Supporting Timmerman’s contention that Mughniyah had helped train the Chechen rebels is columnist Alexander Chancellor, citing the Sunday Telegraph: “…the terrorist responsible for masterminding the Lebanon hostage crisis and killing scores of American servicemen in Beirut has come out of retirement to lend his support to Chechen rebels fighting the Russian assault on Grozny.” [402] According to former CIA agent Bob Baer, the Saudis also supported the Chechen rebels (a charge they deny). “…high-ranking members of the Saudi royal family have been involved in political assassination plots and the training of Chechen rebels with apparent ties to Al Qaeda. … Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz—Saudi Arabia’s “grim sheriff”—who as the longtime overseer of the security forces, is the Saudi official most responsible for working with the FBI and CIA in prosecuting the war on terrorism.” [403] Saudi Arabia’s government-funded support for radical Wahhibism (a known al-Qeada hotbed) has been widely reported, as has the ties between the CIA and Saudi intelligence. Additional evidence linking Mughniyah to the Chechen crisis or to either of the above mentioned agencies never materialized. The following sources implicate the CIA, Pakistan’s ISI and Saudi intelligence with the training of some of the leading Chechen commanders. Bin Laden’s al Qaeda network and Iranian intelligence are also implicated, though like Mughniyah, further mention of Iranian involvement did not surface during the research phase. In Dec. of ’02 B. Raman (former intelligence analyst for the Indian govt.) wrote that the “…foreign mercenaries, many of them got trained by the…(CIA) during the first Afghan war of the 1980s through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)…” [404]

From an article dated Sept. of ’01 and posted on the “Serbian Unity Congress” website, Garland Favorito wrote that according to “…Yosef Bodansky, director of the U.S. Congress Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Bin Laden attended at least one secret Chechnyan war planning summit with Iranian and Pakistani intelligence officers in Somalia during 1996. One of the leaders of that war, Al Khattab, was actually a Mujahideen commander who fought with Bin Laden against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Both Khattab and Shamil Basayev, the other war leader, were trained and indoctrinated in the CIA sponsored Amir Muawia camp in Afghanistan. Basayev also received training in the Markaz-i-Dawar camp in Pakistan where he established relationships with the very highest Pakistani military and intelligence officers.” [405] In that same year (’96), the CIA worked with the ISI to create the Taliban. [406] What’s interesting here is that the ISI (given its close association with the CIA) was collaborating not only with Bin Laden but also Iranian Intelligence. Complex relationships are to be expected on the far side of the world? Perhaps what’s clear is that the U.S, through proxies supports Islamic Jihad, serving a broad range of policy objectives. Sources link Amir Ibn al-Khattab to Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev, who “…was an acting president of the breakaway Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1996 – 1997). He was mentioned on a United Nations list of groups and people with suspected links to the al-Qaeda organisation and is said to have had contacts with the Taleban movement in Afghanistan.” [407] From an independent source that focuses on religions, Andrew Mcgregor wrote in Feb. of ’03 that: “Following the death of … al-Khattab last spring, there was speculation as to whether the foreign Islamist mujahidin would continue to play a large role in the Chechen struggle for independence from Russia. Khattab appears to have been replaced by a 35-year-old Saudi, Abu al-Walid. … There are allegations that al-Walid is variously an agent of Saudi intelligence, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Bin-Laden's al-Qaeda.” [408] Mark Franchetti, Moscow bureau chief of the "Sunday Times of London" wrote in Feb. of ’04 that Abd al-Aziz al-Ghamidi, a.k.a. al-Walid, a “…Saudi militant…a follower of the Wahhabi sect… signaled the determination of Chechen extremists to take their war against the Kremlin to Russian soil when he broadcast a statement from the republic last year on Al-Jazeera...” [409]

This compilation isn’t an attempt to undermine Chechnya’s legitimate right for independence, rather to illustrate that the Rebel leadership was and still is a corrupt proxy, with support coming from many different sources, mainly from the Russian government itself. The focus is the on-going use of state sponsored terrorism to implement the objectives of the ruling class. Sven Gunnar Simonsen from the International Peace Research Institute, wrote in July of ’04 that in 1990 Dzhokhar Dudayev “…the first-ever general of Chechen origin and the former commander of the Soviet air force base in Tartu, Estonia, was elected chair of the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCCP).” By the time armed conflict between militant factions (including those supported by the Kremlin) presented the justification for military intervention by the Russian army in 1994, the ANCCP, a collaboration that included “…several radical nationalist groups…criminals, radical Muslims and clan elders alike” were “…joined by thousands of volunteers, many of whom had earlier opposed... Dudayev.” The Kremlin was initially supportive of Dudayev (photo left). Though unsupportive of complete independence, they adopted a declaration of sovereignty. Dudayev’s power was further consolidated when a plot to overthrow Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was quickly denounced by Dudayev, but not by the parliament. Dudayev’s actions to then break up the parliament, which were rejected by Russian authorities, and his quest for Chechen independence, is what “reportedly” led to Moscow’s subsequent intervention. Unbelievably, after a poorly conceived ground attack on the Capital (Grozny) had failed, “…the Russian command changed tactics; now, a massive bombardment of the capital was initiated, killing perhaps as many as 25,000 civilians and laying the city in ruins. From the outbreak of the war, numerous reliable accounts told of torture in custody, deliberate killings of civilians (including women and children), widespread looting, blackmailing, establishment of ‘filtration camps’ for Chechen men, and summary executions of individuals suspected of working for the enemy. Further, it was revealed that the Russian troops had developed a new, brutal tactic in fighting the rebels: each village they encountered was faced with an ultimatum to surrender; if it did not succumb, they pounded it with shells and bombs until the fighters retreated to the next village.” [410]

According to MSN Encarta, this invasion “islamicized” Dudayev’s “…politics and rhetoric, which were also aimed at attracting international Islamic support for the Chechen cause.” Though backed by the majority of the civilian population that collectively opposed Russian occupation, “Dudayev’s government failed, however, to create viable political and economic structures and to secure the well being of its people. The would-be new state became dominated by semi-independent warlords and various criminal groupings.” [411] In 1996 Russian intelligence dialed into Dudayev’s location “…via the signal from his satphone…” and killed him with a missile air strike. [412] This is an interesting development that followed: “…Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Dudayev’s successor and an Islamist, declared Islam the state religion and created Shari’ah courts. This action split the Chechen leadership along doctrinal lines…” [413] In 2001 journalist Ilia Tarasov interviewed former Chairman of the Supreme council of Russia, Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov, about the relationship between Dudayev and the Kremlin. Supposedly concerned with Dudayev’s growing political clout, the Kremlin offered him a cabinet position of his choice in 1991, which was initially accepted then rejected. When discussing the broader interests the relationship served, Khasbulatov stated: “It covers everything, including the sales of weapons. It was all considered as the resource for the criminal operations with a view to make different moneymakers richer, including the ones in the Kremlin. … The … Chechen wars are good for the military senior officials of Russia – to those generals and that army sector who are there making their fortunes on that war. … those hand-made oil refineries – they are 100% controlled by the generals and commandants’ offices. The Chechen republic is under the total control of the army. How can those self-made refineries work without any protection? The military columns accompany the exported oil, helicopters sometimes shoot them. Russians shoot Russians. Everybody – from the general headquarters to soldiers taking bribes at control and check points are interested in this war.”

Regarding weapons and financial support from Moscow to this separatist proxy headed by Dudayev, Khasbulatov continued to say: “I had a very strict position pertaining Dudayev’s regime. I warned the chairman of the Russian Central Bank, Viktor Gerashenko not to transfer any money to Chechnya. All of a sudden I found out there had been 500m rubles transferred there! Almost 1bn rubles were transferred afterwards.” The previous quote ties the Russian funds to illegal oil transfers from Siberia, benefiting corrupt high officials. Khasbulatov then states that he instructed the Defense Minister and his successor “…to withdraw all the weapons in Chechnya” which included artillery guns and tanks. Khasbulatov’s instructions were ignored. He further states: “I think they were selling the weapons in millions of rubles. … the democratic press of that time period was writing actively about Dudayev’s visits to London, the US, other countries.” [414] The source doesn’t clarify what Dudayev’s trips to the west entailed, though the motivating factor would be the desire to control the Caspian seas’ emerging energy transportation routes. In Oct. of ’99 CNN correspondent Steve Harrigan wrote that during the 3-year ceasefire (’96-’99), “…Chechen rebels have stockpiled heavy firepower… That firepower includes U.S.-made Stinger missiles, according to the Russian intelligence service. But most of the Chechens' weapons were actually sold to them by the Russians themselves, analysts say.” [415]

Again, in an unbelievable level of incompetence, before Russia’s ill-conceived attack on Grozny in ‘94, “eleven generals of the military council of the ground forces, including the commander, Col Gen. V. Semenov, appealed to the state duma that Russian forces were not prepared for such an operation.” Further, there was a clear alternative to military intervention: “in early 1994, Khasbulatov began a peaceful bid for power in Chechnya and had significant Chechen populist support. According to the Russian Nationalities Minister, Sergei Shakhrai: “there was a chance to take power from Dudayev in Grozny in a peaceful way, when Khasbulatov called a rally of 100,000 people and we had to do just one thing—recognize Khasbulatov in Moscow.” [416] Regarding the ceasefire, Donald Smith (Environmental News Network) wrote: “…Russian forces withdrew in August 1996, inaugurating three years of de facto independence. Incursions by Chechen rebels into the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan, which Chechens consider part of their ethnic homeland, triggered a new Russian offensive in August 1999.” [417] In June of ’05, independent journalist Andrei Smirnov & research analyst Mikhail Roshchin reported that this situation has only worsened. In 1999 “…the majority of Dagestanis entirely supported the efforts of the Russian forces to fend off the invaders. However, six years later, the mood of the population has changed dramatically.” According to the article, this change in attitude is attributable to the tactics used by Russian forces, namely, targeting & subjecting innocent civilians to arrest, extortion and torture. [418]

Reciting the Pravda interview with former Russian official Ruslan Khasbulatov, he states that Shamil Basayev (a Chechen rebel commander) was “…trained in the Russian special services…” and was an ally of Russia during an armed conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. Khasbulatov states that after Basayev and al-Khattab had mobilized resistance in Dagestan (’99) and the conflict began; “…no one touched Basayev and when his troops were moving in the mountains with vehicles, the federal choppers were covering them. The militaries started bombing the settlements of Karabakhi and Chabanakhi when Basayev and Khattab left them.” Wikipedia’s profile of Basayev adds interesting corroborating insight. Chronologically, it’s apparent that Basayev’s allegiance changed from asset to proxy adversary depending on the needs of his handlers. “When Communist hardliners attempted to stage a coup in August 1991, Basayev joined supporters of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the barricades around the Russian parliament building in central Moscow.” A few months later Dudayev declared Chechen independence from Russia. Basayev, with a small group of nationalist radicals, decided to utilize “…guerrilla tactics to draw international attention to the situation in Chechnya” which included the hijacking of a Russian passenger plane scheduled to land in Turkey. “The following year, Basayev traveled to Abkhazia, a breakaway region of Georgia, to assist the local separatist movement… Basayev's army killed thousands of Georgian civilians in Sukhumi and the village Leselidze. Ironically, his efforts had the quiet support of Russia, which wanted to create a weak Georgia dependent on its old rulers.” After moving on to Azerbaijan to help put down a seperatist movement there, Basayev then returned to Chechnya, where he became a leading component of the resistance to Russian rule. What’s discerning is that Basayev wasn’t an anomaly, as “…the battle-hardened Chechen volunteers in Abkhazia later became the backbone of the Chechen armed forces…” [419] Clearly, the Chechen rebels were a proxy adversary created by the Kremlin, with the tacit support of the west.

Prior to his assassination in 2004, officials from Washington and London had recognized Chechen rebel commander Aslan Maskhadov (elected president in '97) as a moderate, affording his foreign minister Ilyas Akhmadov and envoy Akhmed Zakayev political asylum. Like Yasser Arafat, they all publicly denounced terrorism. The following considers background material and their association to the conflict on the ground, including to that of Shamil Basayev. Russian journalist Dmitry Pinsker reported that rebel operations commanders Shamil Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev “…acted with the knowledge of interim Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and the commander of the Chechen army, Aslan Maskhadov…” [420] In June of ’04, just prior to coordinated attacks on government facilities in Ingushetia attributed to Chechen rebels (they denied any involvement), Maskhadov had warned that his forces were “…planning to change tactics. Before, we concentrated our efforts on acts of sabotage, but soon we are planing to start active military actions." [421] Incredibly, according to the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), the Ingushetia-based branch of Russian intelligence (FSB) claimed to have had foreknowledge of these attacks that killed 57 people. Given that other pro-Russian agencies denied having prior knowledge, the report therefore doesn’t expand on the fact that local FSB agents did. [422]

On September 1st, 2004, in the Russian town of Beslan, Chechen rebels seized control of a middle school, a situation that ultimately led to the deaths of hundreds of adults & children held hostage. “The terrorist attacks were the responsibility of Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev and his principal Ingushetia-based deputy Magomet Yevloyev.” [423] Consistent with the diverse ethnicity of the Chechen Jihad, “…10 of the dead hostage-takers were from Arab countries.” [424] “The attackers … had demanded independence for the troubled region of Chechnya…” [425] As on prior occasions, that same month Maskhadov distanced himself from terrorist activity. [426] However, a U.S. State Dept. report dated Feb of ’05 states that through 2004 both Russian forces and Chechen rebels “…demonstrated little respect for basic human rights.” The report also charges both sides with “unlawful killings” and “politically motivated disappearances.” [427] Citing numerous sources, including the State Dept report, a Geneva-based organization established by the Norwegian Refugee Council further states that the “Chechen rebels have also been a major threat to the security of civilians in Chechnya and elsewhere in the northern Caucasus, with reports of terrorist attacks, killings, forced labour, and use of civilians as human shields…” [428]

Initially an advocate of Sufi Islam, Maskhadov aligned himself with Yandarbiyev, Basayev and other corrupt warlords representing the pro-Wahhabi opposition in 1999. [429] “February ’99: Amid a growing threat from a rival Islamic government, President Maskhadov endorses the introduction of Islamic Sharia law to Chechnya over the next three years.” [430] Media connected with Maskhadov were supportive of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In an article posted on the Jamestown.org website dated Oct. of ’01, Maskhadov stated that the role of the fundamentalists in the Chechen fight for independence had been greatly exaggerated. Still, the article also states that, “the Chechenpress news agency, which represents Maskhadov's self-proclaimed government of Ichkeria, ran a commentary…accusing the United States and Great Britain of having ordered the air strikes on Afghanistan without having proven that the Taliban was involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.” [431] If memory serves, the Taliban had actually requested the evidence of Bin Laden’s involvement. Regardless, it didn’t prevent the U.S. from receiving an envoy representing Chechen separatists just several months later in January 2002. [432] This is interesting. Citing the Observer, Dr. Brian Glyn Williams (asst. prof. of Islamic History, UMass-Dartmouth) states; “Ahmed al Ghamidi, a Saudi jihadi who fought in Chechnya … is one of the hijackers of United Airlines flight 175 which hit the south WTC tower. Another 9/11 hijacker … that crashed into the Pentagon (Nawaq al Hamzi) also fought in Chechnya.” Dr. Williams also states that three charities that helped finance al qaeda had also channeled funds to Chechnya (the Islamic Benevolence Foundation, the Al Haramein foundation and the Kifahrefugee center). [433] Citing the Wall Street Journal, the Council on Foreign Relations adds: “Zacarias Moussaoui… was… formerly “a recruiter for al-Qaeda-backed rebels in Chechnya.” [434]

As additional evidence will establish, collaborating with extremists linked to Russian intelligence, even from a tactical standpoint, could never result in Chechnya’s independence. Weren’t Maskhadov and his nationalist supporters aware that Shamil Basayev and other warlords were FSB operatives? Wasn’t Maskhadov, a former artillery Colonel in the Soviet army, aware that the main weapons supplier for the resistance was in fact, Russia? From the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) website is a report (June of ’02) by Anatoliy Gordiyenko about corrupt Georgian security officials involved in the shipment of weapons to the Chechen rebels. “…according to local police reports, the state security major in his free time drove around a local crime boss, who, in effect, had a personal chauffeur.... Georgian Ministry of the Interior personnel control the transit of drugs and the drug trade, state security personnel have for a long time now looked after arms smuggling. … the Pankisi Gorge features in most cases of this kind as the ultimate destination for the weapons…The weapons usually come from South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia. Georgian Ministry of State Security personnel most often act as intermediaries. … not all of the arms delivered to the Pankisi Gorge are then shipped on to Chechnya, to Maskhadov's formations... the Russian military themselves are involved in arms shipments to the Chechen gunmen...” [435] The photo (lower right) is Maskhadov together with Shamil Basayev in 1997.

The following quote recites Dr. Williams regarding Maskhadov’s hollow rhetoric about breaking with the extremists during the ceasefire of the late nineties: “It was at this time that Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and his moderate supporters (including foreign minister Ilyas Akhmadov) began to call on Khattab and his IIB jihadis to decamp from Chechnya and proceed to some other zone of jihad.” If Maskhadov commanded the superior force and the presence of the foreign jihadis was greatly exaggerated, as he would later say, why didn’t he force them to leave? Dr. Williams reveals that foreign fighters such as al-Khattab “…brought the outgunned Chechen resistance access to the immense financial resources of his powerful supporters, the quasi-official charities of Saudi Arabia, such as the wealthy Al Haramein foundation.” Unseating the more radical Yanderbiyev in the ’97 election, Maskhadov became president. What’s comical is that the candidate who finished second was none other than Shamil Basayev, the “former” CIA operative. Nevertheless, Maskhadov appointed Basayev to the position of Prime Minister. --BBC [436]

From an in-depth analysis posted on the Human Rights Violations in Chechnya (HRVC) website, Basayev also “…shared responsibilities for oil production.” This particular stint in public office was reportedly brief. The source further states that Maskhadov had requested support from Russia “…to fight criminal gangs and radical Islamist in 1998-1999.” Maskhadov’s special envoy Turpal Atgeriyev, a former field commander and at that time the Chechen security minister, was arrested by Russian authorities sometime after arriving in Moscow. According to the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) Maskhadov’s new government was “…formed by the notorious ex-field commander Shamil Basayev ... The new cabinet included two first deputy premiers - Basayev and Turpal Atgeriyev.” [437] So, Atgeriyev wasn’t Maskhadov’s representative, but Basayev’s. Without researching the motivating cause, Islamists began to resist Maskhadov’s government. “…in the summer of 1998 … a group of Islamists rose in open rebellion ... Loyalists fought a pitched battle with them outside the town of Gudermes, and dozens of Chechens were killed. Maskhadov decided not to arrest the Islamists but instead let them go free.” [438] In a report by Yuri Nazarkin (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) that appears to have been written in 2002, he cites a different position from Moscow regarding a potential ceasefire and the extremist elements, though it was not established that the two reports are referring to the same round of talks. “Trying to avert a new large-scale war, A. Maskhadov appealed for urgent talks with Moscow. [In ’99] V. Putin… responded that talks would be possible only if Maskhadov condemns terrorism and extradite the terrorist leaders from Chechnya to Russia. Maskhadov refused, declared a jihad against Russia and put Basayev, Khattab and Gelayev in command of the resistance forces … in the mountains.” [439]

Again, not to imply a different version of the same round of talks, the following quote from a BBC article references a timeframe around November, 2001: “…Russian authorities of the time were very willing to negotiate with Mr Zakayev. They saw him as a powerful negotiator during the war, who did not share the more radical views of the extremist warlords Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduyev. As President Maskhadov`s representative, Mr Zakayev made an offer to Moscow: he agreed to the status of wide autonomy for Chechnya and suggested the introduction of direct Moscow rule for the interim period. But the Russians insisted on unconditional capitulation of the rebels.” [440] Note: Russia would label Akhmed Zakayev a terrorist when he would later be granted asylum in the U.K. This blatant contradiction serves to legitimize Zakayev, implying that the leadership of the Chechen resistance was politically moderate. The article also shows him accompanied by renowned actress Venessa Redgrave. Surely, she wouldn’t be associated with someone linked to terrorism. While the compilation focuses on Ilyas Akhmadov (another appointee of Maskhadov granted asylum in the U.S.), more on Zakayev is also provided further into this compilation.

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