declaration of Independence as one of the
manifestations on the part of the British government of tyranny over the
colonies: Hurd, Hab. Corp. 109.”
“…In
most of the states statutes have been passed, no only provided what courts or
officers may issue the writ, but, to a considerable extent, regulating the
practice under it; yet, in all of them the proceeding retains its old
distinctive feature and merit,--that of a summary appeal for immediate
deliverance from illegal imprisonment.
There
is a discretion to be exercised in issuing the writ, even when there is power,
as it involved a conflict of laws which it is desirable to avoid; Ex
parte Rearick, 118 Fed. 928; and no court may properly release a
prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court, unless for want of
jurisdiction of cause or person, or some matter rendering the proceeding void; Keizo
v. Henry, 211 U.S. 146, 29 Sup. Ct. 41, 53 L.Ed. 125; but it can and
should be issued and made effective when another court has acted without
jurisdiction; In re Turner, 115 Fed. 231.
A
proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil and not a criminal proceeding and as
final orders of the circuit or district courts in such proceedings can only be
reviewed by appeal, the final order of the supreme court of the Philippine
Islands in habeas corpus is viewed
only by appeal and not by writ of error; Fisher v. Baker, 203
U.S. 174, 27 Sup. Ct. 135, 51 L.Ed. 142, 7 Ann.Case. 1018; so in People
v. Dewy, 23 Misc. 267, 50 N.Y. Supp. 1013, it was said to be a civil
proceeding ; and in State v. Huegin, 110 Wis., 189, 85 N.W. 1046,
62 L.R.A. 700. It is termed a suit in
the nature of a civil action. It has
however, been said that it is, strictly speaking, neither a civil nor criminal
action, but a summary remedy having for its sole object to restore liberty to
one illegality held in custody; Simmons v. Coal Co., 117 Ga. 305,
43 S.E. 780, 61 L.R.A. 789. Though it
is a writ of right, it does not issue as a matter of course, but only upon such
allegations as, if true, would authorize the discharge of the person in
custody; id. The issue of the writ may
be regulated by statute, provided the constitutional right to it is not
infringed; Miskimmins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo., 392, 58 Pac. 411, 49
L.R.A. 831; if there is another appropriate remedy the writ will not be issued
until application has been made for the proper relief; In re Dykes,
13 Okl. 339, 74 Pac. 506.
The
purpose of the writ is to determine whether the person seeking the benefit of
it is illegally restrained of his liberty: In re Moyer, 36 Colo.
159, 85 Pac. 190, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 979, 117 Am St. Rep. 189. It is a common-law and not an equitable
remedy; Sumner v. Sumner, 117 Ga. 229. 43 S.E. 485. It’s only
office, except when used in ancillary proceedings, is to test the right to
personal liberty: State v. Whitcher, 117 Wis. 665, 94 N.W. 787,
98 Am. St. Rep. 968.
It
is appropriate proceeding for determining whether one held under an extradition
warrant is a fugitive from justice, and he should be discharged if he shows by
competent evidence, overcoming the presumptions of a properly issued warrant,
that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state: Illinois v. Pease,
207 U.S. 100, 28 Sup. Ct. 58, 52 L.Ed. 121.
Jurisdiction of state courts. The states being in all respects, except
as to the powers delegated in the federal constitution, sovereign political
communities, are limited, as to the juridical power, only by that instrument
and they, accordingly, at will, create, apportion, and limit the jurisdiction
of their respective courts over the writ of habeas
corpus , as well as other legal process, subject only to such
constitutional restriction; Church, Hab. Corp. 67.
“…Federal
courts cannot grant the writ upon a petition that the person is held under the capias
of a state court issued upon a judgment that has been vacated; In
re Shaner, 39 Fed. 869. A
district court cannot, by issuing a writ, declare a judgment of a state
criminal court a nullity where such court had full jurisdiction over the crime;
Ex parte Ulrich, 43 Fed. 661.
But the writ can be issued to test the question as to the arrest and
imprisonment of a supposed fugitive from justice on the charge of a different
offence from that which he was extradited; In re Fitton, 45 Fed.
471. See also In re Cross,
43 Fed. 517. In general the writ may be
issued by federal court in every case where a party is restrained of his
liberty without due process of law in the territorial jurisdiction of such
courts; Ex parte Farley, 40 Fed 66; In re Neagle,
135, U.S. 1; 10 Sup.Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55.
The granting of the writ is within the discretion of the court and will
not be reversed unless an abuse thereof be shown; U.S. v. Ronan,
33 Fed. 117. But where the petitioner
had been convicted on the indictment of a grand jury impaneled by a court
without authority, it was held that the writ became a writ of right and the
court having power to issue it could not exercise discretion against issuing
it; Ex parte Farley, 40 Fed. 66.”
The
federal court may discharge a prisoner who is held for an act made criminal by
the state in violation of the rights secured by the United States constitution;
In re Davenport, 102 Fed. 540; but they will not discharge a
prisoner convicted in a state court except in cases of emergency, but will
leave him his writ of error; In re Stone, 120 Fed. 101; and
except under extraordinary circumstances, a federal court will not issue the
writ for release of a prisoner held under process issued by a state court in a
civil case, on the ground that such court was without jurisdiction in the
particular suit where it has jurisdiction over such suits in general; Mackenzie
v. Barrett, 144 Fed. 954, 76 C.C.A.8.
The
writ will not issue unless the court under whose warrant the accused is held is
without jurisdiction, and mere objections that the indictment is too vague in
general and does not sufficiently inform him of the offense charge will not be
considered; In re Lewis, 114 Fed., 963.
But
if a party is imprisoned by the sentence of a court judge or magistrate, which
is void for want of authority, as for being under unconstitutional and void
law; In re Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 9 Sup.Ct. 703, 33 L.Ed. 154; In
re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 8 Sup.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216; In re Sawyer,
124 U.S. 200, 8 Sup.Ct. 482, 31 L.Ed.402; or when there was no authority in the
person causing the arrest to make it; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall,
(U.S.) 163, 21 L.Ed. 717; Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock, 447, Fed.
Cas. No. 11,558: In re Farez, 7 Blatchf. 345, Fed. Cas. No.
4,645; In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 13 Sup.Ct. 785, 37 L.Ed. 689; In re Swan, 150 U.S.
637, 14 Sup.Ct. 225, 37 L.Ed. 1207; then there is ground for discharge under habeas corpus.
In contempt
cases, habeas corpus is not issued
for one adjudge in contempt, as he may have a writ of error; Perry v.
Pernet, 165 Ind., 67, 74 N.E. 609, 6 Ann. Cas. 533; In re Stidger,
37 Colo. 407, 86 Pac. 219; to obtain release the judgment and the sentence must
be a mere nullity; Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761, 101 N.W.
1007, 9 Ann.Cas. 1191; where there is entire want of jurisdiction to issue the
process for imprisonment, habeas corpus
is the proper remedy and the person need not resort to an appeal; In Re
Gribben, 5 Okl. 379, 47 Pac. 1074; but it cannot be used to review the
proceeding in contempt, though it is proper in order to secure the discharge of
one not a party and therefore not subject in the jurisdiction of the court; In
re Reese, 167 Fed 942, 47 C.C.A. 87.
“…It
will grant it on the application of one committed for trial in the circuit
court on a criminal charge; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cra. (U.S.) 75, 2
L.Ed. 554; U.S. v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 17, 1 L.Ed. 490; and
where the petitioner is committed on an insufficient warrant: Ex parte
Burford. 3 Cra (U.S.) 448, 2 L.Ed. 495; and where he is detained by the
marshal on a capias ad satisfaciendum after
the return day of the writ; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 568,
8 L.Ed. 780; also the purpose of inquiring into the cause of the restraint of
the liberty of prisoners in jail under or by color of the authority of the
United States, and all persons who are in custody in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States; Ex parte Terry, 128
U.S. 289, 9 Sup. Ct. 77, 33 L.Ed. 405.
“…It will be
granted , however, where the imprisonment although by a state officer, is under
or by color of the authority of the United States, as where the prisoner was
arrested under a governor’s warrant as a fugitive from justice of another
state, requisition having been regularly made; Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean
121, Fed. Cas. No. 12, 968; or where extradited under a treaty with a foreign
country upon the charge of a certain offense for which he was afterwards tried
and acquitted, and immediately thereafter he was arrested under a charge
entirely separate and distinct from the former one; In re Reinitz,
39 Fed. 204, 4 L.R.A. 286. It will also
be granted where United States marshals
or their deputies are arrested by state authority for using force or threats in
executing process of the federal courts; U.S. v. Fullhart, 47
Fed. 802; but see In re Marsh, 51 Fed. 277.
Federal judges should grant writs to persons imprisoned for any act done
in pursuance of a law of the United States; In re Neagle, 135
U.S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55.
“…If
the imprisonment be claimed by virtue of legal process, the validity and
present force of such process are the only subjects of investigation; Bennac
v. People, 4 Barb. (N.Y.) 31; State v. Bulzine, 4 Harr.
(Del.) 575.”
“…Although
the writ of habeas corpus does not
lie for the determination of mere errors where a conviction has been had and
the commitment thereunder is in due form, yet if he court had no jurisdiction
of the offence charged, or if it affirmatively appears by the record that the
prisoner was tried and sentenced for the commission of an act which under the
law constitutes no crime the judgment is void and the prisoner should be
discharged; In re Kowalsky, 73 Cal. 120, 14 Pac. 399; Ex
parte Miraude, 73 Cal. 365, 14 Pac. 888; In re Coy, 127
U.S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263, 32 L.Ed. 274; In re Nielson, 131 U.S.
176, Sup. Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118; Ex parte Kitchen, 19 Nev. 178,
18 Pac. 886; Daniels v. Towers, 79 Ga. 785, 7 S.E. 120.
“…The
writ is also employed to recover the custody of a person where the applicant
has a legal right thereto: as, the husband for his wife, the parent for his
child, the guardian for his ward, and the master for his apprentice; Green
v. Campbell, 35 W. Va. 698, 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 813; Ex
parte Chin King, 35 Fed. 354; (1892) App. Cas. 326. But in such cases, as the just object of he
proceeding is rather to remove the illegal restraint than to enforce
specifically the claims of private custody, the alleged prisoner. If an adult of sound mind is generally
permitted to go at large; if an infant of sufficient age and discretion, it is
usually permitted to elect in whose custody it will remain, provided that it
does not elect an injurious or improper custody; and if of tender years without
such discretion the court determines its custody according to what the time
interests and welfare of the child may at the time require: Hurd Hab.
Corp. 450.”
“If
the imprisonment be illegal, it is the duty of the court to discharge the
prisoner from that imprisonment; but if the court or officer hearing the habeas
corpus be invested with the powers of an examining and committing magistrate in
the particular case, and the evidence taken before the court, or regularly
certified to it in the habeas corpus proceeding so far implicate the prisoner in
the commission of crime as to justify his being held for trial, it is usual for
the court , in default of bail, to commit him as upon an original examination.”
3 East 157; Ex parte Bennett, 2 Cra. (C.C.) 612 Fed. Case. No.
1,311. Where a prisoner is held under a
valid sentence and commitment, the illegality of a second sentence will not be
inquired into on habeas corpus till
the term under the first sentence has expired; Ex parte Ryan 17
Nev. 139, 28 Pac. 1040.
Recommitment after discharge. The act of 31 Car. II. Prohibited , under the
penalty of five hundred pounds, the reimprisoning for the same offence of any
person set at large on habeas corpus
except by the legal order and process of such court wherein such prisoner was
bound by recognizance to appear, or other court having jurisdiction of the
cause. Somewhat similar provisions are
found in the statutes of many of the states.
But these provisions are not held to prevent the subsequent arrest of
the prisoner on other and more perfect process, although relating to the same
criminal act; Ex parte Millburn, 9 Pet (U.S.) 701, 9 L.Ed.280; Byrd
v. State, 2 Miss. 163.
See “The Story of the Habeas Corpus”
by Edward Jenks in 13 L. Q. Rev. 64 (2 Sel. Essays in Anglo-Amer. L. II. 531.)
Habeas corpus is a great prerogative writ known
to the common law for the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
lawful cause. It is in the nature of a
writ of error to test the legality of the commitment. In re Keeler, Fed. Cas. No. 7,637 [1 Hemp. 306], Ex
parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
201.
“To obtain the writ in term at common law, an
application is made by the party’s counsel, grounded on an affidavit of the
circumstances, which must show some probable
cause for the application to induce the court to grant the writ; but if a
probable ground be shown that the party is imprisoned without just cause and
therefore hath a right to be delivered, the
writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, and a rule will accordingly
be granted for the writ to issue.” Hurd
on Habeas Corpus, pp. 213, 214.
NOTE: “Habeas Corpus correct instrument to
retrieve child from unlawful restraint.”
SEE : U.S. v. Green, 3 Mason 482[11]
“Father is ordinary entitled to the custody of
his minor children, and upon habeas corpus, court have power to award it to
him.” State ex. rel. Hodgdon v.
Libbey, 44 New Hampshire 321.
“Questions as to the rightful custody of minor children are
generally determined in habeas corpus proceedings, and the writ of habeas
corpus is the appropriate remedy, when such children are improperly detained
out of the custody of the parent entitled thereto: Ellis v. Jesup, 11 Bush, 403; Clark v. Bayer,
32 Ohio St. 299; 30 Am. Rep. 593; Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss.
408; 31 Am. Rep. 375; Matter of Mitchell, R.M. Charlt. 489; Dowling
v. Todd, 26 Mo. 267; and see State v. Smith, 6 Mo. 462;
20 Am. Dec. 324, and extended notes on the subject 330; Davis v. Davis, 75 N.Y.
221, 227; Tarkington v. State, 1 Ind. 171, 173. Statutory provisions exist in many of the
states recognizing this use of the writ, and the proceeding is for the most
part regulated by statute. Nevertheless,
it should be remembered that the writ is one which the courts have the inherent
power to issue, derived from the common law: People v. Mercein, 8 Paige, 55; Cannon v.
Stewart, 3 Houst. 223; In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 595.
Thereby, this habeas corpus is the correct
instrument to challenge such lawful restraint of my child’s interests:
"A final adjudication on a writ of habeas corpus
brought to determine the right of a parent or guardian to the care and custody
of a minor child conclusively determines all questions necessarily involved, as
between the same parties and on the same state of facts. From its very nature the adjudication can
operate only on those existing facts and conditions that affect the well-being
of the child and the rights of the parent or guardian." In re Application of Gille
(1924) 65 CA 617, 224 P 784.
"The father being domiciled and resident within the
dominions of her Britannic Majesty, such is also the proper and rightful
domicil of his wife and child, and he has a legal right to remove them thither.
The child being detained from the father, its natural guardian and protector,
without authority of law, the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is his
appropriate legal remedy for its restoration to him from its present illegal
detention and restraint; Constitution United States, art. 3, 2; Judiciary Act,
1789, 11; Inglis v. Trustees Sail. Snug Harb., 3 Pet., 99; 7
Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. 3, cap. 21; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl.
& F., 523; Story Confl. L., 30, 36, 43, 74, 160; Shelf. Marriage, Ferg.,
397, 398." SEE BARRY v. MERCEIN, 46 U.S. 103 (1847)
Case precedent(s) concurs with a near identical
case:
In Bowles v. Dixon, 32 Ark. 92; a petition addressed
to the judge of the eleventh judicial circuit stated in substance that
petitioner John Dixon, was the father and natural guardian of two minor
children, caned John M. and Elizabeth, and entitled to the care of their
persons, and to have the supervision of their education. That they had no property in their own right
and there was no cause whatever why he should not have the possession and
custody of said children. That
Elizabeth E. Bowles, of the county of Chicot, in the circuit of his honor the
judge, had said children in her possession, custody and control, and withheld
them from petitioner’s possession unlawfully, and without his consent and
against his will; concluding with a prayer for a writ of habeas corpus
commanding said Elizabeth E. Bowles, or any other person having them in
custody, to bring said children before his honor at such time and place as he
might appoint, and that upon a hearing they be delivered to petitioner, and for
other relief in the premises, etc.
Control, possession and custody of said children was awarded to
petitioner.
Substantiated
en bloc by the union of several states:
“Parent’s guardians, masters and husbands may have the writ
[of habeas corpus] to enforce their rights, and for he protection of infants,
and insane persons, and proceedings shall in all such cases, conform to the
practice of habeas corpus proceedings in other cases. Horner’s Stat. Ind. (1896) § 1107. See also list of statues cited supra, note 1 p. 154, for similar
provisions in other jurisdictions. See
also the following cases:
District of Columbia—In re Poole,
2 MacArthur (D.C.) 583
Georgia—Payne v. Payne, 39 Ga. 174.
Indiana—Garner v. Gordon, 41 Ind. 92.
Iowa—Rivers v. Mitchell, 57 Iowa 193.
Massachusetts—McConologue’s Case, 107 Mass.
154.
Michigan—Matter of Heather Children, 50 Mich.
261.
Minnesota—Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412.
Missouri—Ferguson v. Ferguson, 36 Mo. 197.
New Jersey—State v. Clover, 16 N. J.L. 419;
State v. Baldwin,
5 N.J. Eq. 454.
New York—Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y.
575.
Pennsylvania—Com. v. Reed,
59 Pa. St. 425.
Tennessee—Ward v. Roper,
7 Humph. (Tenn.) 111;
U.S. v. Anderson,
Cooke (Tenn.) 143.
Virginia—Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W.Va.
600; Mathews v. Wade, 2 W.Va. 464.
“It is an immediate remedy from
unlawful restraint.”
1 Watts 67.
“Convicted defendant, seeking to overturn final
judgment by motion to vacate or habeas corpus, must allege with particularity
facts of which he would have judgment overturned.” People v. Norwoods
(1957) 67 C2d 589,316 P2d 1010.
“…if the power to issue the writ of habeas
corpus applies only to cases of statutory jurisdiction, outrages upon the
rights of a citizen can never invoke its exercise by a federal court.” In
re McDonald, (1861) Fed. Cas. No. 8,751 16 Fed. Cas. 17, 30.
This constitutional claim cannot be presented as strongly on appeal as it
is herein because its factual basis rests in part on evidence in addition to
that contained in the record on appeal. See In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875. Although habeas corpus cannot serve as a
second appeal, denial of constitutional rights based on a claim is cognizable
on habeas corpus whether reviewing court considered a petition of habeas corpus
in conjunction with an appeal. People
v. Pena (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 414, 423;
In re Rinegold (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 723, 725.
Furthermore, as stated in People
v. Pope (1979) (9179) 23 Cal.3d
412, 426:
“Where the record does not
illuminate the basis for the challenged acts and/or omissions, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel more
appropriately made in a petition for habeas corpus.”
It is a fact, that both
state and federal courts have the power to overturn state convictions obtained
in violation of federal constitutional guarantees. Sweet v. Cupp (9th Cir. 1981) 640 F.2d
233, 236.
Habeas corpus is a
proper remedy for a collateral attack on constitutional grounds only if no
opportunity to raise such issues on appeal is available, which usually occurs
when the record before the appellate court is inadequate to decide the
issue. People v. Pope
(1979) 23 C3d 412, 426, 152 CR 732, 740.
Accordingly, People v. Torres (1979) 96 CA3d 14, 157 CR
560 (conviction affirmed leaving defendant to pursue the issue on habeas corpus
“where an adequate record for review may be developed”). Defendant was not responsible for failure to
assert constitutional objections at trial or on appeal and that the writ has
been sought with diligence.” In
re Mazoros (1977) 76 CA3d 50, 142 CR 609; In re Rinegold
(1970) 13 CA3d 723, 92 CR 18.
Sentence violated constitutional rights. Se In
re Dewing (1977) 19 C3d 54, 136 CR 708 (ex post facto); In re
Kapperman (1974) 10 C3d 910, 112 CR 649 (cruel or unusual
punishment). See also People v.
Landers (1976) 59 CA3d 846, 131 CR 522 (cruel or unusual punishment
claim under indeterminate sentence law must be raised on habeas corpus, not on
direct appeal. Erroneous computation of
term and denial of credit. In re
Haygood (1975) 14 C3d 802, 122 CR 760.
When it appears on the
face of the record that a lower court lacked jurisdiction to try the defendant,
habeas corpus is proper even if the defense was not asserted at trial
court. In re Demillo
(1975) 14 C3d 598, 121 CR 725 (statute of limitations); In re Dick
(1966) 64 C2d 272, 49 CR 673 (multiple convictions barred by statutes); In
re Ayala (1957) 155 CA2d 807, 318 P.2d 698 (conduct not prohibited by
charged statute).
When
denial of fundamental rights occurs, then it is considered that those
constitutional rights are so fundamental that their denial or impairment in the
trial court furnishes grounds for habeas corpus relief.
Habeas
corpus is an appropriate vehicle to assert violation of the right to counsel
even if the issue was not raised at trial and prejudice is not affirmatively
shown. In re Johnson
(1970) 24 C3d 769, 157 CR 674.
Suppression
of material evidence by prosecution constitutes denial of a fair trial. In re Ferguson (1971) 5 C3d
525, 96 CR 594; In re Lee (1980) 103 CA3d 615, 163 CR 204. To vacate a judgment when the police
suppressed material evidence i.e., the confession of another. People v. Tate (1955) 136 CA2d
31, 288 P.2d 149.
Right
to speedy, fair and public trial under Article I, §
15 of the Constitution of California, In re Crow (1971) 4 C3d 857, 866, 112 CR
513, 519.
Violation
of Article I, § 15 “imprisonment for a debt” of the
Constitution of California (1849) imprisonment of indigent unable to pay
file. In re Antazo (1970)
3 C3d 100, 89 CR 255.
Denial
of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” standard at trial In re Foss
(1974) 10 C3d 910, 930, 112 CR 649, 662.
A
similar constitutional construction is given to Double Jeopardy. Curry v. Superior Court (1970)
2 C3d 707, 87 CR 361. See also People
v. Brisendine (1975) 13 C3d 528, 549 n17, 119 CR 315, 328 n17.
Habeas
corpus was frequently used as an alternative remedy to prohibition to challenge
the sufficiency of probable cause to support the information or
indictment. Pen. C. §
1487(7); In re Joiner (1959) 180 CA2d 250, 4 CR 667.
Sentence
violated constitutional rights. See In
re Dewing (1977) 19 C3d 54, 136 CR 708 (ex post facto); In re
Kapperman (1974) 11 C3d 542, 114 CR 97 (equal protection); In re
Foss (1974) 10 C3d 910, 112 CR 649 (cruel or unusual punishment) See also People v. Landers
(1976) 59 CA3d 846, 131 CR 5222 (cruel or unusual punishment claim under
indeterminate sentence law must be raised on habeas corpus, not on direct
appeal).
If
the statute itself is unconstitutional, and the offense is not actually a crime
thereby; it is well established that habeas corpus is a proper remedy to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute (See In re Berry,
(1968) 68 C2d 137, 145, 65 CR 273, 279) (facts not disputed). Moreover; the writ has been used to restrain
a trial when a pretrial violation of the defendant’s rights has impaired the
defendant’s ability to be fairly tried.
In re Newbert (1959) 175 CA2d 862, 1 CR 80 (arrestee for
intoxication not allowed to call his own doctor to administer blood-alcohol
test). Habeas will issue when it
clearly appears that the statue being challenged has been held void on its face
by the highest court of the demanding state or by the U.S. Supreme court. In re Cooper (1960) 53 C2d
772, 3 CR 140; see 2 California Criminal Law Practice Chapter 27 (Cal. CEB
1969). See also South Dakota v.
Brown (1978) 20 C3d 765, 144 CR 758; Michigan v. Doran
(1978) 439 U.S. 282.
The
California Supreme Court has established broad and sweeping protections for
constitutional guarantees of constitutional secured liberties for individuals
against government interference through reliance on provisions of the state
constitution. Recent California Supreme
Court decisions have reaffirmed the independent nature of the California Constitution
in defining and protecting the rights of citizens (see Cal. Const. Art. I, § 24) and have restated the courts
responsibility and power to adhere to higher state standards than the U.S. Supreme Court has established
un the federal Constitution. People
v. Brisendine (1975) 13 C3d 528, 119 CR 315, 327; People v.
Disbrow (1976) 16 C3d 101, 114, 127 CR 360, 368; See also 18
Crim.L.Rptr.
2507; Falk, The State Constitution: A more
Than “Adequate” Nonfederal Ground, 61 Calf. L.Rev. 273 (1973). The state has adopted a broader approach in
determining applicable due process safeguards.
See People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 C3d 260, 158 CR 316. (See People v. Brisendine,
supra).
Thusly,
it is certain that greater protection is available to secure your
Petitioner/Appellant individual rights under provisions of the California
Constitution. This is particularly true
in light when the U.S. Supreme Court has discussed an issue in dictum but has
not ruled on the particular issue at law (SEE eg., People v. Ramey,
(1976) 16 C3d 263, 272, 127 CR 629, 634) or when the issue can be resolved by
prior California cases interpreting the state constitution (e.g., People
v. Scott (1976) 16 C3d 242, 128 CR 39). When a substantive distinction results from differences in
languages between the U.S. and California Constitution, the independent state
ground furnished by the California Constitution should be appropriate. See In re Lynch (1972) 8 C3d
410, 105 CR 217 (cruel and unusual punishment clause in U.S. Constitution,
amendment VIII; cruel or unusual punishment clause in Cal.Const. art I, §
17) People v. Anderson
(1972) 6 C3d 628, 100 CR 152, See also In re Rodriguez (9175) 14
C3d 639, 122 CR 552. Reliance must be
placed on the U.S. Constitution, however, to preserve federal questions that
might be raised if review is later sought by your Petitioner/Appellant in this
matter.
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH
THE JUDICIAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
September 1, 1789
“Judiciary Act of
1789”
“Sec. 14. And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned courts
of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas
corpus,…And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges
of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of
habeas corpus shall in no case extend
to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of
the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some
court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.” Judiciary
Act, Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
AN ACT CONCERNING THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(Passed April 20, 1850)
The
People of the State of California, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact
as follows:
Article 2549, § 1. Every person unlawfully committed, detained,
confined, or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may
prosecute a Writ of Habeas Corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprison
or restraint.
Article 2550, § 2. Application for such writ shall be made by
petition, signed either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by
some person in his behalf, and shall specify: 1st, That the person
in whose behalf the writ is applied for is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty; the officer or person by whom he is so confined or restrained; and the
place where, naming all the parties, if they are known, or describing them, if
they are not known. 2d, If he
imprisonment be alleged to be illegal, the petition must also state in what the
alleged illegality consists. 3d, The
petition must be verified by oath or affirmation of the party making the
application.
§ 3. Such
writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any Judge
thereof, or any District or County Court in term time, or by any Judge of such
Courts at any time, whether in term or vacation.
§ 4. Any
Court or Judge empowered to grant any writ applied for under this Act, to whom
such petition might be presented, if it appear that the writ ought to issue,
shall grant the same without delay.
Article 2551, § 5. Such writ shall be directed to the officer or
party having such person in custody or under restraint, commanding him to have
the body of such person so imprisoned or detained, as it is alleged by petition
before the Court or Judge, as the case may be, at such time as the Court or
Judge shall direct, specifying in such writ the place where the petition will
be heard, to do and receive what shall then and there be considered concerning
such person, together with he time and cause of his detention, and have then
there such writ.
§ 6. If such writ be directed to the Sheriff or
other ministerial officer of the Court out of which said writ is issued, it
shall be delivered by the clerk to such officer without delay, as other writs
are delivered for service.
Article 2552, § 9. If the officer or person to whom such writ is
directed refuse, after due service as aforesaid, to obey the same, it shall be
the duty of the Court or Judge, upon affidavit, to issue an attachment against
such person, directed to the Sheriff or Coroner, as the case may require,
commanding him forthwith to apprehend such person, and bring him immediately
before such Court or Judge; and upon being so brought, he shall be committed to
the jail of the county until he make due return to such writ, or be otherwise
legally discharged.
Article 2555, § 16. Such Court or Judge
shall thereupon proceed in a summary way to hear such allegation and proof as
may be produced against such imprisonment or detention, or in favor of the
same, and to dispose of such party as the justice of the case may require.
Article 2556, § 18. If no legal cause be
shown for such imprisonment or restraint, or for the continuation thereof, such
Court of Judge shall discharge such party from the custody or restraint under
which he is held.
Article 2557, § 20. If it appear on the
return of the writ of Habeas Corpus, that the prisoner is in custody by virtue
of process from any Court of this State, or Judge or officer thereof, such
prisoner may be discharged in any one of the following cases, subject, however,
to the restrictions of the last preceding section: First. When the
jurisdiction of such Court or officer has been exceeded. Second.
When the imprisonment was at first lawful, yet by some act, omission, or
event, which has taken place afterwards, the party has become entitled to be
discharged. Third. When the process is defective in some matter
of substance required by law, rendering such process void. Fourth.
When the process, though proper in form, has been issued in a case not
allowed by law. Fifth. When the person having the custody of the
prisoner is not the person allowed by law to detain him. Sixth.
Where the process is not authorized by any judgment, order, or decree of
any Court, nor by any provision of law.
Seventh. Where a party has been
committed on a criminal charge without reasonable or probable cause.
Article 2559, § 26. In cases where any party is held under illegal
restraint or custody, or any other person is entitled to the restraint or
custody of such party, such Judge or Court may order such party to be committed
to the restraint or custody of such person as is by law entitled thereto.
§ 28. No
writ of Habeas Corpus shall be dissolved for defect of form,
if it sufficiently appear therefrom in whose custody or under whose restraint
the party imprisoned or restrained is, the officer or person detaining him, and
the Court or Judge before whom he is to be brought.
Article 2562, § 36. All writs, warrants,
processes, and subpœnas, authorized by the provisions of this Act, shall be
issued by the Clerk of the Court, and except subpœnas, sealed with the seal of
such Court; and shall be served and returned forthwith, unless the Court or
Judge shall specify a particular time for any such return.
§ 37. All
such writs and processes, when issued by order of a Judge, shall be returned
before him at the County seat, and shall be there heard and determined.
Article 2563, § 38. If any Judge, after a
proper application is made, shall refuse to grant an order for a writ of Habeas
Corpus, or if the officer or person to whom such writ may be directed, shall
refuse obedience to the command thereof, he shall forfeit and pay, to the
person aggrieved, a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, to be recovered by
an action of debt, in any Court having cognizance thereof.
§ 39. Any one having in his custody, or under this
restraint or power, any person for whose relief a writ of Habeas Corpus shall
have been duly issued, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, who with the
intent to elude the service of such writ or to avoid the effect thereof, shall
transfer such person to the custody of another; or shall place him or her
confinement or restraint; or shall remove him or her without the jurisdiction
of such Court or Judge; shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined in a
sum not exceeding five thousand dollars.
§ 40. Every person who shall knowingly aid or
assist in the commission of any offence specified in the last preceding
Section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished as in the last
preceding Section mentioned.
§ 41. Every
person convicted of any offence under the provisions of the last preceding
Sections, in addition to the punishment therein mentioned, may be also
imprisoned in the County Jail for a term not exceeding two years.
WHEREAS, this is a true common-law Writ
of Habeas Corpus, and must not be dismissed as petitioner by status and by
right and perfect right, demands its instant issue by this court to effect
immediate and palpable substantive remedy at law and due process of law:
In
U.S. v. Williamson, citied In re McDonald
(1861), Fed. Cas. No. 8,751, 16 Fed.Cas. 29, the court, per Kan J., stated (in
pertinent part):
“I do not, indeed, see that there can be a restriction or
limitation of a privilege which may not be essentially a suspension of it, to
some extent at least, or under some circumstances, or in reference to some of
the parties who might otherwise have enjoyed it. And it has appeared to me, that if congress had undertaken to
deny altogether the exercise of this writ by the federal court, or to limit its
exercise to the few and rare cases that might per adventure find their way to
some one particular court, or to declare that the writ should only issue to
this or that class of cases, to the exclusion of others in which it might have
issued at the common law, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that
the ancient and venerated privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had not been
in some degree suspended, if not annulled,…”
“Congress
must provide efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege [the
Writ of Habeas Corpus] should receive life and activity; for if the means be not
in existence the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its
suspension should be enacted.” Marshall, C.J., Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
Your
petitioner seeks justice from Almighty God and the above-mentioned tribunal that
this Great Writ of Habeas Corpus, be immediately issued, for the redress so
proven and contained within this document.
DATED: APRIL
10TH, 2002
SEAL: _____________________________________
Robert
Lindsay; Cheney Jr.—AT LAW
In
Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Fifteenth
Judicial District
6190
Skyway
Paradise,
California
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr.
Fifteenth Judicial District
6190 Skyway
Paradise, California
(530) 877-1265
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
DIVISION ____________
___________ TERM
|
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr.
APPELLANT / PETITIONER
Accused and Aggrieved Party Against THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, By their Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, District
Attorney for the County of Butte
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) COUNTY OF BUTTE, Butte County Consolidated Court
System, “Superior Court”, Gerald Hermansen “Judge”
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) Ms. Susan Sloan, A.K.A. a fiction “SUSAN SLOAN” by
her attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, District Attorney for the County of Butte
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1 THROUGH 500 Respondent(s)/Contemnors (Undefined) |
CASE No._____________ (3RD APPEL. No. C
037374) (Sup.Ct. No. CM 010607) (Sup.Ct.
No. CR 25413) (Muni Ct. No. P 3747) COMPLAINT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE(S) SECTION
270 “Willful Failure to Provide”
and SECTION
166(a)(4) “Contempt” [AND
OTHER LAWS THERETO] [VERIFIED
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS] Date:
________ Time:
________ Dept: ________ |
"The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 163 (1803).
]
ss.
In the matter of the application of Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. ]
For a Writ of Habeas Corpus ] Complaint
RE: FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ] by Special
] Appearance
Your complainant, and Petitioner in this matter,
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., a common law New York State Citizen petitions this
Court under the Constitution for the State of California (1849) under Article
VI, Section one under the Judicial Powers Clause, notwithstanding the Gold
Fringe Flags and adornments of said court, as a common law Judicial Powers
court and demands instant remedy for this court to issue a Writ of Habeas
Corpus directed to the SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF BUTTE,
(Case Number CM 010607) for instant relief as failure to do so will cause your
petitioner instant and irreparable harm and damage.
Jurisdiction of this Court lawfully sitting in the ____________ term, in the organic judicial powers venue and jurisdiction your Appellant/Petitioner is heir to, in order to issue a writ of HABEAS CORPUS prohibiting and preventing a lower court from proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction. This jurisdiction of the above mentioned court arises under Article VI, Sections 1 and Section 4 of the Constitution for the state of California, (1849), to wit:
Sec. 1, “The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a supreme court, in district courts, in county courts, and in justices of the peace. The legislature may also establish such municipal and other inferior courts as may be deemed necessary.”
Sec. 4,“The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases where the matter in dispute exceeds two hundred dollars, when the legality of any tax, toll, or impost or municipal fine is in question, and in all criminal cases amounting to a felony on questions of law alone. And the said court, and each of the justices thereof, as well as all district and county judges, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus at the instance of any person held in actual custody. They shall also have power to issue all other writs and process necessary to the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, and shall be conservators of the peace throughout the state.” People v. Applegate, 5 Cal. 295.
“The purpose of a writ of “habeas corpus” is to test
the validity of the process upon which a person is restrained and the
jurisdiction of the court issuing such process.” In re Jacinto (1935) 8 CA2d 275, 47 P2d 300.
HABEAS CORPUS: remedies. “A writ of habeas corpus is an order win writing signed by the judge who grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his restraint.” Bov. Law Dict. (1859), Vol., I, p. 573
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, Constitution for the united States of America, requires that the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in the Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
The writ of habeas corpus mandated by Article I, Section 8, Clause 2 is a writ of right.
“To obtain the writ in term at common law, an application is made by the party’s counsel, grounded on an affidavit of the circumstances, which must show some probable cause for the application to induce the court to grant the writ; but if a probable ground be shown that the party is imprisoned without just cause and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, and a rule will accordingly be granted for the writ to issue.” Hurd on Habeas Corpus, pp. 213, 214.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause "guarantees more than fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). It also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). Any denial of Due Process must be tested by the "totality of the facts" because a lack of Due Process may "constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice..." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 26 (1964) (quoting from Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-462 (1942) where it was noted that any violation of any of the first Nine Amendments to the Constitution could also constitute a violation of Due Process). "[T]he court must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand to prevent violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect methods. Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property are to be liberally construed, and 'it is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 , 6 S. Ct. 524, 535 (29 L. Ed. 746); Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 304, 41 S. Ct. 261, supra." (as cited from Byars v. U.S., 273 US 28, 32). And it is further established that any law impinging on an individual's fundamental rights is subject to strict scrutiny (San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). "In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available." Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984). And by fiat, any judge interpreting, presiding, or sitting in judgment of any custody case under the law must apply this same standard. Justice Stevens in Troxel comments on the appropriate standard of review stating:
"The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a [parental constitutional] right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights."[13]
Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful of constitutional rights against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Boyd v. United States., 116 U.S. 635.
Writ review is compelled particularly when questions of first impression and general importance to the bench and bar , the disposition of which can establish guidelines for future cases. Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 C3d 149, 155, 118 CR 14, 17.
X
COUNT
I
FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION
THAT
THE COUNTY OF BUTTE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, MICHAEL L. RAMSEY, ET ALS IN OPEN AND OVERT
COLLUSION WITH RESPONDENT’S THE COUNTY OF BUTTE, THE BUTTE COUNTY FAMILY
SUPPORT DIVISION, THE BUTTE COUNTY FAMILY COURT TRUST FUND, THE COUNTY OF BUTTE
CONSOLIDATED COURT SYSTEM; THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (ET ALS) AND THE UNITED
STATES (ET ALS) IN CONSPIRACY WITH JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 500 HAVE AND
ARE ABUSIVELY USING CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §§
270 AND 166(a)(4) FOR A PURPOSE NOT INTENDED AT LAW[14]—TO
DIRECTLY DISENFRANCHISE APPELLANT FROM HIS NATURAL BORN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT SECURED RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
IN ORDER TO UNLAWFULLY KIDNAP AND/OR ABDUCT HIS OWN CHILD FROM HIM AND THEREBY
TO OBTAIN DIRECT AND/OR INDIRECT REMUNERATIOIN FOR RESPONDENTS BY AND FROM
THOSE UNLAWFUL ACTS AND/OR OMISSIONS.
VIOLATION OF:
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE
§ 7.5 INTERPRETATION OF LAW
§ 38 MISPRISON OF FELONY
PC §
148.5 FALSE REPORT OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE
PC 182(a)(2);
and (4) CONSPIRACY—A FELONY ($10,000) AND 1 YEAR IN THE STATE PRISON
PC 184—OVERT
ACT;
PC §
207 – KIDNAPPING/ABDUCTION [FELONY]
PC §
277 – CHILD ABDUCTION [FELONY]
PC §
278 – CHILD CONCEALMENT [MISDEMEANOR]
PC §
209 – KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM / REWARD
PC §
210.5 -- FALSE IMPRISONMENT (FELONY) 3
YEARS
PC §
518 – EXTORTION; § 521 (MISDEMEANOR);
GC 1027.5 –
MARXIST JURISPRUDENCE [FELONY]
CONSTITUTION
OF CALIFORNIA 1849 ARTICLE I, SECTION 1; SECTION 2
TITLE 28
U.S.C. § 1738 – PARENTAL KIDNAPPING AND
ENFORCEMENT ACT [FELONY]
1.) It
is a fact, that: Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution for the state of
California states:
Section 1. “All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”
Section 2. “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people; and they have the right to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it.”
Respondent’s do overtly and with malice and
aforethought, use the published California Penal Code §§
270, 166(a)(4) and/or CCP 1203.4 as an ongoing enterprise to divest a citizen
of his rights, to unlawfully disenfranchise him under color of law, under color
of authority and to usurp the right of men to enjoy and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring and possessing and protecting Appellant’s property, with
no palpable remedy at law, or reasonable lawful redress of grievances. They are in fact, using the “Codes” as an
indispensable means to divest a man of his rights to his own children, in
direct violation of the concise rule of law.
“The philosophy of all these cases is based upon the early
rule of In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380 [62 P. 613], that the right
of a parent to the use of a minor child is a right of property of which a
parent cannot be deprived unless the court finds that he or she is
"unfit."” Booth v.
Booth, (1945) 69 Cal. App. 2d
496, 159 P.2d 93 (Cal.App.Dist.1 06/08/1945)
“The right to take possession of personal property is a
thing in action, and "personal property". McClain v. Buck (1887) 73 C. 320, 14 P. 876
It is a fact, that:
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution for the state of California states:
Section 1. “All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”
Section 2. “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people; and they have the right to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it.”
Respondent’s do overtly and with malice and
aforethought, use the published California Penal Code §§
270, 166(a)(4) and/or CCP 1203.4 as an ongoing enterprise to divest a citizen
of his rights, to unlawfully disenfranchise him under color of law, under color
of authority and to usurp the right of Appellant (men) to enjoy and defending
life and liberty, of acquiring and possessing and protecting Appellant’s
property, with no palpable remedy at law, or reasonable lawful redress of
grievances. They are in fact, using the
“Codes” as an indispensable means to divest a man of his rights to his own
children, in direct violation of the concise rule of law.
SEE ALSO:
“Similarly, Senator Stewart repeated that the federal
Constitution is "the vital, sovereign, and controlling part of the
fundamental law of every State," and although the states may repeat parts
of it in their own bills of rights, "no State can adopt anything in a
State constitution in conflict."[33]
A significant debate in the House on S. 61, the civil rights
bill, took place on March 1. Representative Wilson, chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, explained the background to the bill's phraseology "civil
rights and immunities" and "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property."[34] Quoting Kent's
Commentaries, Wilson explained: "I understand civil rights to be simply
the absolute rights of individuals, such as - 'The right of personal security,
the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
property.'"[35] Wilson added that "we are reducing to statute from
the spirit of the Constitution,"[36] a clear reference to the Bill of
Rights. Referring to "the great fundamental civil rights," Wilson
pointed out:
[Sir William] Blackstone classifies them under three
articles, as follows:
1. The right of personal security; which, he says,
"Consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation."
2. The right of personal liberty; and this, he says,
"Consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving
one's person to whatever place one's own inclination may direct, without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law."
3. The right of personal property; which he defines to be,
"The free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without
any control or diminution, save only by the law of the land."[37]
To protect "the principal absolute rights which
appertain to every Englishman," Blackstone explained that there are
"auxiliary" rights to "maintain inviolate the three great and
primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property."[38] Blackstone included among these rights "that of having
arms for their defence suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are
allowed by law," that made possible "the natural right of resistance and
self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression."[39] Together with
justice in the courts and the right of petition, "the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defense" were available to preserve
the rights to life, liberty, and property.[40]”
[33] [28] CONG. GLOBE 1033-34 (Feb. 26,
1866). [Id. at 1077]
[34] Id. at 1117 (Mar. 1, 1866)
[34]
Id. at 1117 (Mar. 1, 1866)
[35]
Id.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Id. at 1118
[38]
Blackstone, COMMENTARIES 140-141, (St. Geo. Tucker ed. 1803)
[39]
Id. at 143-144
[40]
Id.
"The great object of the first
section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States
and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental
guarantees"[116] (emphasis added).
[116]
[114] CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (May 23, 1866).--- Id. at 2766.
The
Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to Protect All Rights
Paper
by Jon Roland, 2000, Sept. 24
2.)
“The issue of abusive governmental activities
during child abuse/neglect investigations and the subsequent court proceedings
are matters of public interest.” Hale
v. United States Department of Justice, 973 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.
08/31/1992)
3.)
In Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37,
371; 25 L. Ed. 717, Mr. Justice Bradley, in speaking for the court, said:
"The validity of the judgment is assailed on the ground that the acts of Congress under which the indictments were found are unconstitutional. If the position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offense created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment. It is true, if no writ of error lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. But personal liberty is of so great moment in the eye of the law that the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so conclusive but that, as we have seen, the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on habeas corpus by a superior court or judge having authority to award the writ. We are satisfied that the present is one of the cases in which this court is authorized to take such jurisdiction. We think so, because, if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes. Its authority to indict and try the petitioner arose solely upon these laws."
XI
COUNT
II
SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION
IT
IS A FACT, THAT FATHERS HAVE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS[15]
THAT SUPERCEDE[16] AND ARE
SUPERIOR[17] TO THE
RESPONDENT’S RIGHTS[18]
UNDER LAW; IN WHICH RESPONDENT’S UNLAWFULLY SUPERCEDE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WILLFULLY FOR AN ULTERIOR PURPOSE UNDER COLOR OF LAW.
VIOLATION OF:
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC §
207 – KIDNAPPING/ABDUCTION OF CHILD
PC §
209 – KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM/REWARD/EXTORTION
PC 210.5 –
FALSE IMPRISONMENT FOR PURPOSES OF PRTOECTION FROM ARREST OR USE AS SHIELD (8
YRS)
CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 11;
SECTION 12; AND SECTION 13; AND SECTION 19
US CONST.
AMENDMENT THE NINTH – RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
4.)
Your Appellant
and/or Petitioner in this matter, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. has never
denied paternity of his child Windsor
Scott Cheney. It is a fact, that he has
mandated his child upon the unlawful kidnapping of his child on or about
February 15, 1985 based on Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of
California (1849) and has continually DEMANDED that his son NOT BE PLACED INTO
WELFARE or the respondent’s custody. It
is a fact, that respondent’s unlawfully ignored the viva voce Demands and
written lawful Verified Criminal Complaints formally filed into the Butte
County Consolidated Courts; the State of New York Courts and the United States,
objecting to the kidnapping[19]
and/or abduction of his own child by respondent’s[20]
in direct violation of law.[21] As the lawful Father to my son Windsor Scott
Cheney, I in fact, am imbued and protected by law of my right to my own children,
as they are my property; which supercede any alleged rights so enforced by your
Respondent’s in this matter (pertinent parts):
“It is a well settled doctrine of the common law, that the
father is entitled to the custody of his minor children, as against the mother
and every body else; that he is bound for their maintenance and nurture, and
has the corresponding right to their obedience and their services. 2
Story's Eq., secs. 1343-1350; 2 Kent's Com. 193; 1
Bl. Com. 453; Jenness v. Emerson, 15 N. H. 486; Huntoon
v. Hazelton, 20 N. H. 389. By statute of 12 Car. 2, ch. 24
The object of the writ of habeas corpus, in a general sense,
is to release a party from illegal restraint; and, when such party has arrived
at years of discretion--is sui juris, nothing more is done.
But in the case of
an infant, too young to decide for itself, the court must of necessity
determine where it shall be placed, and, in doing so, must determine to whom
the custody belongs. If withheld from that custody, it is deemed to be
unlawfully restrained, and when restored by virtue of this process, is deemed
to be set at liberty.
The power of the
court on habeas corpus to determine the right of custody, and, in proper cases,
to award accordingly, is well established by adjudged cases in both the English
and American courts. On this point many of the English decisions are collected
and considered in Queen v. Clark, 7 El. & Black. 186, 90 E.
C. L. 185. In truth, this jurisdiction in England has been uniformly affirmed, although there has been
controversy in respect to the exercise of the discretion of the court when
called upon to change the custody of an infant. But the power has been conceded
from an early date, as appears from Rex v. Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434,
and cases cited. To the same effect are The People v. Mercein, 3
Hill (N. Y.) 399, and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Briggs, 16
Pick. 203; Mayne v. Baldwin, 1 Halst. Ch. 454; Armstrong v.
Stone, 9 Gratt. 102; State v. Clover, 1 Harr. (N. J.)
419. It is true, that when the person entitled already has the custody, but has
abused the trust, the remedy may not be in this form. But in this case the
father, and natural guardian of the child, is seeking by this process to have
it restored to his custody, and we are required to determine whether, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, the custody of the child ought, or ought not to
be awarded to the father.
Prima facie, however, the right of custody is in the father;
and when the application is resisted upon the ground that he is unfit for the
trust, by reason of grossly immoral conduct, harsh usage of his child, or other
cause, a proper regard to the sanctity of the parental relation will require
that the objection be sustained by clear and satisfactory proofs. Commonwealth
v. Briggs, 16 Pick. 203.
The discretion to be exercised is not an arbitrary one, but,
in the absence of any positive disqualification of the father for the proper
discharge of his parental duties, he has, as it seems to us, a paramount
right to the custody of his infant child, which no court is at
liberty to disregard…
…He is, in truth, the guardian by nature of his child….
…The breaking of the ties which bind the father and the
child can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.
Upon the father the child must mainly depend for support, education and
advancement in life, and as security for this he has the obligation of law as
well as the promptings of that parental affection which rarely fail to bring
into the service of the child the best energies and the most thoughtful care of
the father. In any form of proceeding the sundering of these ties will always
be approached by the courts with great caution, and with a deep sense of
responsibility.
In this case, there being no evidence that the father is
unfit for the trust imposed upon him, there is no solid or substantial ground
for refusing to award to him the custody of his child, unless we give to its
wishes an influence which is not based upon either authority or reason, and
might seriously and extensively interfere with that parental control which is
wisely committed to the natural guardian of children.
Upon the proofs exhibited it does not appear that any
agreement was ever made by the father to yield the custody of the child to the
respondent, or that he has, in any way, waived or abandoned his parental rights
or duties. That he may transfer his parental rights to another by indentures of
apprenticeship, is unquestionable; but it is not so clear that he can do so by
verbal agreement; and there are several
adjudged cases which decide that he cannot. Among these are Mayne v.
Baldwin, 1 Halst. Ch. 454; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399;
State v. Clover, 1 Harr. (N. J.) 419; People v. Mercein,
8 Paige Ch. 67; Rex v. Isley, 5 A. & E. 441; State v. Scott,
30 N. H. 276; Ex parte Earl of Westmeath, 1 Jacob 251. Upon this
point, however, we give no opinion, as it is not necessary in the decision of
this case.” (Herrick v.
Richardson, (1860) 40 NH 272)
Respondent’s
in this matter are intruding upon Appellants fundamental rights, and are using
the courts of the State of California (et als) along with other “Officers of
the Court”, agents, state agencies and/or other public officers in order to
completely criminalize fatherhood under color of law, and under color of
authority and to falsely and maliciously imprison your Appellant.
“Parents have powers greater than the state to curtail
child's excursive of constitutional rights, for parents own constitutionally
protected "liberty" includes the right to direct upbringing and
education of children.” U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend 14; West's Ann. Const. art. 1 § 7(a)--Re
re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298.
“There are "personal rights of such delicate and
intimate character that direct enforcement of them by any process of the court
should never be attempted." Kenyon v. Chicopee, supra, at
534. (Kenyon v. Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528 [1946])
But the father has rights. They are familial. They antedate
the Constitution; they are about as old as civilization itself. Kenyon v. Chicopee, 320 Mass.
528, 534 (1946), eschewed equitable enforcement of "personal rights of . .
. delicate and intimate character,"
SEE John Doe v Jane Doe & Another 314 N.E.2d 128, 365
Mass. 556
"Right of protecting property, declared inalienable by
constitution, is not mere right to protect it by individual force, but right to
protect it by law of land, and force of body politic." Billings v.
Hall (1857), 7 C. 1.
"Right to possess and protect property is not more
clearly protected by constitution, than right to acquire it. Right to acquire
is right to use proper means to attain end; and use of such means, cannot be
prohibited by legislature, except peace and safety of state require it." In
Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502.
"Constitutional guarantee securing to every person
right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property refers to right to
possess absolutely and unqualifiedly every species of property recognized by
law and all rights incidental thereto, including right to dispose of such property
in such manner as he pleases." People v. Davenport (1937),
21 C.A. 292, 69 P.2d 396.
5.) Respondent’s
are placing Women’s Rights (feminism/socialism) over the concise Rights of
Fatherhood and are committing those unlawful acts and/or omissions in order to
place “Welfare Title IV-D” rights superior to a free peoples (your Appellant),
in direct contravention to our laws and our form of government and have in
direct violation of law, placed my son into Welfare and Social Services and
their institutions, which my son Windsor Scott Cheney did not need, and which
Appellant continually objected to; so that they (respondent’s)
could obtain “Title IV-D” welfare remuneration, which they would not
have obtained if Appellant had been given custody.
“But the State does not and could not
intrude this assumption of authority between parent and child standing in no
need of it. It assumes the authority
only upon the destitution and necessity of the child, arising from want or default
of parents.” Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors, 49 Wis.
328; 22 Am.Rep. 702; and see People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280; 8 Am.
Rep. 645.
Such statutes forcing children into institutions
without need, which was the exact case here, are in fact,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: See: Commonwealth
v. Horregan, 127 Mass. 450.[22]
6.) Your
Petitioner and Appellant is in fact the lawful father of Windsor Scott
Cheney, and is the factual head of his family and owner of his son with lawful
title thereto:
"Family" 'means in the strict sense, a collective
body of persons in one house and under one head manager, a household including
parents, children and servants. IN
another sense, family means brother and sister, kindred, descendents of ONE
common progenitor." SEE
ALSO: "Family" as used in CCP
§ 690.11 concerning earnings exempt from
execution or attachment, means a collection of persons living together under
ONE HEAD, under such circumstances or conditions that the head is under a legal
or moral obligation to support the other members, and they are dependent upon him
for support. Lawson v. Lawson,
(1910) 158 C. 446, 111 P. 354] SEE In
re Jessup, (1889) 81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742, 1028, 6 LRA 594; Bennett
Estate (1901) 134 C. 320, 66 P. 370
“The plaintiff in error being of legeance to the crown of
England, his child, though born in the United States during its father's
temporary residence therein,-twenty-two months and twenty days,-notwithstanding
its mother be an American citizen, is not a citizen of the United States. It is
incapacitated by its infancy from making any present election, follows the
legeance of its father, partus sequitur patrem.” Barry v. Mercein, (1847) 46 U.S. 103
Respondent’s
have factually done these acts and/or omissions against Appellant at their own
legal jeopardy:
“A stranger however, has no general privilege of
interference for the protection of what he believes to be anyone's welfare...in
general, the stranger interferes at
his peril, regardless of worthy motives.”
[Grinberger v. Brotherton, 1933, 173 Wash.
292, 22 p.2D 983; Warren v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa 162, 156 N.W.
323.]
7.) It
is a fact, that your Petitioner and Appellant at no time asked for any form of
state subsidy—and in fact, required nor demanded “Child Support” at any time,
but at all times only demanded lawful claim to his own son, which he had lawful
title to and was the natural guardian of.
Respondents factually willfully usurped the my lawful authority to my
own child in my own home asking no burden from anyone, and they did in fact,
kidnap and/or abduct my child for the purposes of profit and reward in order to
obtain Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 – 666 “Title IV-D” Welfare
remuneration, scams and/or schemes, then; did shockingly complain that their
surrogate courts must enforce civil murder against your Appellant in order to
coerce him into accepting said disenfranchisement, slavery; in order not
to burden the taxpayers. This
in fact is overt perjury used in a
planned scheme to overthrow fathers and Appellant rights and liberties to his
own life, liberty and property in order to support their sadistic Welfare scams
and or schemes. This is in direct
contradistinction to reason and the concise rule of law:
“Officer jointly liable with mother for abducting son from
father.” Shields v. Martin,
706 P.2d 21 (Idaho 1985)
FATHER-. “But he is not bound, without some
agreement, to pay another for maintaining them; 9 C. & P. 497; nor is he
bound to pay their debts, unless he has authorized them to be contracted. 38 E.
C. L. R. 195, n. See 8 Watts, R. 366, 1 Craig. & Phil. 317; Bind; Nother;
Parent. This obligation ceases as soon as the child becomes of age, unless he
becomes chargeable to the public. 1 Ld. Ray. 699.
The rights of the father are authority over his children, to
enforce all his lawful commands, and to correct with moderation his children
for disobedience. A father may delegate his power over the person of his child
to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purposes of his
education. This power ceases on the arrival of the child at the age of
twenty-one years. Generally, the father is entitled to the services of his
children during their minority.” 4 S. & R. 207; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t. --Bouvier's
Law Dictionary 1856
8.) The
Fathers’ right to a child, and Appellant’s superior right to his own son is in
fact, a recognized Constitutional RIGHT
and obligation that this court must uphold and enforce against respondents:
Some courts have gone so far as to ground the parental duty
of support in our federal Constitution.
See, e.g., Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 110
Misc.2d 978 (Fam.Ct.1981). That court
stated, "Clearly, the duty of support fits into the legal framework as a
RECIPROCAL of the fundamental Constitutional right to beget and raise
children."
“Father has rights to the Custody of child in preference
to Mother. Child need not join a Habeas Corpus brought by its parent to
obtain its custody. Father cannot
alienate his right to the Custody and control of his child.” People ex rel Barry v. Mercien
3 Hill 399
“One furnishing necessities to wife should know of the
circumstances of the wife's separation from her husband “ Cartwright v. Bate 1 Allen 514
“The court has long held that the constitution must be
construed liberally in view of its purpose.” Colorado Common Cause v.
Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 04/15/1991)
"Freedoms . . . are protected not only against heavy
handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental
interference." Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
523.
"The power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304.
“The care and custody of a minor child is held to be a
personal trust in the father: State v. Baldwin, 5 N.J. Eq.
454; 45 Am. Dec. 399. And according to
the English doctrine, in which some of the American authorities concur, the
father cannot, by the common law, irrevocably divest himself, even by contract
with the mother, or any other person, of the custody of his children; and that
an agreement whereby he surrenders his custody of his children; is not binding,
and he may afterwards revoke his consent, and reclaim the custody by habeas
corpus: Regina v. Smith,
16 Eng. L. & Eq. 221; In re Agar-Ellis, L.R. 10 Ch.D. 49; People
v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 410; 38 Am. Dec. 644; State v. Baldwin,
5 N.J. Eq. 454; 45 Am. Dec. 399; Matter of Scurritt, 76 Mo. 565;
43 Am. Rep. 768; State v. Libbey, 44 N.H. 321; 92 Am. Dec. 223; Johnson
v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259.
9.) Disenfranchising
and enslaving Appellant as the lawful father to his child is in fact, in direct
opposition to our form of government and the public policy of this state:
Fanning v. Fanning
"...As guardian[s] of the interests of the public and
persons not parties to the record, it is our imperative duty to prevent
dissolution of the marriage relation by means which the law condemns and
expressly forbids.
An infant child is the
issue of this marriage, and we cannot tolerate that its character shall be
sullied and its career clouded by a Judicial conviction of the Father on such
evidence of infidelity to the most sacred obligations. Since the "common-law marriages,"
so called-another name for concubinage-is so obtrusively prevalent in the community,
and our calendars are crowded with applications for divorce, it behooves us not
to relax the stringency of the rules which, in the interests of good morals and
social security, have been prescribed by law for the safeguard of the sanctity
and stability of the marriage relation.
Daly Ch. J., and Bischoff, J. Concur.
[THE MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS OF NEW YORK, Book 2, Delehanzy,
Judges of the Several Courts Reported During the Period Covered by this Volume,
p. 94]
See Also (Respondent’s have denied me my constitutional
rights to a relationship with my son):
"'. . . the state may not deny biological parents the
opportunity to establish a protected custodial relationship.'" (37 Cal.3d
at p. 74 (italics added), quoting Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of
Unwed Fathers Before and After. (Lehr v. Robertson (1984)
45 Ohio State L.J. 313, 351.)
“Parents remedy for Taking Away Child—A parent may maintain
trespass vi et arms for taking away his child…Yet…it is clear that n these
situations an action will lie for taking away any child [from a father]…[That the
father] is bound to perform certain duties towards his children, which he
cannot perform if they be taken from him; and to enable him to perform these
duties he is entitled to the custody of his children, and if this right should
be violated by force, he has no hesitation in saying he can maintain this
action; and I recollect an early decision of this court, where it was held that
a parent had such an interest in the support, education and general welfare of
his child that he could maintain an action in this form against any person who
should deprive him of it…It is an immediate injury to the parent. The child is not able to consent, and the
law, therefore condones force, as the taking is unlawful. Vaughan v. Rhodes, (1822) 2
McCord 227
10.)
Appellant being in the condition of a Father,
does not mean that the state can divest him of his constitutional rights and
secured liberties by using the respondent’s unconstitutional, patently unfair
and unjust surrogate court systems:
"Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court." In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967)
Respondent’s continuous enterprise denying your appellant his rights and
secured liberties is in fact, ex post facto as procreating cannot be a crime:
"An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law
which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was
committed, was innocent; a law which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a
law that hangs the rules of evidence
and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which,
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which
deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or
of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or
its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage." Wilensky v. Fields, Fla, 267
So.2d 1,5." [Source: 6th edition,
Black's Law Dictionary, p 580.]
11.)
Your Appellant/Petitioner as the lawful Father
to my son Windsor Scott Cheney has the lawful right not to pay
child support, as a remedy to defend and punish[23]
the unlawful taking of my son from me by respondent’s (as respondent’s left me
with no other remedy at law; and their surrogate courts were insolent to the
law and would not me file lawful verified criminal complaints and act upon
them):
“Glanville, however, maintained a contrary doctrine, and
insisted that the action lay. “For,”
said he, “the father hath an interest in every of his children, to educate them
and to provide for them; and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it is not
reasonably that any should take them from him, and to do him such an injury,
but that the should have his remedy to punish it.” Vaughan v. Rhodes (1822) 2 McCord 227
XII
COUNT
III
THIRD
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
HAVE IN FACT, CONSPIRED AND ACTED IN OVERT COLLUSION AND HAVE IN FACT COMMITTED
AN OVERT FELONY OF ABDUCTION AND/OR KIDNAPPING OF MY SON IN ORDER TO GET HIM
INTO THE “CUSTODY” OF MS. SUSAN SLOAN; AND REPEATED LAWFUL ATTEMPTS OF YOUR
APPELLANT/PETITIONER TO ACCESS THE LAWFUL FORMS OF TRIAL HAVE BEEN THWARTED BY RESPONDENTS
ACTING AS GATE KEEPERS TO THE COURT SYSTEMS TO DENY ME PALPABLE AND CORRECT
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES AT LAW, IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF LAW:
VIOLATION OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC §
207 – KIDNAPPING/ABDUCTION [A FELONY]
PC §
784.5 – CHILD KIDNAPPING [A FELONY]
PC §
531 – FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [A MISDEMEANOR]
PC 532 – FALSE
PRETENSES [A FELONY]
PC §
156 --- FALSE PRETENSES TO INTERCEPT INHERITANCE [A FELONY, 2, 3, 4 YEARS]
PC §
158 – COMMON BARRATRY [MISDEMEANOR; 6 MONTHS, FINE $1,000]
PC §
830 –PEACE OFFERS STRICT CONSTRUCTION
Title 18
U.S.C. § 2 – PRINCIPLES
TITLE 18 §
3 – ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
CAL. CONST.
ART I. SECTION 24, STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW
12.)
No person may either steal, restrain, inveigle,
kidnap, or abduct Appellants’ son from his possession, which in fact, was done
in by Respondent’s in this matter, in overt violation of law.
“A parent, however clearly he may deem himself entitled to
the custody of his infant child, must not resort to force and artifice to
obtain possession of it: Commonwealth v. Fee, 6 Serg. & R.
255. “He should enter through the
straight gate of the law to obtain such possession, and not attempt to climb
over it in some other and wrongful way.”: Jones v. Cleyborn, 54 Ga. 9, 13; Clark v.
Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 312; 30 Am. Rep. 593.
"Governmental power only extends to restraining each
one in freedom of his conduct so as to secure perfect protection to all others
from every species of danger to person, health, and property; that each
individual shall be required to use his own as to inflict injury upon his
neighbors; and these seem to be all immunities which can be justly claimed by
one portion of of society from another, under government of constitutional
limitation." In Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502.
Respondent’s
used conspiracy to abduct and/or kidnap my child so that Respondent Ms. Susan
Sloan could obtain custody by entering respondent’s surrogate courts of the
County of Butte which was aware of this unlawful act and/or omission and by and
from their willful acts and/or omissions, did in fact, assume full liability
for support.
“Husband who at all times relevant, lived in Ohio at the
family’s legal domicile and who had given wife no cause sufficient to justify
her abandoning him, was not liable for support of the children whom wife had
taken outside the state with her; even though husband had made no efforts to
seek out wife and children and contribute to their support.” Buliox v. Buliox, (1962) 185
N.E. 2d 802, appeal dismissed 197 N.E. 2d 193, 175 Ohio St. 561.
13.)
It is a fact, only one parent (not two) can own
a child. The respondent’s along with
their surrogate courts are implementing a legal impossibility of two people
“owning” and “sharing” the child. This
is not only an overt fantasy and direct lie and perjury in the law, it goes
directly against the law:
Trying to Split Children:
“Here be two maxims of the common law. First, that no man can hold one and the same
land immediately of two several lords.
Secondly, that one man cannot of the same land be both lord and
tenant. And it is to be observed, that
it is holden for an inconvenience, that any of the maxims of the law should be
broken, through a private man suffer losse; for that by infringing of a maxime,
not onely a generall prejudice to many, but in the end a publike incertainty
and confusion to all would follow.”
(Section 152b)
[Maxims of Lord Coke]
14.)
It has now become wide-spread knowledge that
respondent’s are acting capriciously and with perfidy against your
Appellant/Petitioner for the purposes of enlarging their Welfare system and
Title IV-D Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes.
“A If the State of
Utah, in its zeal to protect children, sought to create an enlarged child
welfare system by which children could be seized from parents without a showing
of probable cause, and then withheld from them permanently if the beliefs,
attitudes, and ways of life of the parents did not merit official approval, as
measured by state designed tests, such would be ominous indeed. The majority of
Utah citizens would almost certainly not approve. Yet as described above, the
1994 Act comes dangerously close to doing just this.”
[The Child Welfare Reform Act of 1994: Is the Cure Worse than the Problem? By Judge Arthur G. Christean; June 1997 edition of the Utah Bar Journal Vol. 10 No. 5, pg 30-42.]
XIII
COUNT
IV
FOURTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
IN THIS MATTER HAVE A COGENT STATE PROGRAM TO ATTACK YOUR PETITIONER AS A
FATHER AND USE A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK ON YOUR PETITONIER AND/OR APPELLANT AS WELL
AS FATHERS GENERALLY, USING PENAL CODE §§
270 AND 166(a)(4) AS A FRAUD TO OBLITERATE ANY RIGHT OR SECURED LIBERTY SECURED
TO APPELLANT UNDER LAW; TO DENY HIM ALL HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO HIS OWN
CHILD BY ATTACKING HIM BOTH FINANCIALLY AND BY RESPONDENT’S SURROGATE COURT
SYSTEM(S) ALONG WITH CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AS WELL AS FEDERAL
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAMS (AND OTHER “PROGRAMS,” “GRANTS,”
“FOUNDATIONAL PROGRAMS AND/OR MONIES” AND/OR OTHER FUNDINGS) USING COLOR OF
LAW, AND UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY OF THE STATE TO OBTAIN TITLE IV-D “WELFARE”
FUNDING(S) FOR RESPONDENT’S AND THEIR ASSIGNS BY FRAUDULENTLY USING “BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” [PARENS PATRIAE] DOCTRINE AGAINST YOUR APPELLANT IN
OVERT VIOLATION OF LAW.
VIOLATION
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 146 – ARRESTS WITHOUT
PROCESS OR AUTHORITY [MISDEMEANOR, 6 MO.; $1,000]
PC
§ 532(a)(1) FALSE
FINANCIAL STATEMENT TO AGENCY [FELONY,
$5,000]
PC
§ 170 – FALSE PROCURMENT
OF WARRANT [MISDEMEANOR]
PC
§ 168 – DISCLOSING FELONY
WARRANT PRIOR TO EXECUTION [FELONY]
PC
§ 186 –California Control
of Profits of Organized Crime Act [A
FELONY]
CONSTITUTION
OF CALIFORNIA, ART. I, SEC. 8 -
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
ARTICLE
I, SECTION 11 [HABEAS CORPUS DENIAL]
15.)
Respondent’s in this matter use private
practice, policies and procedures to disenfranchise your Petitioner using color
of law, and using color of authority in direct contravention to the
Constitution of the State of California (1849) in order to coerce your
Petitioner by using “Best Interest of the Child”[24]
as a state backed process to undermine Father’s Rights in order to get my child
and respondent’s claim to Title 42 U.S.C. §§
651-666 “Title IV-D” Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes. The process they use is to instantly
undermine your Appellant/Petitioner legal status by using powers of the state
for the purposes of certainty of showing a denial of substantive due process in
order to obtain whatever Respondent’s claim against petitioner. "[t]he touchstone of due process is fundamental
fairness." (Salas v. Cortez, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p.
27.) It is a fact, that the following
unfair and/or unlawful process implemented by respondent’s as a fraud, using
color of law, under color of authority in which to deny fundamental fairness to
Appellant as a father is:
a.) To
allow Respondent’s to overtly steal and/or kidnap and/or abduct Appellant’s son
Windsor Scott Cheney, then to provide no lawful redress at law or remedy at law
to enforce my rights.
b.) Respondent’s
willfully use their unclean hands knowing that their surrogate courts will
uphold any and/or all acts and/or omissions in order to sustain their claims
against Appellant who is the father.
c.) That
there was no showing of unfitness by Appellant at any time in this matter.
d.) After
my child has been kidnapped, Respondent’s and their surrogate courts
immediately attack, seize, and garnish wages and all finances of Appellant in
order that he cannot protect himself—and by and through a willful pattern of
unconstitutionality and total disenfranchisement and civil death[25]
of Appellant’s rights—to then attack Appellant with the weight of all three
branches of government along with 50 states along with the United States to
civilly murder him and enslave him in direct violation of the concise rule of
law.
e.) Said
surrogate courts are in fact, in the employ of the State of California and are
acting in overt collusion with Respondent’s in this matter in order to obtain
Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-666 “Welfare Title IV-D”
remunerations for the purposes of profit and reward.
f.) From
that unlawful act, they then conspire to establish an overtly fraudulent claim
in respondent’s surrogate courts by directly disregarding my claims of
kidnapping lawfully filed and presented before the County of Butte (and other)
Courts of Justice.
g.) They
then force your Appellant into a fraudulent and unconscionable contract[26],
to force him into slavery over his own child, by using the powers of the state
to disregard any claim Petitioner/Appellant has, and to forcibly assert any
claim of respondent’s over appellant/petitioner.
h.) Once
they have this initial fraud and unconscionable “contract” assigned against
appellant in their surrogate courts, using an unlawful civil process “order”
P-3747—respondent’s then unmercifully drive appellant into abject poverty as
a willful and cogent act as established procedure using said “order”—and
then demand that if Petitioner have any “problems” with the unconscionability
of the contract or of the fraud, or the unconstitutionality of their acts
and/or omissions, then they intimate Appellant must come into their
surrogate courts which have knowingly conspired in perpetrating the fraud and
unlawful acts and/or omissions against your Petitioner in the first place so
respondent’s could establish their illegal and fraudulent claim against the
Petitioner as father, then it is a well-established legal fact, that said
courts will then work in direct contradistinction in continuing to deny rights
and in fact, it is a publicly known fact, that such courts do not enforce
substantive due process of law for your Appellant and Petitioner in this matter
as well as fathers in general.
i.) Once
said fraudulent claims are unlawfully coerced and forced upon your
petitioner/appellant using said unconscionable “order” P-3747, respondent’s
along with the surrogate courts and the aegis of the three branches of
government deny any and all substantive redress of grievances—and the complete
aegis of government then comes against appellant in order for him to be forced
into accepting these unlawful frauds, unconscionable contracts, and unlawful
acts and/or omissions of respondent’s so that they may then establish claims in
order to receive Title 42 U.S.C. §§
651-666 (and other) “Welfare Title IV-D” scams and/or remunerations.
j.) Respondents
then claim, that said procedure then is “Res Adjudicata”—and they further
civilly murder Appellant/Petitioner and commit civil death upon him in direct
violation of law, and the Constitution of California (1849), and/or the State
of New York (1777) and/or United States (1787-1791). It is a fact, that no other violation of law, including murder
and terrorist, do not get the civil death committed against them that
respondent’s willfully commit against appellant by their unlawful and overt
conspiracy to enforce “Child Support”.
k.) Respondent’s
then place further claims against your Appellant/Petitioner and then factually
receive even further “Welfare Title IV-D” remunerations along with their
surrogate courts and prisons systems in which to enforce “Child Support.” Respondent’s system has been established
outside the rule of Constitutional law and does not hold up to constitutional
scrutiny and is not in alignment thereto; and is in fact, in direct
contravention to the concise rule of law.
l.) When
Appellant cannot pay, respondent’s use a fraudulent process under color of law
and under color of authority to place him into legal jeopardy using criminal
conversion and then place a civil matter P-3747 into an alleged criminal venue
and/or jurisdiction (actually unknown as respondent’s enforce their fraud by
not answering the Bill of Particulars informing Appellant of the nature and
cause of the action against him, and further denying Appellant lawful
discovery).
i.)
Respondent’s are forcing men (appellant) into
jail to obtain federal “per diem” rates and other subsidies.
ii.)
Respondent’s are placing men illegally in prison
without “ability to pay” hearings.
iii.)
Respondent’s have established fraudulent court
systems that are outside the rule of law and our form of government.
iv.)
Respondent’s have designed a system which
knowingly disenfranchises the father and drives the father away from his own
children by placing him into hardships he cannot overcome nor obtain any
redress of grievances for.
v.)
Respondent’s and their surrogate courts know and
understand that they are placing poor men into prison without due process of
law nor any substantive rights.
vi.)
Respondent’s and their surrogate courts are
using Marxist Jurisprudence in order to enforce their acts and/or omissions
against Appellant in direct violation of law and the public policy of
California as well as the several union states.
m.) Respondent’s
then manufacture and invent crime only extending from their pen, and their
lies, overt perjuries using said fraudulent procedures and surrogate courts and
have been informed that no court in the land will uphold the laws, nor provide
any remedy at law for Appellant nor uphold any of my rights.
16.)
Respondent’s unlawful acts and/or omissions to
unlawfully disenfranchise me from my own child, and to unlawfully enforce civil
death against me; and to force me into slavery, and into debtors prisons in
order to enforce and manage that unlawful taking of property; are
unconstitutionally established by the following SCAMS and/or government(s)
and/or scheme(s)[27]:
a.) Title
42 of the United States Code §§ 651-669. [“Title IV-D laws of the Social Security Act.]
b.) Title
45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 200-449.
c.) “Family
Support Act of 1988”
d.) Child
Support Recovery Act of 1992 (SCRA), Pub. L. No. 102-521
e.) Title
18 U.S.C. § 228
f.) “Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)”
g.) Action
Transmittals. These are policy
documents issues by federal OCSE.
h.) Office
of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) [Administration of Families] in the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) [FEDERAL]
i.) Federal
Parent Locator Service [FPLS] [FEDERAL]
j.) Department
of Justice [FEDERAL]
k.) Office
of the Attorney General Public Rights Division [FEDERAL]
l.) National
Director of New Hires [FEDERAL]
m.) California
Department of Social Services (CDSS) [State of Cal.]
n.) Child
Support Program Management Branch [State of Cal.]
o.) California
Parent Locator Service (CPLS) [State of Cal.]
p.) Mandatory
Bank Match Systems [State of Cal.]
q.) New
Employment Registry (NER) [State of Cal.]
r.) California
Central Registry (CCR) [State of Cal.]
s.) Published
California Family Code.
t.) Published
California Penal Code.
u.) Published
California Civil Code of Procedure.
v.) Published
California Welfare and Institutions Code.
w.) Divisions
12 and 82 of the Department of Social Services “Manual of Policies and Procedures”
x.) Department
of Social Services Regulations Bureau, 744 “P” Street, Sacramento, California
95814.
y.) Family
Support Division Letters. (FSD)
z.) DCSS,
P.O. Box 419064, Rancho Cordova, California 95741-9064
aa.) Family
Support Division Information Notices (FSDIN)
bb.)
All County Family Support Division Director’s
Letters.
cc.) County
of Butte District Attorney’s Office (See Welfare and Institutions Code §
11475.1).
dd.)
County of Butte Family Support Division
ee.) County of Butte Family Support Trust Fund
ff.) Lockheed
Martin Computer Specifications.
gg.) Maximus Computer Specifications.
hh.) OTHER governmental/private not fully known
nor disclosed to me as of this date.
Respondent’s are using
these systems of Health and Human Services et als (and others) and using bad
faith and unlawful practices, policies and procedures, and keeping false
records[28]
clothed under the color of law, under color of authority in which to overthrow
the Constitution of California, (and/or the Constitution of the State of New
York and/or the Constitution for the United States) and the secured liberties
and fundamental rights of your Appellant / Petitioner.
17.)
Once Respondent’s have inflicted the fraud
against the Appellant (the father) and with direct collusion of the courts
enforced “Best Interests of the Child” against your Petitioner and Appellant,
they then directly turn around and with the aid of their surrogate courts admit
the lie that Respondent’s now have in bad faith obtained “Custody” of my son
clothed under color of law, and under color of authority; they then turn around
and demand Appellant enjoin in his own destruction—and admit that they overtly
lied to obtain “Custody” and that in fact, they are not in the “Best Interest of the Child” and cannot either
support or take care of my son—and need subsidy; of which they unlawfully
attempt to bind me to using unconscionable contracts:
Ҥ19.2 What makes a
contract unconscionable?”
“The Code does not define unconscionability nor does its
text indicate what elements go into making a contract unconscionable. The official comments suggest:
‘The
basic test is whether in the light of the general background and the commercial
needs of the trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of
the contract…The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise…and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.’”
[RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES UNDER UCC ARTICLE 2, by Harold Greenberg © 1987, Wiley Law
Publications, John Wiley & Sons, New York, ISBN 0-471-81283-8, pp. 282-283]
It
is a fact, that no reasonable man would enter into this contract, instead; he
is violently forced into this “contract” by overt fraud and collusion, and
thereby, this contract is factually null and void from the first instance of
inception and is null and void in ab initio[29].
18.)
“Child Support” is in fact, a fraud, it is in
excess of true support of my son, and never went to him, and in fact, bound him
into slavery and poverty and factually never was in his best interests. Said “Codes” in support are in fact a fraud
only used to control Appellant (and other fathers) and as a tool to keep Father
from his child. (Respondent’s recognize
mother needs money to raise the child; then totally destroy and disenfranchise
the father then after he is forced and driven out of the child’s life, fraudulently make the charge that Appellant
“abandoned” my son—when in fact, “Child Support” enforced by published
California Penal Codes §§ 270 and 166(a)(4) and all supportive
“laws” clothed under color of law, under color of authority have created a
national disaster of fatherlessness where 40% of this nations children go to
bed every night without their father in the home, directly due to
respondent’s willful acts and/or omissions in support of their continued acts
and/or omissions of fraud:
"When a parent is deprived of the custody of his child,
and therefore of its services and earnings, he is no longer liable for its
support and education." Selfridge v. Paxton, 145 Cal.
713, 79 Pac. 425; Ex parte Miller, 109 Cal. 648, 42 Pac. 428; McKay
v. McKay, 125 Cal. 65, 57 Pac. 677; Matter of McMullin,
164 Cal. 504, 129 Pac. 773; People v. Hartman, 23 Cal. App. 72,
137 Pac. 611.
Officers who arrested father while attempting to recover
custody of child at request of mother were not entitled to qualified immunity. Fonte
v. Collins, 898 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1990)
"An officer [or any person in government office i.e.
Judge] who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the
government." Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp.
94.
“Father arrested to keep him from seeing his daughter
awarded $285,000 in
damages, $115,866 in attorneys' fees.” Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d
196 (1st Cir. 1987)
19.)
Respondent’s are in fact, committing this
Domestic Violence against your petitioner using color of law, using color of
authority, for the purposes of obtaining “Title IV-D” Welfare remuneration
scams and/or schemes:
"And my colleagues across the country
have already informed me how I can win
at this system: recruit the middle class, bring those higher orders into your system, and that way you will be
able to benefit like some of the other
States from the cap removal on the never-welfare population." …That will lead to financial pressures on
states to expand their Child Support Enforcement Programs to encompass all
cases in the state, including those families who have never had to interact
with government in order to pay or receive child support. Indeed, those states
which already have near-universal government programs for child support will
receive huge windfalls of incentives under the proposal, while states which
historically concentrated on poor and near-poor families will lose federal incentive
revenue, compared to the current system. California stands to lose two-thirds
of its federal incentives, nearly $60 million, if the proposal were implemented
this year.”
(and
further down that page ...)
"Most of the testifiers have hinted, including the Secretary's own report. Look out for that behavioral aspect, and that is going after the gold, going after the middle class orders." [From testimony from Leslie L. Frye, Chief, Office of Child Support, California Department of Social Services, Sacramento, California, before the 1997 House Ways and Means Committee, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources: THE ADMINISTRATION'S CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT INCENTIVE PAYMENT PROPOSAL, held Thursday, March 20, 1997; pg 93]
It is a fact, that
Respondent’s along with their surrogate courts (and other agencies and public
institutions), are in fact, imposing a payment scam and or scheme, clothed
under legislative acts, such that your Appellant/Petitioner must be forced to
pay for a Welfare system never approved by the public, against public policy,
and against our form of government, with no vote, nor any form of
representation whatsoever.
20.)
It is a fact, that this issue has been presented
to Respondent’s and their surrogate court systems and/or government(s) before
and they have knowledge of the law as well as the facts of this issue and did
violate Appellant’s rights and secured liberties regardless for profit:
“About 1999 [ACFC] tried to get a 50-50 Shared Parenting ballot initiative in California. The California Legislature prepared a Fiscal Note that estimated that it would cost California about $70 million dollars a year net in Federal subsidies to stop separating children from one of their parents. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this is that the "profit and reward" for the entire state to be gained from driving fathers out of their children's lives is about $70 million a year. That figure may be very low, because a GAO study from 1997 states that the "net program savings" of the California child support operation is $177,731,427 (cost to California of running the program, less Federal subsidy and incentives). The Report is GAO/HEHS-99-105.”
It
is a fact, although “declining caseloads” of welfare cases started to occur
during this timeframe, the costs to your Appellant as well as fathers and the
public have constantly risen, with California Health and Human Services
collections going up, as well as the “crisis” of “Deadbeat Dads” as well as
their budgets. Clearly this is prima facie
proof of the fraud, as “IF” there was in fact a ‘reduction’ in services, it
would correlate into a reduction in budgets, in “Deadbeat Dads” etc., etc.,
etc. It is a fact, that Respondent’s
are lying about “not making any money” from “Child Support Collections” only
using color of law and color of authority with the force of government to
sustain this transfer of wealth enterprise against your Appellant/Petitioner
(and other fathers as well as the public)[30]
in order to fund their “Title IV-D” Welfare empires.
21.)
This is why in our form of government the Father
has superior rights to the child, over the state clothed under color of law
(Parens Patriae)[31] as he does
not need state subsidy to raise his own child.
Haeredum
Deus facit, non homo. “God
and not man, make the heir.”
The
Child knows his Father’s bed the best.
Qui
Doit inheritoer al pre, doit inheriter al fitz. “He who ought to inherit from the father, ought
to inherit from the son.
Hares
est eadem persona cum antecessore. “The
heir is the same person with the ancestor.
Co. Litt. 22.
Remisus
imperanti melius paretur.
“A [father] commanding not too strictly is best obeyed.” 3 Co. Inst. 233.
Qui
providet sibi, providet haredibus. “He who provides from himself, provides for
his heirs.”
22.)
The state can only invoke the Parens Patriae
doctrine, against incompetent children and/or adults. Respondent’s are attacking
Appellant/Petitioner and his son who are not incompetants—and who
have demanded to be released from the yoke of injustice inflicted by the Respondent’s:
“The doctrine of parens patriae refers to the sovereign
power of guardianship of persons under disability and the inherent and
fundamental right and duty of the state to care for persons. who are unable
to care for themselves or who are a menace to themselves or to the health,
morals or safety of others. (In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115 [145 P.
871, 872; Ann.Cas. 1916E 1022]; McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1 [205
P. 917, 925-6]; State v. Green, supra, p. 902.) In re Keddy, (1951) 105 Cal.
App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (Cal.App.Dist.2 06/29/1951) It is a fact, that this was not the case in this matter, as I was
not an incompetent, nor was my unemancipated child Windsor Scott Cheney who was
in fact, stolen, and/or kidnapped, and/or abducted out of his own home and
hidden from me by respondent’s.
23.)
The Parens Patriae Doctrine invoked by
Respondent’s is a SECONDARY inferior doctrine to the sovereignty
of the (your Appellant who would have never burdened the state and had his
son on welfare, to which he continually and vituperatively objected to)[32]
father: (also: the home, and family) and is only to be invoked reluctantly and only as a last resort. Respondent’s factually, are usurping their
own limits of power and enumerated constitutional authority, over the secured
liberties of fatherhood so that they may increase their social security
empire, and burden the People of the State of California, and respondent’s
illegally apply Feminist/Marxist Jurisprudence in which to use their surrogate
courts to apply unconstitutional social engineering theories (Hillary Clintons’
“Village) to control “We the People” who must fund these illegal and
unconstitutional acts and/or omissions committed by respondent’s:
"On the third factor, the governmental interest
supporting the procedure, the court identified the state's interests as the
parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child
and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden
of such proceedings.” (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at pp.
766-767 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 615].)
“No court may, except for the gravest of reasons, transfer a
child from its natural parent to any other person.” People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539,
104 N.E.2d 895 (1952).
“The natural parents of a child have a right to the care and
custody of their child that is superior to all others unless the right has been
abandoned or the natural parents proved to be unfit.” People ex Rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113
N.E.2d 801 (1953).
“Parental custody may not be displaced in the absence of grievous
necessity or cause.” Matter
of Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 423 N.E.2d 361
(1981).
“Neither the lawyers nor judges nor
experts in psychology or social welfare may displace the primary responsibility
of child raising that naturally and legally fall to those who conceive and bear
children.” Matter of Bennett v.
Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 40 N.Y.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277 (1976); Matter
of Gomez v. Lozado, 40 N.Y.2d 839, 387 N.Y.S.2d 834, 356 N.E.2d 287
(1976).
"The parent has the right to the care
custody and assistance of his child," the court reasoned. "The duty
to maintain and protect it is a principle of natural law…Before any
abridgement of the right, gross misconduct or almost total unfitness on the
part of the parent, should be clearly proved. "
“The State as parens patriae, has determined the imprisonment beyond recall. Such a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and oppression. If, without crime, without the conviction of any offense, the children of the State are to be thus confined for the `good of society,' then society had better be reduced to its original elements, and free government acknowledged a failure.” [People ex.rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. at 280-87 (1870)]
24.)
It is a fact, that the Parens Patriae doctrine
unlawfully invoked by Respondent’s is only supposed to be used as a last
resort, however they have used their unlawful acts and/or omissions as a
pre-emptive strike against your Appellant/Petitioner to disenfranchise him in
direct violation of law, using color of law, under color of authority:
“The Honorable Richard S. Tuthill, a Civil War Veteran,
concluded opening day by instructing his makeshift staff 'not to rush
"neglected and wayward" children into court, but rather to 'confer
with parents, priest or pastor, using every effort to set the child right
without resorting to an arrest save the final reserve', bringing children to
Juvenile Court "only as a last resort." Tanenhaus, Id. at 8 [What is the State to Do? Juvenile Justice in Historical Perspective,
presented at the Chicago Council on Urban Affairs annual luncheon, July 17,
1997]
"To say that one may not defend his own property is
usurpation of power by legislature." O'Connell v. Judnich
(1925), 71 C.A.386, 235 P. 664.
Citing from Monmouth
County v. G.D.M., 705 A.2d 408, 308 N.J. Super. 83, 88 (Chancery Div.
1997):
Some courts have gone so far as to ground the parental duty
of support in our federal Constitution.
See, e.g., Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 110
Misc.2d 978 (Fam.Ct.1981). That court
stated, "Clearly, the duty of support fits into the legal framework as a RECIPROCAL
of the fundamental Constitutional RIGHT to beget and raise
children"....
PLEASE ALSO NOTE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS
NOTED:
“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652,
64 S.Ct. 438, 442 (1944).
“Parental rights may not be reduced by state action if there
is a less restrictive alternative available to accomplish public policy.” See,
e.g., Shelton vs. Tucker, 364 U.S. 4798, 488, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 81
S. Ct. 247 (1960).
XIV
COUNT
V
FIFTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
KNOWINGLY ARE INSOLENT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND OUR LAWS AND IMPLEMENT A
COMPLETE HATRED AGAINST OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND DID OBSTRUCT JUSTICE AND ARE
IN FACT, INFLICTING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST YOUR PETITIONER IN OVERT
VIOLATION OF LAW, HAVING FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA TO UPHOLD THEIR CRIMES AND UNLAWFUL ACTS AS THEY HAVE BEEN INFORMED
THAT SAID COURTS WILL UPHOLD THEIR HATRED, VIOLENCE AND UNLAWFUL ACTS AND/OR
OMISSION AGAINST YOUR PETITIONER AND APPELLANT AND WILL PROTECT RESPONDENT’S
UNLAWFUL ACTS AND/OR OMISSIONS, AND WILL IGNORE NOR AFFORD PETITIONER WITH NO
RIGHTS AT LAW, AND WILL VIOLATE ALL LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS[33]
IN WHICH TO KEEP YOUR PETITIONER UNLAWFULLY AND/OR ILLEGALLY IN CIVIL DEATH AND
IN EXTREME HARDSHIP IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE CONCISE RULE OF LAW, AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF CALIFORNIA, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW YORK, AND THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES.
VIOLATION
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PENAL
CODE § 38 – MISPRISION OF
FELONY
GOV.
CODE § 1027.5 – MARXIST JURISPRUDENCE[34]
U.S.
CONST. ART IV, § 4
CAL
CONST. (1849) ART I, SECTION 1—RIGHT TO LIFE AND PROPERTY, RIGHT OF DEFENSE
TITLE
42 U.S.C § 1982 – PROPERTY RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 2 – PRINCIPLES
TITLE
18 § 3 – ACCESSORY AFTER THE
FACT
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 4 – MISPRISION OF
FELONY
CAL.
CONST. ART. (1849) I, Sec. 3; 8; 9;
11;12; 15; and 19
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART III- SEPERATION OF POWERS
25.)
Respondent’s are factually insolent to the
rights of your Appellant and are attempting to establish a proto-soviet
socialist state where all children are “owned” and controlled by the state and
not the father (appellant) who respondent’s feel they must destroy. This is in direct violation to the
Constitution of California (1849) and of the United States (1787-1791) and our
form of government and concisely against public policy:
“To say that the father of a child is not "affected or
aggrieved" by an order declaring such child a ward of the juvenile court
is to do violence to the American philosophy and system of government, in which
the alien philosophy that the child is the creature of the state finds no
countenance. Under the American way of life, the child belongs to the family,
and any judicial proceeding which seeks to impair or take away a father's
parental authority is certainly litigation, in the subject matter of which such
father is interested, and, therefore, brings him within the fundamental rule of
appellate jurisdiction that "under our decisions any person having an
interest recognized by law in the subject matter of the judgment, which
interest is injuriously affected by the judgment, is a party aggrieved and
entitled to be heard upon appeal." (Estate of Colton, 164
Cal. 1, 5 [127 P. 643].) In re
Rauch, 103 Cal. App. 2d 690, 230 P.2d 115 (Cal.App.Dist.2 04/23/1951)
26.)
Once respondent’s disenfranchise and enslave
Appellant (or any father) they assume they then can civilly murder him as an
organized hate group subsidized by government and clothed under color of law,
under color of authority in overt violation of law and the concise rule of law:
"Once a father who is separated or divorced from a
mother and is no longer living with his child...could not be treated
differently from a currently married father living with his child." Quilloin v. Walcott, 99 S.Ct.
549, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56, (1978)
27.)
Respondents use practice, policies and
procedures reprehensible and eminently shocking and illegal to our form of
government:
United States v. Russell
(1973) 411 U.S. 423, 431-436, 36 L.Ed. 2d 366, 93 S.Ct. 1637 the Supreme Court noted: "Conduct of
Law Enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking the judicial process to obtain a
conviction" "California cases
have treated this defense as viable."
(People v. Thoi (1989 4th Dist) 213 Cal.App. 3d 689, 696,
261 Cal.Rptr. 789.)
Also NOTE: “The
early English Law according to the early common law of England, An agreement
which placed any restriction on a mans right to exercise his trade was void and
against public policy. Ipswich
Taylors Case, 11 Coke 53a. 77
reprint 1218; Dutton v. Poole, 2 Lev. 210, 83 reprint 523; Anonymous,
Moore K.B. 242, 72 Reprint 555; Dyers Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V
p. 4 pl. 26. [Corpus Juris 13,
“Contempt to Corporate”, Edited by William Mack LL.D and Willaim
Bensbam in have LL.B. Vol. XIII New York, The American Law Book Co. London :
Butterworth & Co., Bell Land 1917. See “Contracts”- §
412, p. 468.]
28.)
Respondent’s by their willful acts and/or omissions in fact, have
given up all rights to any immunity claims[35],
and all “Officers of the Court” and respondent’s thereto factually have no
remedy at law[36]; as they
factually have not had jurisdiction in this matter[37],
they have not had subject matter jurisdiction; they have not had in personam
jurisdiction; nor have they had probable cause nor any lawful warrant(s) in
this matter:
“In absence of jurisdiction in personam over father, court
of sister state has no power to adjudicate as between child and father what is
amount of father’s obligation to support his son.” Southern Pac. Co. v. Zehnle, (1947) 163 F2d 453.
“The liability of state judicial officials and all official
participants in state judicial proceedings under 2 was explicitly and
repeatedly affirmed.18 The notion of immunity for such officials was thoroughly
discredited. The Senate sponsor of [460 U.S. 325, 359] the Act deemed the idea
"akin to the maxim of the English law that the King can do no wrong. It
places officials above the law. It is the very doctrine out of which the
rebellion [the Civil War] was hatched." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1758 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull). Thus, 2 was "aimed directly at the
State judiciary." Id., at 1155 (Rep. Eldridge). See also id., at 1778
(Sen. Johnson, member of the Senate Judiciary Committee) ( 2 of the 1866 Act
"strikes at the judicial department of the governments of the
States").
New York high court rules that sovereign immunity no longer
protects state government against lawsuits for violations of state
constitutional rights, such as protection against unreasonable search and
seizure and equal protection of the law; N.Y. state government can now be sued
for monetary damages in state court for violation of state constitution.” Brown v. State, No. 186,
N.Y.Ct. of Appeals, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1996).
Under the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act 5
USC 'D', BURDEN OF PROOF, "the proponent of a rule or order beards the
burden of proof." The Supreme
Court has stated that "If any tribunal (court) finds absence of proof of
jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the case must be dismissed." [See Louisville RR v. Motley,
2111 US 149, 29 S.Ct. 42]
29.)
Respondents by and through their overt lies,
perjuries, unconstitutional acts and/or omissions and overt collusions and
unlawful crimes as well as other acts and/or omissions willfully conspire
having full knowledge Appellant will never obtain a fair trial within the State
of California courts:
"Since the duty of the trial court to afford every
defendant in a criminal case a fair and impartial trial is of constitutional
dimensions, the inherent power of he court to correct matters by granting a new
trial transcends statutory limitations."
People v. Oliver (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 747, 751 [120
Cal.Rptr. 368] People v. Cardenas
(1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 643, 647-648, 170 Cal.Rptr. 763
"There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress
to thus liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus in order to
safeguard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States against infringement
through any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established
thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner in custody
pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may
have a judicial inquiry in a court of
the United States into the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention,
although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his
conviction to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court
to proceed to a judgment against him. .
. . " . . . it is open to the courts of the United States upon an
application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond forms and inquire into
the very substance of the matter, . . ."
Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82
L.Ed. 1461
30.)
Appellant demands that you judicially note and
place on the record the following:
Seditious Conspiracy - United States Code, Title 18, section
2384 - "If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put
down or to destroy by force, the government of the United States, or to levy
war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to
seize, take or possess any property of the United States contrary to the
authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000.00 or be
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
"…[The constitution is] Intended to give a broad remedy
for violations of federally protected civil rights." Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978)
XV
COUNT
VI
SIXTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
AND THEIR SURROGATE COURTS ARE IN FACT, USING THE “BEST INTEREST” OF THE CHILD
DOCTRINE TO ESTABLISH AND SUPPORT PUBLISHED CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §§
270 AND 166 (a)(4) VIOLATIONS: TO DIRECTLY DISENFRANCHISE HIM; AND PLACE YOUR APPELLEANT INTO A NEEDLESS
DEBT AND TO GIVE RESPONDENT’S SUPER RIGHTS NOT GUARRANTEED AT LAW IN DIRECT
VIOLATION THEREOF.[38]
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 120 – OATH OF OFFICE
PC
§ 121 -- IRREGULAR OATH
PC
§ 129 – FALSE RETURN ON
OATH – [A FELONY]
PC
§ 115.3 –ALTERED
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS [A FELONY]
PC
§ 273f – [MISDEMEANOR]
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
CALIF.
CONST – ART XX, § 3 (247 Words total)
Title
18 U.S.C. §§ 35, 111, 153, 241, 242, 245(b)(1)(B), 246, 371, 1341, 1343, 1503,
1505, 1512, 1513(b), 1515(a).
TITLE
28 U.S.C. § 1361—OFFICER TO DO
MANDITORY DUTY UPON WITNESSING CRIME
31.)
Respondent’s establish this “need” for Title
IV-D welfare remuneration scams and or schemes by their surrogate courts
holding the child’s rights superior to the Father, in direct violation of
law. The maxim of laws are clear on
this: Nulli enum res sua servit jure
servitutis. “No man can have a
servitude over his own property.” Dig
8, 2, 26; 17 Mass. 443; 2 Bouv.Inst. n. 1600, this comes under Appellants Inability
to Pay defense.
“Legal Impossibility.
Performance of a contract cannot be compelled where it would involved a
violation of law.” Monaca Borough
v. Monaca St. R. Co., 247 Pa. 242, 91 A. 344.
Nemo potest sibi devere.
“No one can owe to himself.” [See confusion of rights].
Invito beneficium non datur. “No one is obliged to accept a benefit against
his consent.” Bouviers Law Dictionary
(1914), “Maxim” p. 2140
32.)
Respondent’s did in fact, place Appellants child
with the mother whom they knew was incompetent, and a “Welfare Queen” and was
in fact, immoral (having an illegitimate child by another man, (Joseph Sloan)
and then unlawfully attempting to pawn it off on Appellant) thereby placing
Windsor Scott Cheney into direct jeopardy into an immoral environment:
“Where the father and mother have separated, and their
infant children must of necessity be deprived of the care, protection, and
training of one of [the parents], then it is the duty of the courts to confide
the custody of the infants to that parent, whether father or mother, best
suited to maintain, protect, and educate them, and bring them up in moral
courses: McKim v. McKim, 12 R.I. 462; 34 Am. Rep. 694; Good
rich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670.
“Where improper decree has been made against infant he may
Impeach it by an Original Bill, and is not bound to proceed by way of rehearing
or Bill of Review; and this right is
not confined to cases where fraud has intervened to obtain such decree.” Loyd v. Malone (1859) 23
Illinois, 43.
33.)
That the mother takes care of her children, and
it is understood this is to be done without payment. ("The presumption from a mothers maintenance of her child,
whatever be the means of either is, that she furnished it as a gift[39]." See also Guion v. Guion Admin.,
16 MO 48 ).
“The law raises no implied promise to pay; from the mere
fact of a mother’s maintenance of her child, the presumption is, that she
furnished it gratuitously, without regard to the means of either.” Cummings
v. Cummins, (1839) 8 Watts 366
34.)
Appellant
by law, is not responsible for the debts of Respondent(s):
Husband is not liable for Debts of the Wife, contracted
after she has obtained a decree against him for alimony. Bennet v. O'Fallon [2 Missouri
69] (See also: Mitchell v.
Treanor, 11 Geogia 324]
35.)
Support by Appellant is established under
law. As the Father, I am imbued with a
quid pro quo guarantee at law. “This
for That.” I am obligated for the
child’s support, maintenance, care, and education of my child, because I am entitled to their services,
companionship, obedience, custody, and any earnings.
"By the common law the father is bound to support his
minor children; and so long as he does, he will be ENTITLED to their
Services." Guion v. Guion
Admin., 16 MO 48
“State cannot impair obligations of contract on
marriage.” Tolen v. Tolen,
2 Blackford 407
36.)
Respondent’s in fact, ‘invent’ obligations
against me in direct violation of law:
“An Infants contract for necessities is not binding, where
he is living with his parent: Hull
v. Connolly, 15 Am. Dec. 612.
An infant is absolutely bound by his contracts for necessaries only, and
then only for their actual value...” Rainwater
v. Durham, 10 Am. Dec. 637
37.)
Payment by Appellant must be voluntary in
accordance with law:
“Father is OBLIGATED to support the child UNDER A WRITTEN
VOLUNTARY PROMISE or by COURT ORDER.” Griffith v. Gibson, 73
Cal.App.3d 465; 142 Cal.Rptr. 176
(NOTE: Factually,
there is neither any promise whatsoever from me as this was done by
respondent’s against my authority, sustained and continuous objections
and in distinct contravention to my consent NOR WAS THERE ANY LAWFUL
COURT ORDER).
38.)
Please note that Appellant is not required at
law to pay “Child Support” as his child has been unlawfully abducted from him
against his consent:
“Party furnishing necessaries to son voluntarily absent from
his father's house, without the father's consent, must look to the son
and not the father, for payment although he is not aware that the son's is
absent against his father's will.” Hunt
v. Thompson 3 Scammon 179
39.)
The Father (appellant) is in fact, the head of
his home and family, and children, and has the God-given right to own his
property, and to keep government out from his home, and out of his
decisions. Thereby, there is no “Best
Interest of the Child” doctrine superior to appellant’s lawful authority:
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the crown. It may be a frail
[home]—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter—the
rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not
cross the threshold of that ruined tenement!”
[William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 1708-1778, Speech in
the House of Commons 1763, p. 312]
40.)
Respondent’s are prohibited by law and cannot
abrogate my rights, demand money from me, or obligate me to something against
my will, or use any other persons
rights to supercede my own:
“Sic eutere tuo ut alienum non laedas. One must use his own rights as to not to
infringe upon another." The right
to free speech must be used as not to infringe upon the constitutional
guarantee of he right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
possessing and obtaining certainty and happiness." Jordah v. Hayda (1905) 1
Cal.App. 696, 82 P. 1079
41.)
No respondent in fact has rights superior to
your Appellant/Petitioner and cannot either enslave him, nor “obligate” him nor
transfer any of his rights against Appellant’s will, consent or authority.
“No
one can transfer to another a right larger than he himself has.” Smith v.
Bank of America (1936) 14 CA 2d 78, 87; 57 P.2d 1363.
Nullus
jus alienum forisfacere potest –“No man can forfeit
another's right" Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1914), "Maxim," p.
2151. [Ancestors or predecessors were and are sans any Authority, Right, Power,
Liberty or Privilege to convey or prejudice the Rights of Posterity by or
through their ignorance of Law.]
XVI
COUNT
VII
SEVENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
ARE VIOLATING NOT ONLY THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF YOUR APPELLANT/PETITIONER, AND
PRO-ACTIVELY DESTROYING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND OF THE
UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH DEBTORS PRISONS, AND TO OVERTHROW
THIS NATION FROM WITHIN USING THE PRECEPTS OF SOCIALISM, AND/OR COMMUNISM
AND/OR FEMINISM AS THE “NEW” RULE OF LAW[40]
WITHIN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA UNDER COLOR OF LAW, UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY.
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 273(h)
PC
§ 522 [A FELONY]
PC
§ 688 – UNNECESSARY RESTRAINT
PC
§§ 693, 694 – RESISTANCE TO UNJUST OFFENSE
PC
§§ 793, 794 – DOUBLE
JEOPARDY IN FOREIGN COURT BAR TO PROSECUTION IN CALIFORNIA
PC
§ 38 – MISPRISION OF
FELONY
GC
§ 1027.5 – MARXIST
JURISPRUDENCE
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 4 – MISPRISION OF
FELONY
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE I, SECTION 8
Title
18 U.S.C. §§ 35, 111, 153, 241, 242, 245(b)(1)(B), 246, 371, 1341, 1343, 1503,
1505, 1512, 1513(b), 1515(a).
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 11 – LAWS HAVE UNIFORM OPERATION
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
42.)
Your appellant was in fact, fraudulently
kidnapped into prison, without either lawful probable cause, nor a lawful
warrant, nor without the legal forms of trial; in direct violation of law, and
Respondent’s are not allowing any form of lawful redress within the courts of
the State of California, and they are obtaining substantive Federal and State
funding in order to frustrate the mechanisms of law and fundamental justice.
43.)
The present system enforcing debtor’s prisons
against Appellant is in overt violation of law, public policy and our form of
government.
"Far more horrific is the notion that a debtor may be
incarcerated in order to extract payment of the debtor's liability from third
parties who have no obligation to do so.
It simply cannot be supposed that Congress contemplated that the
exception in section 362(b)(2)(b) would be implemented by the courts in a
manner analogous to medieval practices of debtor's prison and ransom."
“The horrifying aptness of the analogy of
medieval debtor's prison set forth by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the above
case as to the practice of shaking down relatives and friends is even more
apparent when many of the people going to jail for civil matters (where there
is no probable cause) are subjected to assault, rape, sexually transmitted
diseases, AIDS, tuberculosis and poor jail conditions that are
"unfit" for human beings.” In
re Moon, (1996) 201 B.R. 79, 87-88 (Bktrcy. S.D.N.Y. 1996)
44.)
The law is factually clear; Respondent’s cannot
color their claim as they have submitted no proof or evidence against your
Appellant which they cannot circumvent as they have unclean hands in this
matter:
"Statutes or ordinances [my note:
ordinances are defined as rules], designed as debt collecting devices under the
guise of penal laws, contravene the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. Thus, the
legislature may not circumvent the
prohibition by rendering criminal a simple breach of contract, the nonpayment
of debt, or the failure to use one's own money for a purpose other than for
payment of debts. However, statutes
against false pretenses, frauds, cheats, and the like, are sustained as against
the constitutional objection that such statutes impose imprisonment for debt,
on the theory that one who violates the act is punished for the CRIME he has
committed, although civilly the acts may also constitute a breach of contract
or the nonpayment of a debt".
(See, 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Section 204(4), p. 1011). State v. Madewell, (1973) 63
N.J. 506 at 512 (N.J. Supreme Court)
45.)
Your Appellant by his status and by right and
perfect right is guaranteed a Republican form of Government[41]
of which Respondent’s acting in their private and professional capacities are
clothed under color of law and under color of authority and are overtly
insolent to our form of government and overtly violating the concise rule of
law:
“The Constitution guarantees to every state a Republican
form of government (Art. 4, Sec. 4). No state may join the United States unless
it is a Republic. Our Republic is one dedicated to "liberty and justice
for all." Minority individual rights are the priority. The people have
natural rights instead of civil rights. The people are protected by the Bill of
Rights from the majority. One vote in a jury can stop all of the majority from
depriving any one of the people of his rights; this would not be so if the
United States were a democracy. (see People's rights vs Citizens' rights)
“Government; Republican government. One in which the powers
of sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by the people, either
directly, or through representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers
are specially delegated.” In re
Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219; Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22 L.Ed. 627. [Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 626]
"The courts have consistently struck down state
regulations and actions which in purpose and effect seek to impose
discrimination.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,
334 U.S. 410." NAACP v. Alabama 1964 .S.Ct..1052 , 377 U.S.
288, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 12 L. Ed. 2d 325
46.)
Respondent’s are using a fraud at law, using
their surrogate courts. There can never
be any probable cause in Child Support warrants because they are civil in
nature. Probable cause only can exist
in the criminal context. See, Allen
v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 1995); Paff v.
Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425 (3rd Cir. 2000); Doby v. DeCrescenzo,
171 F.3d 858 (3rd Cir. 1999)(Fourth Amendment applies to seizures in civil as
well as criminal proceedings, citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-15,
107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (1980) (Involuntary civil confinement is a
massive curtailment of liberty); see also, Rzayeva. Foster, 134
F.Supp.2d 239 (D.Conn. 2001).
“Federal appeals court rules, as a matter of law, that since
dispute was civil, rather than criminal, it could not give rise to probable
cause, and as such the litigant's rights were violated by being arrested in a
civil matter.” Allen v. City of
Portland, 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 1995)
47.)
Respondent’s are keeping Appellant in a constant
state of slavery, civil death and denial of all rights in order to “keep him in
his place” and to stop him from seeking redress of grievances through the
courts of which he will ultimately win to their ultimate jeopardy [Presently, they are overtly perjuring
themselves and stating I am a “parole absconder” which is a lie—they are only
attempting to invent and manufacture crime so they can put me in jail
needlessly, and burden the taxpayer and extort them to pay extortion
imprisonment “per diem” rates:
“The courts of the state are open to every citizen
for the redress of his wrongs, and unless he is at liberty to seek
such redress without rendering himself liable in damages to defendant, in
case he shall fail to establish his complaint, this right would in many
instances be a barren privilege.” Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co.
(1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 547.
THEREBY,
RESPONDENT’S AND THEIR SURROGATE COURTS WERE COMPELLED TO ALLOW ME STAY’S OF
EXECUTION—AND/OR INJUNCTIONS—WHICH THEY HAVE CONSISTANTLY REFUSED TO DO BECAUSE
THEY REFUSE TO ALLOW ME REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES AND PROPER ACCESS TO THE COURTS
SO I MAY PROPERLY DEFEND MYSELF.
48.)
Respondent’s are insolent to the law, are
thumbing their nose at the Constitution of California and of the United States:
“Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse; disregard the
character of its own existence.”
--Supreme Court Justice, Tom C. Clark “
[Quoted in Foundations of Freedom: A Living History of
our Bill of Rights, by John H. Rodehamel, The Constitutional Rights
Foundation, Los Angeles, © 1991, p. 97]
49.)
Moreover, several recent state court decisions have reinvigorated
"the natural law defense" of family rights as a viable element of the
American legal tradition. For example, in a stunning 1982 decision, the Utah
Supreme Court struck down a provision of that state's Children's Rights Act
which allowed for the complete termination of parental rights upon a decision
by welfare authorities that "such termination will be in the child's best
interest." Writing for the majority, Justice Dallin Oaks stated:
"This parental right [to rear one's children]
transcends all property and economic rights, It is rooted not in state or
federal statutory or constitutional law, to which it is logically and chronologically
prior, but in nature and human instinct." He noted that much of the rich
variety in American culture had been transmitted to children by parents
"who were acting against the best interest of their children, as defined
by official dogma."
[In
Re J.P., document no 17386, filed June 9, 1982, The Supreme Court of
the State of Utah, pp. 13, 17.]
There was no surer way to destroy authentic
pluralism,” Justice Oaks added, “than by terminating the rights of parents who
violated the "trendy" definitions and "officially approved
values imposed by reformers empowered to determine what is in the `best
interest' of someone else's child."
50.)
Please Judicially note and place on the record
the fact of what President James Madison, one of the founding fathers of this nation
stated succinctly of which the respondent’s by their acts and/or omissions
against your petitioner are violently usurping and denying him as the natural
guardian to his own child:“
James
Madison—Address to the States, April 25, 1783
“Let it be remembered finally, that it has ever been the
pride and boast of America, that the rights for which she contended, were
the rights of human nature. By
the blessing of the Author of these rights on the means exerted for their
defense, they have prevailed against all opposition and form the basis of
Thirteen Independent States.” [Our
Sacred Honor, Words of Advice from the Founders in Stories, Letters, Poems and
Speeches, by William J. Bennet ©1997, Simon and Schuster, Rockefeller
Center, 1230 Avenue of the America’s, New York, NY 10020, ISBN 0-684-84138-X p.
322]
51.)
It is a fact that debtors prisons are illegal,
and respondent’s are compelled to show an “ability to pay” by palpable
and affirmative evidence. This was
never factually done, as they unlawfully imprisoned your Appellant/Petitioner
for a debt and placed him into debtors prison:
In this emergent appeal, the trial court's Order
incarcerating an indigent child support obligor was reversed; there was no
evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount
ordered by the Court. The incarceration of defendant in the absence of any
showing that he could pay the $10,000 purge figure set by the Court was
"manifest error. A litigant may not be incarcerated for failure to pay
support in accordance with the court order, except upon a showing of an ability
to comply." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate release of
defendant and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of evidence that
he had the ability to comply with the court's order.” MCBSS o/b/o Brookins & Williams v. Tolbert,
(App.Div. June 7, 2000) Before: Hon. Gerald Council, JSC (Mercer County)
“In this emergent appeal, the trial court's Order
incarcerating an indigent child support obligor was reversed; there was no
evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount ordered by
the Court. "A litigant may not be incarcerated for failure to pay support
in accordance with the court order, except upon a showing of an ability to
comply." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate release of defendant
and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of evidence that he had the
ability to comply with the court's order.”
Cruz v. Cruz, (App.Div. March 19, 2001) Before: Hon. Rosalie B. Cooper, JSC (Ocean
County)
In this emergent appeal, the trial court's Order
incarcerating an indigent child support obligor was reversed; there was no
evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount ordered by
the Court. A finding that an obligor has not established changed circumstances
warranting modification of a support order is not synonymous with, and cannot
substitute for, a finding based on substantial, credible evidence that the
obligor has the ability to comply with the order. "The purpose of an order
incarcerating a judgment debtor is to induce compliance with the order. In such
cases, the incarcerated party has the key to freedom in his/her hands because
the debtor-spouse has the ability to comply with the order as a condition for
release." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate release of
defendant and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of evidence that
he had the ability to comply with the court's order. Bachman v. Cohen (App.Div. April 12, 2000) Before:
Hon. Thomas W. Cavanaugh, Jr., JSC (Monmouth County)
“After the initial remand, a second trial court order
incarcerating defendant was reversed and appellant ordered released
immediately. Although the findings of the trial court as to appellant's
ability to earn were affirmed, the remedy chosen (incarceration until payment
of $28,163.10 towards arrears) was erroneous as the record was devoid of
evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the release amount ordered by
the Court. "We disagree only with the remedy chosen by the judge. An order
incarcerating a debtor-spouse ... presupposes that the judgment debtor has
assets that have been secreted or otherwise placed beyond the reach of
execution. R. 1:10-3." The Appellate Division ordered the immediate
release of defendant and prohibited his re-incarceration in the absence of
evidence that he had the ability to comply with the court's order.” Weinstein
v. Weinstein (App.Div. April 7, 2000) Before: Hon. Louis Locascio, JSC
(Monmouth County)
52.)
As the above mentioned tribunal; as well as
Respondent’s in this matter have knowledge of the law, you are hereby
judicially noticed and advised that Title 28 Section 2007 (a) and (b) states
that no person can be imprisoned for debt on a writ issued from a federal court
in any state where imprisonment for debt is outlawed/prohibited/abolished. That
would create a conflict with 18 U.S.C. 228 (Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act) or
California and/or New York Laws and/or
California laws and thereby would be unconstitutional.
“Husband’s harm was not monetary, but rather an injustice
comparable to a “false imprisonment” – defined as “the unlawful violation of
the personal liberty of another.” [Civil is the same.] “It is immaterial
that the deprivation may be temporary and non-final.” Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
53.)
It is a fact that any imprisonment for a debt
vitiates the debt and is a full discharge of the debt. This is well settled law and well understood
by Respondent’s in this matter[42]:
"In the early age of the Republic the creditor had what
Lord Coke calls a personal lien, nexus, a mortgage of the person of the debtor,
and might upon his default in payment, have kept him as his slave or sold
him. The gambling debts of the Germans
were frequently pain in the same manner.
The Common Law has adopted the modifications of the rule which was
introduced in the time of Theodosius,
by whom it was declared that imprisonment of a debtor for the smallest space
of time was a full satisfaction: "Nec sane remuneratione precil
debet exposcere cui, etiam minimi temporis spatio servitium satisfeeit ingenui." The Theory of the Common Law,
by James M. Walker, Charleston, S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852;
p. 34
NOTE ALSO:
“It has been contended, that as a contract can only bind a
man to pay to the full extent of his property, it is an implied condition that
he may be discharged on surrendering the whole of it.” Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat. 122 1819
XVII
COUNT
VIII
EIGHTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
HAVE FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED A SYSTEM OF SLAVERY USING PUBLISHED
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE(S) SECTION §§
270 AND 166(a)(4) [AND OTHER RELATED “LAWS”
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 181 – SLAVERY [FELONY]
PC
§ 784.5 – CHILD SLAVERY
[FELONY]
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
CAL.CONST.
(1849) ART I, SECTION 15 –SLAVERY PROHIBITED
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART I, SECTION 13
CONST.
U.S.—AMEND. 13 – SLAVERY PROHIBITED
TITLE
42 U.S.C. § 1994 – Peonage Abolished
54.)
It is a fact, that your Appellant, as an
Honorable United States Marine Corps veteran who served his country with honor
and distinction, who is a member of the white Christian race of this nation, a
member of the organic posterity of this nation, is not nor ever has been a
slave.
"The chief division of rights of persons is this: men
are either free or slaves." The Institutes of Justinian
(533AD); Lib. I, Tit. III, Gai. I. 9.
55.)
It is a fact, that slavery is in direct
contradistinction to our form of government as well as to the concise rule of
law, and the public policy of the several union states, and is
unconstitutional, and an act of war and opprobrious to a free peoples:
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Matthews ruled that the "Sovereignty
itself of course, not subject to the law, for is the author and source of law;
but, in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom
all government exists and acts. And the
law is the definition of limitation of power...For the very idea that one man
may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material
right essential to the enjoyment of life at the mere will of another seems to
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself".
56.)
It is a factual truth, that it is not in
Appellant’s son’s best interests to have respondent’s cogently and willfully
place a father forced into peonage against his will and over his consent in
order to support their entry into the welfare state, as slavery and peonage is
factually abolished in this nation:
“The holding of any person to service or labor under the
system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or
State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders,
regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore
established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall
hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly,
the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in
liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.”
57.)
Respondent’s have knowledge of the law, and are
fully aware of the system of slavery they are unlawfully establishing against
your Appellant/Petitioner as well as other fathers[43]:
“The slavery that plagues us today is what may best be
described as a cannibalistic slavery that has slowly developed since the
1930's where those in power enslave
multitudes without accepting the responsibilities of masters. Back in pre civil
war times, a Virginia lawyer named George Fitzhugh could see how people could
be slaves without being bought or sold. He saw how there were those in his day
who enslaved people in a cannibalistic fashion, thereby accumulating great
wealth. They were people who had "all the advantages [of slavery], and
none of the cares and responsibilities of a master." Cannibals All! - Or Slaves Without
Masters, by George Fitzhugh, Harvard Univ. Press, 1960, pg. 20
(Originally published in 1857).
If you understand how slavery works, the answer is simple,
because it is the duty of masters to support the offspring of slaves. One need
not be bought or sold to be a slave. All that is necessary is for the law to
operate upon a person's labor in such a manner so as to direct and receive the
fruits of that person's labor (see: Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How
393, 624- 25).
"It is immaterial whether a system of slavery was
introduced by express law, or otherwise, if it have the authority of law. There
is no slave state where the institution is not recognized and protected by
statutory enactments and judicial decisions." Dred Scott v. Sanford
19 How 393, 535
58.)
Respondent’s are concisely and willfully imposing slavery in overt
violation to the Constitution of California (1849) Article I, Section. 18. In the Dred Scott case, two justices
dissented from the majority opinion. One was Curtis and the other was McLean.
Curtis showed the application of the old slave maxim PARTUS SEQUITUR VENTREM[44]
in his dissenting opinion. He stated:
"If, in Missouri, the plaintiff were held to be a
slave, the validity and operation of his contract of marriage must be denied.
He can have no legal rights; of course, not those of a husband and father. And
the same is true of his wife and children. The denial of his rights is a denial
of theirs. So that, though lawfully married in the Territory, when they came
out of it, into the State of Missouri, they were no longer husband and wife,
and a child of that lawful marriage....is not the fruit of that marriage, nor
the child of its father, but subject to the maxim partus sequitur
ventrem." Dred Scott v.
Sanford (1856), 19 How. 393, 599-600.
As I am factually
not embarrassed nor a “Fourteenth
Amendment” citizen, I cannot be forced into paying or being “obligated to
“Child Support.”
"The labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce." (See: Clayton Act; 38 Stat. 731, 15
U.S.C. Sect. 17, 15 U.S.C.A. Sect. 17)
It
is a fact, that Respondent’s are in fact cogently establishing a system that
forces children away from their fathers to mothers who need State[45]
support in order to establish a system of slavery, so that the state can obtain
“Title IV-D” Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes of which they factually
would not obtain upon allowing custody to be granted to the father (appellant)
in accordance with law.
59.)
IT IS INCONTROVERTABLE, THAT IT HAS BECOME
COMMON PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THAT
RESPONDENT’S AND THEIR SURROGATE COURTS ARE IN FACT, ENFORCING A SYSTEM OF
SLAVERY AGAINST YOUR APPELLANT. PLEASE
FACTUALLY NOTE THE FOLLOWING YAHOO GROUP ON THE INTERNET WHICH BRAGS ABOUT THIS
SLAVERY. YOUR APPELLANT DEMANDS THE
FOLLOWING URL BE JUDICIALLY NOTED AND PLACED ON THE RECORD:
Yahoo Group - Ex-Husband_is_now_my_Slave
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Ex-husband_is_now_my_slave/
[April 11, 2002 reviewed]
“A serious and supportive discussion forum for divorced or
legally separated women to discuss how
they have used divorce, child support,
alimony and the courts to make their ex-husbands their financial slaves.
Also how ex-wives have used the psychology of divorce to turn their ex-husbands
into servants and slaves for their own amusement and enrichment. A forum for
women to share their success stories in humiliating and bankrupting
ex-husbands--and then moving on, with their ex's money, to better relationships
with more attractive men. Humiliation. Revenge. Female power. Female financial
domination. No doubt about it: For many women, divorce can be the road to the
easy life--and wealth and riches. And the beauty of it all is that it's all
done at the expense of your ex, who now is your financial slave. This list is
about placing your ex in psychological and financial bondage. Discuss the
tactics--and laugh about it--here.”
XVIII
COUNT IX
NINTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
LIES
AND PERJURIES OF RESPONDENT’S TO ESTABLISH CLAIM—PAINT THEM WITH UNCLEAN
HANDS—AS LYING AND PERJURIES ARE THE STANDARD PRACTICE OF RESPONDENT’S[46]
IN WHICH TO ABROGATE THE RIGHTS AND SECURED LIBERTIES OF YOUR
APPELLANT/PETITIONER USING COLOR OF LAW AND UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 14 – PERJURY
PC
§ 118.1 – PERJURY BY
PEACE OFFICER [FELONY 3 YEARS]
PC
§ 118(a) [FELONY]
PC
§ 127 – SUBORNATION OF
PERJURY [FELONY]
PC
§§ 128, 129 – PERJURY UNDER
OATH [FELONY 4 YEARS]
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 1001—FALSE STATEMENTS
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 1002 – POSESSION OF FALSE PAPERS TO
DEFAUD THE US
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 1621 – WILLFULNESS
TESTIMONY MADE UNDER OATH
TITLE
18 § 1623 – TWO OR MORE
PERJURIES
TITLE
28 § 1746 – KNOWLEDGE OF
PERJURY
TITLE
28 U.S.C. § 1746 – PERJURY IN COURT
60.)
Respondent’s overt perjuries and lies cannot
establish any claim, jurisdiction, or action against me in this matter as they
have been lies. This whole matter
started with the kidnapping of my son on or about February 15, 1985 of which
has been continually sustained by overt perjury after perjury:
The rule "falsus in uno, falus in ominbus" means
that where a witness is found to have sworn falsely in a certain material part
of his testimony, his entire testimony may for that reason be
rejected." Brandt v. Krogh
(1910) 14 CA 39, 111 P. 275
61.)
Time cannot render any act done “In the Best
Interest of the Child” good over time.
Quodinitio
vitiosum est, non potest tractu temporis convalescere. “Time cannot render valid, and act void in
its origin.” Dig 50, 17, 29.
“Time
does not confirm a void act. (CC § 3539)”
"The science of law, in its most comprehensive sense,
is the body of rules of human conduct which are universally recognized as
obligatory. In a more limited view, is
the body of rules which constitute the code of a particular state. But in either sense, the basis of every
system must be truth." [See The
Theory of the Common Law by James M. Walker, Charleston, S.C., Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1852; p. iii].
"It is no less good morals and good law that the government should
turn square corners in dealing with the people then that the people should turn
square corners in dealing with their government." St. Regis Paper Col. V. United States,
368 U.S. 206, 299, 82 S.Ct. 289, 301, 7 L.Ed.2d 240 (1961) (Black J.,
Dissenting)
It
is a fact, that Appellant/Petitioner has in fact, attempted to seek redress and
has not participated in any way shape or form with the illegal acts and/or
omissions of Respondent’s.
“In
illegal contract is void, yet a party otherwise entitled to profit by this
fact, cannot be heard in equity if by his own acts he participated in the
wrong.” Richman v. Back of Perris
(1929) 102 CA 71, 782 P. 801.
62.)
Under law, Respondent’s and their surrogate
courts were compelled to return my son to me by law; as they factually acted in
Bad Faith, and in direct contradistinction to law:
"By the civil law, the child of parents divorced is to
be brought up by the innocent party, at the expense of the guilty
party." Ridley's View,
part 1, ch. 3, sect. 9, cites 8th Collation.
Vide, generally, 1 Blackstone's Comm. 440.
63.)
This court is bound to not allow respondent’s to
benefit from their continued crimes against Appellant/Petitioner.
“The doctrine [of unclean hands] promotes justice by making
a [respondent] answer for his own misconduct in the action. It prevents "a
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression." [Respondent’s]
must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be
denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim.” Kendall-Jackson
Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (E. & J. Gallo Winery) (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 970.
64.)
Respondent’s have usurped the most fundamental
forms of trial, and have abrogated the common law forms of justice and used
their surrogate courts to implement tyranny from their UNCLEAN HANDS:
XIX
COUNT
X
TENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE I SECTION 10 OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN APPELLANT AND HIS SON
WHICH RESPONDENT’S ARE UNLAWFULLY ABROGATING THE UNALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN MY SON AND MYSELF (APPELLANT)
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
CCP
§ 1866 – CONSTRUCTION OF
NATURAL RIGHT
CCP
§ 708.180 – DENIAL OF DEBT
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SEC. 16 –OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
CAL.
CONST (1849) ART. I, SEC. 11 -- UNIFORM
OPERATION OF LAWS
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
U.S.
CONST. ART. I, SECTION 10 – OBLIGATION
OF CONTRACTS
65.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s in the first
instance of this matter by kidnapping my son from me, without my authority or
consent, violated Article I, Section 10 of the Obligation of Contract between
my son Windsor Scott Cheney (his proper legal name, spelling and
capitalization), and Appellant/Petitioner Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., (his
proper legal name, spelling and capitalization), his lawful father.
"The United States Constitution's Contract Clause
Article I, Section 10, (See United States Trust Company v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1], "The instant case involves a financial obligation and thus as
a threshold matter may not be said automatically to fall [431 U.S. 1, 25] within the reserved powers that cannot
be contracted away. At the time the
Constitution was adopted and for really a century thereafter, the contract
clause was one of the few express limitations on state power."
66.)
Respondent’s refuse to enter proper and legal
NAME[47]
of your Appellant:
“There
is no foundation for bringing the action against a fictitious person.” People v. Herman, 45 Cal. 689.
67.)
Respondent’s in capriciously and unlawfully
using and inflicting PC 270 and 166(a)(4) (and other supporting laws) against
your Appellant, their main intent is to in fact, unjustly drive fathers into
total debt and destruction driving up huge amounts of child support in which
they know and understand no father can pay; then, to deny them the right of any
ability to protect either their children, their home, or any of their property and
deny them all redress of grievances or remedy at law.
“The convention appears to have intended to establish a
great principle, that contracts should be inviolable. The constitution,
therefore, declares, that no State shall pass ‘any law impairing the obligation
of contracts.’” Sturges v. Crowninshield, (1819) 4 Wheat. 122
68.)
Respondents willfully without due process of
law, nor even lawful authority, using color of law, under color of authority,
manufactured crime for their own pecuniary and financial remuneration purposes
to disenfranchise appellant: “Private
contracts are not subject to unlimited modification under the police
power.” [Id. 431 U.S. 1,
17] See also: “The state cannot diminish rights of the people.” Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516.
69.)
Respondent’s by their own acts and/or omissions
in committing Appellant/Petitioner to Civil Murder, had knowledge that they had
driven me into complete poverty, and had destroyed my life, and that I could
not pay any monies, but they continuously came after me anyway so that they
could obtain state and federal remunerations for their crimes so that they
could warehouse me and illegally place me into jail and/or prison and that they
could manufacture crime for the purposes of profit and reward:
“In State v Bess, 44 Utah, 29 [137 Pac. 829],
in a prosecution under a statute similar to our own, the judgment was reversed
for the same reason, it being said: ‘We think the evidence wholly fails to show
willful neglect on his part as contemplated by the statute to provide for and
support the children mentioned in the information. True, evidence was introduced showing hat he failed to contribute
anything for their support; but the evidence also shows that the current and
necessary expenses of himself and two boys far exceeded his earnings during the
time covered by the information, hence his neglect in that regard was not
without 'just excuse.'" People
v. Forester, (1916) 29 Cal.App. 460
70.)
Respondent’s willful acts and/or omissions are
in complete violation of the law, and they fully understand this as they have
been assured of complicity and support by their surrogate courts which will
protect their unlawful acts and/or omissions and become willfully blind to
them:
"Said the court: 'The legislature did not enact this
law for the purpose of punishing the parents for failure to do their duty as
such. Such a purpose would smack too
strongly of paternal government. The
only legitimate object of the statute is to secure to infants, who are in
future to become citizens of this state, proper care; such care as is necessary
to protect their lives and health. In
other words, to prevent destitution. It
follows from the foregoing that if the infant children are receiving food,
clothing and lodging from any source, there is no occasion for the state to
interfere by penal law or otherwise.” People
v. Hartman, 23 Cal.App. 72, 81-82.
XX
COUNT
XI
ELEVENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
ARE IN FACT USING PUBLISHED CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §§
270 AND 166 (a)(4) FOR A PURPOSE NOT INTENDED AT LAW, AND ARE NOT ADHERING TO
THE CONCISE RULE OF LAW, AND ARE IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION AND CONTRADISTINCTION
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF CALIFORNIA (1849) AND THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED
STATES (1787-1791) FULLY KNOWING THEIR SURROGATE COURTS WILL PROTECT THEIR
INSOLENCE TO THE RULE OF LAW
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 8 – INTENT TO DEFRAUD
[FELONY]
PC § 519 – FEAR AND THREAT TO EXTORT [FELONY]
CAL. CONST. (1849) – ART. I, SEC. 11 [LAWS MUST
HAVE UNIFORM OPERATION]
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 –[BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES, EX POST
FACTO]
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FIRST – REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
US
CONST. ART 6, SEC. 2 -- CONST. SUPREME
LAW OF THE LAND
US
CONST. ART IV, SEC 4 – REPUBLIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT
US
CONST. AMEND THE FIFTH—MODE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
71.)
THERE IS NO LAWFUL EXCUSE—NO REMEDY AT
LAW FOR APPELLANT/PETITIONER (nor any other father): The law IN FACT must
provide a remedy to me, in which respondent’s and their surrogate courts acting
in collusion and in direct conspiracy to the Constitution of California (1849);
are insolently refusing LAWFUL REMEDY to me and all fathers.
CC § 3523 transfers the equitable maxim Ubi
jus ibi remedium. substituting the
words “wrong” for “right” and declares “for every wrong there is a
remedy.” People v. Reid
(1924) 195 C. 249, 232 P. 457, 36 ALR 1435.
The maxim “for every wrong there is a remedy,” bestows upon
a person wronged the right to seek redress in an action and the bias for grant
thereof is dominated the cause of the action.
Painter v. Berglund (1939) 31 CA2d 63; 87 P.2d 360.
“Impairment of a remedy was held to be unconstitutional., if
it effectively removed the value of substantive contract rights”. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1,
75-76, 84-85 (1823) (See also Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311,
315-318 (1843); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall., at
552-554.
72.)
Respondent’s knowingly are impressing a Bill of
Pains and Penalties against your Appellant in overt violation of law as well as
the Constitution of California (1849) and the United States (1787-1791):
Bill of Attainder is "Legislative acts, no matter what
their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial." United
States v Brown, 381, US 437,448-49,, 85 S Ct 1707, 1715, 14 L.Ed.
484;492; United States v Lovett, 328 US 303, 315, 66 S. Ct.
1073,1079,90 L Ed. 1252.
An act is a Bill of Attainder if the punishment is death, a
Bill of Pains and Penalties if the punishment is less severe; both kinds of
punishment fall within the scope of the constitutional prohibition." U.S. Constitution Art. 1, Sec 9 (as pertains
to Congress); Art 1, Sec 10 (as pertains
to legislatures)
"No State shall ...... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any
title of nobility...." Article
1, Sec 10, United States Constitution.
73.)
Respondent’s knowingly refused to answer
Appellant’s Bill of Particulars lawfully filed against Respondent’s District
Attorney Michael L. Ramsey, et als.; and his surrogate court systems; and
Respondent’s did knowingly and insolently refused to inform me of the nature
and cause of the accusation against me, the venue, the jurisdiction and the
real party in interest—and willfully kept me ignorant thereto during all times
of this matter in order that they could usurp my substantive rights and
constitutionally secured liberties using color of law, under color of
authority, in overt violation of the Constitution of California (1849) and the
Constitution of New York (1777) as well as the Constitution for the United
States (1787-1791). The following case
is almost an exact reenactment of the injustices perpetrated by Respondent’s
against Appellants in this matter:
Petitioner was not informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation. The statute was in no
respect complied with. The petitioner
was arrested on a warrant that neither charged an offense nor contained a
certified copy of any charge, and was
immediately committed to jail for 30 days. Sona v. Aluminum
Castings Co., supra; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418; Ex parte Robinson, 19
Wall. 505; Windsor v. McVeigh,
93 U.S. 274; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; In re Holt, 55 N. J. L. 384.
“…The record on appeal was wrongfully
altered after the appeal was perfected
by arbitrarily striking out defendant's answer and motion in arrest of
judgment, and for a new trial; and the
court's refusal to act on the same was a refusal to perform the duties required of it by law; and striking the papers from the record on appeal after
appeal was perfected was an invasion of
the province and jurisdiction of appellate courts, and deprived petitioner of
substantial legal rights. A sentence imposed for an offense not charged is
void.”
… "All that is requisite to their validity is that,
when not taken for matters occurring in open court, in the presence of the Judges, notice should be given to the
attorney of the charges made and
opportunity afforded him for explanation and
defense. The manner in which the proceeding shall be conducted, so that
it be without oppression or unfairness, is
a matter of judicial regulation."
The Court in Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267,
applied this rule to proceedings for contempt. Due process of law, therefore,
in the prosecution of contempt, except
of that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of
the charges and have a reasonable
opportunity to meet them by way of defense or
explanation.” [SEE Cooke
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767]
Finally, note the observations from our founding fathers on
the unconstitutional acts of Respondents:
"Alexander Hamilton wrote: 'Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat
and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the government
principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind if the doctrine of
disqualification, disenfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the
legislature. The dangerous consequences
of this power are manifest. If the
legislature can disenfranchise any number of citizens at pleasure by general
descriptions.'
'The Constitution outlaws this entire category of punitive
measures. The amount of punishment is
material to the classification of a challenge statute. But punishment is prerequisite..." "The deprivation of any rights, civil
or political, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation
determining the fact.’" United
States v. Lovett, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1083 (1946)
XXI
COUNT
XII
TWELFTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
PENAL
CODE § 270
FACTUALLY NOT A FELONY
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 17(a)(4) – DEFENDANT
DOES NOT VOLUNTEER FOR FELONY
PC
§ 871 – NO CRIME
CAL.
CONST (1849) PREAMBLE
CAL.
CONST (1849) ART. I, SECTION 4 – RELIGIOUS BELIEF
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 16—EX POST FACTO, BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES
CAL
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SEC. 24 –ENUMERATION OF RIGHTS
CAL.
CONST. (1849) – ART. I, SEC. 11 [LAWS MUST HAVE UNIFORM OPERATION]
US
CONST. AMEND. THE NINTH – RIGHTS NOT DENIED TO PEOPLE
74.)
It is a fact; that Penal Code §
270 is not a felony. Respondent’s fully
understand this fact.
“By section 16 of the Penal Code, crimes are divided into
two, and only two classes. 1. Felonies; 2. Misdemeanors. Section 17 of the Penal Code defines two
cases of crimes as follows: ‘A Felony
is a crime which is punishable with
death, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
Every other crime is a Misdemeanor.’
The law does not define misdemeanor, as those offenses punishable by
fine or imprisonment in the County or City Jail, but as those for which the
penalty imposed, whatsoever it may be is other than death or imprisonment in
the state prison. The conclusion would
therefore seem irresistible that, since the punishment for which however, is
not that prescribed for a felony, it must necessary follow that it is a
misdemeanor. As said in Pillsbury
v. Brown, 47 Cal. 480; “A misdemeanor is an act or omission for which a
punishment other than death or imprisonment in the state prison is denounced by
law.” Union Ice Co. v. Rose, 11 C.A. 357
75.)
It is a fact, that California Law is concise
upon this issue and the evildoer Respondent’s cannot change the appellation:
“According to the form given in Section 238, it is proper to
precede the statement of the acts constituting the offense by a statement of
the crime for which the party is indicted, ‘giving its legal appellation, such as
murder, arson, manslaughter, or the like, as designating it as a felony or
misdemeanor’ This does not require that
it shall be called a felony or misdemeanor, but assumes the legal appellation[48]
of the crime will itself show whether it is a felony or misdemeanor. If the legal appellation as given in the
statue defining the offense does not show whether it is a felony or a
misdemeanor, it cannot be made or shown to be one or the other by the pleader
calling it a felony or misdemeanor.” People
v. War, (1862) 20 C. 117
76.)
It is a fact, that Penal Code §
17 mandates that the change of law be cogently accepted by the Appellant at
arraignment, which in fact, never occurred, and which to I never have accepted,
nor ever will accept as I have never accepted jurisdiction appearing specially
at all times and have continually objected to said Penal Code §
270 being invented into a felony:
PC
§ 17 (b) (4)—
“When the prosecuting attorney files in a court having
jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses a complaint specifying that the offense
is a misdemeanor, unless the defendant at the time of his or her arraignment or
plea objects to the offense being made a misdemeanor, in which event the
complaint shall be amended to charge a felony and the case shall proceed on the
felony complaint.”
77.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s embodied in
their legal representatives themselves have admitted that Penal Code §
270 “is only a misdemeanor.” [SEE
EXHIBIT ____—DDA Jack Schafer July 08, 1996 Motion for Reconsideration and
Modification of Sentence 1204.1 and 654]
78.)
The living sages of the law concur with your
Appellant/Petitioner
“In criminal cases, no power should be lodged in any judge to construe the law, otherwise than according to the letter. A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer less. In case of apparent hardship, the crown has the power to pardon.” Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, edited by Wm. Hardcastle Browne, A.M., by L.K. Strouse & Co., Law Publishers, New York, 1892, p. 26.
79.)
The California Penal Code (as the Codes
themselves are neither public law, nor are they legal statutes as passed
as required by law of California Statutes “The people of the State of
California, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:”:)
80.)
Whether a “Code” appellation is state prison
and/or county jail it is in fact, only a misdemeanor:
“An appeal will not lie to this court in a criminal cause,
except in cases amounting to a felony; Sec. 245 of Penal Code, as Amended in
1874 provides that the punishment for an assault with a deadly weapon shall be
“by imprisonment in the state prison or in a county jail not exceeding five
thousand dollars, or by both.” Section
17 of the same Code provides that “A felony is a crime which is punishable by
death or by imprisonment in the state prison.
Every other crime is punishable by fine or imprisonment in the state
prison is also punishable by fine or imprisonment in a county jail, in the
discretion of the court, it shall be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes
after judgment imposing a punishment in the state prison.” (Amendment of 1874). “The offense of which the defendant was
convicted was therefore, only a misdemeanor, and no appeal lies from
judgment.” People v. Charles W.
Aubry, 53 C. 427, 428.
XXII
COUNT
THIRTEEN
THIRTEENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
PENAL
CODE §§ 270 and
166(a)(4) BEING USED BY RESPONDENT’S FOR A PURPOSE NOT INTENDED BY LAW, FRAUD:
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 186.11 – FRAUD, VICTIM
RESTITUTION
PC
§ 531(a) – FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES [MISDEMEANOR—1 YR, $5,000]
PC
532(a) et seq. FALSE STATEMENTS AND BENEFIT FROM [FELONY, 1 YR, $5,000]
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
81.)
Respondent’s perjure themselves from the first
instance of this matter and implement a fraud against Appellant making a
“mutilated beggar” claim that their law and cause must be liberally construed
in order to persecute Appellant and deny him all his rights so that “society”
embodied in the State of California and all its subsidiary institutions shall
not be “burdened” by the maintenance of the beggar Ms. Susan Sloan (in
capturing Appellants son into Welfare).
However, the direct opposite was true, and it is a fact, that I only
demanded my son, WITH NO BURDEN TO THE STATE WHATSOEVER! In contravention, Ms. Susan Sloan has had
illegally placed not only my son into the system of the County of Butte
(and its fellow organization the STATE OF CALIFORNIA) but also has
procreated two other additional illegal bastard children while on welfare—(placing
my son into further poverty and jeopardy against my will and against my consent
and lawful authority)—and it is understood by the facts that she as well as
respondent’s sole intent was in fact, to burden the people of the State of
California and seek remuneration for these crimes.
“We are not insensitive to respondent’s argument, that the
statue under consideration should be liberally construed to effectuate its
purpose and we realize the social problem involved in cases of this character
and burden placed upon the state and upon such admirable institutions as the
Eureka Benevolent Society, which cared for defendant’s family during several
years of his absence. However, we are aloes
aware that section 270 of the penal code might be used for an instrument of
oppression and abuse in many conceivable cases unless it be construed by the
courts with a view to protecting substantive rights of defendants charged
thereunder. The decisions of this state
show a wise policy of protection against such possible abuses. In the case of People v. Forrester,
29 Cal.App. 462 [155 Pac. 1023] the court in considering the section of the
Penal Code we are discussion, quotes with approval the following language from
another jurisdiction: “While the law in
question is salutary , it nevertheless is of that character which requires it
to be administered with some care as to not to produce more mischief by its
enforcement in certain cases than can be prevented thereby.” People v. Wallach, (1923) 62 Cal.App. 385; [Crim. No. 1099: 1st
Appel. Distr., Div. 2, June 1923]
82.)
Respondent’s acts and/or omissions places
“Welfare” and “Title IV-D” Welfare claims over the rights, immunities and
privileges of your Appellant/Petitioner, and is in fact a unlawful usurpation
of power in direct contradistinction to our form of government and the concise
rule of law, as well as public policy; as enumerated in the Constitution of
California (1849) as well as of the Constitution for the United States
(1787-1791) as well as Appellant’s personal rights and secured liberties:
“The only ground upon which a court of law can interpose, is
some personal outrage. But your
Lordship exercises the jurisdiction, belonging to the Sovereign, as Parens
Patriae, delegated to the person holding the Great Seal. A court of law can only control abuse of
power; but cannot appoint any other person in the place of the parent as
guardian to exercise power. The leading
circumstances, influencing your Lordships discretion are the ability of the
Father to maintain his child, and his disposition to make right use of his
authority.” [pg. 55]
“…If he
maintains the child, and does not neglect it, your Lordship cannot deprive him
of custody; nor interfere with a Father, teaching that mode of religion which
he thinks best. A husband also has the
right to the society of his wife, and if she deserts him, no one is
justified in harboring her or supplying her with necessities.
“…the
Father; under whose protection the law places [the child], will full powers;
provided they are used for proper purposes.
“But there
is no instance, either that court or this, of taking the child from the Father,
willing to receive [it]; not under articles of peace an in no suit in
Ecclesiastical, or any other court.” DeMannevill
v. DeManneville (1804) [SEE: Rex v. Demanneville, 102 Eng
Rep 1054 (KB 1804).]
[Please note:
Ms. Susan Sloan and her contemnor Respondent’s did kidnap my son and
flee Windsor Scott Cheney’s home using force and stratagem, keeping him from
the same home as your Appellant/Petitioner who had clean hands in this matter
and who also lived at 14955 Clearcut Lane, Forest Ranch, California in on or
about February 15, 1985—and she did enjoin in crime with the County of Butte et als., for the purposes of obtaining
either direct or indirect “Title IV-D” Welfare remunerations from that unlawful
act of kidnapping and/or abduction. She
deserted the place were my son and I lived, and hid and/or concealed him from me—and under law, cannot receive
any Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes—notwithstanding feminist
respondents within the County of Butte, the State of California and/or the
United States.]
XXIII
COUNT
XIV
FOURTEENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
ARE WILLFULLY INFLICTING CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS AGAINST YOUR
APPELLANT/PETITIONER
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
8
C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2), (3) -- TORTURE
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
U.S.
CONST. AMENDMENT THE EIGHTH
83.)
It is a fact, that published California Penal
Code is only a misdemeanor, and not a felony—and thereby; the wrong which has
been inflicted upon me is in overt violation of the Constitution of California
(1849) , Article I, Section 6 “excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted,
nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.” And the Constitution for the United States (1787-1791) Amendment the
Eighth: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, no excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” See In re O’Shea,
(1909) 11 CA 568, 105 P. 776 “Cruel and unusual punishments are punishments of
a barbarous character, unknown to the common law. The term when first used in the Bill of Rights…” SEE also: ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
84.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s in their
continued acts and/or omissions and insolent constitutional violations of my
rights; supported by their surrogate court systems, have made Appellant’s right
to defend any of his legal rights to life, liberty or property, a factual
impossibility.
“The law never
required impossibilities.” CC §
3531.
XXIV
COUNT
XV
FIFTEENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
YOUR
APPELLANT HAS SUFFERED MULTIPLE DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATIONS IN DIRECT VIOLATION
OF THE LAW:
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 654 – DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PC
§ 655 – DOUBLE JEOPARDY
FOREIGN LAW
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 8
U.S.
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FIFTH
85.)
No Citizen cannot have more than one penalty or
suffer more than one imprisonment for one alleged “crime”:
"It was the object of this section of the Code, as it
was enacted in 1883, to prevent the abuses which were considered to have arisen
in the imprisonment of persons in civil actions under the law as it previously
existed; and, by this section, the time for which a person may be imprisoned
under an execution or other mandate to enforce the recovery of a sum of money
has been declared and restricted. And
the section has been so famed as expressly to include 'a commitment upon a fine
of contempt of court in the non-payment of alimony or counsel fees in a divorce
case.' Then it has prescribed the
length of time to which the imprisonment may be extended for such
non-payment. And the section has
further and finally declared that 'the prisoner shall not be again imprisoned
upon a like process issued in the same action, or arrested in any action upon
any judgment under which the same may have been granted.' This language in its application to this
case, is broad and plain, forbidden a further imprisonment upon a like process
issued in the same action; and it has direct reference to the imprisonment
previously authorized and sanctioned by this section, and, by its meaning and
import, restricts and limits the imprisonment to what has been before provided
for and described. If that is not to be
the effect of this concluding language of the section, then it has accomplished
nothing for the relief of a person imprisoned for an action for divorce. For as the law previously existed, where a
person had been imprisoned for a contempt for the non-payment of a sum of
money, and had been discharged from imprisonment by the court for his inability
to comply with the order, he count not afterwards be arrested and imprisoned
for the same default. There was no
necessity for legislation to secure relief in that respect; for if he person
could not endure the imprisonment, or his circumstances were such that he could
not comply with the order for the payment of the money, and the court
terminated and relieved him from imprisonment for either of such causes, his
further commitment to enforce the payment of the same sum of money was neither
sanctioned nor provided for by any provision of the law; and, for the future
security and protection of the person, there was no necessity, therefore, for
the legislation to declare that he should not be again imprisoned for the same
cause.
What was intended by the enactment of
this section was to secure still further relief than that before sanction to
the party who had previously been imprisoned and lawfully discharged. And that was described and directed in their
language, prohibiting the person from being again imprisoned upon a like
process, not for the non-payment of the same sum of money, but issued in the
same action. This language is very
general and entirely unrestrained, and it is obvious meaning is that no further
process shall be issued against a person in an action for divorce, upon which
he shall be committed to prison for the non-payment of a sum of money, after he
has been once imprisoned and lawfully discharged under the preceding provisions
of the section. If the enactment is not
to secure this end, then it has accomplished no substantial benefit to the
defendant required to pay alimony in an action for a divorce, for he may still
be perpetually imprisoned if this section shall be held to permit his
imprisonment after he has once been legally discharged under it. If that discharge is not to secure his
protection against like proceedings afterwards instituted under the judgment,
then, after he has served his first three or six months in prison and been discharged,
he may be immediately arrested and committed again to prison for the
non-payment of alimony accruing under the judgment while his imprisonment was
endured. And this may go on from time
to time through the entire period of his natural life. The intention of the law was not to permit
this continued oppression and incarceration, but it was to restrict the right
of imprisonment, when the period mentioned in the section should be fully
endured by the party, to that imprisonment only, excluding after the power to
arrest or imprison the person in default of future payments." Winton v. Winton, 53 Hun 4; 5
NYS 537, (aff. 117 NY 623, mem. 22 N.E. 379)
(case in pertinent parts) [First Department, May Term, 1889] pgs 4 through 7. (cited from HUN)]
86.)
Please note:
“The common law maxim “no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life
more than once for the same offense,” is embodied in the Federal Constitution
and those of the Several States; and where a defendant has been once placed
into jeopardy, the verdict of acquittal prevents a second trial for the same
offense, upon appeal by the prosecution, notwithstanding error committed in
ordering the verdict. People v. Terrill (1901) 132 C. 497.; 64 P.
894. It is a simple fact and settled
law that I cannot be brought in multiple times and punishments and
imprisonments for “Penal Code § 270 violations” and/or Penal Code §
166(a) (4) violations. Respondent’s and
their surrogate courts continually violate this constitutional mandate with
insolence.
87.)
It is a fact, that I did pay TAXES both State
and Federal, which establishes and maintains Respondent’s systems and their
surrogate courts, of which they then illegally abduct my child into that same
system I have paid taxes for, and then claim that “the public” (of which I am a
part of and did pay taxes in concomitant unison with said “public” also pay
these taxes, which clearly makes this an accounting fraud as I am being double
, and triple penalized for the same act and/or omission committed by
Respondent’s, in direct violation of law.
“A state may NOT impose a charge for the enjoyment of a
right granted by the Federal Constitution.” Murdock v. Penn, 319
U.S. 105, 113.
XXV
COUNT
XVI
SIXTHTEENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, AND FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE ALLEGED “DEBT” THEY
DEMAND TO STEAL FROM ME, IS IN FACT, RESPONDENT’S HAVE A SCAM WHERE THEY
REDEFINE OBLIGATION [AND/OR DEBT] INTO SOMETHING ELSE IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF
LAW, AND THE NORMAL USE AND REASONABLE UNDERSTANDING OF WORDS.
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 72 – FRAUDULENT CLAIMS
[FELONY, $10,000]
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE I, SECTION 6 –
EXCESSIVE FINES
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SEC. 15 – NO IMPRISONMENT FOR A DEBT
CAL
CONST. (1849) ART I, SEC. 16 – NO BILL OF ATTAINDER OR EX POST FACTO LAW
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
88.)
The law is clear, it states that in redefining
Child Support that any other reading or instrument of the term “obligation” or
“debt,” comes only from clean hands of Respondent’s and a voluntary acquiescence and agreement
by the father and commitment to bind himself to (which never happened as Appellant has always correctly asserted
that this was and still is a kidnapping case) any agreement to pay “Child
Support[49]”,
in order to change the nature and character of the mere legal obligation into a
“special debt” or “special obligation”.
“Where wife is entitled to alimony, as innocent
party in divorce proceeding, property settlement agreement
represents an effort by parties to fix amount to be paid….with the agreement
of the parties is not a “debt” within the meaning of constitutional
provision against imprisonment for a debt. (Const. Art. I, §
15). Miller v. Superior Court,
(1937) 72 P. 2d 868.”
"In general, a statute is itself treated as a contract
when the language and circumstances evince a legislative intent to create
private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State. Comarpe Dodge v. Board of Education,
302 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1937), with Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,
303 U.S. 95, 104-105 (1938).
In
order for Respondent’s to get from the normal term of “debt” to “special debt”
[sic], it must show clean hands, that the contract was brought at innocent
party, with clean hands, as if this requirement is not met, there can be no
lawful contract or agreement between the parties, and the whole proceeding
would be an extrajudicial proceeding outside the law. Otherwise, the state would complicit with aiding and abetting in
criminal acts or unconscionable contract and slavery which the state is forever
estopped from entering into and would lose any ability to redefine the
Constitutionality of the obligation[50].
89.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s have knowledge
of the law, and in order for the “obligation” or “debt” to be a “special” debt
or obligation, that in the concise and common meaning of language, respondent’s
must admit it as such. It is a fact,
that nowhere in respondent’s fraudulent paperwork is the term “special
obligation” or “special contract” or “special debt” been produced, thereby in
accordance with the concise rule of law, the instrument or “order” so placed
against me is null and void and can only come under the meaning of “obligation”
as defined under Sharon v. Sharon, (1888) S.Ct. [No 9984 In Bank—January 31, 1888] 1 is in fact, only
an obligation and no more.
“’Duties’ and ‘Obligations’ were evidence used in the same
sense in a former C.C. § 55 which stated in part that consent alone will
not constitute marriage, that it must be followed by solemnization or by a
mutual assumption of marital rights, duties, or obligations.” Sharon v. Sharon (1880) 75 C
1, 10; 16 P. 345.
90.)
See Also:
"Plaintiff contends, however, that a document may not
effectively be incorporated by reference unless it is part of the permanent
records of the court.
"...Thus
in this case, the decree, may be given its intended effect by referring to an
adequately identified document and the fact that the document is not a part of
the permanent records of the court does not vitiate the decree. [citing cases.] Price v. Price, 85 Cal.App.2d
732 [194 P.2d 101], is contrary to the foregoing authorities and is
disapproved. Bearing in mind
that intention is the primary criterion." Lubin v. Lubin, (1956) 144 C.A.2d 781; 302 P.2d
491]
91.)
Thereby, Any “money judgment” is thereby null and
void extending from any stillborn alleged fraudulent “court orders” from cases
P-3747, SCR 25413, CM 010607, and/or C 037374.
In New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (1812),
the Court held that a State could properly grant a permanent tax exemption and
that the Contract Clause prohibited any impairment of such an agreement. This holding has never been repudiated.
92.)
California law is subferior and in error to
Federal law on this question of whether Child Support is a DEBT:
"Child support obligation arising from a court order,
whether family court or another civil court, is a DEBT that may be enforced
through CIVIL remedies. It is a
"thing" in interstate commerce." U.S. v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir.
2001)(citing cases from the First Circuit, Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit,
Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit and Ninth Circuit). In the Third Circuit case of U.S. v. Parker, 108
F.3d 28, 31 (3rd Cir. 1997) held that the activity regulated by the Act [Child
Support Recovery Act] falls within the broad definition of commerce which we
adopted in U.S. v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 577 (3rd Cir. 1995). Failure to make required payments gives rise
to a DEBT which implicates economic activity."
Thereby,
Child Support for the proof and reasons stated, without formal presentation
or implementation or presentment of the contract (or ‘special contract’) by
respondent’s as a special instrument or obligation renders the contract in the
normal meaning of the legal terms it has been framed in, which respondent’s
have always contended throughout all paperwork, motions and testimony in open
court that Appellant’s alleged “Child Support Obligation, is in fact, only
a debt or “obligation” as those are the only words ever factually used
to describe it.
Child support is considered a regular debt and not a special
debt by many of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the Title 18 U.S.C. 228 cases.
They use this argument to justify the use of the Commerce Clause.
Commerce Debt instrument. See U.S. v. Parker,
108 F.3d 28, 31 (3rd Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d
1027, 1032 (1st Cir. 1997), en banc denied, 110 F.3d 132 (1st. Cir.
1997)(holding that state-court-imposed child support orders are
"functionally equivalent to interstate contracts" and rejecting idea
that child support payment obligations are somehow "different";
citing U.S. v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 at 106 (2nd Cir. 1996)); U.S.
v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1996)("True, the court
order arises from the family relation. Once in place, the order creates a debt.
Like any other debt, it is a thing of value, one of millions of obligations
that make up a stream of commerce subject to congressional control."); U.S.
v. Lewko, Case no. 01-1231, Oct. 25, 2001, U.S. Court of Appeals First
Circuit ("Regardless, a child support obligation arising from a court
order, whether family court or another civil court, is a debt that may be
enforced only through civil remedies).
93.)
It is a fact, that the common usage of words and
understanding of the public, that Penal Code §§
270 and/or 166(a)(4) only deal with a “debt” or “obligation” and appellant’s
and their surrogate courts are not of an authority nor can they manufacture
them into something more [ergo: “special debt” / “special obligation” / “special contract”).
To disregard such a deliberate choice of words and their
natural meaning, would be a departure from the first principle of
constitutional interpretation. "In
expounding the Constitution of the United States," said Chief Justice
Taney in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 U.S. 540, 570-1, "every word
must have its due force and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the
whole instrument, that, no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly
added. The many discussions which have
taken place upon the construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness
of this proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution and the foresight
of the illustrious men who framed it.
Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation and
its force and effect to have been fully understood." Wright v. United States, 302
U.S. 583 (1938)
SEE ALSO:
“The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted
safely, except where reference to common law and to British institutions as
they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the convention who submitted it to
the ratification of conventions of the thirteen states, were born and brought
up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its
vocabulary...when they came to put their conclusions into the form of
fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of common law,
confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.” Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 108.
“The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be
misled by mere pretences. They are at
liberty---indeed, are under a solemn duty---to look at the substance of things,
whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended
the limits of its authority. If
therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial
relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.” Mugler
v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 661
XXVI
COUNT
XVII
SEVENTEENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW AS WELL AS THE FACTS AND FACTUALLY KNEW I HAD NO
ABILITY TO PAY; BUT VINDICTIVELY KEPT PROSECUTING APPELLANT ANYWAY
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 1447, 1448 – MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE II
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART I, SECTION 8, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 15 AND 18 SLAVERY AND DEBTORS PRISON
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FIFTH, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
US.
CONST. AMENDMENT THE EIGHTH—CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT
94.)
Respondent’s had knowledge of the law AS WELL AS
OF THE FACTS. They factually knew
because of their own acts and/or omissions in this matter, and outright
persecutions which drove me into total ruin; that I had no money, was
destitute, and finally, could not pay rent, nor secure credit because of their inhumane
tyranny, persecution, and oppression they applied against me in direct
violation of the concise rule of law (See Affidavit in Support XXV and XXVI pg
162):
“Parent and Child--Conviction for Nonsupport--Proof of
Ability--In order to support a conviction of a parent for failure to support
his minor children, it is essential that proof of his ability so to do be made,
as inability without fault is a "lawful excuse," within the meaning
of that phrase as used in section 270 of the Penal Code..
Id.--Inability to Support--Evidence--Business Reverses and
Personal Injury--Inability due in part to an injury to the hand of a skilled
dentist and in part to business reverses, without any ground for interference
that his financial embarrassment was the result of artifice or any design to
deprive his children of support, is a sufficient showing of lawful excuse for
failure to discharge such parental duty."
"It is admitted by the attorney-general
that is should be made to appear that the father has the ability to supply what
is needed or else a conviction is not supported." Indeed, it is apparent that inability
without fault is a "lawful excuse" for failure to discharge this
parental duty. 'While it is the duty of
a parent to support his children of tender years, yet in order that he be
imprisoned for failure to obey an order of the court in connection therewith,
it must affirmatively appear that he has the ability to comply with the order
of the court." (In re
McCandless, 17 Cal.App. 222 [119 Pac. 199]).
“He could not even pay his rent.”
People v. Forester,
(1916) 29 Cal.App. 460 [Crim. No. 319.
Third Appellate District--January 22, 1916]
95.)
Respondent’s willfully violated their own laws
in order to persecute me and oppress me and keep me constantly in jeopardy of double
jeopardy violations and constant imprisonment for no crime.
“Whether or not a parent has the financial ability to comply
with the child support order is particularly important in prosecutions under
the CSRA, which requires that the parent's failure to pay support must be
"willful" in order to warrant a conviction. In other words, in order
to obtain a conviction under this federal law, the government must prove
that the parent has the resources to comply and simply chose not to do so.
See United States v. Mathes, 151 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Brand, 163 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 1998).
ABILITY TO PAY
There is no
substantial evidence that Bettencourt had the ability to comply with the court
orders underlying this contempt proceeding. The order of contempt is
annulled. In re MARK BETTENCOURT
on Habeas Corpus. Cite as 93
C.D.O.S. 4460
Sixth Appellate
District
Super. Ct. No. 678646
Santa Clara County
Superior Court. Hon. Nancy Hoffman, Judge.
Filed June 15, 1993
96.)
Your Appellant upon being kidnapped from his
home in Queens New York by Respondent’s and their assigns, did in fact, bring
forth the concise settled law which denied any “kidnapping” and/or
“extradition” and/or “cooperative state transfer” of appellant which they willfully violated.
“Throughout this history, and no less today, [the laws’]
thrust even to the disregard of legal or factual merit has been ‘to allow the
letter of the law gracefully and charitably to succumb to the spirit of
justice’ (People v. Davis, 55 Misc.2d 656, 659 286 N.Y.S.2d 396.”
…[Defendant] had no previous involvement with the criminal
justice system, such that convictions would tend to stigmatize them and their
families discourage vocational rehabilitations, eliminate the prospect of
restitution and counterproductively, visit much of the burden of these
handicaps on their families…the burden [is] on the People to prove ability to
provide support or disprove the other defenses raised by the defendants,
conviction was less than certain.”
“…In determining whether “the existence of some compelling
fact, consideration or circumstance clearly [demonstrates]” that “dismissal is
required as a matter of judicial discretion”, a court “must” to the extent
applicable, examine and consider, individually and collectively, the following:
(a) the
seriousness of the circumstances of the offense;
(b) the
extent of harm caused by the offense;
(c) the
evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;
(d) the
history of the character and condition of the defendant;
(e) any
exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel* * *;
(f) the
purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence* * *;
(g) the
impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community;
(h) the
impact of a dismissal upon the confidence * * * in the criminal justice system;
(i) *
* * the attitude of the complainant or
victim with respect to the motion;
(j) any
other relevant fact indicating that * * * conviction would serve no useful
purpose:
People v. Rickert,
(1983) 450 N.Y.S.2d 734
It is a fact,
that respondent’s insolently did not adhere to their own concise rule of law,
but in fact, did willfully disregard settled law in which to persecute and
commit egregious and vindictive prosecution against Appellant in direct
violation of law.
97.)
Respondent’s had knowledge of the law as well as
the fact, and knew I had no ability to pay and yet they still went the
exceptional distance of alleging “extradition” (where that was in fact a lie
and a fraud) and without the legal
forms of trial or any proof; they did place excruciating burdens against me and
did kidnap me from my home in Woodside Queens in New York, and a great expense
did capture, kidnap and abduct me against my will to Oroville California,
without obeying the legal forms of trial.
“…That in the absence of evidence of accused’s ability to
comply with child support order, the accused could not be convicted under New
York law and thus could not be extradited to California.”
“Further, in order to prevent the use of extradition to
acquire jurisdiction of a person for prosecution for an offense for which he
could not be extradited…’Under this statute it has been noted that an
unemployed parent…lacking other assets, was relieved of his support obligation,
without regard to the reason for his unemployment” (see Hechtman, 1972
Practice Commentary. McKinney’s
Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law § 260.05 [1975—1976
Supp.])
The People argue that the Family Court order of June 16, 1972 entered
in the reciprocal support proceeding established his ability prima facie. We disagree. The order simply
directs the defendant to pay $ 16 a week for Child Support. That may establish the childrens needs, but
it does not state that the defendant has the capacity to make the
payments. There is no reference to the
defendant’s financial resources, and although the order calls for a finding as
to his earring capacity, that portion of the order was left blank and crossed
out. The other papers attached to the
Governor’s Warrant are also silent on this point….[this] means that there must,
at least, be some showing of an evidentiary nature establishing every element
required under the relevant New York penal statute. ON this record there is nothing of an evidentiary nature showing
that the defendant had the ability to furnish support out of his financial
recourses or by means of his earning capacity.” People v. Hinton, 386 N.Y.S.2d 703
XXVII
COUNT
XVIII
EIGHTEENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
FACTUAL
INTENT OF SYSTEM IS TO DRAIN AND TRANSFER WEALTH[51]—TO
KEEP PEOPLE NEEDLESSLY IMPRISONED INTO MODERN CALIFORNIA GULAG PRISON SYSTEMS,
CONTACTED WITH THE COURTS, TO CONTROL A FREE SOCIETY—TO PLACE INNOCENT AND POOR
MEN IN JAIL SO THAT RESPONDENT’S VIA THEIR SURROGATE COURT SYSTEMS CAN
OVERTHROW THIS FREE NATION FROM THE INSIDE VIA ‘OFFICERS OF THE COURT” USING
COLOR OF LAW UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE UNITED STATES
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 38 – MISPRISION OF
FELONY
GC
1027.5 –MARXIST JURISPRUDENCE
CAL.
CONST (1849) ART. I, SEC. 8 – SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 1
US
CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT THE THIRD – MILITARY SUBORDINATE TO CIVIL POWER
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FIFTH – SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FOURTH – SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND WARRANTS
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE NINTH – RIGHTS NOT DENIED TO PEOPLE
US
CONST. ART. 3 SECTIONS (1) AND (2)
98.)
FACTUALLY NO LAWFUL EXCUSE PRAGMATICALLY APPLIED
TO PENAL CODE § 270.
“A recent order to pay child support does not necessarily
lead to a conclusion that the obligor had a present ability to pay. ‘Ability to
pay’ can literally change within a day - the day the contemnor hears, 'You're
fired.' Under such circumstances it is unlikely that the potential condemner
will rush right out and spend money - assuming there is any - on an attorney to
seek a modification." (In re Feiock, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d
at p. 148.)
99.)
Respondent’s and their surrogate courts are in
charge of an ongoing enterprise, clothed under the “Best Interest of the Child”
which in fact, is nothing more than the Jewish Question in Nazi Fascist courts
of WWII: “Are you a Jew?” [father?] to implicate and convict of guilt. Said courts and/or tribunals are a sham and
a complete impossibility to fatherhood (Appellant).
Legal Impossibility.
“Performance of a contract cannot be compelled where it would involved a
violation of law.” Monaca Borough
v. Monaca St. R. Co., 247 Pa. 242, 91 A. 344.
100.)
It is a fact, that respondent Deputy District
Attorney Jack Schafer did in fact, admit on the witness stand by and through his silence; upon
direct questioning by Appellant “What is the lawful excuse” he did in fact,
remain silent; thereby acquiescing to the fact that there is no “lawful excuse”
allowed by the County of Butte and/or the State of California for any father
violating published California Penal Code §270 and/or
166(a)(4).
XXVIII
COUNT
NINETEEN
NINETEENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
ALL
JUDGES[52]
ARE NOT IMPARTIAL—ALL HAVE THEIR INTERESTS ATTACHED TO THE COLLECTION OF
CHILD SUPPORT, FILLING PRISONS, AND FINDING GUILT AGAINST YOUR APPELLANT.
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 96 MISCONDUCT [$10,000]
PC
§ 96.5 – OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE [FELONY, 1 YEAR AND $10,000]
PC
§ 98 – FORFIETURE OF
PUBLIC TRUST
PC
182 – CONSPIRACY [FELONY, $10,000]
PC
§ 186.9 – MONEY
LAUNDERING
PC
§ 186.10 ($250,000)
PC
§ 237 – FALSE
IMPRISONMENT [MISDEMEANOR, 1 YR, CTY
JAIL, $1,000]
CAL.
CONST (1849) ARTICLE VI ET SEQ.
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 1—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
Title
18 U.S.C., Section 1
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 241 – DEPRIVATION OF
SECURTED LIBERTIES
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 242 – DENIAL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
101.) Respondent’s
and their surrogate courts factually receive direct and/or indirect
remunerations from the persecution and legal jeopardy being implemented against
Appellant.
"Under provisions of this section that a Judge shall
not sit as such in, or take part in decision of an action in which he is
interested, such interest must be an interest in a pecuniary or property right,
and one from which the judge may profit or lose." People v. McDonald, (1957) 8
Misc.2d 50, 167 N.Y.S.2d 394
"It is a maxim of every code in every country, that no
man should be a judge in his own cause; it is not left to his discretion or to
his sense of decency whether he shall act or not; when his own rights are in
question he has no authority to determine the cause; so well is the principle
understood that in every court consisting of more judges than one, the judge
who is a party in a suit takes no part in the proceedings or decision of the
cause." Washington Ins. Co.
v. Price (1823) 1 Hopk. 1.
"The state is bound to furnish every litigant not only
an impartial judge, but one who has not, by any act of his, justified a doubt
of his impartiality." Moers
v. Gilbert, (1941) 175 Misc. 733, 25 N.Y.S.2d 114, affirmed 261
App.Div. 957, 27 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426, Appeal den. 261 App.Div. 1074, 27 N.Y.S.2d
783.
"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can
will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by
law, and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it.
Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will
of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the
legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." [Emphasis in
original]. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir.
1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22
U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d
1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).
102.)
Respondent’s and their surrogate courts are
using “discretion” to violate Appellant’s rights and Constitutionally secured
liberties and to overcome all Constitutional restrictions of power[53].
"The public welfare demands that constitutional cases
must be decided according to the terms of the Constitution itself, and not
according to judges' views of fairness, reasonableness, or justice. I have no
fear of constitutional amendments properly adopted, but I do fear the rewriting
of the Constitution by judges under the guise of interpretation." Columbia University's Carpenter
Lectures 1968, Quoting Hugo Black - U.S. Supreme Court Justice
103.)
Respondent’s are well aware that it is a virtual
impossibility for them to suffer any legal jeopardy for their crimes against
Appellant and in fact depend upon the fraud upon the courts in their surrogate
court systems in which to protect them:
“Second, the hearing before the magistrate not always will
suffice to discourage lawless or reckless misconduct. The pre-search proceeding
is necessarily ex parte, since the subject of the search cannot be tipped off
to the application for a warrant lest he destroy or remove evidence. The usual
reliance of our legal system on adversary proceedings itself should be an
indication that an ex parte inquiry is likely to be less vigorous. The
magistrate has no acquaintance with the information that may contradict the
good faith and reasonable basis of the affiant's allegations. The pre-search
proceeding will frequently be marked by haste, because of the understandable
desire to act before the evidence disappears; this urgency will not always
permit the magistrate to make an extended independent examination of the
affiant or other witnesses. Third, the alternative sanctions of a perjury
prosecution, administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit are not
likely to fill the gap. Mapp v. Ohio implicitly rejected
[***681] the adequacy of these
alternatives. Mr. Justice Douglas noted this in his concurrence in Mapp, 367
U.S., at 670, where he quoted from Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
42 (1949): "'Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches
new heights if we expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates
for well-meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the
District Attorney or his associates have ordered.'" (SEE Franks v. Delaware,
(1978) 438 U.S. 154; 98 S. Ct. 2674; 57 L. Ed. 2d 667)
"Judges who do not report the criminal activities of
other judges become principals in the criminal activity," 18 U.S.C.
Section 1.
Judges shall be impartial and held accountable when judges
are biased. Bracey v. Warden, U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133
(June 1997).
Therefore, if a judge does not fully comply with the
Constitution, then that judge's orders are void. In re Sawer, 124
U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without
jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of
treason.
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have
jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S.
v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).
104.)
All respondent’s surrogate courts and the judges
contained therein knowingly conspired and committed overt fraud against your
Appellant at all hearings in this matter:
"Fraud upon the court" occurs whenever any officer
of the court commits fraud before a tribunal. A judge is not a court; he is
under law an officer of the court, and he must not engage in any action to
deceive the court. Trans Aero Inc. v. LaFuerga Area Boliviana, 24
F.3d 457 (2nd Cir. 1994); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d
1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985) (fraud upon the court exists "where the judge
has not performed his judicial duties").
105.)
Respondent’s committed overt “fraud upon the
court” in direct violation of law and Appellant/Petitioner’s secured liberties:
Since fraud upon the court voids the entire proceeding, In
re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is
axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); People ex rel. Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Gilmore, 345 Ill. 28, 177 N.E. 710 (1931),
106.)
It is a factual impossibility of Appellant
obtaining a fair and/or impartial and/or just Judge in this matter from any
court in the State of California or any court involved with Title IV-D
“Welfare” funding “Child Support” scams and/or schemes as they have been bought
off by federal mandates and funding’s.
Courts have said a trial judge must always remain fair and
impartial. Kennedy v. Los Angeles
Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1989). "He must be ever mindful of the
sensitive role [the court] plays in a jury trial and avoid even the appearance
of advocacy or partiality." Id.
quoting United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1974).
At the same time, however, courts have recognized that a
trial judge is "more than an umpire." United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989).
"Because this case comes to us in the posture of a
habeas appeal, the question is whether the state trial judge's behavior
rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process
under the United States Constitution."
Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 838 (1986); McBee v. Grant, 763 F.2d 811, 818
(6th Cir. 1985).
The
U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct.
1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law
in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with
the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of
his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him
any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States". [Emphasis supplied in original]
107.)
THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN
DESTROYING APPELLANT.
“Because a full custodial arrest is such a severe intrusion
on an individual's liberty, its reasonableness hinges on "the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S., at 300.
108.)
APPELLANT HAS ZERO RIGHTS. NO RIGHT TO DEFENSE. NO RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL.
"And to condemn a person without hearing him or giving
him an opportunity of defending himself, was contrary to natural justice; and
such proceedings have always been held illegal, and void by this
court." 9 Ed. 4, 14, G. 11 Ca. 99.
Fa. Baggs Case I Sid. 14. 2 Sid. 97. Rex
v. Champion. 4 Mod. 37. Glies
Case.
Rex v. Chancellor, &ct.
of Cambridge S.C. Fort 202. Pg. 1334 to 1342
“The
writ of “habeas corpus” is a writ to restore to his liberty a citizen who is
imprisoned without color of law.” In
re Kowalsky, (1887) 73 C
120, 14 P 399.
(It
is a fact, that respondent’s are in fact, restraining your appellant of his
liberty and denying him all his constitutionally secured liberties, and rights
in direct violation of law, with no palpable remedy at law.)
XXIX
COUNT XX
TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION
PUBLISHED
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 270 “WILLFULL FAILURE
TO PROVIDE” AND PENAL CODE §
166(a)(4) ARE FACTUALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL[54]:
VIOLATIONS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
PC
§ 13
PC
§ 20 – MENS REA
PC
§ 21 – ACTUS REUS
CAL.
CONST (1849) PREAMBLE
CAL.
CONST. ART. I, SEC. 1 – RIGHT TO PROPERTY
CAL.CONST.
(1849) ART I, SEC. 8 “JUST COMPENSATION”
CAL.
CONST. (1849) ART. I, SECTION 10—REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
U.S.
CONST. – AMEND. I – REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
US
CONST. ART 4, SEC. 4 – REPUBLICAN FORM
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FIFTH – TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE
US
CONST. ART 6 SECTION 2—SUPREMACY CLAUSE
109.)
It has become common public knowledge that the
crisis within the respondent’s surrogate courts is exponentially out-of-control[55],
completely illegal, unlawful, and unconstitutional and/or
non-constitutional. They are supporting
a system completely in disregard and a direct insolence to the Constitution of
California (1849), the New York State Construction (1777) and the Constitution
for the United States (1787-1791):
"Wherever right to own property is recognized in free
government, practically all other rights become worthless if government
possesses uncontrollable power over property of citizen." House v.
Los Angeles County Flood Control District (1944), 25 C.2d 384, 153 P.2d
950.
For the most part, “constitutional issues” present little
encumbrance within the divorce venue. Few individuals have a greater
apprehension of the inextricable link between cultural devolution and the
threat to children than divorced dads. Consider the indictment offered by
Michigan attorney, Mike Tindall: “The
(domestic law court) is out of control and … it has turned into a system of
private administrative law, not bounded by the constitutional restraints that
are supposed to operate in courts of law. Currently, each county’s (court) is
operated like its own little kingdom, like renegades. They each create their
own system and run it pretty much as they like. These systems have become very
efficient little cash machines, generating profits rather than working for the
best interests of children and their families. The way they do this is by
ignoring the niceties of due process.”
Cleaning Up After Radical Feminism: Manhood Is A Terrible Thing To
Waste, By Gerald L. Rowles, Ph.D. http://toogoodreports.com/column/general/rowles/20020408.htm; April 8, 2002, To comment on this article or express your opinion directly to
the author, you are invited to e-mail Dr. Rowles at glrowles@earthlink.net
SEE ALSO:
“The judges’ contempt for both fathers and constitutional
rights was openly expressed by New Jersey municipal court judge Richard
Russell. Speaking to his colleagues during a training seminar in 1994, he said:
“Your job is not to become concerned about the constitutional
rights of the man that you’re violating. Throw him out on the street, give him
the clothes on his back and tell him, “See ya around.” . . . “We don’t have to
worry about their rights.”
The Catholic World Report,
August/September 2001, pp. 54-58.
By Dr. Stephen Baskerville
110.)
It is also a fact, that this tyranny and
oppression inflicted by Respondent’s against your Appellant/Petitioner is
willful, and is a direct harm and damage to him as well as all free
peoples. It is a fact, that Appellant/Petitioner
now fears[56]
Respondent’s and their out-of-control, secular government as well as their
surrogate courts as they are acting with complete disregard and insolence to
the concise rule of law, and now act as a domestic enemy, inflicting Domestic
Violence against your Appellant/Petitioner (and other Fathers) in direct
violation of law and the constitution:
"Where rights secured by the constitution are involved
there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 491 (1968)
111.)
Respondents are insolently violating the
Preamble of the Constitution of the United States which factually and concisely
states: “We the People of the United
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility…”
112.)
Respondents are also factually willfully and
cogently aware that they are in direct contradistinction to Article IV, Section
4 which factually describes by their
act and/or omissions that they are willfully with planned intent committing Domestic
Violence against your Appellant/Petitioner (and other Fathers) in this
matter: “The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.” This clearly
is a mixed war inflicted against your Appellant/Petitioner by Respondent’s who
fully understand their treason and willfully abrogate the concise rule of law
in order that they may receive Federally Funded “Title IV-D” Welfare
remuneration scams and/or schemes.
113.)
Respondent’s have factually established an
ongoing fraud at law which they now depend upon to generate huge amounts of
monies and in which benefit them and they fully and willfully understand they
are violating the basic laws of the constitution in which to unjustly implement
against your Appellant (and many fathers as a class):
“If
the legislature clearly misinterprets a constitutional provision, the frequent
repetition of the wrong will not create a right.” Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619
XXX
COUNT
XXI
TWENTY-FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S
HAVE WILLFULLY DISCRIMINATED[57]
AGAINST YOUR APPELLANT FOR BEING A FATHER, WHO HAS ONLY DEMANDED HIS RIGHTS:
WHO WOULD NOT PAY “CHILD SUPPORT” WHICH HE WAS FACTUALLY WAS NOT OBLIGATED
TO PAY RESPONDENT’S WHO IN FACT
KIDNAPPED HIS SON FROM HIM, APPELLANT REFUSED EXTORTION ATTEMPTS BY MAIL BY
RESPNDENT’S, AND AT ALL TIMES ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN HIS RIGHTS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE
SITUATION WHERE RESPONDENT’S AND THEIR SURROGATE COURTS FACTUALLY DESTROYED
APPELLANT AND ANY DUE PROCESS OF LAW RIGHTS OF APPELLANT AND PROVIDE NO EQUAL
RIGHTS[58]
UNDER THE LAW
VIOLATION
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
FED.CIR.R.
15 (c) –DISCRIMINATION
TITLE
18 U.S.C. § 2340 – TORTURE
18
U.S.C. 1341 - MAIL FRAUD
U.S.
CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT THE FIFTH -- EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
114.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s have cogently
and willfully in overt collusion with their surrogate courts denied me all
substantive due process of law:
“ [The] Constitutional Guaranty "that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"
entitles every person to follow and adopt such lawful industrial pursuit, not
injurious to the community, as he may see fit.
The term "liberty" as used in the constitution, is not dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint, but includes the right of a man to
be free in the enjoyment of his faculties, subject only to such restraints as
are necessary to the common welfare.
LIBERTY means the right not only of freedom from servitude,
imprisonment, or restraint, but the
right to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he
will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling and to pursue any lawful
trade or avocation. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW. Statue prohibiting any person who
sells, exchanges, or disposes of any article of food from offering to give or
giving some other article as a gift, prize, premium or reward to the purchaser
infringes upon the liberty of the seller, and is unconstitutional and
void. It cannot be sustained as a
lawful exercise of the police power of the state. LEGISLATURE CANNOT DETERMINE WHAT IS A PROPER EXCERCISE OF THE
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE that the determination will not be subject to
scrutiny and revision by the courts.
While it is generally for the legislature to decide what laws and
regulations are needed to protect the public health, and serve the public
comfort and safety, the courts MUST be able to see, upon the perusal of an
enactment, that there is some fair, just, and reasonable connection between it
and the ends above mentioned. Unless
such relation exists, the enactment CANNOT BE UPHELD AS AN EXCERCISE OF THE
POLICE POWER People v. Gillson,
109 New York, 389
115.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s in conjunction
with their surrogate courts only know force, fraud, threat, menace, direct
harm, extortion and continual unlawful imprisonment against your
appellant/petitioner in which to continually keep him imprisoned and devoid of
rights divested of all regular processes of law:
"Moreover, due process of law requires that criminal
prosecutions be instituted with the regular processes of law, which processes
include the requirement that the institution of any criminal proceeding be
authorized and approved by the district attorney." People v. Municipal Court
(1972) 27 CA3d 193, 103 Cal Rptr 645.
Extortion is defined in Black's
Law Dictionary - 6th Edition as:
"The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right."
See also:
Legal Fraud -- "Acts as
though not originating in actual evil design to perpetrate fraud, yet by their
tendency to mislead others or to violate confidence, are prohibited by law.
Misrepresentation of a material fact made willfully to deceive and acted on by
the opposite party to his damages constitutes 'legal fraud'."
This goes directly to the heart of this matter—that
Respondent’s distinctions are contrary to the public good:
"LORD COKE: And it appears in our books, that in many
cases the common law will control acts of Parliament [deliberative body], and
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed,
the common law [general custom and usage from the lex non scripta] will control
it and adjudge such act to be void...So if an act of Parliament gives to
any to hold, or to have conusans of, all manner of pleas arising before him
within the manor of D., yet shall he hold no plea, to which he himself is a
party: for, as hath be said, iniquum est aliquem suae rei esse judicem." Bonham's
Case (1610), Common Pleas, 8 Rep. 118a. [Common right vested by God
governs all legislation, public and private.]
116.)
Respondent’s and their surrogate courts did not
at any time provide me with any fair or just hearing, trial, court or tribunal;
they denied me discovery; evidence and the legal forms of trial:
To vacate a judgment when the police suppressed material
evidence i.e., the confession of another.
People v. Tate (1955) 136 CA2d 31, 288 P.2d 149.
To vacate a judgment when the prosecution suppressed
evidence that was favorable to the defense or that was ordered to be produced
at trial by the court, or when their was perjury by the prosecution. See In re Rosoto (1974) 10
C.3d 939, 112 CR 641.
NOTE ALSO:
"[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall * * * make
timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused * * *."
In this case the prosecutors utterly failed to abide by that
rule of professional conduct. Accordingly the trial justice in this case was
confronted not only by dire facts of prosecutorial misconduct but also by his
own sworn obligation to preserve and protect the integrity and credibility of
our justice system and the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted
by this Court to "govern all criminal proceedings in this state."
Super.R.Crim.P. 59.
"[T]he manner and magnitude of the prosecutorial
misconduct * * * in this case has not only resulted in substantial prejudice to
the defendants but has the effect of eroding confidence in the criminal justice
system. Of equal concern is that the situation also raises the alarming specter
that the system works only if an accused has the financial resources to make
independent investigation prior to trial to ferret out misconduct to ensure due
process. At the very least, the court would be justified in precluding the
testimony of the witnesses for the State (Brusini, Zaino, Piccoli, and Santos)
but that remedy does not effectively respond to the evidence. It does nothing
to impress upon the prosecution that it cannot be allowed to benefit from
having acted in a manner that is less than constitutional and ethical in the
pursuit of convictions."
"[t]he courts cannot allow the integrity of the
criminal system to be undermined by the overzealous prosecutor." In
re Ouimette, 115 R.I. 169, 175, 342 A.2d 250, 253 (1975).
117.)
Respondent’s had a duty to speak and/or inform
me of the nature and cause of the matter and instead, willfully remained
silent, hid both exculpatory and normal discovery from me; they denied me witnesses,
ignored subpoena’s; and subpoena Duces Tecum; remained silent upon my repeated
and insistent demands for Demand for Statement of Decisions; they did along with their surrogate court systems
deny me sua sponte rights; and kept me falsely imprisoned, without pen, paper
and ability to contact my counsel of choice and/or next best friends—in order
to frustrate both my access to the courts and justice; but also to keep me
ignorant and to be assured that I could not properly defend myself and to deny me
truth and justice[59]:
"Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a
legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be
intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct... If that
is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be
tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately" U.S.
v. Tweel, 550 F2d 297, 299-300.
"Fraud: An intentional perversion of truth for the
purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable
thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right." Black's 5th, 594
(emphasis added.)
"Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents,
and even judgments." U.S.
vs. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61.
. "Damages will lie in proper case of negligent
misrepresentation of failure to disclose." Van Buren v. Pima Community College Dist. Bd., 546
P.2d 821, 113 Ariz. 85 (Ariz.1976).
118.)
Respondent’s are intentionally denying
respondent the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness by
implementation of Penal Code § 270 and §
166(a)(4) and their associated laws in support thereof:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving
any person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." The Court has long
recognized that the Due Process Clause "guarantees more than fair
process." Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
It also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests." Id., at 720;
see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). Any denial of Due Process must be tested by
the "totality of the facts" because a lack of Due Process may
"constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice..." Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 26 (1964) (quoting from Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 461-462 (1942) where it was noted that any violation of any of the first
Nine Amendments to the Constitution could also constitute a violation of Due
Process). "[T]he court must be
vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand to
prevent violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect methods.
Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property are to be
liberally construed, and 'it is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon.' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 , 6 S. Ct.
524, 535 (29 L. Ed. 746); Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 304,
41 S. Ct. 261, supra." (as cited
from Byars v. U.S., 273 US 28, 32).
119.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s and their
surrogate courts did provide me with a sham of a trial, that shocks the
conscience of “we the people”[60]
and the Appellant, and causes fear and dread; as Respondent’s defiantly did
obstruct justice knowing that nothing can stop their unlawful and egregious
acts and/or omissions.
“Maloney contends that during his trial the prosecution
knowingly used false testimony and violated his right under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) to be shown exculpatory evidence that is
in the prosecution's possession. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new
trial based upon such allegations, we defer to the district court's judgment as
to whether the evidence wrongfully withheld by the government might if
disclosed have changed the outcome of the trial. When this question revolves on
a pure issue of law, our review is de novo. Boyd, 55 F.3d at 242.
Section 1503 prohibits a person from
endeavoring to obstruct or impede the "due administration of
justice." To establish a violation of this section, courts require the
government to establish that the defendant knew of a pending judicial
proceeding and intended to impede its administration. See United States
v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2362 (1995); United States v.
Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994). Maloney argues that the
evidence failed to establish either the existence of a pending judicial
proceeding or his knowledge of it. We will reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, it is determined that no rational jury could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Brandon, 50 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1995). [SEE United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th
Cir. 11/29/1995)]
120.)
It is incontrovertible, that Respondent’s along
with their surrogate court systems are in fact acting in collusion and are
biased, unfair and apply the “law” inequality against Appellant as he is a male
and treated completely different by Respondent’s who do so using color of law,
under color of authority, and biased practices, policies and procedures:
Jones v. Jones,
156 Fla. 524, 527, 23 So. 2d 623, 625 (1945) (citations omitted). This concept
still exists in Florida's family court system today; Florida's Fifth District
Court of Appeal recently noted that "there remains a temptation for many
judges to consider the right to custody as the mother's to lose and unless her
fitness is legitimately challenged, the father's right of equal consideration
is often ignored." Ayyash v. Ayyash, 700 So. 2d 752, 754 n.3
(Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
See Also:
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, GENDER BIAS
STUDY OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS (1989), reprinted in 24 NEW.
ENG. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS STUDY].
[107] “See, e.g., id. at 746 (noting that "women face
discriminatory attitudes and actions" regarding child custody, but failing
to recognize that men face discriminatory attitudes and actions regarding child
custody); id. at 748, 830 (reporting that "perceptions of gender bias may
discourage fathers from seeking custody and stereotypes about fathers may
sometimes affect case outcomes," but failing to examine either the
perceptions or the stereotypes and how they affect fathers so that, by their
own data, 93.4% of the time mothers receive primary residential custody); id.
at 829 (suggesting that it is appropriate for mothers to overwhelmingly receive
custody because of, in part, "the unequal sacrifice of earning potential
these women make in order to be primary caretakers," yet failing to
examine gender bias against men who are culturally forced into the
"provider" role).”
See Also:
“A prime example is a 1951 study commissioned by the World
Health Organization and conducted by John Bowlby, a preeminent psychoanalyst.
Bowlby set up a study to follow the effects of maternal deprivation. Paternal
deprivation was not studied. Yet, Bowlby felt confident enough to report that
"the child's relation to his mother . . . is without doubt in ordinary
circumstances, by far his most important relationship." Bowlby's findings
were widely implemented by child care institutions and reinforced court findings
that children should be kept with mothers at all costs. Consequently, to reduce
the toddler-mother "separation anxiety" as reported by Bowlby,
psychologists recommended that fathers be denied overnight visitation. Studies
such as these have been incorporated into our family court system and have
become unquestioned aspects of our family law. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at
35-36; see also Martha J. Cox & Blair Paley, Families as Systems, 48 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (1997) (noting that child development studies have
focused on the role of the mother-child relationship); infra text accompanying
note 162 (noting that as late as 1996, the guidelines in Florida's Twelfth
Judicial Circuit provided that a noncustodial parent-almost always the
father-could not have overnight visitation with a child until the child turned
two years old)”
121.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s refused to
answer a timely Bill of Particulars filed against them on or about May 18,
1998, and did knowingly keep your petitioner ignorant of the nature and cause
of the accusation, so that I could not defend myself, and complete denial of
substantive due process of law, and a complete impossibility to your
Appellant/Petitioner who could not defend himself as he was knowingly and
wilfully kept ignorant by Respondent’s so that they could win in their
surrogate courts using color of law, under color of authority:
XXXI
COUNT
XXII
TWENTY-SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION
SIMPLE
CORROLLARY—IS PRIMA FACIA: IF THERE IS
A CONSTITUTION; THEN I AS APPELLANT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS[61]. HOWEVER; IT IS A FACT, THAT I HAVE NONE,
AND THAT THIS CONDITION FACTUALLY DOES NOT EXTEND FROM ANY ACT OR OMISSION I
HAVE DONE—NOR ANY LAWFUL CONTRACT I AM OBLIGATED TO—BUT RATHER; ONLY FROM THE
WILFULL AND UNLAWFUL ACTS AND OMISSIONS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENTS AGAINST
YOUR APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
VIOLATION
OF
CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE:
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FIFTH – LIFE LIBERTY PROPERTY
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE FIRST—RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE
TITLE
US
CONST. AMENDMENT THE NINTH – RIGHTS RETAINED BY PEOPLE
US
CONST. ART 6 SECTION 2—SUPREMACY CLAUSE
122.)
THIS IS NOT OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
respondent’s are well aware of the impossibility and unfairness of the present
system in their surrogate courts and depend upon their failure to provide
appellant (or Fathers in general) with any redress of grievances or to enforce
the concise rule of law:
“Supporters of de novo review on habeas maintain that it is
an essential safeguard, due to a deep distrust of state courts. See, e.g., Habeas
Corpus Issues, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime, House Judiciary
Committee, May 22, June 27, and July 17, 1991, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Serial No. 39, p. 386 (statement of David Bruck). Opponents of de novo review
note that the superiority of federal courts in reaching the "right"
result is far from certain. State court decisions reaching results outside the
bounds of reasonable debate among jurists are rare. See K. Scheidegger,
Rethinking Habeas Corpus 34 (1989), reprinted in Habeas Corpus Issues, supra,
at 249. A federal court may "find" constitutional error in a state
judgment and overturn it, only to have the Supreme Court determine years later
in another case that the state court's view of the law was correct all along.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F.2d 1275, 1278 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a particular Kentucky procedure violates "federal
standards"); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992) (holding
that this procedure "easily passes constitutional muster"). The ABA and Criminal Justice Issues: An
Informational Report of the Criminal Law and Procedure Practice Group of the
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, August 1997
"This Constitution and the laws...made in pursuance
thereof...shall be the supreme law of the land..."
"History is clear that the first ten amendments to the
Constitution were adopted to secure certain Common Law rights of the people,
against invasion by the Federal Government." Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp. 813, 816 (1947)
U.S.D.C.-So.Dist.Calif.
123.)
It is a fact, that the American Bar Association
(ABA) as well as the California Bar Association are involved in this overt
fraud, as they have provided no remedy at law, in direct contravention to their
own practices, policies and procedures:
ABA
Positions on Criminal Justice Issues
The 1992 report of the ABA's Advisory Committee on the
Prosecution Function concluded that the ABA's policies on criminal justice
issues "routinely favor criminal defense positions." The ABA and Criminal Justice Issues: An
Informational Report of the Criminal Law and Procedure Practice Group of the
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, August 1997
SEE ALSO:
See ABA code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (a)
(Final Draft 1969) (A prosecutor 'shall not institute or cause to be instituted
criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not
supported by probable cause"); American Bar Association Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecutor Function 1.1, 3.4, 3.9
(1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, Rule 4(c)
(1963) [Gerstein v. Pugh, (1975) 420 U.S. 103 (1975)
PLEASE NOTE AND JUDICIALLY PLACE ON THE RECORD THAT THIS IS
NOT OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT:
Reid
v. Covert, (1956) 354 U.S. 1, at p. 17:
"[T]his court has regularly and uniformly recognized
the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty . . . It would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution as well as
those responsible for the Bill of Rights - let alone alien to our entire
Constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article VI as permitting the
United States to exercise power under an international agreement, without
observing constitutional prohibitions. (See: Elliot's Debates 1836 ed. pages
500-519). In effect, such construction would permit amendment of that document
in a manner not sanctioned by Article V. The prohibitions of the Constitution
were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they
cannot be nullified by the executive or by the executive and senate
combined."
IT IS A FACT, THAT BOTH THESE POSITIONS PROMULGATED BY THE
ABA ARE A LIE. IT IS ALSO A
FACT, THAT “GETTING A LAWYER” IS NO REMEDY TO THIS ISSUE AS THE ABA AND ITS
ATTORNEY’S ARE PART OF THE PROBLEM AND THEY ARE NOT PROHIBITING, PREVENTING,
NOR DEFENDING AGAINST RESPONDENT’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS AND/OR OMISSIONS USING
PENAL CODE § 270 AND/OR 166(a)(4) [AND OTHER
ASSOCIATED LAWS] AS THEY ARE PART OF THE TRANSFER OF WEALTH SCAM AND/OR SCHEME
BEING PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT’S UNDER COLOR OF LAW AND UNDER COLOR OF
AUTHORITY.
124.) Respondent’s
and their surrogate courts “pretend” that Appellant has constitutional rights,
but in pragmatic application of their surrogate court systems, Appellant in
fact, (along with many other fathers) have zero rights. No right.
None. Zip. Nothing.
As Respondent’s system is prima facia: it is only designed to destroy
and annihilate the “non-custodial” (absent) parent:
Troxel v. Granville,
99-138 (2000) affirmed "parental rights are absolute" .
a.) Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,232
(1972) "The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"
b.) Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) " We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship
between parent and child is constitutionally protected"
c.) Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) "Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad
parental authority over minor children."
d.) Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) And again confirmed that there is a
constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parent, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder." Id.,at166.
It
is a fact, that your Appellant/Petitioner (and generally fathers) have no such
rights—and in fact are being destroyed, unlawfully enslaved, disenfranchised intentionally
by Respondent’s and their ongoing enterprise to place unjust debts and
obligations against him for their purposes of profit and reward.
XXXII
COUNT XXIII
TWENTY-THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
STEVEN R. MCNELIS WAS NOT A JUDGE[62]
IN MY MATTER, HE WAS NOT STIPULATED[63]
TO; HE WAS NOT ACCEPTED AT ANY TIME IN MY MATTER; AND HE WAS FACTUALLY
DISQUALIFIED UNDER LAW
VIOLATION OF:
CRC Rule 244 – NO WRITTEN STIPULATION TO JUDGE
CCP § 170.1(a)(6)(c) – DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE
CAL. CONST. (1849) ART. VI, Sec. 1 – JUDICIAL
POWER
CAL CONST. (1849) ART. I, SEC. 3 –TRIAL BY JURY
CAL. CONST. (1849) ART I, SEC. 8 – SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
CAL. CONST. (1849) ART. VI, Sec. 3 – DULY
ELECTED JUDGES
CAL. CONST. (1849) ART. VI, Sec.5 – DULY ELECTED
JUDGES BY ELECTORS
CAL CONST. ART XX § 3 – 247 WORD OATH OF OFFICE
CAL. CONST. ART I, SEC. 15 – PUBLIC TRIAL
CAL. CONST. ART. VI, § 15 – JUDGES ELIGIBILITY (STATE BAR)
CAL. CONST. ART VI, § 17 – NO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT OR RETIREMENT
SERVICE
CAL. CONST. ART. VI, § 18 – FELONY AGAINST JUDGE
US CONST. AMEND. FIFTH – SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
OF LAW
US CONST. AMEND SIXTH – MODE OF TRIAL – FAIR,
IMPARTIAL TRIAL
125.) The
fact is clear and concise that Mr. Steven R. McNelis lied and overtly perjured
himself on May 23, 2000 in this matter.
He in fact, (1) Claimed to be a duly elected judge in accordance with
the Constitution of California (1849) (2) He claimed to be “under assignment”
and appointed by the Judicial Counsel of California, and (3) He committed overt
criminal acts and complete idiocy and incompetent acts as a pretended “Judge”
in the lower County of Butte “Superior Court” case CM 010607. In fact, this is a short list of his crimes,
as none of these things were true.
However, the fact, is, that I immediately fired him viva voce—which
again, he incompetently stated that he did not understand what a CCP §
170.1(a)(6)(C) disqualification was. It
is a fact, that he was not a judge. It
is a fact that he was not appointed by the Judicial Council at that instant he
claimed to be on May 23, 2000. It
is a fact, that after a complete
investigation (which took weeks because of Mr. McNelis overt lies and
cover-up’s), I did file a formal written disqualification against him, and at
no time during trial did I accept him, and as my own counsel In Propria
Persona, Sui Juris, I did not submit to either his court nor his
jurisdiction. It is a fact, that Mr.
McNelis then “found” reasonable cause, and/or “probable cause” to go to trial after
not only my non-stipulation to him, but after he had in fact, been disqualified. The law is clear on this issue, however; all
courts within the STATE OF CALIFORNIA are capriciously ignoring this issue:
"The California Constitution provides that the Governor
appoints Superior Court judges when there are vacancies, but hat after appointment,
on completion of the term, superior court judges must sit for nonpartisan
election. (Cal.Const., art. VI, §
16 & art. II, § 6.)
It also provides for qualifications (Cal. Const., art. VI, §
15), a six term (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16), and
limited grounds for removal (Cal. Const., art. VI, §
18). Since 1862 our Constitution has
contemplated the use of court commissioners to perform "chamber
business" (see Cal. Const. of 1849, art. VI, §
11, as amended Sept. 3, 1862; Cal. Const., former art. VI, §
14), now referred to a s "subordinate judicial duties." (Cal. Const. art., VI 422; Rooney v.
Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 361-362 [110 Cal.Rptr.
353, 515 P.2d 297].) In addition since
1879, our Constitution has permitted a cause to be tried in the superior court
by a temporary judge. (Cal. Const of
1879, former art., VI, § 8; see also Cal. Const., former art. VI,
§ 5, as amended in 1928.) The original provision was that such a judge
must be a "member of the bar, agreed upon in writing by the parties
litigant or their attorney's of record, approved by the Court, and sworn to try
the cause." (Ibid.) This provision
was repealed in 1926, but was reinstated in article VI, section 5 in 1928 to provide
for trial by a temporary judge "[u]pon stipulation of the parties litigant
or their attorneys of record. ..."
(Cal. Const. former art. VI, § 5, as amended in 1928.) The current version of this language as
revised in 1966 provides: "On stipulation of the parties litigant the
court may order and cause to be tried by a temproary judge who is a member of
the State Bar, sworn and empowered to act until final determination of the
cause." (Cal. Const., art VI, § 21.)
[1] The jurisdiction of a court commissioner, or any other
temporary judge, to try a cause derives from the parties stipulation. [Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp.
Supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 360.)
Thus in the absence of a proper stipulation, the judgment entered by the
court commissioner in this case would be void.
(People v. Tijerina, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 49; In re
Frye (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 407, 409-410 [197 Cal.Rptr. 755].)
"...We have ratified a line of cases recognizing that a
valid stipuation for purposes of the constitutional provision may arise as a
result of the conduct of the parties.
These cases hold that conduct short of an express oral or written
stipulation may be tantamount to a stipulation that a court commissioner may
sit as a temporary judge. (In re
Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 178-179 [193 Cal.Rptr. 165, 666 P.2d 22];
E.N.W. v. Michael W. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 896, 899-900 [198
Cal.Rptr. 355]; Estate of Lacey (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 172, 182
[126 Cal.Rptr. 432]; People v. Oaxaca (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 153
[114 Cal.Rptr. 178]; Estate of Soforenko (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d
765, 766 [67 Cal.Rptr. 563]; see also 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(3d ed. 1985) Courts, § 283, pp. 306-307,) As one Court of
Appeal has said, "An attorney may not sit back, fully participate in a
trial and then claim that the court was without jurisdiction on receiving a
unfavorable result to him." (Estate
of Lacy, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 182).
The idea that parties may, through their conduct, be held to
have stipulated to trial by a court commissioner is not controversial. The tantamount stipulation doctrine
apparently first rose in Estate of Soforenko, supra, 260
Cal.App.2d 765. In that probate matter,
the appellate court explained: "[A]ppellant was represented by an attorney
who noted his appearance on the record; he voiced no objection to the matter
being heard by the commissioner, and he participated fully in the hearing that
ensued. He examined the executor as a
witness at some length. He argued
appellant's objections to the account, and the asserted inadequacy of the
report.
Second, we have already strongly suggested that the right to
trial by a regularly appointed or elected superior court judge, rather than a
commissioner sitting as a temporary judge, is not so fundamental that it
necessitates the kind of admonition and waiver that must precede a guilty
plea. In People v. Haskett
(1982) 30 Cal.3d 841 [180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776], also a capital case,
the defendant contended that his oral stipulation to have a court commissioner
preside at his preliminary hearing was ineffective....To act as a magistrate at
a preliminary hearing, a court commissioner must attain a status of “temporary
judge." [Citations.] Consequently,
he must be a member of the Sate Bar and must obtain the stipuation of the
parties litigant." [Citation.]
Moreover, the law...required that...the commissioner be appointed and
supervised by the trial court and be 'otherwise qualified.' [Citation.] These safeguards minimize the risk that the
defendant will be incompetently tried and prejudicially effected by a
commissioner acting as a magistrate. (People
v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 858.)
We are well aware that under article III of the federal
Constitution, litigants enjoy a personal interest in being tried by an article
III judge, whose independence from other branches of government and from public
outcry is secured by life tenure. (Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor (1986) 478 U.S. 833, 847-848 [92
L.#d.2d 675, 690-691, 106 S.Ct. 3245]; Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. (1981) 458 U.S. 50, 57-60 [73 L.Ed.2d 598, 606, 608, 102
S.Ct. 2858]; Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America v. Instromedix
(9th Cir. 1984) 725 F.2d 537, 541 (opn. of Pacemaker Diagnoristic Clinic
of America v. Instromedix (9th Cir. 1984) 725 F.2d 537, 541 (opn. of
Kennedy, J.).) The federal courts have been jealous to protect the judicial
power of Article III courts, and their care is grounded on the understanding
that the founders of our nation consider it essential to the balance of power
amount the three branches of government that the federal judiciary have
lifetime tenure in order to assure their independence from the other
branches. We recognize too, that the
United State Supreme Court has found that article III secures both
institutional and personal interests, and that it primarily "was designed
as a protection for the parties from the risk of legislative or executive
pressure on judicial decision.'" (Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
v. Schor, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 848 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 691].)
...that although article III of the federal Constitution
secures a person right, that right may be waived by consent to trial in a
lesser tribunal. (Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 848 [92 L.Ed.2d
at pp. 848-849.].) ...Recent authority from the hihg court suggests that
failure to object may considered as consent, or at least as waiver to the
article III claim. (Pertize. v.
United States (1991) 501 U.S. ____, _____ [115 L.Ed.2d 808, 822, 11
S.Ct. 2661, 2669].) [SEE In re
Horton, (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82]
126.) It
is a fact, that I did then file a lawful MOTION TO DISMISS citing Respondent’s
own published California Penal Code § 991(e) which
concisely states that where PROBABLE CAUSE FAILS: “A second dismissal pursuant to this section is a bar to any
other prosecution for the same offense.”
Respondent’s shockingly ignored this motion, and any and all other
motions which I filed into the County of Butte “Superior Court” (196 Motions
and pleadings, substantially ignored) a gross violation of substantive due
process of law.
XXXIII
COUNT XIV
TWENTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
RESPONDENT’S DID COGENTLY VIOLATE AND WILFULLY
ABROGATE EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES [64]
VIOLATION OF:
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE:
PC §
1387 – DUE DILIGENCE TO DISMISS
PC §
1552 – 30 DAY VIOLATION
18 U.S.C. §
3182 – 30 DAY LIMIT EXTRADITION ACT[65]
PC 1549.2 – NO LAWFUL GOVERNOR’S WARRANT
PC §
1555 – WAIVER TO NOT ALLOW FURTHER PROCESS OF CIVIL ACTIONS UNTIL RETURN HOME
STATE
PC § 1555.2(c) – DUE
PROCESS OF LAW
CAL. CONST (1849)
ART I, § 8 – SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
U.S. CONST. AMEND THE FIFTH – SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF
LAW
18 USC §3182 – UNLAWFUL AFFIDAVIT BY DA
127.) I
was at all times unlawfully and capriciously arrested kidnapped from my home in
Woodside, Queens New York and brought to Oroville California to be forced into
jail for five (5) months before trial to an unjust mock of a trial held by
respondent’s in overt violation of the concise rule of law.
“In civil cases the courts refuse to take jurisdiction of a
defendant brought before the court by wrongful acts or of force, menace or
fraud.” (See 2 Cal. Proc. 3d
Jurisdiction, § 61)
128.) Respondent’s
cannot claim exception in the law, nor use law as a shield to justify their
illegal kidnapping of me, in overt violation of the Constitution of California
(1849) as well as the Constitution for New York (1777) as well as the
Constitution for the United States (1787-1791):
“In light of these developments we are satisfied that the
"Ker-Frisbie" rule cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's
expansion of the concept of due process, which now protects the accused against
pretrial illegality by denying to the government the fruits of its exploitation
of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on its part. Although the issue
in most of the cases forming part of this evolutionary process was whether
evidence should have been excluded (e.g., Mapp, Miranda, Wong Sun, Silverman),
it was unnecessary in those cases to invoke any other sanction to insure that
an ultimate conviction would not rest on governmental illegality. Where
suppression of evidence will not suffice, however, we must be guided by the
underlying principle that the government should be denied the right to exploit
its own illegal conduct, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
488, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963), and when an accused is kidnapped
and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power
over his person represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its
own misconduct. Having unlawfully seized the defendant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment,*fn4 which guarantees "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures," the
government should as a matter of fundamental fairness be obligated to return
him to his status quo ante.
“…Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict
the guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law. See United
States v. Archer, supra at 677.
“…If the charges of government misconduct in
kidnapping Toscanino and forcibly bringing him to the United States should be
sustained, the foregoing principles would, as a matter of due process, entitle
him to some relief. The allegations include corruption and bribery of a foreign
official as well as kidnapping, accompanied by violence and brutality to the
person. Deliberate misconduct on the part of United States agents, in violation
not only of constitutional prohibitions but also of the federal Kidnapping Act,
supra, and of two international treaties obligating the United States
Government to respect the territorial sovereignty of Uruguay, is charged. See
U.N. Charter, art. 2; O.A.S. Charter, art. 17.*fn5 The conduct alleged here
satisfies those tests articulated by the Supreme Court in its most recent
"entrapment" decision, United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct. 1637 (1973), where, in holding that due
process did not bar prosecution for the manufacture and sale of an illegal
drug, even though a government undercover agent had supplied a scarce chemical
required for its synthesis, it noted that the government agent had violated no
constitutional prohibition or federal law and had committed no crime in
infiltrating the defendant's drug enterprise. It furthermore appeared that the
type of undercover activity engaged in there by the agent was necessary in
order to gather essential evidence. Here, in contrast, not only were several
laws allegedly broken and crimes committed at the behest of government agents
but the conduct was apparently unnecessary, as the extradition treaty between
the United States and Uruguay, see 35 Stat. 2028, does not specifically exclude
narcotics violations so that a representative of our government might have been
able to conclude with Uruguay a special arrangement for Toscanino's
extradition. Cf. Fiocconi v. Attorney General of United States,
339 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
See McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 87 L. Ed. 819, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943); United States v. Estepa, 471
F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606
(2d Cir. 1967); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1962). See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise,
Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. L.J. 29, 32 (1952) (The "real roots
of the McNabb rule" are found in a refusal to countenance "trials
which are the outgrowth or fruit of the Government's illegality," since
they "debase the processes of justice."). See also Government
of Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043, 1045 n. 2. Clearly this
power may legitimately be used to prevent district courts from themselves
becoming "accomplices in willful disobedience of law." See McNabb,
supra at 345. Moreover the supervisory power is not limited to the admission or
exclusion of evidence, but may be exercised in any manner necessary to remedy
abuses of a district court's process. Cf. Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214, 100 L. Ed. 233, 76 S. Ct. 292 (1955). Drawing again from the
field of civil procedure, we think a federal court's criminal process is abused
or degraded where it is executed against a defendant who has been brought into
the territory of the United States by the methods alleged here. Cf. Commercial
Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 53 L. Ed. 782, 29 S. Ct.
445 (1909); Fitzgerald Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, supra. We could not
tolerate such an abuse without debasing "the processes of
justice."*fn6
“…That the Bill of Rights has extraterritorial
application to the conduct abroad of federal agents directed against United
States citizens is well settled. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 1 L.
Ed. 2d 1148, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1957) (Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Balzac
v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13, 66 L. Ed. 627, 42 S. Ct. 343
(1922) (due process); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939, 95 L. Ed. 677, 71 S. Ct. 480 (1950)
(Fourth Amendment.)*fn9 The government, however, while not denying that
American citizens may invoke the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures conducted by our government beyond the continental limits of the
United States, contends that such rights are not available to aliens who are
the victims of such conduct. We disagree. Like the Fifth Amendment guarantee of
due process, the Fourth Amendment refers to and protects "people"
rather than "areas," Katz v. United States, supra at
353, or "citizens," compare United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 228, 86 L. Ed. 796, 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942), and Russian Volunteer Fleet
v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 75 L. Ed. 473, 51 S. Ct. 229 (1931); with Au
Yi Lau v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 144
U.S. App. D.C. 147, 445 F.2d 217, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864, 30 L. Ed. 2d 108,
92 S. Ct. 64 (1971). "The Constitution of the United States is in force .
. . whenever and wherever the sovereign power of that government is
exerted," Balzac v. Puerto Rico, supra at 312-13. It is
beyond dispute that an alien may invoke the Fourth Amendment's protection
against an unreasonable search conducted in the United States. Au Yi Lau
v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., supra at 223.
No sound basis is offered in support of a different rule with respect to aliens
who are the victims of unconstitutional action abroad, at least where the
government seeks to exploit the fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal
proceeding against the alien in the United States. It is no answer to argue
that the foreign country which is the situs of the search does not afford a
procedure for issuance of a warrant. As the court pointed out in Best v.
United States, supra at 138:”
"…Obviously, Congress may not nullify the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment by the simple expedient of not empowering
any judicial officer to act on an application for a warrant. If the search is
one which would otherwise be unreasonable, and hence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, without the sanction of a search warrant, then in such a case, for
lack of a warrant, no search could lawfully be made." 184 F.2d at 138
[SEE United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267
(2nd Cir. 05/15/1974)]
See also:
“In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct.
854 (1975), the Supreme Court restated the rule that an illegal arrest or
detention does void a subsequent conviction.”
129.) See
also, rights of your Appellant stated by case law:
We observed, however, that Toscanino's abduction violated
the United Nations Charter, art. 2, para. 4, and the charter of the
Organization of American States, art. 17, both of which proscribed use of force
by one state against the territory of another. As evidence that abductions
would contravene those provisions, Toscanino relied principally on the Eichmann
incident, in which the U.N. Security Council, in response to a formal complaint
filed by the United Nations representative from Argentina, found that Argentinean
sovereignty was violated when Israeli and other "volunteers"
kidnapped the mass murderer from Argentina in order to bring him to justice.
And, we suggested, a defendant might be able to interpose the violation of
those charters as a defense to a criminal prosecution any rights arising out of
such provisions are, under international law, those of the states and . . .
individual rights are only derivative through the states. [SEE United States v. Lovato,
520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 07/14/1975)]
"It is competent for New York Courts to inquire whether
petitioner is a fugitive and to declare extradition warrant void and prevent
his extradition to demanding state if it is found that petitioner is not, in
fact, fugitive from justice." Edlebaum
on Behalf of Miller v. Cuomo 472 N.Y.S. 302, 122 Misc. 2d 1029.
130.) No
legal forms of trial was allowed you’re
Appellant/Petitioner and I was denied substantive due process of law as
an ongoing crime syndicate implemented by Respondent’s in direct violation of
law and over the concise rule of law.
131.) It
is a fact that at no time was there any lawful warrant, nor was there any
lawful probable cause established, nor was there any governor’s warrant or
governors’ writ[66].
"Where federally protected rights have been invaded, it
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. at 684 (footnote omitted); see Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United
States, 289 U.S. 28, 36 (1933) (Cardozo, J.); The Western Maid,
257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
The protection of Cal. Const., Art I, §
13, and U.S. Constitution Amend IV against violation of the right of the people
to be secure in their person and houses against unreasonable seizure applies to
arrest within the home. Warrantless
arrests within the home are per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent
circumstances. People v. Ramey (1976) 16 C.3d 263, 275-276, 127
Cal.Rptr. 629 636-637, 545 P.2d 1333, 140-141
"Court held that an arrest based solely upon a United
States Attorney's Information was invalid because the accompanying Affidavits
were defective." Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927)
132.) Respondent’s
lied and perjured themselves knowingly in an overt conspiracy for force me into
a mock trial where they fully understood before and had prior knowledge
that the “trial” was rigged and that I would be found only guilty—and did
enjoin with said surrogate courts and their corrupt “Judges” to deny me a fair
trial.
Thus, where a relator challenges the fairness of foreign
process, courts "are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to
assume that the trial will be fair." Glucksman v. Henkel,
221 U.S. 508, 512, 31 S. Ct. 704, 705, 55 L. Ed. 830 (1911).
133.) Respondent’s
willfully violated the law and are inventing and manufacturing crime and not
allowing me to leave the state to return to my home.
“That right as we understand it, is that he shall be tried
only for he offense with which he is charged in the extradition proceedings,
and for which he was delivered up, and that if not tried for hat, or after
trial and acquittal, he shall have a reasonable time to leave the country
before he is arrested upon the charge of any other crime committed previous to
his extradition.” Id. At 424. “…Therefore,
international law recognizing that the asylum state may limit the trial of the
fugitive in the demanding state to those crimes which have been found to be
extraditable offenses in law and where probable cause to believe the petitioner
committed the crime has been show by the evidence.” Freedman v. United States, (1977) 437 F.Supp. 1252,
1259 (D.C.N.D.Ga. 1977) “…Until an
extradited person has had reasonable time in which to return to the state from
which he was brought, he is privileged from the service of civil process. Murray v. Wilcox, 122 Iowa
188, 97 N.W. 1087 (1904); Compton Ault & Co. v. Wilder 40 OhioSt. 130
(1883)
134.) The
“forum” or “trial” Respondent’s willfully kidnapped and abducted me into was a
sham and mock of a trial and neither fair nor substantive due process. Said juror’s were hand-picked by the County
of Butte and were not of the middle part of the County, but rather, a special
committee selected only to find my guilt.
In fact, one Judge in the jury pool was Judge William Raymond Patrick,
who was disqualified for bias on the same cause. Appellant’s full 151 items of evidence was not presented to this
“jury” (the committee), the case was presided over by “Judge” Gerald Hermansen
who factually had been recused, with no plea ever factually been made by me,
with no probable cause determined, nor any lawful warrant. The whole case was factually an overt fraud,
a mock of a trial, a sham and a danger and Domestic Violence against “we the
people” who are now hunted by these evil tribunals for the purposes of profit
and reward. Appellant was kept falsely
imprisoned all the time, with bail set at an astronomical $100,000 with no
substantive legal reason for being so.
Appellant was knowing persecuted by this court, who factually ignored my
written 196 Motions and Pleadings.
“…The record on appeal was wrongfully altered after the
appeal was perfected by arbitrarily striking out defendant’s answer and motion
in arrest of judgment and for a new trial; and the court’s refusal to act on
the same was a refusal to perform the duties required of it by law; and
striking the papers from the record on appeal after appeal was perfected was an
invasion of substantial legal rights. A
sentence imposed for an offense not charged is void.” [See Cooke v. United States, (1925) 267 U.S. 517,
45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767.]
XXXIV
COUNT XXV
TWENTY-FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
THE CALIFORNIA CODES ARE NOT LAW
VIOLATION OF:
CAL. CONST. (1849) ART I, Sec. 11 – ALL LAWS WILL HAVE UNIFORM OPERATION
CAL. CONST. (1849) ART III—DISTRIBUTION OF
POWERS
CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION (1849) DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS WITH PREAMBLE
US CONST. ART 6 SECTION 2—SUPREMACY CLAUSE
From GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CONTINUED
IN FORCE AND NOT AFFECTED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODES(1873), pp. iii-iv:
PREFACE.
By the provisions of an Act to put into effect certain parts
of the Codes and provide for their publication, the Commissioners were
required, in addition to superintending the publication of the Codes, to
compile, for publication, all general statutes continued in force by either of
the Codes. Among these general laws not affected by the Codes were the Acts
funding the State debt; Acts regulating and in relation to rodeos; Acts in
relation to Judges of the plains; Acts in relation to lawful fences, estrays,
and the trespassing of animals on private property; the fee and salary bills of
the various counties of the State, beside other laws specially mentioned and
recognized as continuing in force by the Codes. The corporation laws of the
State existing prior to the adoption of the Codes were continued in force for
certain purposes, and the existence of corporations which had been formed
before twelve o'clock, noon, of the first day of January, eighteen hundred and
seventy-three, were not affected by the Code, unless such corporation elected
to continue its existence under it, but the laws under which such corporation
was formed continued applicable to all such corporations. (See Civil Code,
Sec.’s. 287 and 288.) The corporation laws of this State, as they existed
before the adoption of the Code, are therefore collected and published in this
volume. Wherever the Codes make provisions concerning certain subjects in such
cases, all laws relating to the same subject matter which were theretofore in
force in this State, whether consistent or not with the provisions of the
Codes, are repealed. In this volume the Commissioners have given a brief
history of legislation which has been had upon various subjects, and where the
Code has made provision concerning such subjects, reference thereto is made,
the sections of the Codes relating to the subject, and superseding the prior
law, being cited. It was deemed advisable also to make brief mention of the
special Acts passed, and which affect only certain portions of the State, so
that this volume, when taken in connection with the Codes, might form a
complete and harmonious whole, and the reader may be able at a glance to inform
himself concerning any special, as well as any general law. The Commissioners
have adopted the alphabetical arrangement, believing it will be the most useful
and convenient form.
CREED HAYMOND, Chairman,
JOHN C. BURCH,
JOHN H. McKUNE, Commissioners.
CAMERON H. KING,
WILL J. BEATTY, Secretaries.
From INDEX TO THE LAWS OF CALIFORNIA,
1805-1893, (1894), p. 696:
STATUTES REPEALED BY THE CODES.
Section 4505 of the Political Code states that "the
express repeal of statutes will be provided for by a separate statute."
The bill contemplated by this statement (Senate Bill No. 519, session 1871-2)
failed of passage in the Assembly, because of an objection made to its being
taken up out of order. A list of the statutes enumerated in this bill, and
hence intended to be expressly repealed, is here given for the purpose of indicating
what statutes, according to the Code Commissioners, were superseded by the
Codes.
[Translation: No pre-existing Statutes of California were
repealed by the Political Code]
THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS IS THE REASON WHY THE CODES FAIL AS
“LAW”:
"The evils perpetrated by means of special and local
acts were appreciated at the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1879,
and inspired a strong purpose to prevent such evils in the future. [Denman
v Broderick (1896) 111 C 96, 43 P 516.] This purpose is evidenced by
clear and unmistakable language. [Thomason v Ashworth (1887) 73 C
73, 14 P 615; Boca Mill Co. v Curry (1908) 154 C 326, 97 P 1117.]
The result is that special legislation is not generally permissible, but is
only allowable, when permitted at all, where the exigency of the occasion
imperatively calls for a special law. [Sacramento
v Swanston (1915) 29 CA 212, 155 P 101.]
"It was the object of the framers of the constitution
to prevent vicious legislation for private ends which might be passed in an
apparently harmless provision of a local or private statute. [Brunch v
Colombet (1894) 104 C 347, 38 P 45; Tulare v Hevren
(1899) 126 C 226, 58 P 530.] It was also intended that the laws for the
protection of the citizens and their property should be made uniform,
consistent, and harmonious, in order that privileges given to one should be
enjoyed by all alike. [Tulare v Hevren (1899) 126 C 226, 58 P
530.] Another purpose of the inhibition of special and local legislation is to
make as many as possible interested in every act passed. [Brunch v
Colombet (1894) 104 C 347, 38 P 45.] However, as in the case with other
constitutional guaranties of equality, the requirement that laws be general
wherever possible does not prevent reasonable classifications of persons and
things for legislative purposes. [See secs. 313 et seq.]"
IT IS A FACT, THAT THIS CURRENT LITIGATION AGAINST YOUR
APPELLANT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR 17 YEARS, IT IS SCHEDULED TO GO ON FOR THE REST
OF MY LIFE, AS I WILL EXHAUST ALL COURTS SEEKING THE IMPOSSIBLE “REMEDY AT LAW”
OR “REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES” RESPONDENT’S HAVE UNLAWFULLY DENIED ME AS THEY ARE
HIDING THEIR CRIMINAL ACT BY AND THROUGH THEIR UNFAIR AND UNLAWFUL SURROGATE
COURT SYSTEMS—AND THEY WILL THEN FRAUDULENTLY
PROCLAIM THAT I AM A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AS I SEEK LAWFUL REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES BECAUSE I BUT DARE ENFORCE MY SIMPLE RIGHTS TO BE A FATHER WHICH
THEY HAVE ILLEGALLY ANNIHILLATED IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
CALIFORNIA (1849)/CONSTITUTION OF NEW YORK (1777) AS WELL AS THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES 1787-1791)
In this connection it has been observed that the framers of
the constitution and the people who adopted it did not hedge the legislature
about with restraints in the matter of special and local legislation and at the
same time leave the door wide open for the same abuses to be practiced under
the guise of general legislation. [Re Estate of Stanford (1899)
126 C 112, 58 462.]"
135.) It
is a fact, that respondent’s are now using the published California Penal Code §§
270, 166(a)(4) and other associated laws for a purpose not intended at law, in
direct contradistinction to our form of government to place innocent men in
jail such as your Appellant/Petitioner
(and tens of thousands of other innocent fathers) in order as a
terrorist tool of the awesome power of State of California and the County of
Butte to extract and compel the extortion of an alleged payment of $38,000 by a
fraudulent “Court Order” they seek to unlawfully obtain from me.
"...I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free." In Re
Winship (1970) 90 S.Ct 1068
XXXV
CONCLUSION
136.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s have violated
the concise rule of law, they have abrogated Appellants constitutional rights, and they have overtly as an ongoing
enterprise, willfully violated the public policy of the State of California,
and the State of New York, and the United States, and the laws of the several
union states. It is a fact, that
Respondent’s cannot own my child, as they are incompetents, and need subsidy
to do so. It is a fact, that the
State of California does not own my son, as it is an artificial entity and a
corporation and is factually my public servant. Respondent Ms. Susan Sloan is a beggar, an incompetent, and a
liar and a perjurer—factually, an immoral person—and not only by and from her
unlawful acts and/or omissions noted throughout this document, has forfeited
any rights to my son Windsor Scott Cheney; but also as her station as the
subferior in accordance with the law of the Bible, clearly points to me as the
Father as sovereign, owning, caring for and as the natural guardian of my
son. It is a fact, that somebody does
own Appellant’s son, and in and by law, it is Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., the
father and natural guardian, lawful owner of my child. It is clear, that Respondent’s have an
ongoing enterprise for profit to overthrow the concise rule of law, and
Appellant’s constitutional rights.
137.)
It is a fact, that Appellant has been destroyed
by the Respondents, who are using the fascist police power of the State of
California, to establish a fraudulent, not-at-law claim to disenfranchise me,
to enslave me, and to ruin and greatly damage me, which they factually have
done. Respondent’s use their own acts
and/or omissions which create the destruction of my life, in order so that they
may establish more fraudulent claims and to manufacture and invent even more
“crime” for the purposes of profit and reward in direct contradistinction to
the secured liberties and enumerated protections of the Constitution of
California (1849), the Constitution for the State of New York (1777) and the
Constitution for the United States (1787-1791).
138.)
It is a fact, that my son was greatly damaged by
the perfidy and unlawful acts and/or omissions by Respondent’s and in fact,
Windsor Scott Cheney was thrown out of Respondent Ms. Susan Sloan’s home (and
even then your Appellant was not given discovery and notified of this act
and/or omission by Respondent’s which would have freed him in his home state of
New York) and they willfully did this to abrogate the legal forms of trial and
to deny Appellant any right he had secured under law.
139.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s have knowingly
and willfully established an ongoing enterprise, a massive conspiracy backed
and supported in direct collusion with their surrogate courts of the State of
California and the State of New York as well as the United States, as well as
the Legislature’s and Executive department’s contained thereof; for the
purposes of profit and reward to disenfranchise the natural guardian pointed
out in law (your appellant/petitioner and most male fathers) in order to
disenfranchise him/them, enslave him/them, force him/them into a condition of
slavery and/or peonage for their own profit and remuneration motives, clothed
under color of law, under color of authority, for purposes still not comprehended
fully by your Appellant/Petitioner.
140.)
It is a fact, that your Appellant/Petitioner
never agreed to any part of these unlawful acts and/or omissions and/or schemes
perpetrated against him, as this present system implemented by Respondent’s is
Anti-American and/or not American, and reprehensible, it is in fact, an
unconscionable contract, which Appellant (nor any male father) would enter
into, but rather, Appellant (or any male father) is bludgeoned into it by
Respondent’s and their surrogate court systems clothed under color of law,
under color of authority as an ongoing enterprise for the purposes of profit
and reward.
141.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s have no lawful
signature or consent of your Appellant, and as his status is proof and secure;
as he is not embarrassed by the Fourteenth Amendment and not a citizen thereto;
I have a right and perfect right to question the debt and/or “special debt”
and/or obligation, and/or “special obligation”, and/or contract and/or “special
contract” of which I do not owe, and have in fact, filed on January 01, 2001 a
lawful “Debt on a Specialty” of which respondent’s have factually defaulted
upon.
142.)
Clearly, it is a fact, that respondent’s are a
clear and ever present danger to the rights of Fatherhood, ergo: your appellant
and petitioner in this matter Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr.[67];
and this is a well-known, and irrefutable fact as respondent’s history of
destruction to his gender thereof is being accomplished as a Title 42 U.S.C.A.,
Section 651-666 [Welfare “Title IV-D] profit scam and or schemes as a
transfer-of-wealth scheme against Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., to the benefit of
the respondents for their own remuneration and/or profit scam and/or scheme
and/or direct or indirect remunerations.
“The Court uses three standards of review. First, strict
scrutiny is applied to any statute based on a suspect classification or
fundamental right. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(reviewing an Oklahoma statute that forbade the sale of 3.2% beer to males
under the age of 21 while females over 18 could purchase the beer).
[192] See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 680-82. Despite
the heightened level of scrutiny, the Court has nonetheless continued to uphold
some statutes that discriminate against either gender. See, e.g., Michael
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 475 (1981)
(upholding a statute subjecting men but not women to statutory rape charges
when they engage in sex with a partner under the age of 18); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding the male-only draft); Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (sustaining a federal statute that
granted female navy members a longer time period in which to achieve a
mandatory promotion); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 (1974)
(upholding a Florida statute that provided a property tax exemption for widows
but not widowers); Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974)
(upholding New Jersey's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities under the
state's disability insurance program). Consequently, the Court has sent mixed
messages as to exactly which level of scrutiny would be used when reviewing
equal protection challenges to laws. See STONE ET AL., supra note
180, at 681-82.
Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[C]ourts must subject [all legal restrictions
that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group] to the most rigid
scrutiny.") Government must show a necessary and compelling reason for
burdening a specific race, national origin, or alienage. See Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 24 (1972).
Second, intermediate scrutiny is applied to any statute
based on the quasi-suspect classes of gender. See Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) ("A classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" (citation omitted)). The
Court uses this level of review for invidious
(intentionally harmful) or benign (intending to help women
or redress past discrimination against them) discrimination. See STONE ET
AL., supra note 180, at 679-82, 713-18. Government must show a
substantially related interest to an important governmental objective. See Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Third, the rational relation test is applied to any statute
not based on a suspect or quasi-suspect class; the government action must bear
a rational relationship to an acceptable goal sought by the government. See
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (3rd ed. 1986). The
statute will be upheld as long as it bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental objective, which is almost always the case. See id.
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court reviewed gender classifications using the
rational relation test. See HERMA HILL KAY, SEX- BASED
DISCRIMINATION 26-27 (2d ed. 1981). In 1971, the Court began to use a
heightened level of scrutiny when reviewing gender-based statutes. See id.; Reed,
404 U.S. at 75.
SEE ALSO:
"Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public
purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation
it affects all persons similarly situated, is not within the [fifth]
amendment." (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, [5 Sup. Ct.
357]; French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 662, [77Pac. 663].)
"In Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 467, [11
Sup. Ct. 577], it is said that "By the fourteenth amendment the powers of
states in dealing with crime within their borders are not limited, except that
no state can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and
impartial justice under the law; that law in its regular course of
administration through the courts of justice is due process, and when secured
by the law of the state the constitutional requirement is satisfied." (People
v. Coleman, 145 Cal. 615, [79 Pac. 283].) "An act to be general in
its scope need not include all classes of individuals in the state. It answers
constitutional requirements if it relates to and operates upon the whole of any
single class." (Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 230, [24 Pac. 383].)
...
143.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s
arbitrarily, forcibly, and fraudulently
against my continued objections, kidnapped my own son Windsor Scott Cheney, and
refused to lawfully compensate me before that taking in overt violation of law:
The compensation must be made before the citizen can
be divested of his rights. San
Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114; McCain v. Sierra County,
Jan T., 1857, See also Constitution of New Jersey (1776) Art I, Id (above).
144.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s are cogently
violating law as an organized crime syndicate, and have brazenly informed your
Appellant/Petitioner of this unlawful corruption committed for the purposes of
profit and reward clothed under color of law, under color of authority:
145.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s are cognizant
that they cannot nor have not won in this matter, that they have only via their
surrogate courts imposed a huge fraud upon me, and they fully understand that
they cannot win upon the “charges” of published California Penal Code §§
270 and/or 166(a)(4) accusations, and they now are engaged in direct and overt
collusion with their surrogate courts, continuing to manufacture charges and
crime in direct violation of law; and denying me all the legal forms of
trial and justice in this matter, as they know they have legally lost this
matter—and are not allowing me to challenge their unlawful acts and/or
omissions at a court of competent jurisdiction, of which when I do get to such
a lawful court, I will most assuredly win on this matter and be justly
vindicated.
146.)
It is a fact, that Respondent’s scam and/or
criminal scheme is to use their surrogate courts as a weapon against your
Appellant/Petitioner; to at first establish a fraudulent claim against him by
unlawfully overtly stealing his child from him; then to disenfranchise him and
allow him no input nor remedy at law nor allow him to use his own genius or
capabilities to secure himself a solution; nor to allow him ownership and
control over his own child; then they hand over his son to an incompetent,
immoral beggar Ms. Susan Sloan who needs state and/or Respondent’s subsidy;
then, they force their surrogate courts upon your Appellant and fraudulently
use the legal forms of trial for a purpose not intended at law, and then from
these surrogate courts they establish a procedure that is in direct violation
to our form of government, and establish these frauds and unlawful acts and/or
omissions against his authority, consent and will as “Res Adjudicata”
proceedings, then; upon that overt fraud committed under color of law, and with
color of authority, they then manufacture crime against your
Appellant/Petitioner for the purposes of profit and reward, they Civilly Murder
your Appellant knowingly, denying him all rights for a “crime” they themselves
only invented and perpetrated upon him themselves only from a pen and their own
practices, policies and procedures outside the law and in direct
contradistinction to the Constitution of California and for the United States. They then knowingly receive state and
federal monies and grants to enforce this ongoing fraud against your
Appellant/Petitioner and keep him uselessly engaged within their surrogate
courts which they know are a complete fraud, and while they receive direct and
indirect remunerations for their fraud, crimes and scam against him, they know
their Civil Murder of Appellant he cannot sustain himself to live, that he
cannot work, have a bank account, he cannot drive, his wages are garnished, and
he can have no licenses in exact conformity to their adherence to Marx’s
Communist Manifesto Plank’s 1 through 6 and 10[68]; that there is an Orwellian crime syndicate
as a Domestic Enemy embedded within Appellants own government respondent’s are
privy to; throughout the complete aegis of government hunting Appellant FOR NO
CRIME HE HAS FACTUALLY BEEN COMMITTED, but they are hunting him for a fraud
they themselves invented while they continually get paid for this whole scam,
of which they know that in the end, they will engage him into decades of court
battles within their useless surrogate court systems which have sworn not to
obey the Constitution of California and/or for the United States to deny your
Appellant justice or redress of grievances and which if appellant cannot pay
the extortion, that they will extort it from the public by unlawfully
warehousing and imprisoning appellant in direct violation of law, and to obtain
state and federal “per diem” rates and other remunerations to falsely
incarcerate him so that they may impose this social engineering against our
once free society.
147.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s have illegally
exacerbated this issue needlessly, and are using incomprehensible powers of
debt in order to sustain their unlawful proceedings against me.
148.)
It is a fact, that said respondent’s have
violated their oath of office thereto, by not adhering to the legal forms of
trial; and where they refuse to answer my lawful Bill of Particulars filed
against them, on May 18, 1998 by my process server and next-best-friend one
Carl Andersen. They did in fact, deny
all efforts to obtain lawful discovery;
to willfully prosecute me and place me into legal jeopardy, with
factually no crime occurring; and without the legal forms of trial, and without
the parties having within their power to confront their accusers at legal
trial. Respondent’s have willfully kept
your Appellant/Petitioner ignorant of the instant action against him, and have
denied to him the knowing of the lawful venue; the jurisdiction; and the real
party in interest thereof. They have
refused my interrogatories, as well as all forms of lawful redress; in overt
violation of law and not supported by any lawful contract or obligation
thereto. They have knowingly and
willfully used the processes of law in direct contravention to the concise rule
of law, insolent to the restrictions placed against them by the concise rule of
law; knowingly having been informed that they will be protected by their
surrogate courts, and that they can commit any Domestic Violence against your
Appellant/Petitioner; in direct violation of the concise rule of law, and the
constitutions of which they have sworn an oath to uphold.
149.)
It is has become a common known fact, that
respondent’s are in fact criminals unlawfully operating within the venue of the
authority of government and their surrogate courts—and are a direct oppressor
against fathers as a class of peoples who they label as “non-custodial”
parents, and/or “absent parent” to whom they actively discriminate, clothed
under color of law, and under color of authority, for purposes of their own
profit and gain. They have become
greatly feared and are a danger to the peace and safety of the State of
California, the State of New York, and the Union of Several States as well as
to the United States of America.
150.)
It is a fact, that Appellant, along with a
state, and nation of fathers now correctly fears respondent’s as they are, in
fact, committing a Domestic Violence against them and are clothed under color
of law, under color of authority and appellant along with other fathers fear
respondent’s and their corrupt surrogate court systems, all whose acts and/or
omissions are completely outside the rule of law, and in direct
contradistinction to the Constitution of California; and/or the State of New
York, and of the United States.
151.)
It is a fact, that there is no reasonable remedy
at law for your Appellant/Petitioner (nor any other male father) exactly due to
the corruption described herein.
152.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s will in fact,
use any lie, any frivolous claim in order to back their unlawful acts and/or
omissions against your Appellant/Petitioner who in fact, has clean hands in
this matter, and who only asked for his son and for his son not to be on
welfare, and who would have cared for his son without asking nor burdening any
party, and who would have allowed Ms. Sloan to be the secondary parent and he
would have not financially destroyed her for the privilege nor asked anything
from her.
153.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s have destroyed
and ruined your Appellant/Petitioner, as that is their exact design, and the
system and laws and surrogate courts; as they profit from the control and
destruction of fatherhood in direct contravention to the Constitution of
California as well as the United States, and our form of free government.
154.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s have damaged my
son, Windsor Scott Cheney, as they have destroyed children at a level never
before seen in humanity as again, that is respondent’s exact design, as
they need failure and damage to enlarge
and contribute to their Socialist/Feminist empire of “Health and Human
Services” “entitlements” and other “programs” which they use in order to
destroy your Appellant/Petitioner and his family/son.
155.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s fear no
constitutional law nor government as
they have undermined them using “Title IV-D” welfare remunerations scams and/or
schemes noted above.
156.)
It is a fact that respondent’s are completely
out-of-control, and there is neither redress of grievances for appellant nor
any palpable remedy at law, which is in fact, a known pre-meditated design of
respondent’s system along with their surrogate court systems.
157.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s unlawfully,
intentionally and willfully interfere and frustrate the supreme contract
between Appellant/Petitioner Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., and his son Windsor
Scott Cheney in direct violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution
for the United States (1787-1791), and provide no redress of grievances or
palpable remedy at law.
158.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s along with their
surrogate court systems are in fact, implementing Marxist
Jurisprudence/Feminist Jurisprudence against your unsuspecting
Appellant/Petitioner, and are using oppression and fear to disenfranchise
Appellant in order to transfer wealth from him, to respondent’s.
159.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s along with their
surrogate court systems have in fact, in place a “no win” scenario for
appellant (and other fathers) within said courts of the State of California and
of the United States, as it is a recognized fact of Appellant and the public
that the courts of respondent’s are to be feared and are out-of-control and a
danger to a free peoples, that they are a “known quantity” to respondent’s and
will use color of law and color of authority to protect respondent’s ongoing
fraud and criminal and unlawful acts and/or omissions and direct insolence to
the Constitution of California:
“Supporters of de novo review on habeas maintain that it is
an essential safeguard, due to a deep distrust of state courts. See, e.g.,
Habeas Corpus Issues, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime, House
Judiciary Committee, May 22, June 27, and July 17, 1991, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Serial No. 39, p. 386 (statement of David Bruck). Opponents of de novo review note
that the superiority of federal courts in reaching the "right" result
is far from certain. State court decisions reaching results outside the bounds
of reasonable debate among jurists are rare. See K. Scheidegger, Rethinking
Habeas Corpus 34 (1989), reprinted in Habeas Corpus Issues,
supra, at 249. A federal court may "find" constitutional error in a
state judgment and overturn it, only to have the Supreme Court determine years
later in another case that the state court's view of the law was correct all
along. See, e.g., Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F.2d 1275, 1278 (6th Cir.
1989) (holding that a particular Kentucky procedure violates "federal
standards"); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992) (holding
that this procedure "easily passes constitutional muster"). The ABA and Criminal Justice Issues:
An Informational Report of the Criminal Law and Procedure Practice Group of the
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, August 1997
160.)
Because of respondent’s continual fascist acts
and/or omissions in this matter, your Appellant/Petitioner along with a nation
of fathers clearly fears respondent’s and their surrogate courts and their
government(s) as being severely oppressive, diseased, and criminally and
constitutionally outside the law. It
cannot be refuted that respondent’s have a hatred for your
Appellant/Petitioner, men in general and all fathers in general. No country designed to establish, maintain
and secure liberty and freedom would either propose such Domestic Violence
against its own people, or implement it.
161.)
It is a fact, under law as well as a protection
by the Constitution of California (1849) that your Appellant can no longer be
allowed imprisonment upon this issue as he has suffered cruel and inhumane
punishments, as well as continual persecutions over a 17 year period for no
factual crime.
162.)
Respondent’s in this matter, at no time had
lawful jurisdiction, and they have wilfully and wilfully admitted and defaulted
as such; and thereby; your Appellant has the right to protect himself and not submit
to an illegal and/or unlawful arrest which this court must protect him from:
"Once a party raises the question of an agency's
jurisdiction, the general rule that the agency must decide the
issue." 2 AM JUR Administrative
Law §§ 332 (2d Ed. 1962)
“The rule is stated in Bac. Abr. Hab. Corp. B.
10, as follows: ‘If the commitment be against law, as being made by one who had
no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no man ought to
be punished, the courts are to discharge.’" In re Application of James Rose, 6 A.2d 388, 122
N.J.L. 507 (N.J. 05/22/1939)
163.) It
is a fact, that published California Penal Codes §§
270 and 166(a)(4) violate the basic premise of equity, that “One must come into Equity with Clean
Hands,” and “Equity Abhors a forfeiture.”
Clearly, said codes are in direct contradistinction to law and our form
of government, and a great danger and opprobrious to a free peoples. Thereby, because of their insolence to the
concise rule of law guaranteed by the Constitution of California (1849) as well
as the Constitution for the United States (1787-1791) they must be struck down
as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
XXXVI
PRAYER
FOR RELIEF
164.) Your
Appellant/Petitioner Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. hereby comes before Almighty
God and this Judicial Powers court for substantial remedy and justice in the
above entitled cause of action.
165.) That
this Constitutional Challenge brought forwards by your Appellant/Petitioner
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., issue in the first instance and that this court
provide me with palpable legal remedy in order to stop the unconstitutional
acts and/or omissions committed by Respondent’s.
166.) That
this court overturn and vacate the illegal, perfidy and capricious
“conviction(s)” in the lower court of the County of Butte, and all their fraudulent
“orders” of P-3747; SCR 25413; and CM 010607.
167.) That
this court vacate and expunge all such fraudulent lower court convictions in
cases P-3747; SCR 25413 and CM 010607.
168.) That
this court mandate that any and all “Order’s of the Court” in this matter be
given to Appellant in this matter.
169.) That
this court overturn the illegal restraint of your Appellant/Petitioner and that
you restore his liberty to him.
170.) That
this court prohibit any and all further malicious and vindictive acts and/or
omissions of the Respondent’s in this matter against Appellant, and stop their
continual and sustained vexatious litigancy against your Appellant.
171.) That
this court prohibit any further Domestic Violence against your
Appellant/Petitioner and that you allow him and his son to live in peace
without further government interference.
172.) That
this court remove all fraudulent “parole absconder” charges and fraudulent
“parole” or any other attachments against him.
173.) That
this court find on the above demonstrated counts proving respondent’s illegal
acts and/or omissions against the constitutional law of this state and stop the
Domestic Violence of published California Penal Code §
270, and 166(a)(4) against Appellant/Petitioner as well as other fathers within
the State of California.
174.) That
this court allow Appellant to return to his home and never to be harassed by
the contemnor State of California respondent’s again.
175.) That
this court prohibit any further Civil Death of your Appellant/Petitioner and
restore him completely of all rights, immunities and privileges, and prohibit
respondent’s from any further damage to your Appellant.
176.) That
this court a complete rescission go against respondent’s in this matter and the
State of California where any and all claims against Appellant/Petitioner are
vacated and/or expunged so that he may simply be free as he has suffered too
much in this matter over a seventeen year period.
177.) That
this court find for your Appellant/Respondent the above mentioned Counts so
described above and render the published California Penal Code §
270 vexatious null and void, and unconstitutional and contrary and in conflict
with the concise rule of law.
178.) That
this court find for your Appellant/Respondent the above mentioned Counts so
described above and render the published California Penal Code §
166(a)(4) vexatious and null and void; unconstitutional and contrary and in
conflict with the concise rule of law.
179.) If
any part of this Constitutional challenge is denied, that Appellant/Petitioner
demands a written statement of decision by the above mentioned court sitting at
term, in lawful venue and jurisdiction showing the findings of facts, and
conclusions of law based upon the decision therein.
180.) That
this court give to me, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. the Appellant/Petitioner, the
accused and greatly aggrieved and damaged party in this matter, any other
further remedy or protections at law, that this court deems fair and just.
DATED: APRIL
10TH, 2002
SEAL: _____________________________________
Robert
Lindsay; Cheney Jr.—AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui
Juris
Fifteenth
Judicial District
6190
Skyway
Paradise,
California
Fifteenth Judicial District
6190 Skyway
Paradise, California
(530) 877-1265
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
DIVISION ____________
___________ TERM
|
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr.
APPELLANT / PETITIONER
Accused and Aggrieved Party Against THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, By their Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, District
Attorney for the County of Butte
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) COUNTY OF BUTTE, Butte County Consolidated Court
System, “Superior Court”, Gerald Hermansen “Judge”
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) Ms. Susan Sloan, A.K.A. a fiction “SUSAN SLOAN” by
her attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, District Attorney for the County of Butte
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Respondent/Contemnor (Undefined) JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1 THROUGH 500 Respondent(s)/Contemnors (Undefined) |
CASE No._____________ (3RD APPEL. No. C
037374) (Sup.Ct. No. CM 010607) (Sup.Ct.
No. CR 25413) (Muni Ct. No. P 3747) AFFIDIAVIT IN SUPPORT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE(S) SECTION
270 “Willful Failure to Provide”
and SECTION
166(a)(4) “Contempt” [AND
OTHER LAWS THERETO] [HABEAS
CORPUS] (Common
Law) Date:
________ Time:
________ Dept: ________ |
I,
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., the Appellant/Petitioner in this matter, having
full knowledge of the laws for perjury within the State of California, as well
as the State of New York, and of the United States of America, having full
personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, being duly sworn before
Almighty God; hereby states and formally deposes:
I.
That deponent is the petitioner in
the above entitled action.
II.
That my name, Robert Lindsay; Cheney
Jr. is my only name and is not spelled at any time or accepted in any way if in
all capitals or any derivative thereof, and must be spelled and capitalized
exactly as aforementioned hereby.
III.
I am a free white Christian male
adult, a state Citizen of the state of New York. I am not an incompetent, and am Sui Juris, a man about the land
living during a profound time of peace.
IV.
That I am in my own proper person,
acting as my own counsel in this matter.
That I am NOT PRO SE, or PRO PER; but it is a fact, that I am In Propria
Persona, Sui Juris.
V.
That I have read completely this
formally submitted document at law to the above mentioned court; and that I
have personal knowledge of the matters contained therein, and as to those
matters submitted upon information and/or believe, as to those matters I
believe them also to be true.
VI.
That I am presently being unlawfully
restrained of my liberty by Respondent’s in this matter.
VII.
That both I, Robert Lindsay; Cheney
Jr. as well as my son, Windsor Scott Cheney have been irreparably harmed by
Respondent’s ongoing acts and/or omissions in this matter.
VIII.
That this petitioner is presented to
the Justices of the above mentioned court on behalf of the said Robert Lindsay;
Cheney Jr.
IX.
That I, the said Robert Lindsay;
Cheney Jr. has been unlawfully kidnapped, is imprisoned, detained, confined and
restrained of my personal liberty. I
have been unjustly and unlawful prosecuted, and/or persecuted with no
substantive due process of law, unequally, as the male parent to my son Windsor
Scott Cheney, and with malice and aforethought by the Respondent’s in this
matter along with their surrogate courts within the COUNTY OF BUTTE and/or the
STATE OF CALIFORNIA for a purpose not intended at law.
X.
That the said Robert Lindsay; Cheney
Jr. is so kidnapped, imprisoned, detained, confined and restrained of his
personal liberty by unknown state actors and agents, to wit: “The California
Department of Corrections” in the Butte County Jail, attempted incarceration in
a state prison, by one “Parole Agent” Tim Torres, of the Chico Parole office,
without valid warrant, or court order of any court, even though your petitioner
has demanded as such and has not volunteered or lawfully contracted to said
“state parole” in any way, shape or form, and at all times, has reserved all
rights, and given up none. The
aforementioned restraint of liberty, stems from an unlawful kidnapping, without
due process of law, in direct violation of law, by the COUNTY OF BUTTE, and
respondents in this matter, whom have unclean hands, have committed unlawful
acts and/or omissions against your petitioner in this matter under the guise of
color of authority, under color of law, using fraud, duress, and overt acts of
collusion and conspiracy for profit. An overt violation of law and abuse of
official authority.
XI.
That said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr.
is not committed at the present, imprisoned, detained, confined by virtue of
the final judgment or decree of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal
jurisdiction, or by virtue of an execution issue upon such judgment or decree
allowed by law.
XII.
That said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr.
is not committed, imprisoned, detained confined or restrained by virtue of any
lawful process, judgment, decree or execution issued by any competent court or
judge of the United States in a case where such court of judge has exclusive
lawful jurisdiction, nor by virtue of a final judgment or decree of any
competent court of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or of any execution issued
upon such judgment or decree, nor for any treason, felony or other crime
committed in any other state or territory of the united States of America, for
which the said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. ought by the constitution and laws of
the united States of America to be delivered up to the executive power of such
state or territory.
XIII.
That the true cause or pretense of
such confinement, imprisonment, detention and restraint, according to the best
knowledge and belief of your petitioner, is a political vendetta, and personal
vendetta, inflicted by the respondents in this matter using the published
California Penal Code for a purpose not intended for at law, and in direct
conspiracy and in overt contradistinction to the good and wholesome laws of the
state of California, the state of New York, and the union of the several states
thereof, and the united States of America.
XIV.
That the said imprisonment,
detention, confinement and restraint are illegal, and that the illegality
thereof consists in this to wit: overt treason to the laws of the state of
California and in direct violation to the Constitution for the state of
California (1849), the Constitution for the State of New York (1777), and the
Constitution for the united States of America (1787-1791). Respondents in this matter have been
involved in the kidnapping of my son, Windsor Scott Cheney; which occurred on
or about February 15, 1985 by one Ms. Susan Sloan, and thereby, she conspired
with the Butte County District Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, et al., and the
COUNTY OF BUTTE, to collude with said respondents in this matter to enter into
a direct fraud known as “Welfare” under U.S.C.A. Title 42, §§ 602, 651 through
666 and Government Code §§ 77,000 and 88,000 et seq. and other welfare
enumerated “Title IV-D” remuneration scams for profit[70]. That all said respondents in this matter,
knowingly, criminally and maliciously, overtly entered into such frauds and
scams to accrue said benefits; in which to criminally kidnap and deprive your
petitioner of his only son, to remove my rights as a father, to civilly murder
me to force me to accept said fraud and crimes done against me; then to
conspire under color of law, using color of authority of the COUNTY OF BUTTE,
and/or the STATE OF CALIFORNIA in order to perpetrate and inflict said acts
and/or omissions against your petitioner—who LAWFULLY supplicated said
respondents and sought redress (throughout the complete aegis of government,
both state and federal) for substantive due process of law and redress of
grievances, which was criminally denied said due process of law by respondents
in this matter, as a overt scam in which to civilly murder me as a father
seeking his rights in this matter in order to complete their crimes under the
guise and safety of color of law, using color of authority, in order to
accomplish their acts and/or omissions against your petitioner. A clear criminal abuse of official
authority.
XV.
Said respondent’s do not have any
valid or lawful instrument at law that grants said respondent’s agency, and
that all acts and omissions committed by said respondent’s have been done in
overt violation of the law, and have been committed for the sole purpose of profit
through welfare enumerated “Title IV-D” remuneration scams.
XVI.
No application for a writ of habeas
corpus for the relief herein sought has been before made to or refused by this
court or judge(s) superior to the one herein presented in California. That your petitioner did submit a habeas
corpus to the Butte County Sheriff, Scott Mackenzie, however; it was ignored—in
overt violation of law--and another habeas corpus submitted before Mr. Gerald
Hermansen at the “Superior Court” and was amazingly “stayed” by said Mr.
Hermansen acting as “judge” who was in fact disqualified at the time then later
‘denied’ the petition. A writ of habeas
corpus was also sought in the New York Supreme Court and then later the United
States District Court by Judge Mukasey, who intimated that the Governor’s Writ
was valid on its face, when in fact, there was no Governor’s Warrant as
mandated by law.
XVII.
That the legality of the
imprisonment aforesaid of the said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. has not already
been adjudged upon prior proceedings, to the best knowledge and belief of your
petitioner. In fact, aforesaid
court(s), judge(s), and other state actors, agents, and agencies have overtly
conspired to hide and keep secret their acts and/or omissions in this matter to
unlawfully hid their crimes from the record, the public, and scrutiny under
law.
XVIII.
That it is impossible for said
respondent’s to do the right thing, or obey their oath of office, or adhere to
the good and wholesome laws that they supposedly have sworn an oath to, as said
respondent’s have a personal, private, and professional interest and direct (or
indirect as the case may be) remuneration for usurping the rule of law, in
direct insolence to law, and factually and arrogantly are violating law and the
rights of Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. for profit. They are in fact, a domestic enemy acting outside their scope of
authority, under color of law, and under color of authority in a conspired
organized crime syndicate in which to abuse official authority, in order to
obtain “Title IV-D” Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes for profit.
XIX.
That on or about February 15, 1985,
that I did return home from work and did find my son missing from our home
located at 14955 Clearcut Lane, in Forest Ranch, County of Butte, State of California. My son, Windsor Scott Cheney, was kidnapped
by one Ms. Susan Sloan in violation to law and contract, did kidnap my son, and
did seek refuge and protection from respondent’s in this matter, for her
crimes. Your petitioner did call both
the County of Butte Sheriff’s Department, and the Chico Police, and both did
knowingly protect respondent’s acts and/or omissions and did refuse to do
anything saying: “Get a lawyer” in direct violation of the rule of law.
XX.
That your petitioner did appear in
court afterwards, and did continually demand his own son, in accordance with
the common law, and the rule of law, including the published California Civil
Code § 7004(a) which said “Judges” in this matter, did deny me the care,
custody and control of my own son in direct violation to their oath of office,
and did so having direct knowledge that they were getting direct welfare
remunerations, benefits, and/or other profits, power or aggrandizement’s for
their criminal acts and/or omissions. A
clear abuse of official authority.
XXI.
Ms. Susan Sloan, did also get
pregnant again, by another man—which was unknown to me—to which in keeping with
her criminal acts and/or omissions in this matter, did blame said pregnancy on
me, to which respondents in this matter did as an organized crime syndicate,
with unequal protection of the laws as their modus operandi, did come after me
and demand extortion monies also for this child which name turned out to be
Joseph Sloan. Ms. Sloan did come to me
knowing I did not believe in abortion and did ask for an abortion. I did not agree to the abortion (thereby my
liberty of conscience and adherence to morality in times of great danger, saved
that child’s life) and that child was born soon thereafter, with me being
burdened and paying all the expenses in reference to said pregnancy thereof. Respondents did attack me seeking to extort and steal even more
monies than they already were stealing at this time. Ms. Sloan at all times, knowingly with malice and
aforethought, never did tell me the truth, until the child was born and was of
a clearly different race, to which she still insisted it was my child,
(incredulously, insisting that the hair would turn blonde at some point)
placing me at great danger and jeopardy with respondents, who malignantly were
trying to destroy me financially even to a greater extent and burden me with
this child, even though it was not my own, and again, came from an unclean act
by Ms. Sloan, to which said respondents enjoined with her unclean act for
profit, and with unclean hands, knowingly came to the courts of the COUNTY OF
BUTTE, knowing they could profit at my expense and unjust and unlawful
enslavement for these continued criminal, and/or immoral acts and/or omissions
committed by Ms. Sloan. Ms. Sloan had
two (2) more children while on welfare with different men, and did each time
knowingly access the Department of Health and Human services to go on welfare
for their benefits and known “Title IV-D” Welfare remuneration scams in which
both she and they would directly and/or indirectly profit from. At all times respondents did knowingly
support and enjoin with Ms. Susan Sloans’ immorality, as they all knew that
because of the criminal and biased, and unequal court systems, within the
COUNTY OF BUTTE, they would receive continued profits, grants, benefits and/or
other “Title IV-D” Welfare remunerations to expand female immorality.
XXII.
Your petitioner did seek lawful
redress of grievances throughout the aegis of government and was denied, as
again all state actors, agents, and agencies fully understand that they are
obtaining direct or indirect remunerations from “Title IV-D” remunerations, and
are cogently incapable of allowing redress or providing substantive due process
of law, as allowing me my rights to my own son at law would directly effect
their profits and/or benefits. No state
actor, agent, agency or municipal corporation has lawfully established agency
in this matter, nor agency over me; yet willfully and criminally committed
their overt acts and/or omissions. They
were accessories after the fact; directly or indirectly aiding or abetting in
the criminal acts and/or omissions of other “public servants”, state agents,
agencies, or other state actors, both public and private, who were criminally
acting against me, in overt violation of law.
At all times I demanded my son, and could have taken care of him without
demanding any monies from anyone else, while also allowing Ms. Sloan unfettered
access to my son; without state intervention, to which said state had no
state interest nor lawful authority to intrude in upon my life at all. Thereby, no court ever would have been
contacted, no welfare or any other such agency would have gotten involved in
either my or my son’s life, and at no
time would the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and/or the people of
the state of California, ever been burdened in any way shape or form, if my
will and lawful authority had been obeyed, in accordance with respondent’s oath
of office, and contractual bindings to the good and wholesome laws as
established by the Constitution for the state of California (1849).
XXIII.
Said Municipal court, in only a
Civil matter, did protect their investment, Ms. Susan Sloan from criminal
prosecution for her crimes of kidnapping my son; and they did unlawfully,
enjoin with her, gave her monies at my expense, ‘represented’ her in direct
violation of the concise rule of law, and using threat, duress and fraud, did
by fraud by way of inducement, force me into an unlawful unconscionable and/or
unknown contract(s) because they knew that they would obtain “Title IV-D”
welfare enumerated profit schemes and remunerations and did place me and my son
against my consent, and over my vituperative objections, into a slavery for
profit scheme via aforesaid “Title IV-D” welfare remuneration schemes.
XXIV.
The aforesaid Respondent, the Butte
County District Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, on or about 1990 or 1991 did in
overt violation of law and my rights to life, liberty and property, did
unlawfully steal and seize all my bank accounts, seize and garnish my wages,
leaving me destitute. It was a this
time I lost contact with my son, Windsor Scott Cheney, directly due to this
attack and treason against me, because I was factually destitute.
XXV.
On or about December of 1994, I lost
my career at California State University, Chico, due to no fault of my
own. Although aforesaid respondent’s in
their organized crime syndicate, did raise my “obligation” amounts via wage
garnishments from $100 per month to $361 a month (against my will, and over my
continued objections and against my consent) yet when I lost my job, they were
not able to thereby adjust downward, in their ‘supposed’ fair and just welfare
remuneration scheme…which clearly shows that respondent’s are only involved in
a ruthless organized crime scheme, using the overt fraud of color of authority,
under color of law for profit.
XXVI.
On or about May 1995 I was then
involved in a lethal motorcycle accident in which I almost lost my life, when a
¾ Ton Truck ran a red light at 50Mph on a blind turn at 20th Street
in Chico, California and broadsided me on my motorcycle nearly killing me. I was sent into the hospital, and was
operated on, and spent two weeks there until I was sent home, and fed by
friends at home, where I recuperated for 9 months and was mostly bed-ridden
that whole time. Respondent’s had
knowledge of this tragedy, and of my multiple wounds and recuperation in a
wheel-chair; yet amazingly was never again able to adjust their aforesaid
“obligation” against me downward, which again, clearly shows that respondent’s
are only involved in a ruthless organized crime scheme, using the overt fraud
of color of authority, under color of law for profit.
XXVII.
On or about January 1996, on black
father, Mr. Robert Cumbuss came to me to seek aid for his family as his son
Brady-Dayton Cumbuss was brutally murdered in the Butte County Jail (a known
malady, as that institution was famous for).
Me and my group, did stand up for this gentleman, and did publicize this
crime, and from that held both Butte County authorities, the said respondent’s
and the Butte County Sheriff at the time, Mick Grey, up to public scrutiny and
contempt, and thereby; said Sheriff Mick Grey had to resign in disgrace, and
the Butte County District Attorney, as well as others, were held up to contempt
and humiliation for their own acts and/or omissions in arrogance of law. From this, they held this against me, for
doing the right thing, in accordance with law, and held a public, and personal
vendetta against me and did decide to use published California Penal Code §
166(a)(4) and §270 for a purpose not intended by law, and did “prosecute” me
for these things magically changing a civil matter into a criminal matter in
overt violation of law, even though they had direct knowledge that I had an
inability to pay—as I had lost my job—and had almost died in my motorcycle
accident for the time period therein, yet vindictively used the public domain
and funds to unlawfully prosecute me as nobody controls these criminals
using the public trust and the infinite public coffers to support a known
organized crime syndicate of using children and enslaving fathers for profit. All public officials, acting in both the
professional and private capacities, are in fact accessories after the fact to
their conspired crimes and/or acts and/or omissions they knowingly, with malice
and aforethought are committing against me; and they are acting in abuse of
official authority for profit.
XXVIII.
March 10th 1996, South
Butte County Municipal Court: I was then “arrested” at home without any
warrant, at my home; and placed into the Butte County Jail, and beaten for
defending myself and not booking or entering into the court’s
jurisdiction. I was unlawfully
imprisoned for a Penal Code §§ 270 and 166(a)(4) violations.
XXIX.
At this mock trial, on or about
April 29, 1996, I handed one “Judge” Steven Howell, a Notice of Defects in
Presumption of Facts (etc.), and upon his reading said document he stated on
the record: “I have no jurisdiction in this matter,” to which he then attempted
to set a ‘trial’ date. I then stopped
the hearing, and demanded that the court reporter read back his comment that he
had stated he had no jurisdiction in this matter. She belligerently remained silent. I then judicially noted Mr. Howell, and placed the date and time
on the record and that he had just stated on the record, quote: “I have no
jurisdiction in this matter” end-quote.
Clearly, this court had no jurisdiction and knew it. Later, I attempted to get this record, and
could not, as said “Judge” Howell had mysteriously sealed this record, for no
valid reason other than to protect his organized crime syndicate and to protect
its profits under “Title IV-D” welfare remuneration schemes, in direct
violation of law. Later the court
minutes showed the court clerk overtly lying to protect said organized crime
syndicate within the Butte County courts, to where said minutes stated that
“Judge” Howell stated that he had no jurisdiction over defendants’ motion, which
was an overt lie, as not having jurisdiction over the motion, follows that said
Judge had no jurisdiction, and both he, and said clerk knew of that fatality.
XXX.
April 4th 1996: That your respondent was fraudulently forced
to an alleged criminal hearing under case number CR25413 where another
out-of-town “Judge” named Richard C. Cumming disregarded the fact that he had
no jurisdiction. I challenged
jurisdiction at all times and the court(s) never proved or responded to these
lawful challenges. I did an “appearance without an appearance” and
had my counsel hand him a contract simply stating that he would uphold his oath
of office, to which he refused to sign.
This act by pretended “Judge” clearly showed overt collusion and fraud. Upon this, I had my counsel’s then fire him
using published California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1(a)(6)(C), to which
he refused. Said “Judge” then ordered
two under-cover agents and a bailiff to forcibly capture me, outside the
court and drag me across the bar, without me or anyone ever giving my
proper name to this forum. I never
accepted or stipulated to this “Judge”.
XXXI.
I did in fact, file kidnapping
charges against Ms. Susan Sloan, for the unlawful kidnapping of my son using
the published California Penal Code, § 277 and did file this Verified Criminal Complain
in accordance with law, and aforesaid verified criminal complaint was
unlawfully ignored and stamped “Received but Not Filed” thereby denying me
substantive due process of law and my ability to lawfully access the courts in
order to defend myself.
XXXII.
I then filed a lawful Misprison of
Felony Charges against the County of Butte District Attorney, Michael L.
Ramsey, under Government Code § 1027.5, for denying me my substantive due
process rights and against, said cross complaint was unlawfully refused being
stamped “Received but Not Filed” by the Court Clerk.
XXXIII.
Said “tribunal” was a zoo. My rights and the law was intentionally
violated at every instance by this unlawful Star Chamber tribunal. The respondent Butte County District Attorney,
Michael L. Ramsey, packed this court, in a Misdemeanor case, with over 43
government agents and state employees, even though in the next court room over
was the 16 year-old attempted murderer of Officer Rod O’Hern, whom shot that
officer in the head, blinding him for life, yet at his trial, there were
NO government officials to support him against that act of attempted murder,
conversely, at my tribunal, the court room was intentionally packed,
in overt violation of law, which clearly shows how large and invidious the Butte
County organized crime syndicate is which surrounds this supposed “crime” for
profit using “Title IV-D” welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes.
XXXIV.
I arrested said “Judge” Cumming
which he and the Superior Court and Sheriff unlawfully ignored; then fired and
disqualified him innumerable times, yet, was not able to get this criminally
vindictive “judge” off of my case in any way—as he did so many unlawful acts
and/or omissions against me in which to prove that this was no more than a Star
Chamber tribunal, without any jurisdiction, a complete fraud only there to find
my guilt, and an open conspiracy to “get me” for both a personal and political
vendetta, in which to also protect their organized crime syndicate, also known
as “welfare” and “child support.”
District Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, et al., and other Butte County
agents and employees are using their positions of power in order to use their
color of authority for their own personal predilections in direct violation of
law. An abuse of official authority.
XXXV.
I refused to participate, and did
not voir dire the jury, and said jury, in direct contradistinction to law, in
direct violation to the rule of law, with no jurisdiction, knowing that I was
crippled and had no ability to pay; they “found me guilty”; and said “judge”
did commit me to one and one-half years in jail, for a misdemeanor published
California Penal Code §270 and a § 166(a)(4) supposed violations,
even though he had no jurisdiction to do so.
XXXVI.
After spending approximately one
month in the Butte County jail, on or about July 08, 1996 the Deputy District
Attorney, Jack Schafer, did upon his own motion, did file a PEOPLE’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE, under Penal Code sections 1203.1
and 654; and did try to reduce the amount of the sentence by six months, to
which I formally objected in writing by motion, stating under law, that they,
and this court factually had no jurisdiction in this matter, and could not by
law reduce any sentence, as without jurisdiction, the whole matter was fraud to
which both the said forum and “judge” ignored these facts, and reduced the
fraudulent sentence to one year against the rule of law, over my objection and
against my vocal consent. Insolently,
they did anything they wanted—as nothing was stopping them from their criminal
acts and/or omissions in direct violation of law.
XXXVII.
Upon fraudulently refusing the court
“verdict” and sentence, I was then placed into the Butte County Jail against my
consent; and thereby, in order to lawfully protest said unlawful incarceration,
did undergo a sixty-three day hunger strike to protest this incarceration as
that was the only law available to me as this organized crime syndicate had no
restraints or control, and could not be fought in any other way. At the sixty-third day, the Butte County
Sheriff, Mick Grey, allowed two of my personal friends, Bill Brouhard and
Douglas Bussey, to come in and coerce me to stop my no food, only water and
salt hunger strike. After an extended
and long period, I reasonably acquiesced upon a promise of the sheriff that he
would set me free on Sheriff’s parole.
He then reneged, upon which I did another ten day hunger strike, to
which he then acquiesced and set me free on “Sheriff’s Parole.”
XXXVIII. With
only five days left to go on “Sheriff’s Parole” the sheriff then came to my
home and door as I was sick from my hunger strike, and again arrested me
without a warrant, and placed me again into jail with no lawful charge or
violation of law, to which I did another hunger strike to protest as law no
longer worked in Butte County
XXXIX.
I then completed a hunger strike, no
food, only water and salt of seventy-two days and almost died. At day sixty five of this hunger strike, the
prosecution Jack Schafer did establish a “deal” with Ms. Susan Sloan and asked
me to give up my son; to give up all rights to him, and not to see him until he
was 18, and to ‘allow’ the “new” father to adopt my son, and upon this
agreement, Mr. Schafer would drop all charges, both past and future child
support amounts, and set me free with no further ‘obligation.’ Since I had done no crime, I complete
refused and rebuked this criminal extortion.
Shortly after this, the sheriff again, just set me free on “Sheriff’s
Parole” and gave me a certificate of completion for “obeying all laws.”
XL.
Sick and debilitated, still healing
from both hunger-strike and motorcycle accident, I recuperated at home, at a
subsistence level and barely survived.
XLI.
On or about 3/19/98 an
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM was sent by Barbie in the “Kathleen Nichols
Consolidated Court” demanding a disposition for arrest.
XLII.
On or about 3/19/98 one person whom
I never met before or had knowledge of, one Brad Rundt did write a DECLARATION
OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST WARRANT, signed only as “Rundt” demanding a published
California Penal Code § 270 and § 166(a)(4) for one CHENEY, ROBERT LINDSA.
XLIII.
On or about 3/25/98 a NOTICE TO
APPEAR was sent to aforementioned CHENEY, ROBERT LINDSA, by R.Shjak, mailed on
3/25/98 for an appearance date of 4/10/98.
I did not open this incorrectly addressed envelope and sent it back via
certified mail.
XLIV.
On or about April 2, 1998, I sent a
lawful response under CCP 116.370 and/or CCP 418.10 also enumerated under
published California Rules of Court Rule 1234 in which my “YOUR INCORRECTLY ADDRESS ENVELOPE” was sent
to the misaddressed and mislabeled envelope back to the return address court by
certified mail, number Z 133 300 853 and I thereby lawfully waited for a lawful
written response from the court. None
ever came.
XLV.
On 3/25/98 before my response was
lawfully responded to, a FELONY COMPLAINT was filed against me by one Deputy
District Attorney, Jack Schafer, brought in the Municipal Court, South Butte
County Judicial District, County of Butte, which was not under oath, not
subscribed, nor verified and was a continuing saga of the personal and
political vendetta placed against me by these criminals under the guise of the
authority of law and under color of law of the COUNTY OF BUTTE in the STATE OF
CALIFORNIA.
XLVI.
On 4/10/98 a REQUEST FOR PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR ARREST WARRANT, was brought by Jack Schafer, in the BUTTE COUNTY
COURTHOUSE, CONSOLIDATED COURTS of which the judge in that matter, one Barbara
Roberts found that “court found declaration of probable cause to be
insufficient” and an ex parte message attached to the District Attorney’s
office in overt violation of law stating “please resubmit by 4/24/98.” An erroneous ruling stated upon this
document that “defendant failed to appear” where in fact under and by law a
response to my “YOUR INCORRECTLY ADDRESSED ENVELOPE” should have issued, and
then after 15 days, a Summons should have issued. This document cites a violation date of May 23, 98.
XLVII.
On 4/13/98 an “AMENDED DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST
WARRANT” issued by Brad Rundt, citing a published Penal Code § 270 violation,
and only signed by Rundt, with no supporting affidavit nor private citizen
declaration in the “Municipal Court, South Butte County Judicial District,
County of Butte, State of California.”
XLVIII.
On or about May 11, 1998, Mr. Brad
Rundt, a District Attorney Investigator II, did appear at my home, without
notice to me, without invitation, nor without any warrant, and attempted to
‘arrest’ me for no crime in overt violation of law. I thereby called my neighbor Frederick Earl: Rusk, who came and
also demanded a warrant, to which Brad Rundt again exclaimed: “I don’t need any
warrant.” At no time did Brad Rundt
have any warrant of any type. Also,
Kevin Brian: Haddock and Dixie Ann Hawks were in attendance with a video camera
and witnessed that Mr. Brad Rundt, factually had no warrant of any type with
him. When a channel twenty-four news
crew came of which I called; both Brad Rundt and supporting Chico Police, soon
thereafter fled.
XLIX.
The next day, on or about May 12,
1998, I along with Kevin Brian: Haddock, Carl H. Andersen, Frederick Earl:
Rusk, and others in attendance, established a joint party telephone call, which
was tape-recorded with the agreement of all parties in attendance with Mr. Brad
Rundt. In this planned telephone
meeting, Mr. Rundt at first assured me that a valid warrant existed that was in
accordance with all the requirements as stated and required under the Penal
Code. He also stated that even as such,
he didn’t need any warrant to be served on me, by him; even though I demanded
production of said “warrant” at all times.
Several times during this call, I supplicated Mr. Rundt for a summons,
to which he ignored. I asked for a summons
and he knew, as I stated to him “Let’s just do law here. Send me a summons and I’ll show up to any
court you want, and do anything you want” and again, he ignored that. I then gave Mr. Rundt a 24 hour FAX number
and demanded he fax us the warrant. He
then hung up to talk to “okay it” with County of Butte Deputy District Attorney
Jack Schafer. When he called back, he
said that he didn’t have the warrant, that it was “over at the Sheriff’s
department.” He then stated that “even
if no valid warrant existed, it would be forced upon me.” This was clearly in direct violation of Mr.
Rundts’ published California Penal Code, § 842 which mandates that the warrant
must be shown to me upon request. It never was. It was always denied to me, even through every tribunal I was
entered into to. He admitted he knew my
son was kidnapped from me, and that he agreed that we were citing him the law,
but that “no court” would ever obey it.
He had prior knowledge of the fraud and organized crime syndicate that
the District Attorney’s office was running under the guise of “Child Support”
and he knew and intimated that any illegal act or omission on his or any other
Butte County employee would be unlawfully supported and backed by the
California Court system in direct violation of the Constitution for the state
of California (1849) and the Constitution for the united States (1787-1791).
L.
The next day, Frederick Earl: Rusk
investigated said alleged warrant at the Butte County Sheriff’s department and
found that the warrant had been recalled to which I was given a copy of the
RECALLED warrant. Upon further
investigation at the court, found that there was “insufficient probable cause”
for any warrant to exist. Thereby, I
knew at this time that there was no lawful action or matter against me.
LI.
On or about May 18th,
1998, knowing the aforesaid; I then submitted via my Counsel of Choice and Next
Best Friend, Mr. Carl H. Andersen; a Bill of Particulars, demanding to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against me, the venue, the
jurisdiction and the real party of interest and did lawfully serve it upon the
Butte County District Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, to which he insolently and
in arrogant violation of law, ignored it and never lawfully answered it in
accordance with his oath of office and the concise rule of law, thereby; he was
knowingly keeping me ignorant of aforesaid matter labeled as Case Number CM
010607. He defaulted on said Bill of
Particulars, and as I had no lawful answer and waiting until August of 1998 for
a reply, and being personally damaged, drained, financially destitute and sick;
I contacted my father and returned home in Queens County New York, to
recuperate and heal from these unlawful acts and/or omissions perpetrated
against me and criminally inflicted by the Butte County District Attorney,
Michael L. Ramsey, et al. in his continued direct violation of the rule of law,
and as a personal and unlawful political vendetta against me.
LII.
Having no other remedy, I lawfully
re-established my residency in my homeland, and did not hide nor flee nor was a
fugitive of any type. I lived normally,
with and under my lawful name as I have repeatedly entered into the aforesaid
courts: Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., and not in any form of capitalization
otherwise (such as ROBERT LINDSAY CHENEY JR., or other variations)[71];
and I wrote a book during my time healing which was called: “Suffering
Patriarchy, an Analytical Exploration into the Promise of the Forbidden Planet”
(515 pages), cataloguing how government(s) were in gross violation of law and
order in regards to “Child Support”, and fulminating revolution to usurp this
nations good and wholesome laws of this nation by destroying fathers such as
myself, which is occurring all across this nation on a daily basis, and is not
being stopped by redress of law, nor any substantive due process of law of any
type and were intentionally inflicting these oppressions upon parents in order
to gain profit and power over a free peoples in doing so.
LIII.
On or about December 29, 1999, four
armed, unidentified men screaming that they were from the FBI, and having fake
FBI identification, broke into our home at 51-15 43rd avenue, in
Woodside, County of Queens, State of New York, and without any warrant thereby
demanded by me and my parents, forcibly kidnapped me claiming they arrested me
against my consent, and over my vituperative objections, and brought me into
New York County, and placed me into the Manhattan Detention Complex, (MDC) at
125 White Street, New York, New York, 10013.
I refused to “book” and/or to take pictures or fingerprint, and was
savagely beaten, hit and knocked out by one “D. Gonzalez” a supposed “Captain”
in the NYPD prison MDC intake center and also a female officer whom helped him
named “O’Brian.” My eye was swollen and
I had a cut on it from the unlawful beating.
LIV.
On or about December 30, 1999 man
approached me named Joseph Zablowski who stated he was from the New York “Legal
Aid Society” and whom claimed to be my lawyer.
I factually told him that he was not my lawyer, that we had not
contracted, and that I demanded to be released, as there was no valid or lawful
warrant for my arrest, and none was produced.
He knowingly went along with the criminal fraud of the County of Butte
and the State of California, for profit and when I demanded that a writ of
Habeas Corpus be immediate drawn and placed against this court for immediate
issuance, he feigned ignorance of knowing what a Habeas Corpus was and that it
was not the right thing to do, and that I should “just volunteer” to be
extradited, in contravention to my rights and the rule of law. When I cited him from memory the famous
habeas corpus cases ex parte Milligan and Miller, he again feigned ignorance;
and again stated he was my lawyer. He
asked if I wanted bail, and I told him I would accept nothing from this court
as it did not have jurisdiction. I was
brought before a female person named “Judge” Coin, to whom I appeared specially
and not generally. I told her she had
no jurisdiction, that there was in lawful instrument nor warrant for my arrest
or detainment, that a timely Bill of Particulars had been submitted to the
Butte County District Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, et al., and he insolently
refused to answer aforesaid Bill of Particulars, in direct violation of law,
she maliciously instead placed me under arrest and unlawfully committed me into
the MDC in direct and overt violation of law.
LV.
I then appeared before one “Judge”
Sullivan, who again; having knowledge of the law, directly violated the concise
rule of law he took an oath to uphold and did deny me right to my Counsel,
Wilbur Street, and did deny me my right to have compulsory process for
procuring witnesses in my favor, and did deny me my right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, the venue, the jurisdiction and the real
party in interest—and did in fact, knowingly suspend amendment the sixth, to
the Constitution for the united States (1787-1791), and did deny me substantive
due process of law, as he was insolent and arrogant to the rule of law, and did
enjoin with the criminal activities of “Title IV-D” welfare remuneration
schemes in overt collusion with the County of Butte and the State of
California, for profit, and did receive a direct benefit for doing these
crimes, acts and/or omissions against me, in direct violation of law.
LVI.
One Judge named Bartley, did listen
to my factual iteration that the Butte County District Attorney, willfully and
criminally did not inform me of the nature and cause of the instant accusation,
the venue, the jurisdiction and the real party of interests, and did order one
Deputy District Attorney named Ms. Susan Roque, to get the District Attorney’s
“Special Projects” division and to answer the Bill of Particulars I did
lawfully serve upon the aforesaid Butte County District Attorney, Michael L.
Ramsey. That was on Friday. On that very next Monday, when the aforesaid
Ms. Roque then appeared before “Judge” Sullivan again, she willfully refused
and omitted, and did not answer said Bill of Particulars, and willfully
violated Judge Barkleys’ direct and concise order to her and to the prosecution
in this matter; and those willful acts and/or omissions that greatly damaged me
as I was again, in overt violation of law, placed unlawfully into prison for
profit, against my will and over my continued objections.
LVII.
I was placed unlawfully into prison,
and forced to work in the “Grievance” Office, headed by one Ms. Jacquelynne
Moore, and also run by one Ms. Johnson.
There, I completed a writ of habeas corpus at great effort and placed it
and lawfully had it served to all parties in open court by my Counsel, Wilbur
Streett. It sat for months unattended,
until my Counsel, Mr. Wilbur Streett did complain bitterly to the court clerk,
who finally sent it before a Judge, one Ms. Suarez, whom immediately issued it
for a hearing within three days. Instead,
the court malingered unlawfully and refused to allow the habeas corpus
hearing. Instead, I was unlawfully kept
imprisoned, and NOT brought to court, even thought I demanded as such, going so
far as to call the watch commander and to complain directly to him. I was ignored, as the great writ of habeas
corpus was suspended. My Counsel Wilbur
Street several times was in open court waiting for my habeas corpus hearing and
each time heard it ignored, one time to the extent where “Judge” Alderberg did
state: “The District Attorney needs more time,” when in fact he had knowledge
of the law and knows that the habeas corpus is a proceeding only for the
defendant to test the legality of an unlawful commitment, as it is not for the
District Attorney to gain more time in fact it must be issued immediately (1 Watts 67), which this was such a
time. Again, “Judge” Alderberg
knowingly joined in the criminal acts and/or omissions against me for profit,
and enjoined with the Butte County District Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, et
al., for profit, and knowingly violated the concise rule of law in overt
violation of his oath of office, knowing he was going to obtain direct “Title
IV-D” welfare remunerations and other benefits and/or profits.
LVIII.
On or about February 14, 2000, the County of Butte had to resubmit
a “warrant” that was “for extradition purposes only” which clearly showed that
the underlying “warrant” which was not supported by affidavit, nor
subscription, nor verified nor lawful in any way, and clearly only a defective
instrument upon several level’s, only instituted by an overt lie, by a
government employee, for profit and a personal and political vendetta. No “crime” had ever occurred, and clearly
now ‘public officials’ were “fixing” these crimes done against me in order to
protect themselves and not to adhere to the rule of law or to allow substantive
due process or justice to occur in my matter.
LIX.
At all times I demanded the
“Governor’s Warrant” which never was lawfully provided to me, nor was any ever
produced at any hearing or trial, and as I continually and lawfully demanded,
going so far as to write the Governor of California and New York themselves
demanding as such and never obtaining any “Governor’s Warrant” or “Governor’s
Writ” as mandated by law. They replied
that they did not have that document.
No government official has given me a copy of this lawfully required
document; as I also did a MOTION ON DETAINERS which was also completely
ignored, as at no time has any court revealed how I was kidnapped from my home
in Woodside, Queens County New York, and brought across state lines, or how I
was lawfully arrested, or falsely imprisoned.
Respondent’s are acting in overt collusion, and keeping their crimes
secret and not lawfully answering my demands to know and understand the nature
and cause of this matter.
LX.
At all times I was kept ignorant of
the proceedings and not allowed notice of hearings, or the nature and cause of
the hearing, nor the results of the hearings.
I was denied substantive due process at every level and step of these
processes, in direct violation of law.
LXI.
On or about April 28th,
2000, I was brought into “Judge” Alderberg’s court and was placed into the
custody of the original “FBI Agents” whom now mysteriously were only NYPD
detectives. Mr. Alderberg informed me I
was to be “extradited” as he was placing me into these NYPD detectives custody,
to which I bitterly objected to in open court.
Mr. Alderberg stated to me that “I could not ask anything here in
court.” Which I protested openly that I could.
He then placed me into these two fraudulent officers, as they walked me
handcuffed and in chains over to the “MCC” Federal Prison against my will and
over my continued objections. I was
placed into the custody of one Federal Marshall Meade. Mr. Alderberg warned the NYPD officers “and
do not discuss this matter in any way with the defendant” thereby again,
keeping me ignorant of the nature and cause of this action, and knowingly
hiding his deceitful and unlawful acts and/or omissions. I demanded to know how I could go into a
federal jurisdiction with no crime committed and all state actors did not
replay nor answer me at any time. I
refused to book into said Federal prison, and was unlawfully beaten under the
authority (as this event was video tape recorded) and forced to give my right
thumb print.
LXII.
I was then not allowed any telephone
calls, no communication to the outside; nor the ability to see any
magistrate. I told the federal officers
that I had committed no crime and demanded my instant release to which the
laughed. They then invented a federal crime for me under U.S.C.A. Title
18, § 228 to which I objected to. I did
not sign anything, nor did I consent in any way. Said invented crime was then “torn up” when I landed in
California, which clearly demonstrates the overt fraud taking place in
violation of law.
LXIII.
I then, on or about May 1, 2000, was
placed on a federal prison plane, and sent to a Federal Prison facility at
Oklahoma City, and I refused to book and was held in place for a photograph but
signed nothing and gave no fingerprints.
I was placed into solitary confinement, and then flown to California on
or about May 8th, 2000. I
stayed in a Federal Facility in Sacramento, and then was then given to one Mr.
Ross Pack and Mr. Honea from the Butte County District Attorney’s office and
against my vocal objections and against my consent, was forcibly taken chained
and handcuffed, to the Butte County Prison in Oroville, County of Butte, State
of California.
LXIV.
May 8th, 2000 I was then
again beaten under the authority of Correctional Officer Dan Young at the Butte
County Jail to whom I respectfully refused to book in accordance with law and
my secured liberties and rights. He in
violation of law, had several officers take me with excessive force, and steal
nine fingerprints from me, of my property, and then I was forcibly held against
my will in front of a camera and photographed against my will and in overt
violation to law. They had beaten me so
severely that I needed medical attention as my wrist had been sprained and I
needed a ace-bandage wrap. I needed
more comprehensive medical attention and was denied. I demanded to be immediately taken before a magistrate and was
refused. I was then taken and placed
into solitary confinement in A Pod.
While in A Pod, I was denied the right to call my counsels of choice, or
to make any legal telephone calls. I
was denied any pen or pencil, was
denied paper, and denied all my rights as I was unlawfully incarcerated.
LXV.
On or about May 9, 2000, I was
brought before one “Judge” William Raymond Patrick who assured me that he was a
lawful judge. He informed me that
another “Judge” Barbara Roberts had been “recused” by the District Attorney’s
office under a CCP 170.6 motion, to which I had no knowledge of and which I
could not participate in. He then read
me an overt lie, which was a declaration by one Deputy District Attorney Daniel
T. Nelson. I lawfully informed Mr.
Patrick that I had lawfully filed a Bill of Particulars with the Butte County
District Attorney, Michael L. Ramsey, and that he must answer as I was ignorant
of the nature of these proceedings, the nature and cause of the accusation
against me, the venue, the jurisdiction and the real party in interest of this
matter. He ignored that and placed me
back into the Butte County Jail, stating the District Attorney had raised the
“bail” to $100,000! Mr. Patrick
informed me that the penal code § 270 “crime” which was a misdemeanor, was in
fact being prosecuted as a felony, in direct violation of law, to which I
continuously objected to.
LXVI.
I was kept into prison, as all Butte
County employee’s and Judges had personal knowledge that I was being kept there
as a political and personal vendetta—and that as I was self-representing myself
along with non American Bar Association “attorney’s” was kept intentionally
falsely imprisoned only so that my case would be debilitated and I would not be
able to properly defend myself. This
act was willful and criminal, an intentional plan to stop me from winning my case
as both In Propria Persona, and a Father, which the County of Butte, the
Governor of California and the State of California along with the Federal
government (among others), had overtly enjoined with this crime, and in no way
would I be able to be allowed to win at law as then they could not protect
themselves. Instead, they kept me in
jail, forced into an unjust Star Chamber proceeding whose only design was for
me to lose, and which was a prior forgone conclusion, and outright fraud.
LXVII.
On May 23, 2000, I was brought
before a new “Judge” whom identified himself as “Judge” Steven R. McNelis and
to which I did not engage with under the Doctrine of Tantamount
Stipulation. I asked him whether he was
a duly elected judge, and he said he was.
He then violated my rights, and arrogantly broke the law right in front
of me, I then again; concisely asked him whether he was a duly elected judge,
to which he again stated that he was.
He then violated law, and my secured liberties and rights, and enjoined
with the conspiracy against me, and allowed the Butte County District Attorney,
Michael L. Ramsey, to place a liar, whom I had no knowledge of or prior contact
with; Mr. Ross Pack, whom did overtly lie and use hearsay upon hearsay against
me, to which said “Judge” McNelis allowed, and violated my right to know the
nature and cause of the accusation against me, the venue, the jurisdiction and
the real party in interest. Said
“judge” allowed the information, without a valid warrant, sworn or verified
affidavits, or due process of law; and against my rights in this Star Chamber
proceeding, did allow the District Attorney the latitude to commit any crime he
wished against me. I did disqualify
this “Judge” in the first instance, to which he lied and stated “I can’t do
that Mr. Cheney” and as a recused and formally fired Judge under CCP
170.1(a)(6)(C); he did proceed to lie and “find” “probable cause” where there
was none, and to allow the District Attorney to add an additional count in
overt violation of extradition law, and the good and wholesome laws of a
freedom loving peoples. I at great
effort, later found out that this said “Judge” overtly lied, and conspired with
the District Attorney, as factually there was no paperwork on him
whatsoever. At this point I filed a formal
CCP 170.1(a)(6)(C) in writing to this effect, with proof, and with this new
information did formally back-up my
disqualification of him thereby, invalidating his finding of “probable
cause” and because of this I did file a Motion for Dismissal under the
published California Penal Code §991(e) which was unlawfully ignored, in direct violation to the rule of
law and my substantive due process rights.
Later, in an amazing and direct criminal act of fraud and criminal
dictatorship, the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court of California silently
slipped a document into my case file, unknown to me, which we found by chance,
which lied and declared that “Judge” McNelis was not a judge but a Retired Judge,
which factually proves he lied, and that aforesaid “judge” was assigned by Mr.
Ronald George from May 1, 2000 to June 30, 2000. In overt and direct violation of law, these unlawful tribunals
and judges did raise the counts and penalties of the pretended crime by adding
counts in direct violation of extradition law and procedures. I was served in court with another civil
action to which I refused as I was immune under law from further service, as I
must be allowed the ability to return to my home back in New York, which the
County of Butte refuses to do as it is abusing its official authority in using
the infinite coffers of public debt and the prisons in order to force me into
unlawful crimes in order to support their crimes and social services industry.
LXVIII.
I then fired “Judge” William Raymond
Patrick as he was not a duly elected judge as he led me on to believe
either. He immediately ‘volunteered’
for the disqualification stating that he was going to accept a CCP 170.6
disqualification. I instead fired him
under both CCP 170.6 and CCP 170.1(a)(6)(C) of which the 170.1(a)(6)(C)
carried. I then defaulted all judges of
whom I disqualified, of which they did not answer. I demanded under 170.3(c)(5) that I be able to agree on the “Judge”
to hear these matters and thereby formally submitted my qualification to such
judge, however; I was never contacted again and could not qualify any “Judge”
and thereby, supposedly a fraudulent “Retired Judge” Galen, whom I did not
agree to, and which was done unknown to me in direct violation to their own
published California Civil Code of Procedure section 170 et seq.
LXIX.
“Judge” Gerald Hermansen then
attempted to take control of my case, however; I immediately recused him as he
was both a witness in my case, to be formally called; as I had given prior
written notice of this both to him and the Butte County District Attorney
Michael L. Ramsey; and as he had committed criminal acts against me and was
involved in felonies, I demanded he be disqualified from this matter. He willfully refused. I then filed a Verified Criminal Complaint against
him and “laid complaint before the magistrate” and had it filed, and then filed
a Bill of Impeachment to the California Supreme Court and filed a notice of a
felony placed against this “Judge” Hermansen by me which was duly filed in the
Superior Court and thereby under the Constitution of California Article VI, §
18, (a)“A judge is disqualified from acting as judge, without loss of salary,
while there is pending (1) an indictment or an information charging the judge
in the United States with a crime punishable as a felony under California or
Federal law.” Mr. Hermansen thereby
having factual knowledge that a felony was charged against him by me and so
filed as I both filed my proceedings in his tribunal and filed with the
California Supreme Court, and he knew that said court would “lose” this filing
and proceeding…and had prior knowledge of their corruption. I called Federal Express and secured their
factual timely service upon the California Supreme Court, and verified its
lawful delivery to that court, however; that corrupt institution is insolent to
the rule of law and is belligerent to either doing the right thing, or adhering
to the rule of law.
LXX.
On or about August 2000, I was again brought into another
“arraignment” (so many arraignment’s in this matter that I could not keep
count—I was never noticed of the true intent nor extent of these “hearings”)
and there to my amazement was “Judge” McNelis.
(Also, I was never lawfully served paperwork which was submitted against me at these tribunals and thereby
intentionally kept ignorant of these
proceedings). After he asked me
whether I had been ‘served’ and I stated “no.”
I then attempted to speak, and McNelis stopped me, several times stating
he just had to get some things done, but after that he would allow me to speak
as long as I wanted. He again conspired
with the District Attorney’s Office and allowed them to submit yet another
“Amended Information” and allowed the County Counsel, Robert Mackenzie to let
Sheriff Scott Mackenzie deny me my right to my subpoena seeking discovery from
his office. After he did that he
allowed me to speak which I stated “What is your name?” to which he slyly
stated, “You know what my name is Mr. Cheney.” To which I asked him again, and
which he answered, “My name is Steven Richard McNelis.” I then asked him: “Are you a duly elected
Judge?” to which he then went into an apoplectic seizure and slurred out a bevy
of words of which I could not understand as he physically got up, and huffed
and puffed and sprinted out of the court. As he did so, I said “I recused you!” then yelled as he continued
sprinting out “YOU ARE DISQUALIFIED!” as several bailiff’s surrounded me
ominously. This coward “retired judge”
then sprinted out of the court, and Dan
Bailey, then went up and demanded an immediate court record of the
transcript. When we got it later the
next day, it was a lie, and was somewhat correct up to the end, to where at the
end, it was a complete lie, as what was then placed into the transcript by the
court transcriptionist, had nothing to do with NOTHING that what actually
happened in this courtroom, and did not contain my statement noting I recused
and did not accept this retired judge in any way shape or form, nor did it show
that this coward retired judge scurried out of the courtroom, and ran in fear,
and had to physically exert himself and huff and puff as he ran in fear out of
the court. I submitted an affidavit
stating what actually did occur and did correct the record, however; “Judge”
Hermansen and the organized crime syndicate of these unlawful tribunals refuse
to tell the truth, apply the law, and to allow my documentation to be entered
into the record and hid this truth.
LXXI.
I lawfully submitted a lawful motion
for a demand for change of venue on or about August 25, 2000, as no fair trial
could ever be accomplished within the corrupt County of Butte, and as this
clearly was factually a personal and political vendetta, I had prior knowledge
that they were going to get a known and corrupt jury with shill’s strategically
placed throughout this “jury” as the Butte County Judges would give me a “Jury
Trial” instead of a “Trial by Jury” of which I continually demanded, and allow
this fraudulent “jury” to “find me guilty” when in fact it was already an overt
plan to only find my guilt. In fact,
when the jury was selected, this was proven by a inordinate amount of people
from the Social Services sector and Government services (whom gain direct
benefit from “Title IV-D” Welfare remuneration scams and schemes) and incredibly;
they even attempted to place prior fired and disqualified “Judge”
William Raymond Patrick on my trial!!
Then when I bitterly protested, “Judge” Hermansen took away a
disqualification unjustly charged against me for his removal! It is an impossibility for me to obtain a
fair trial in any county getting Federal or Welfare “Title IV-D” remuneration
scams and schemes, and a complete impossibility to ever get any fair trial
throughout the courts and tribunals of the County of Butte, State of California. This is one reason why I demanded a change
of venue, but was unlawfully denied.
LXXII.
I carefully submitted 120 items of
evidence formally into evidence and formally presented them into open
court. Yet, only “four” were allowed to
be entered, and then when the jurors were out, “Judge” Hermansen took away two
of those which were critical to prove my innocence. Yet, the District Attorney Daniel T. Nelson berated me for
repeatedly demanding discovery saying that I was only asking for two things,
the Governor’s Warrant and the original Warrant which he claimed was
inconsequential, then he lied in stating that he had generously already given
me ‘discovery’ and that there was no more; yet at “trial” he made absolutely
sure the last thing entered into “evidence” was the ‘warrant’ that was never
given to me, and kept evidence from me all through the trial. In fact, I screamed at the Judge when it was
found that there were underlying documents that were not given to me, and I thereby
demanded that my Counsel, Daniel H. Bailey stay with Mr. Nelson and after that
hearing, they both not lose sight of this newly discovered “discovery” and that
file be immediately copied by both so I could be sure this criminal District
Attorney would not omit anything in that file, Mr. Hermansen so ‘ordered’ that
to happen, but when the hearing was over and Dan H. Bailey walked out and
demanded a copy of said file, Mr. Nelson laughed directly in his face then
arrogantly walked away from him defying both law, and a direct order from Mr.
Hermansen. I believe I am missing
pertinent items still unlawfully kept from me in direct violation of law. I was arrogantly kept from Discovery at
every portion of this matter, in direct violation of law even though Daniel T.
Nelson lied and stated otherwise which factually was proven to his detriment.
LXXIII.
At all times during these
proceedings, I was unlawfully denied Discovery by respondents, which I
repeatedly filed and demanded over and over.
In open court on or about September 28, 2000, after cross examining one
of the respondent’s witnesses whom worked in the Family Support accounting
office, I found that underlying documents she had used to bring the alleged
charge against me had been willfully and intentionally kept from me by said
respondents. This was foundational and
palpable information that was knowingly denied to me both by the COUNTY OF
BUTTE Consolidated Courts, and the respondents, who conspired to keep aforesaid
information and Discovery from me.
After I made a vituperative point in open court, I demanded that the
Deputy District Attorney, after this hearing date, take the aforementioned
foundational documents, and with them always in sight, go to a copy machine and
copy the whole file and give him the copy.
I greatly protested and demanded reasonable rights and liberties to a
fair trial and was denied that at all times by “Judge” Hermansen. Mr. Hermansen did admonish the Deputy
District Attorney Dan T. Nelson, who he commanded to take this file of discovery
I was denied, then with said file in open view at all times, to go and copy
said file at the first instance after the hearing. After the hearing, my Counsel and legal runner, Daniel H. Bailey,
did approach Mr. Nelson directly after this hearing and demand they go and copy
this file, of the discovery that was not given to me, and Mr. Nelson did
insolently laugh in the face of Mr. Bailey and did arrogantly walk off in
direct opposition to Mr. Hermansen’s command to him in this matter. Said respondent’s since the beginning of
this matter in 1985 have an overt hatred and insolence to their oath of office
and the concise rule of law, as this egregious example demonstrates their
continued and insolent acts of bad faith to both law and order.
LXXIV.
On or about September 17, 2000; I was brought before an unknown
person whom presented himself to me as a “Judge” whose name was Lamb, who did
by surprise, without any lawful discovery was given to me, was inept and stated
such things as the Bill of Particulars was inconsequential. I did fire and disqualify him because he was
inept and ignorant of law. Mr.
Hermansen did come into and replace him this proceeding over my continued
objections as he had already been disqualified and did force me to trial by
surprise and without due process of law mandates being met; and I was denied
any time for proper response, as this fraud
to push me to trial was conspired and overtly planned by both
aforementioned judges along with the prosecution.
LXXV.
At this “trial” I was not able nor
allowed to subpoena witnesses, even though they had been lawfully noticed and
served, yet those government officials thereby whom had compulsory process for
their attendance as a witness at “trial” insolently and arrogantly refused to
come there. Their attendance was
mandatory to a “fair trial” and thereby, the prosecution and the court worked
in collusion to prohibit me from obtaining either justice or substantive due
process of law in this matter. I
demanded that “Judge” Gerald Hermansen be called as a witness, and he
insolently refused, in direct and overt violation to his oath of office, and
the law.
LXXVI.
Respondent’s overtly and knowingly
directly lied several times at this pretended unlawful ‘trial.’ With great effort, I finally got Deputy
District Attorney Jack Schafer on the witness stand. I then asked him if he had any discovery that would lawfully
mitigate the alleged charges against me.
He said he didn’t know. I then
asked if he had any personal knowledge of discovery “anywhere on planet earth”
that would mitigate the charges against me.
He knowingly lied and said “No”.
I then at that time said “I’ve caught you in a direct lie Mr. Schafer,
and presented him with a memorandum from his office, with his name on it, cc’d
to him, that said described the “deal” which would “eliminate” all my problems,
if I would only give up my son. Mr.
Schafer knew he was overtly caught in a direct lie, and even though I submitted
this palpable evidence against him, “Judge” Hermansen for no good lawful
reason, took out this evidence I did factually submit in front of this
aforesaid jury, out of their presence.
LXXVII.
I was then unlawfully “found guilty”
at this unknown tribunal, by this special and pre-planned jury without any
evidence submitted to them, nor with them ever having any jurisdiction, without
any lawful findings of fact, and erroneous and malignant conclusions of
law. I then even though unlawfully
imprisoned, kept at law, and kept submitting paperwork demanding substantive
due process of law, and justice which I have been denied at every point of this
proceeding. This whole matter has been
cruel and inhuman punishment, and torture, in direct violation of law…as it has
been going on the order of sixteen years to which I still have maintained all
my rights, and given up none.
LXXVIII. The
County of Butte Deputy District Attorney, Dan T. Nelson, did factually state
before the jury that “We have no evidence in this matter. You’d have to believe that Mr. Cheney hadn’t
worked for seven years.” With no
evidence ever presented, with the respondents never meeting the lawful burden
of proof, without Dan T. Nelson ever meeting
every element to his allegations of crime so charged against me; this
planned, hand-picked, corrupt jury did find a verdict of guilty against me with
no factual evidence. They clearly and
overtly violated law in which to find me guilty, which could not occur as a
matter under the law, as factually no law was broken, and no evidence was
produced at trial, and factually the District Attorney did not meet every
element he is required to under law in which to prove my guilt.
LXXIX.
I did factually on or about October
18, 2000 did submit a lawful REFUSAL OF JURY VERDICT; FORMAL OBJECTION TO TRIAL
AND TRIBUNAL; REFUSAL OF ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT, of which the aforementioned court
ignored in overt violation of law.
LXXX.
I did on or about October 18, 2000
did file an APPLICATON FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL citing
published California Penal Code § 1243; and a NOTICE OF MOTION TO VACATE
JUDGMENT (PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS), published California Penal
Code § 1265; which all lawful motions
entered in good faith by me, were factually ignored by aforementioned court in
complete bad faith to me and in direct and in overt violation to law, and a
direct violation of “Judge” Gerald Hermansen’s oath of office.
LXXXI.
On or about October 31, 2000, in the
midst of me submitting post conviction motions and relief against this
injustice, “Judge” Gerald Hermansen, did raise his hands and yell “I am
thinking of letting you out today Mr. Cheney!”
I did demand to know the nature of what he was exclaiming, and he
brought a County of Butte (which I refused as being my lawyer at all times) to
discuss the matter with me, to which this Public Defender did tell me that the
only thing I would be giving up would be the right to cross examine a probation
officer who lied in my case. I demanded
he inform me of everything that this decision effected, to inform me of all
legal intents of this decision and he stated that this was the only thing I was
giving up, the right to cross-examine this female probation officer. I told him as I repeatedly informed the
tribunal that this was going to go up to the Supreme Court and that I demanded
my release, as to which Mr. Hermansen did release me that very day. I signed nothing at any time within the
Butte County Jail, nor in any court, as I did not contract nor did they have
any form of agency in any way shape or form, in this matter.
LXXXII.
The next day, I found out that
“Judge” Hermansen had lied, and entered into the record that I upon my own motion
wanted to remove all my motions and pleadings from this matter—which was
again—an over lie. I at no time made
such a motion, and in fact at all times I stated the exact opposite, that I
demanded a lawful court and lawful Judge address them and to apply justice and
give me redress and lawful remedy in this matter. This whole proceeding has been an overt lie.
LXXXIII. I
did immediately try and establish contact with my son, and was rebuffed by a
man claiming to have “brought up my son” when in fact, he obtained direct
and/or indirect remunerations for having my son with him. I did go to Paradise High School, and again
was denied the right as my son’s own father from seeing my own son, in direct
violation of law. They would not even
indicate whether he went there. I did
attempt to speak with the principal, and instead was directed to the vice
principal, who again denied me my rights under the law to my own son.
LXXXIV.
I was told to go to the Chico Parole
office, which I did to lawfully inform them I did not agree to any conditions
for my release and freedom, as I spent an excess of time in jail for penal code
section 166(a)(4) and 270 alleged; and informed the parole officer there that I
was not bound to parole, and that there was no court order or any obligation
binding me to “Parole”. I demanded the
court order so binding me to parole, and he could not produce it. I know that “parole” is only a way to get
people deeper into prison and to get more time from them than their sentence
specified. Parole is a complete fraud. I recorded all conversations with
aforementioned “parole” officers. I
then was told to keep in touch and call in that next Thursday. I did so to again demand any lawful court
order and this officer was not there. I
then spoke with the “Day Officer” to which I demanded a court order from him,
which he informed me there was none. He
then told me to call back to him that next week. I then called that next week to demand a lawful court order, and
he was not there. I recorded these
telephone conversations. I called back
twice, to which I informed him on his telephone recording machine, as he was
not there, that all further correspondence would be lawfully done in writing as
I refused to volunteer for the fraud of parole.
LXXXV.
I then on or about Friday, November
17, 2000; went to the Oroville Court house to research my case file with Dan
Bailey, my counsel and legal runner.
There, we were informed that two of the files which were missing were in
Chico. We then went to Chico, to find
out and inquire why these files were not done, and why we had not been given
transcripts. We were kept intentionally
malingering their by malfeasant court clerks who then told me I had a telephone
call. I amazingly took this unusual
call at the court clerks desk, and it was a Chico Parole officer who identified
himself as Mr. Torres. He demanded and
“ordered” that I go to Chico Parole at 2PM that very day, it was already
12:45PM. I told him I would not go and
he “commanded” me to go, which I then factually and forcefully demanded from
him a lawful court order placing me on “Parole” to which he said he did not
have any, but I had to go. The clerk
then cut off this telephone call. While
we were there the clerks still malingered and intentionally kept me there
waiting for court materials I demanded.
Mr. Torres, showed up at the Chico court with a Chico police officer and
“ordered” me to go to Parole, then handed me his card. I then demanded a valid court order from
him, as I informed him that there was none.
He remained adamant and threatened me, and “ordered” and “commanded” me
to show up at parole at 2PM. Dan Bailey
was with me during all these proceedings.
After Mr. Torres left, the Court clerk quickly came out and gave lame
excuses as to why the court files were not done, saying he just got them, when
in fact we knew they had been there for the past two weeks. He then vacillated and said he’d have them
done by next Tuesday. I still do not have
either aforesaid files nor the court transcripts.
LXXXVI.
Dan and I then showed up to the
Chico Parole office to confront this illegality, as we openly again, were
recording this meeting as we always did.
Mr. Torres then came out and spoke with me and said we couldn’t record
anything, to which I demanded why, and demanded he produce both his authority
and court order doing this. He then
said that his supervisor said he could do this, to which I then demanded to
speak with his supervisor. One Ms.
Katherine Haskins who identified herself as a Parole Supervisor came out and
spoke with me. I then demanded she
produce her authority and show me the court order. She then asserted she could do these things, without court order
and that I had to come in back of their office and book and
take pictures. I then asked “What is
the consequence if I don’t do that?” To
which she falsely responded “To me that is a ‘no’ answer.” To which then four
men jumped out from behind the door, and falsely and unlawfully grabbed me,
used excessive force, and arrested me in overt violation of law. Mr. Bailey was frightened by this criminal
show of force, and aforesaid “Parole Officers” were belligerent and acting
treasonously, immediately handcuffing me, and seizing my tape recorder and
unlawfully stealing the tape then placing me into chains while they pushed me
up against the wall. I demanded to
have counsel present at all phases of this unlawful proceeding, in accordance
with law, to which they refused, several times my repeated requests for
counsel. They were arrogant and
insolent to law, and told me I wasn’t getting my property back. I demanded they produce their authority for
doing this and they all remained silent, in direct violation of law. They then brought me handcuffed in back, and
said I was being sent to state prison for a year. I then ask them if I would book and sign and comply with them,
would they send me to state prison, to which they said they would not and said
I could gain my liberty if I submitted to this illegal extortion. I then was forced by this fraud, to take
pictures. I signed all papers
“Non-Assumpsit” and did not give my signature to which they did accept. They then let me leave their office. Dan was not there as Ms. Haskin’s had
ordered him to leave. Mr. Torres went
over the terms and conditions of this fraudulent “parole” of which Ms. Haskins
said that there had to be special terms.
In direct violation of law and my rights, they invented things that I
couldn’t do, such as have any tape recorder or tape recording device, I could no
longer bring anyone into parole with me, and that I couldn’t go anywhere 50
miles away from Chico. Other unlawful
and unconstitutional restrictions, only placed there in bad faith, and in
direct violation to law and my rights were such things as not having any knives
in my possession or in my home over 2” in length, (but I could have kitchen
knives only in the kitchen), not having any guns, nor any weapons…etc.,
etc. If it was unlawful, or illegal, or
unconstitutional, they arrogantly placed it into this null and void “Parole”
document. In order to get out of this
criminal organized crime syndicate, I did not engage them as they had nothing
to do with law, nor were they acting in good faith, even though several times I
asked them if they were acting in good faith, to which they said that if I did
not violate any laws, they would not go after me. (Which again, was only a lie).
I could tell they were lying as they were completely out of control. I was then unhand cuffed, and allowed to
leave the office only after I had been falsely arrested, assaulted, battered,
and unlawfully and criminally forced to conform to their fraud. I then ran from that office to Frederick
Earl: Rusk home, a distance of about five or six miles. I called the office where I was working on
my appeal in Paradise, and Carl H. Andersen informed me that several Paradise
police and three Chico Parole officers had just been there and had gone
completely through the office. I told
him he must have been mistaken…and he said no, that they were there to violate
me and arrest me. He said they were
belligerent, and out of control. I told
him this was impossible, that it was only about an hour since I left their
office! What could I have possibly
done? I asked. He said there was nothing I had done, which
was in fact the truth. This clearly
shows that they were out of control and were only acting in bad faith, that
they only falsely arrested me at the parole office to unlawfully coerce and
maliciously force a signature from me and to unlawfully take my pictures so
that they could again arrest me for nothing to prohibit me from going to the
upper courts and exposing the County of Butte continuing unlawful corruption
and illegal acts. They were only
attempting to keep control over me to unlawfully prohibit me from seeking
redress of grievances or substantive due process of law. They do not want me going to the upper
courts or to be able to properly and effectively defend myself, so they are
using the complete aegis of government to unlawfully keep me under their
control, so that they can protect themselves from their crimes.
LXXXVII. I
was then informed that I was to appear Monday, at the Chico Parole office by
the parole officers. I had already told
Mr. Torres on November 17, 2000, that on that very Monday, I would be in
Sacramento filing legal paperwork, to which he said he would speak with Ms.
Haskins and ask if that was okay. They
agreed to that and did release me as such, so I did inform him that I would not
be there on Monday, in accordance with his prior agreement that I be in Sacramento
filing legal paperwork. That Monday, I
did go to Sacramento and did file legal paperwork, demanding this offensive
unlawful instrument they forced me into, be legally returned to me I was forced
into by unlawful acts and omissions of out of control Chico Parole officers who
act against me in direct violation to their oath of office and to the concise
rule of law. I did by agency lawfully
notice them by that Tuesday, as they had legal notice of my filing.
LXXXVIII.
The Third Appellate Court of Appeal
on or about November 30, 2000; did in overt collusion with the County of Butte,
and the Department of Corrections “Parole” office, did overtly deny my legal
complaint and did deny it with no explanation and did intentionally, and
maliciously deny me substantive due process of law.
LXXXIX.
On or about December 12, 2000, I did
file a request for Stay of Execution of Judgment and Record on Appeal, and said
motion was ignored by the 3rd Appellate Court.
XC.
On or about January 02, 2001, I did
file a DEBT ON A SPECIALTY which respondent’s did in fact, ignore and legally
default upon which lawfully showed that I did not owe any “debt” or “special
debt” or “special obligation” or “special contract” or otherwise to
respondent’s.
XCI.
On or about January 18, 2001, I did
in fact, file a JUDICIAL NOTICE—NOTICE
OF DEFAULT AGAINST “JUDGE” GERALD HERMANSEN, showing that in fact, he
insolently refused to answer my lawful notice and Judicial Notice is hereby
placed on the record that "Judge" Gerald Hermansen is in default by
law, as he has in fact not answered my ORDER MANDATING JUDGE GERALD HERMANSEN
TO VERIFY HIS CLAIM AND PROVE LAWFUL JURISDICTION IN CASE NUMBER CM 010607
proving that at no time did any “Judge” have lawful jurisdiction in this
matter.
XCII.
I did appeal and was frustrated from the exact moment on
appeal. A division of Respondent’s
superior court refused to give me the transcripts and delayed my receiving
justice. With no contract, and with me
at all times being In Propria Persona, they did willfully keep and attempt and
threaten that I “must” obtain a “lawyer” so that they could destroy my case.
XCIII.
On or about July 10th,
2001, I did file a Request for Order Extending Time to File Appeal Brief, and
did complain bitterly about not receiving the proper record, evidence and
transcripts.
XCIV.
ON June 19th, 2001, I did
file a Motion for Reconsideration (C038347) on my Mandamus I sent into the
Court of Appeal of the State of California, in and for the Third Appellate
District (henceforth 3rd Appellate or Appellate court), which
was erroneously denied on or about May
31, 2001.
XCV.
On or about July 15th,
2001 I did file a Demand for Disqualification to the Supreme Court of
California, demanding that Ronald M. George the Supreme Court justice be
disqualified for his unlawful acts and/or omissions in this matter conspired
together with Mr. Steven R. McNelis.
XCVI.
On or about July 15, 2001 I did file
with the State of California, Commission on Judicial Performance a DEMAND FOR
INVESTIGATION/DEMAND FOR ACTION—complaining about contemnor’s Steven R. McNelis
and Chief Justice Ronald M. George
XCVII.
On or about July 15th, 2001, I did file a Freedom of
Information Request to the U.S. Marshall Jerry J. Enomoto and Russell
Qualliotine, demanding answers and files and documents to how I was kidnapped
from New York to California. CC’s were
to Senator Wally Herger and Senator Hillary Clinton. Everyone did ignore this lawful request.
XCVIII.
On or about July 15, 2001, I did
mail respondent’s and their surrogate courts a Letter Re: Appellant’s Brief
factually demonstrating and complaining of the injustice that the respondent’s
surrogate 3rd Appellate Court was denying me substantive rights and
substantive due process of law. It was
in fact, ignored.
XCIX.
On or about June 19, 2001, I did
file a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON MANDAMUS (CRC § 107) ORDER FOR
CORRECTION OF TRANSCRIPT(CCP §
1916 and 338; CRC Rule 7, et seq.) demanding that Defense exhibits in the lower
Superior Court One through 123 plus 150, 151 and Brad Rundt telephone call tape
cassette [Also all Defense Exhibits at trial A through I]; along with All
Peoples Exhibits 1 through 10 under CRC Rule 10(c) be remitted to me
immediately. It was ignored.
C.
On or about July 19th,
2001, I did file a Notice of Disqualification under CCP § 170.1(a)(6)(c)
because said Appellate court was joining with the Respondent’s plan of
frustrating my right to a fair trial, and I did demand a fair judge in the
Appellate court which was denied on or about June 23, 2001.
CI.
On or about July 25, 2001 one Ms.
Dawn Darling, did return a letter to Dan H. Bailey, my legal runner stating the
truth that in fact, the transcript given to me was in gross error (although she
did not admit the extent.
CII.
On or about August 14th,
2001 I did receive notice from Bernadette M. Torivio and I was assured I would
receive written acknowledgement of my complaint against Mr. Ronald M. George
and Steven R. McNelis.
CIII.
On or about August 15th
2001, I did file a Call to Order demanding from my Legislators and all
concerned parties that Respondent’s capricious and unlawful 3rd Appellate
Court obey the concise rule of law.
Said Call to Order was ignored.
CIV.
Also on or about August 15, 2001, I
did also file a Emergency Alternative Writ of Mandamus (Emergency Alternative
Writ of Mandamus, Demand for Court of Record; Demand for Correct and Complete
Transcripts; Demand for All Exhibits.
CV.
On or about August 21, 2001, I did
receive a return of my filed brief from the 3rd Court of Appeal
Deena C. Trujillo who held me up to the strict construction of the law and
demanded I follow their inane procedural rules.
CVI.
On or about August 21, 2001, after
denial that there was nothing wrong with the Record, said 3rd
Appellate Court did the corrected record on appeal. Also on this date the 3rd Appellate Court did again
frustrate my attempts at a fair trial and/or appeal and did return my Brief
holding me up to strict construction of Respondent’s and their lawyers (while
allowing their lawyers liberal construction of the laws).
CVII.
On or about August 31, 2001, I did
file with the Court of Appeal my legal brief with the court (78 pages).
CVIII.
On September 9, 2001 I did file with
the Judicial Council a REFUSAL OF YOUR OFFER, DEMAND YOU DO YOUR JOB AND
PROSECUTE STEVEN R. MCNELIS AND HIS ACCOMPLICE RONALD M. GEORGE.
CIX.
Amazingly, on or about October 2,
2001, I did receive a letter from the Supreme Court of California out of date
stating that my Demand for Disqualification, stating that I do not have a case
pending before the supreme court, however; this disqualification was sent July
15, 2001 with the Mandamus also filed to that court.
CX.
On or about September 14, 2001 I did
receive from the U.S. Marshall’s service a response to my FOIA request
demanding that I send them Verification of Identity. I did send in PROOF OF IDENTITY on October 9, 2001.
CXI.
On or about October 15, 2001 I did
receive from the Court of Appeal, a notice that my Brief was “overdue”…even
though they had not responded for my requests for discovery and the complete
record, transcripts and evidence.
CXII.
On October 31, 2001 I did receive
from the U.S. Marshall’s service a response that they had commenced a search
for the documents in my matter and will contact me when search is complete.
CXIII.
Amazingly, on or about October 31st,
2001, I did file a JUDICIAL NOTICE: NOTICE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF FAIR AND/OR JUST
APPEAL, factually demonstrating and showing that respondent’s surrogate courts
will bought off and intentionally unjust.
CXIV.
On or about October 31, 2001 I did
file my third corrected Appellant’s Brief, being held to the most excruciating
and strictest standards of the law (75 Pages with 29 Attachments).
CXV.
On or about November 1, 2001 I did
receive a Response that “Appellant’s judicial notice of fair and/or just appeal
is denied” in direct violation of law.
CXVI.
On or about November 13, 2001, I did
get a response for my request for records and only got back two (2) documents
that had no applicable information I asked for.
CXVII.
On or about November 15, 2001, I did
file an “APPELLANT’S PATENT REFUSEAL OF DENIAL OF JUDICIAL NOTICE” with the
Court of Appeals.
CXVIII.
On or about December 13, 2001 in a
document dated December 10, 2001, Ms. Donna M. Varga, staff council stated that
in its December meeting the Commission on Judicial Performance determined not
to take further action to my complaint dated July 15, 2001.
CXIX.
On or about January 02, 2002 I did
file a NOTICE FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION factually showing that respondent’s had
no claim as they had not given substantive due process of law, and had directly
perjured themselves and allowed their surrogate courts not to allow any
substantive legal process for your Appellant/Petitioner in this matter.
CXX.
On or about February 5, 2002
Respondent’s did file their second frivolous MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL.
CXXI.
On or about February 09, 2002 I had
two next best friends go to the Judicial Council in San Francisco, so that the
clerk could explain why and how the “judicial assignment” number 108445-00
dated April 27, 2000 legally came into existence. Mr. Brad Campbell the clerk of said Judicial Council immediately
flushed red and then said that said 108445-00 contract was “nunc pro tunc”
(after the fact). My next best friend
Richard Pitchers said “Isn’t that illegal?” to which Mr. Campbell became
reticent and silent.
CXXII.
On or about February 13, 2002; I did
file a WRIT OF PRECIPAIE against Judicial Analyst Brad Campbell, demanding to
make more definite and certain the law and legality of “Judicial Assignment”
108445-00 to which on or about February 22, 2002 I did get a REASON FOR
DOCUMENT RETURN from the County of Butte Superior Court stating “Need Butte
County Case number and Name of Case.”
On March 05, 2001, I did file a DOCUMENTS ON LAWFUL CASE ASSIGNMENT
108445 STEVEN R. MCNELIS AND HIS ACCOMPLICE, RONALD M. GEORGE to Ms. Sharol
Strickland clerk of the Superior Court.
Ms. Strickland never answered this demand for substantive legal proofs
as I did return both the case number and name (of which they were eminently
aware of.)
CXXIII.
On or about February 22, 2002
Respondent’s did in fact, get every REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME they
requested from the Third Appellate court, over my objections thereto.
CXXIV.
On or about February 25, 2002 I did
file a APPELLANTS DEMAND TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL, 50 pages, of which
on or about February 26, 2002 the Court of Appeals did maliciously deny me
substantive due process of law and did deny me redress of grievance under color
of law, under color of authority for the purposes of committing Domestic
Violence against me in overt violation of law using the lies the originated the
process itself.
CXXV.
On or about March 5, 2002 I did file
a APPELLANTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON UNLAWFUL DISMISSAL BY THIRD PARTY.
CXXVI.
On or about March 5, 2002 Mr. Dan H.
Bailey did write an affidavit from his own personal knowledge proving that
there was no order placing me on “parole.”
CXXVII.
On or about March 06, 2002 I did
receive a RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, which was an overt fraud, that essentially said:
“Because we denied him substantive due process of law, and would not allow the
lower court record, transcripts, and evidence to come into trial, therefore we
want our surrogate courts to deny all questions relating to the Appellant’s
Brief. Also, we can’t understand
everything else, thereby we want that out also.” The whole procedure is nothing but a scam and the 3rd
Appellate court is a sham mock of an Appeal and is only there to obtain Welfare
Title IV-D remuneration scams and/or schemes.
CXXVIII. On
or about March 13, 2002, Mr. Nelson Kenyon did file with the Appellate Court an
AFFIDAVIT OF UNDERSTANDABILTY AND COMPREHANSION OF Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr.
APPELLATE BRIEF TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD
APPELLATE DISTRICT.
CXXIX.
On or about March 21, 2002 I did
file a DEMAND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS (61 Pages) served on Respondents (to the
California State Attorney General Bill Lockyer) demanding to know the nature
and cause and make more definite and certain their claims in their RESPONDENT’S
BRIEF filed on or about March 06, 2002.
CXXX.
They did totally default on it and
ignore it.
CXXXI.
On or about March 21, 2002 I did
file an EXTENTION FOR TIME for good cause as I was waiting upon a return for
the Bill of Particulars.
CXXXII.
On or about March 21, 2002; I did
receive a return on the “Motion for Reconsideration on unlawful Dismissal by
Third Appellate Court – Order to show cause” is denied. The 3rd Appellate insolently
admitted their lies and refused to answer my lawful order to show cause, a
denial of substantive due process of law.”
CXXXIII. On
or about March 25, 2002; I did receive an return form the Third Appellate Court
denying my “Emergency Request for Extension of time and Appellant’s Bill of
Particulars, in response to the State of California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer Reply Brief” and it was again denied.
(Everything of substance is denied by this court showing it is a slave
to their Master respondent’s criminal wonton needs and acts and/or omissions.)
CXXXIV.
On or about April 1, 2002, I did
sent out to all Respondent’s as well as the Superior Court of San Francisco, a
NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE (23 pages).
CXXXV.
On or about April 16, 2002 I did
file a NOTICE TO APPEAL 3rd APPELLATE DENIAL TO HEAR APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
IT IS CLEAR AND
CERTAIN, that the Respondent’s and their ownership of their surrogate courts
within the State of California and the United States is directly due to Welfare
Title IV-D remuneration scams and or schemes and it is a fact that they have
been criminally bought off in an ongoing enterprise to frustrate and overthrow
the Constitution of the State of California and/or of the United States for the
purposes of establishing slavery and false claims against your
Appellant/Petitioner Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. (and other fathers). It is a fact, that I have at all times acted
in good faith and have come to the above mentioned tribunals seeking law and
justice which I have been unlawfully denied.
I have even gone so far as to stay in the jurisdiction so that I could
prove my innocence, however; it is a fact, that the above mentioned tribunals
and all Respondent’s are acting criminally and have been given the word from
above to destroy this nation from within, to abrogate the concise rule of all
and not to allow your in propria persona Appellant/Petitioner to win at any
cost. They have been assured of their
corruption and support of their illegal crimes and/or welfare schemes by and
through Title IV_D welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes and are destroying
Appellant’s rights to be a father from the first instant of this matter, which
was the plan from the start.
Wherefore, your
petitioner comes before Almighty God under law and prays to this lawful
judicial powers court that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted and lawfully
issued forthwith, in the first instance to the said greatly aggrieved and
accused party in this matter, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., to provide me remedy and
redress of grievances, against the said “California Department of Corrections”
to the said Chico Parole Supervisor one Ms. “Katherine Haskins”, and/or any and
all actions of the COUNTY OF BUTTE, for any cause aforesaid, and commanding
them to bring and have the body of the said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. before
your this judicial powers tribunal at the time and place therein to be
specified, to do and receive what shall then and there be considered by the
aforementioned court concerning the said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., together
with the time and cause of the detention of
the said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., and bring with them this here great
writ; and that the said Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. may be restored to his
liberty and unconditional freedoms.
Dated this Tenth
Day of April, in the year of our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, Year
Two-Thousand-Two.
SEAL: _____________________________
Robert Lindsay;
Cheney Jr.–AT LAW
In Propria
Persona, Sui Juris
Fifteenth Judicial
District
6190 Skyway
Paradise,
California
VERIFICATION
County of San Francisco ]
] ss.
State of California ]
I, Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr., being the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury as follows:
That the afore-going Document(s),
Affidavit(s), Declaration(s), and/or Materials, Id., including referenced
and/or attached documents, and/or duplicates of such documents are exacting
copies of the originals in my/or my counsel’s (specifically not American Bar
Association, or professional “Attorney’s”) possession. That I have read the foregoing document(s)
and attachments, and know and understand their contents, and having personal
knowledge that they are true, and know them to be true knowing the laws and
penalties for perjury. As to those
matters submitted therein upon information and/or belief, as to those matters,
I also believe them true.
Executed this Tenth Day in April, in
the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, year Two-Thousand-Two.
SEAL: ___________________________________
Robert
Lindsay; Cheney Jr. – AT LAW
In
Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Fifteenth
Judicial District
6190
Skyway
Subscribed this Tenth Day in April, under exigent circumstances,
before Almighty God, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, year
Two-Thousand-Two.
SEAL: __________________________________
Robert
Lindsay; Cheney Jr. – AT LAW
In
Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Reserving
All Rights, Giving Up NONE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
______________ Term
Robert Lindsay; Cheney Jr. ]
] Case No.
Appellant/Petitioner ] CERTIFICATION
OF SERVICE/
vs. ] AFFIDAVIT OF
] PROOF OF SERVICE
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ]
Respondents/Contemnor’s ] CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE
_______________________________________________] [CCP § 1013 and §
2015.5]
I, the
undersigned hereby certify and declare that I am over the age of 18 years, and
not a party to the within entitled cause of action; and, Further, hereby
deposes and says: that on the date signed below, I did serve UNDER AUTHORITY OF
APPELLANT/PETITIONER the attached document named:
1.) CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 193 Pages
2.)
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 13 Pages
____________________________________________________________________________
The aforesaid
documents were served in the following manner:
____By personal
service. I did personally deliver the
above-described documents at the address, or addresses captioned below:
____By the U.S.
Postal Service having knowledge of the United States Mail Post
paid certified
envelope, sealed by my hand at _______________________.
Certified Number
__________________________________
____By phone
communication transmission [FAX], the material aforementioned on-line was sent
at a total of ______ transmitted pages to
Tel.#( ) -
____By sealed
envelope, hand enclosed by me and mailed to the following indicated party(s):
NOTE: Notice to the Principal is notice to the
Agent, Notice to the Agent is notice to the Principal.
|
Court of Appeal Third Appellate District 900 N. Street, 4th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814-4869 |
Butte County DA Michael L. Ramsey 25 County Center Drive Oroville, California 95965 |
State of California State Atty. Gen. Bill Lockyer P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94233-255 |
|
California Dept. of Corr. Legal Affairs Div. 1515 S. Street Sacramento, CA 95814 |
Butte County Consolidated Courts 1 Court Street Oroville, CA 95965 |
SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN FRANCISO 400 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA
94102-4514 |
Further, I
declare under penalty of perjury knowing the laws thereof within the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct and that these documents were
served by me personally as stated above and/or mailed and sealed as stated
above within the California Republic.
DATED: April ____2002 ______________________________________
______AM/PM
|
Dixie Ann Hawks 975 East Ave.,
STE 112 Chico, CA 95926 By lawful
service 530-877-4636 |
Nelson Kenyon 3359 Steele
Drive Bay Point,
California County of Contra Costa-by lawful Service 925-458-5002 |
Judge Ronald Evans
Quidachay,
Presiding Judge
Department 206
400 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA
94102-4514
Court Officer:
Gordon Park-Li, Chief
Executive Officer
[1]
The “SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO” shall be Concurrent
with and Equivalent to with “coextensive jurisdiction with the district courts
of the union state of California” as created in Article VI, Section 1,
Constitution for California of 1849, see: Stats. 1861-72, ch. CXIV, p. 116 and
Digest of Laws of California – XXII.
COURTS OF JUSTICE, III.-THE DISTRICT COURTS, Article 632, Section 12,
No. 15. [Am. April 25, 1857; R.S.St.
1855, 117; St. 1854, 74; St. 1853, 289; St. 1851, 11; St. 1850, 93; C.L. 740.]
[2] "The word 'posterity' embraces not only children, but descendants to the remotest generation." Breckinridge & wife v. Faulkner, 8 Bush (Ky.) 527. [Emphasis added.] [All Common Rights vested by God were never placed in commerce and are therefore unalienable with respect to civil government]
[3] SEE: Mookini v. United States (1938) 58 S.Ct. 543, 303 U.S. 201,82 L.Ed. 748, at p. 205."The term "District Courts of the United States," as used in the rules, without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a "District Court of the United States."
[4] State of California may be something other than courts lawfully established by Mookini above under” 4 U.S.C.S. section 110(d). "The term `State' includes any Territory or possession of the United States." And,
4 U.S.C.S. section 110(e). "The term Federal area means any lands or premises held
or acquired by or for the
use of the United States or any department, establishment, or agency of the
United States; any federal area, or any part thereof, which is located within
the exterior boundaries of any State, shall be deemed to be a Federal area
located within such State." I
am not an "individual entity" as defined under Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 80 L.Ed. 1143, 56 S.Ct. 773.
[5]
"The law has three distinct
purposes: 1. To maintain the existence and well-being of society. 2.
To maintain the preserve the person and property of each individual
member free from all burdens which are not common to every other member.
3. To maintain and preserve the special
rights of each member, and also of each member in relation to property. [The Theory of Common Law, by James M.
Walker Charleston, S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852, p.
22]
[6] "This Government...has certainly some power to protect its own Citizens in their own country. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights." - Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, at page 1757 (1866).
[7] “A fiction of law is a legal assumption that a thing is true which is either not true, or which is as probably false as true; the rule on this subject being that the court will not endure that a mere form or fiction of law, introduced for the sake of justice should work a contrary to the real truth and substance of a thing--never working an injury." Hibberd v. Smith (1885) 67 C 547, 561 4 P 473, 8 P 46, 56 Am.Rep. 726 (Respondent’s are willfully inflicting overt injury against Appellant intentionally by using this fiction).
[8] By and through her own acts and/or omissions, a beggar needing state supplied support in which to raise her child. NOTE: At no time did your appellant/petitioner approach government or welfare at any time, nor did he at any time ask for “Child Support”—it is a fact, that he continuously only asked for his own child, and the right to raise that child unfettered, free and sovereign without any interference. This would have unemployed respondent’s whom sought financial and pecuniary remunerations to do the same, as their plan and intent is to needlessly burden the taxpayer using direct and/or indirect “Title IV-D” Welfare scams and/or schemes.
[9] "The compensation shall be made before he citizen can be divested of his rights." San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114; McCann v. Sierra County, Jan T. 1857
[10] SEE published California Government Code § 1027.5
[11] The same general doctrines were recognized on a former application in the same case, reported in 8 Paige Ch. 47, where it was held that the jurisdiction of a court of equity embraces a writ of habeas corpus, and that the court will also act upon petitions without a bill. So in 2 Story Eq., sec. 1340, and note 1. The same views are recognized in People v. Mercein, 25 Wend. 64; People v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637, and People ex. rel. Nickerson, 19 Wend. 637. See, also, 2 Kent Com. 194. To the same effect are Mayer v. Baldwin, 1 Halst. (N. J.) 454; Armstrong v. Stone and Wife, 9 Gratt. 102. The case of Commonwealth v. Briggs, 16 Pick. 203, was a strong one; and, although the child was young (between three and four years only), and in the custody of the mother, yet, on habeas corpus, it was delivered up to the father. In the case of State v. Scott, 30 N. H. 274, the court, Woods, J., held that neither party had a legal right to the custody of the child; the agreement of the mother to commit the child to the care of the Society of Shakers having no binding force, and the right of the mother being lost by the second marriage: therefore it is held that the court have nothing to do but to inquire if the child is restrained of its liberty, and, if so, to set him free. (From Herrick v. Richardson, 40 NH 272 also noted below.]
[12]
The “SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO” shall be Concurrent
with and Equivalent to with “coextensive jurisdiction with the district courts
of the union state of California” as created in Article VI, Section 1,
Constitution for California of 1849, see: Stats. 1861-72, ch. CXIV, p. 116 and
Digest of Laws of California – XXII.
COURTS OF JUSTICE, III.-THE DISTRICT COURTS, Article 632, Section 12,
No. 15. [Am. April 25, 1857; R.S.St.
1855, 117; St. 1854, 74; St. 1853, 289; St. 1851, 11; St. 1850, 93; C.L. 740.]
[13] "He may make this showing by demonstrating that the issues that he raises are debatable among jurist, that a court could resolve the issues differently, or that the questions presented deserve further proceedings.” See Slack v. McDaniel, (2000) 529 U.S. 473, 483-84."
[14] Please reference: Federal Law, specifically the Parental Kidnapping and Enforcement Act (PKPA), a.k.a. 28 USC Sec. 1738A which states that, "full faith and credit given to child custody determinations," which "appropriate authorities of every state shall enforce according to its terms…"
[15] Statutes and rulings that infringe upon fundamental rights are presumptively unconstitutional, and a substantial burden rests on the state, not citizen, to prove its case.
“It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law ‘impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution it is presumptively unconstitutional.’” Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297 (1980) (USSC+).
[16] "Constitution of this state declares, among inalienable rights of each citizen, that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property. This is one of primary objects of government, is guaranteed by constitution, and cannot be impaired by legislation." Billings v. Hall (1857), 7 C. 1. [e.g. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)]
[17] (See supra p. 691. “* * * “the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior * * * and therefore can suffer no loss or injury.” 3 Bl.Comm. 142. See also Cowen, Domestic Relations; Action for Loss of Consortium, 1951, 25 Aust.L.J. 390, 1952, 26 Aust. L.J. 358).
[18] In United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) this Court reaffirmed in the strongest possible terms that "all gender-based classifications today" by every governmental unit must be subjected to "heightened scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause.
[19] One is guilty of Inveigling who, without force, but by fraud and deception subject to his control the will of another. One is sent out of the state against her will if her consent to go was procured by fraud. People v. De Leon 109 New York 226
[20]
521 U.S. at 936 (citing 42 U.S.C. $ 5779(a) (Requiring state and local law
enforcement agencies to report cases of missing children to the Department of
Justice.) This was never done in my
case, over and above my continued objections!
[21] "Here we interpret the California Penal and Government Codes to authorize the district attorney to present or lay a complaint before a magistrate as to a possible felony, but not to exclude or prohibit the same act when performed by a private citizen. And see Western Surgical Supply Co. v. Affleck, 1952, 110 Cal.App.2d 388, at page 392, 242 P.2d 929, at page 931, where it is said of a then existing Penal Code Section:
"The section *fn4 does not restrict the making of a complaint to any certain person or individual; it may be by anyone having knowledge of the offense charged." Cf. People v. Currie, 1911, 16 Cal.App. 731, 117 P. 941. [SEE Johnson v. MacCoy, (1960) 278 F.2d 37]
[22] “So statutes authorizing the commitment of infants without care or guardianship o reform schools and like institutions, so far as they purpose to give inferior tribunals jurisdiction of offenses punishable by infamous punishment, are held to e unconstitutional…” State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406; 55 Am. Rep. 458.
[23] A secured liberty under Article I, section 1 “All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Clause.
[24]
"The
statist notion that government may supercede parental authority in order to
ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of
children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions. Judges and state officials are ill-equipped
to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of
powerful countervailing interests."
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990),
citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985,
2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982).
[25] "The right to unaccrued alimony stops with the death of the party directed to pay.” Parker v. Parker, 193 Cal. 478, 225 P. 447; Roberts v. Higgins, 1222 Cal.App. 170, 9 P.(2d) 517; Borton v. Borton, 230 Ala. 630, 162 So. 529, 101 A.L.R. 320, with note 323.
[26] “But where it is insisted that the father has relinquished his right to the custody of his child to a third person, by contract, the terms of the contract, to have the effect of depriving him of his control, should be clear, definite, and certain: Drumb v. Keen, 47 Iowa 435; Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479.
[27] Because Respondent’s refuse to answer the Bill of Particulars filed against them, and did not provide either palpable discovery nor answer Interrogatories to your Petitioner/Appellant, due to their insolence, Appellant does not know the full nature and cause of this action, nor the real party in interest, and is intentionally kept ignorant of this matter; there may or may not be other scams and/or procedures and/or government(s) established under color of law, and/or under color of authority in which support these fraudulent scams and/or schemes implemented and managed by Respondent’s.
[28] An 18 U.S.C. 1002 violation.
[29] When "mis-information given, its self evident of fraud," U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91 S.Ct. 62, 27 L.Ed.2d (1970); U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, and "fraud, vitiates, nullifies, and abrogates anything to which it attaches, including the most solemn agreements, contracts, and judgments." U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61-71 (1878).
[30] SEE Figure 1. State and Federal CSE Savings vs. Costs Formula, pg. 6. See also, Table 1 pg. 10; and APPENDIX 1, “California” pg. 30; APPENDIX III, pg. 34; APPENDIX IV, pg. 36;
[31] "The parens patriae relationship does not exist between police and child but between court and child.” Harling v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1961) supra, 295 F.2d 161, 314.
[32] "As general rule men have natural right to do anything which their inclinations may suggest, if it be not evil in itself, and in no way impairs the rights of others." In Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502.
[33] Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, 127,2 L.Ed. 554, U.S. V. Mitchell, 2 Dall 348, 355,1 L.Ed. 410, Bryant v. U.S. 257 US 386, 387" A conspiracy to prevent altogether, the enforcement of a statute of the United States has been held to be a conspiracy to commit treason by levying war against the United States" [Article III SEC. 3 CL1]
[34] The California Government Code §1027.5. "The Legislature of the State of California finds that:
(a) There exists a world-wide revolutionary movement to establish a totalitarian dictatorship based upon force and violence rather than upon law.
(b) This world-wide revolutionary movement is predicated upon and it is designed and intended to carry into execution the basic precepts of communism as expounded by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin."
[35] State's acceptance of federal funding for child support enforcement (42 U.S.C. 651-669, domestic violence programs and CAPTA (Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ["Mondale Act"]) also waives its 11th Amendment immunities.
[36] Liability of Agent.—Agent is personally liable unless he shows authority to bind principal: Gillaspie v. Wesson, 31 Am.Dec. 715; Pitman v. Kintner, 33 Id. 469; Wood v. Goodridge, 52 Id. 771. Principal Is Only Liable for Acts of Agent when the same have been done within the scope of his authority: Wood v. Goodridge, 52 Am.Dec. 771; Brown v. Johnson, 51 Id. 118; Goodloe v. Godley, Id. 159.
[37] Once a party raises the question of an agency's jurisdiction, the general rule is that the agency must decide the issue. [See for reference 2 AM JUR 2d Administrative Law $$ 332 (2d Ed. 1962)]
[38] Agency regulations which have no statutory foundation are void; see City of Tucson v. C.I.R., 820 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir. 1987). Agencies do not have unbridled authority to adopt whatever regulations they wish; see Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 306, 90 S.Ct. 506 (1970) ("The power under the regulations to declare a registrant 'delinquent' has no statutory standard or even guidelines. The power is exercised entirely at the discretion of the local board. It is a broad, roving authority, a type of administrative absolutism not congenial to our law-making traditions")
[39] California Statutes of 1975 Ch1244 Section 1. Section 195 of the Civil Code is repealed. SEC 2. Section 196 of the Civil Code is amended to read: 196. The parent entitled to the custody of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstances. IF the support and education which the father of a child is able to give are INADEQUATE, THE MOTHER MUST ASSIST HIM TO THE EXTENT OF HER ABILITY.
[40] Maxim of Law: “Where two rights concur, the more ancient shall be preferred.”
[41]
In
California, the Government Code sides with Locke. Sections 11120 and 54950 both
say, "The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies which serve them." The preambles of the U.S. and California
Constitutions also affirm the choice of Locke by the People. See Cal.Const Art I, §
24.
[42] See Also Winton v. Winton, (1889) 53 Hun 4; 5 NYS 537 below.
[43] "Any number of parties may join in an appeal under CCP $ 941. Does not exclude the plural." Sutro Estate (1907) 152 C. 249, 92 P. 486, 1027.
[44] Partus sequitur ventrem. "The offspring follow the condition of the mother. This is the case of slaves and animals; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 167, 502; but with regard to freemen, children follow the condition of the father."
[45] "The status of slavery is not necessarily always attended with the same powers on the part of the master. The master is subject to the supreme power of the State, whose will controls his action towards his slave, and this control must be defined and regulated by the municipal law.....In other words, the status of slavery embraces every condition, from that in which the slave is known to the law simply as a chattel, with no civil rights, to that in which he is recognized as a person for all purposes, save the compulsory power of directing and receiving the fruits of his labor. Which of these conditions shall attend the status of slavery, must depend on the municipal law which creates and upholds it." Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856) 19 How 393, 624-25.
[46] “…When a defendant makes a materially false, unsworn statement to a police officer, the false statement must constitute an actual impediment, rather than a mere attempt to impede the investigation. See United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1497 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994).
[47] SEE CCP § 780.108 et seq.
[48] APPELLA'TION, n. [L. appellatio. See Appeal.] Name; the word by which a thing is called and known. Spenser uses it for appeal. Webster’s 1828 Dictionary.
[49] Cases are: In re Hendricks, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 793, 85 Cal.Rptr 220. This says that obligation to pay alimony and child support IS NOT A DEBT. Only upon wife having clean hands, then does it convert: citing this case Miller v. Superior Court, (1937) 72 p.2D 868.
[50] “A contempt proceeding is not a civil action and cannot result in a money judgment in favor of the aggrieved party.” Lubin v. Lubin, (1956) 144 C.A. 781; 302 P.2d 491.
[51] United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2001). “See e.g. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. $552.452 (providing paryment of support o the office of the Michigan friend of the court). As a result, court-ordered wealth transfers to or from Michigan residents are not per se a fit object of the federal Commerce Power.”
[52]
The
respondent’s judges are falsely personating US officers pursuant to Title 18
(Federal Crimes) Chapter 43, especially §912.
[53] "The constitution of this state is not to be considered as a grant of power, but rather as a restriction upon the powers of the legislature, and it is competent for the legislature to exercise all powers not forbidden by the constitution of the state, or delegated to the general government, or prohibited by the constitution of the United States." People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; People v. Bigler, 5 Cal. 23; Williams v. Thompson, Jan. T. 1856.
[54] “First, the [petitioner] must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right…[S]econd he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez v. Toledo, (1980) 446 U.S. 635. See also: "That if a statute is part of an unlawful scheme to reach a prohibited result...the statute must fail..." McCallen v. Massachusetts, 27 U.S. 620, 630
[55] "In the united States, Sovereignty resides in the people who act through the organs established by the Constitution." Chrisholm v. Georgia, 4 Dall 419, 471; McCulloch v. Maryland, Wheat 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370: "...the congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared." Perry v. U.S. 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935)
[56]
"As
is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils
inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the
end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA2
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)
[57] Justice Brandies concisely labeled this: "Discrimination is the act of treating differently two persons or things under like circumstances." National Life Insurance Company v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 630.
[58] “The right to equal protection of the laws "guarantees that all parties who are similarly situated receive like treatment by the law." J.T. v. O'Rourke, 651 P.2d 407, 413 (Colo. 1982)
[59]
NOTE: The rule of law provides this even in murder cases: "The
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. . . . A room is
searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. . . . The
privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free." People
v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587, 588 (1926).{fn
3} But factually, in this matter,
no crime has been committed, and yet the County of Butte, State of California
et als, has continually violated the law and blundered—yet—they refuse to
follow the concise rule of law or any benefit of Constitutional law to be
provided to your Appellant/Petitioner.
[60] "If a person intended to create an inefficient, unpredictable, ineffective, expensive, unresponsive system for review of governmental acts, he or she would use the system we have in Oregon as the perfect model" Forman v Clatsop County, 297 Or 129, 133; 681 p2d 786 (1984) [This is the model of Respondent’s current surrogate court systems that they depend upon in the State of California et als.]
[61] "In both United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 38 U.S. 217, and NAACP v. Button, 37 U.S. 415, and also in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 37 U.S. (1964), it was held that a State may not pass statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law or to interfere with the right to freedom of speech.
[62] “All questions of judicial qualification…involve constitutional validity.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 441, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)
[63] “The jurisdiction of a court commissioner or any other temporary judge, to try a cause derives from the parties stipuation. (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 360.) Thus, in the absence of a proper stipulation, the judgment entered by the court commissioner in this case would be void.” People v. Tijerina, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 49; In re Frye (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 407-40 [197 Cal.Rptr. 755]
[64] In re George Cooper on Habeas Corpus states [(1960) 3 Cal. Rptr. 140, 53 Cal.2d 772]: “A citizen ought not to deprived of his person liberty upon an allegation which, upon being sifted, may amount to nothing more than a suspicion.” Rice v. Ames (1901) 180 U.S. 371, 374, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577. ‘Charges are not verified by an affidavit that somebody is informed and believes that they are true. This is mere evasion of the law; the most improbable stories may be believed of any one, and the man most free from any reasonable suspicion of guilt is not safe if he holds his freedom at the mercy of any man three hundred (or more then two thousand) miles off, who will swear that the has been informed and believed in his guilt.’” (Swart*1478 [ 349 P.2d 963] v. Kimball (1880), 43 Mich. 443, 451, 5 N.W. 635, quoted with approval in Ex Parte Spears (1891), 88 Cal. 640, 642, 26 P. 608.)
[65] “If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.” Extradition Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302, See also 18 U.S.C. § 662 (1940 ed.) Rev. Stat. § 5278.
[66] “The Governor has no power to cause the arrest and surrender, to another state, of a resident of this state except insofar as the law, either by constitutional provisions or by statute, empowers him so to invade the liberty of the resident. In re Hart, 229 C.A.2d 455; 40 Cal.Rptr. 4201
[67] "The Law favors common right." Bouvier's Law Dictionary(1914), "Maxim," p, 2142. [God's Law favors the common Right with which He has vested every Christian Man.]
[68] “Of course, in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads in the rights of property.. (1) Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes (2) A heavy progressive income tax (3) Abolition of all rights of inheritance (4) Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels (5) Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank… (6) Centralization of he means of communication and transport in the hands of the state… (10) Free education for all the children in public schools.” [The Communist Manifesto. A Modern Edition, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, ã 1998 Verso, Verso, UK: 6 Meard Street, London WIV 3HR ISBN 1085984-898-2, pp. 60-61.]
[69]
The “SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO” shall be Concurrent
with and Equivalent to with “coextensive jurisdiction with the district courts
of the union state of California” as created in Article VI, Section 1,
Constitution for California of 1849, see: Stats. 1861-72, ch. CXIV, p. 116 and
Digest of Laws of California – XXII.
COURTS OF JUSTICE, III.-THE DISTRICT COURTS, Article 632, Section 12,
No. 15. [Am. April 25, 1857; R.S.St. 1855,
117; St. 1854, 74; St. 1853, 289; St. 1851, 11; St. 1850, 93; C.L. 740.]
[70] Please take Judicial Notice of “Count IV” et seq. noted above.
[71] “There is no foundation for bringing the action against a fictitious person.” People v. Herman, 45 Cal. 689