Continuing the matter of the Chechens exploiting licensed SPs, one perspective could be that service providers are bound by law and feature scrambling and encryption systems ensuring that even terrorist organizations can openly communicate with confidence. The possibility that the Kremlin would risk anarchy and influence in a region of such strategic importance for fear of infringing on the rights of what it considers a terrorist organization seems extremely remote. However, there is no shortage of information supporting the premise that governments, including the Kremlin respect privacy laws and only eavesdrop after establishing probable cause and/or obtaining a court order. From the Moscow Times, here’s a typical example: “Mobile phone providers switched off their encryption systems for 24 hours on a government order, allowing the Federal Security Service and the police to eavesdrop on all calls. … An alert notifying callers that their conversations could be listened in on popped up on cellphones around Moscow at 9 p.m.” [461] This implies that the FSB can only conduct surveillance after requiring the server to shut down its encryption system and even then, they inform their Clientele of the security lapse. Another source (Spygear), advertizes that one can utilize a cell phone incognito with “…easy to obtain prepaid calling cards. … The telephones GPS location chip is disabled, and therefore, you cannot be tracked via GPS Satellite.” Accordingly, there’s also no identification required to obtain the device itself, thus, the provider has no “traceable” data of its users, except of course when and where the account was established. “The phones are UNLOCKED and open to all networks. An International cell phone is classified as a GSM cell phone that operates on the GSM 900 and GSM 1800 frequency.” [462] This would seem to imply that personal ambiguity is the key security feature. The battle between surveillance and ambiguity, both from a legal and technical standpoint are considered a front side media wash. According to Wikipedia, the NSA, along with agencies from four other countries created “ECHELON…thought to be the largest signals intelligence and analysis network for intercepting electronic communications in history. Run by the UKUSA Community, ECHELON can capture radio and satellite communications, telephone calls, faxes and e-mails nearly anywhere in the world and includes computer automated analysis and sorting of intercepts. … Allegedly created to monitor the military and diplomatic communications of the Soviet Union and its East Bloc allies, ECHELON is today believed to also search for hints of terrorist plots, drug-dealers' plans, and political and diplomatic intelligence.” [463] Here’s where this topic takes a very interesting turn. From a ‘98 “BBC special report” written by his sister Deborah, “Darren Hickey was one of four telephone engineers - three Britons and a New Zealander - working for Granger Telecom who were kidnapped in Chechnya in October. They were found beheaded in December.” [464] Before the engineers were murdered, one of them, Peter Kennedy(below left), made the following confession: "We have been recruited by the English intelligence service. We installed a satellite aerial so that all telephone conversations on Chechen territory were heard by German, English and Israeli special services and the Central Intelligence Agency." Vakha Arsanov, the Vice-President of Chechnya was quoted as saying the confession was forced. “Sir Andrew Wood, the British Ambassador to Moscow, said: "We don't comment on these things in general. But any reasonable analysis would show that we have no wish to spy on Chechen territory.” -- Vernon Loeb (WP Staff Writer) [465] What the following material will establish is that the engineers weren’t in Chechnya on behalf of just Granger, but also British Telecom (BT). British Telecom will then be linked to surveillance involving the Ministry of Defence and espionage efforts associated with Echelon. Addressing the U.K. Parliament, Hereford representative Paul Keetch stated: “…my constituent, Mr. Peter Kennedy, was not working for Granger Telecom, as I believed during that debate. He was working as a self-employed sub-contractor for one of Britain's largest companies, British Telecom. … BT could have provided that [security] for Peter Kennedy. I should have thought that that would be a small price to pay in a multi-million pound deal. … It is no wonder that BT is making the profits that it has made.” [466] Interestingly, the reports confirm that the abductions occurred after the job was completed. Also, Keetch’s comment about BT’s profits implies that the infrastructure never became subjected to acts of sabotage. Note: Vakha Arsanov (cited above) was at that time Maskhadov’s VP. On the globalsecurity.org website is a report about the Chechen conflict, a section of which pertains to kidnapping and ransom. The report mentions the four engineers from the U.K. in the context of other abductions, including that of Russian envoys and other westerners. “…Russian law enforcement agencies strongly maintain that abductions were designed to discredit Maskhadov and disrupt the process of negotiations.” However, the report also states that “Maskhadov certainly knew who organised these outrageous abductions, but was also certainly unable to punish the culprits.” [467] U.S. foreign policy expert and former Sr. associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Anatol Lieven, wrote in Sept. of ’04: “President Maskhadov failed completely to suppress these groups. Indeed, senior Russian envoys were kidnapped and murdered while under his personal protection. According to Western officials, the criminal and Islamist group headed by the commander Arbi Barayev, which was responsible in 1998 for the kidnapping and beheading of four British telecom engineers, was under the protection of Maskhadov’s then vice president, Vaqa Arsanov…” [468] The HRVC compilation states that Maskhadov's government charged Arbi Barayev, who ran the kidnapping business, with murder and ordered him to be imprisoned. Citing “Vyacheslav Izmailov, a former army officer who fought in Chechnya… Arbi Barayev was known to have the protection of Chechen FSB agents… There is no evidence that Maskhadov was profiting from the kidnapping business, but some associates of him certainly did.” [469] Again, Maskhadov’s depiction as a moderate was based on little more than hollow rhetoric. A ‘99 article written by Duncan Campbell cites examples of how British Intelligence intercepted the telephone communique of the Irish government and other international connections. Campbell refers to the Ministry of Defence’ “Electronic Test Facility,” a 150-ft high tower. “The tower was craftily erected between two BT [British Telecom] microwave radio towers carrying telephone traffic. The ETF was the ideal place to discreetly intercept international telephone calls… The ETF tower was operated by personnel from an RAF [Radio Introduction Unit] …based in Malvern, Worcestershire. The “special signals” section of the RAF… install and run projects for GCHQ.” [470] Note: the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is the U.K. agency associated with Echelon. Here’s an ’01 article from Action America about how Echelon works: “More and more, the ECHELON spies are relying upon the phone company to provide taps into lines through their switching equipment. For example, it was revealed in a British court recently by officials at British Telecom (BT) that there are at least three high volume fiberoptic cables, capable of carrying over 100,000 conversations at once, serving the Menwith Hill Spy Station (…) in England.” [471] The British Ambassador’s statement that Great Britain has no interest in Chechnya’s affairs is easily refuted. The West’s presence to control Caspian Sea resources and trans’ shipment routes is well established. Shamil Basayev is a strongman operating with complete immunity throughout the entire Northern Caucasus. Is it mere coincidence that he’s a highly skilled operative trained by the CIA, ISI and Russian secret services? From a January ‘98 RFE/RL article: “Maskhadov, in a bid to bring stability to Chechnya, had decided earlier to extend Basayev's powers as acting Prime Minister for six months. … Basayev named his younger brother, Shirvani, Chairman of the State Committee for Fuel and Energy, giving him control over the only profitable industry in the republic. This control extends to the Chechnya section of pipeline carrying oil from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. Moscow observers note Shirvani Basayev has no experience in the oil sector…” [472] As well the U.S. and Great Britain have supported corrupt regimes in neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan. From the Baku Ceyhan Campaign website is an ‘05 media briefing that focuses on BP’s role in supporting the oppressive regime of President Ilham Aliev in Azerbaijan. “BP is the largest investor operating in Azerbaijan, primarily through its dominant role in developing the off-shore Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil field 2 and building the export Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. As opposition rallies have mounted over the past three months, the Azeri police have continued to respond with violence. A number of journalists were attacked… Over the past ten years, BP has made itself the most powerful corporation in Azerbaijan, with enormous power over government and business decisions.” [473] A study of Georgia from the Central Asia Caucasus Institute (Johns Hopkins) adds: “A planned and relatively orderly succession took place in Azerbaijan in 2003. Opposition protests on Ilham Aliyev’s election briefly turned violent, but failed to generate mass support and were rapidly suppressed.” [474] The following material pertains to the U.S. support of former Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze. From a Freedom House profile of Georgia; “Following a national referendum in April 1991, Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union. Nationalist leader and former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected president in May. The following year, he was overthrown by opposition forces and replaced with former Georgian Communist Party head and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze. … In the April 2000 presidential poll, Shevardnadze easily won a second five-year term with a reported 81 percent of the vote…. While Shevardnadze's win was widely anticipated, the large margin of his victory led to accusations of electoral fraud. Election monitors noted numerous and serious irregularities, including the stuffing of ballot boxes, the presence of police in polling stations, a lack of transparency in the vote tabulation process, inflated voter turnout figures, and a strong pro-Shevardnadze bias in the state media…. who has pursued decidedly pro-Western policies…” [475] Reciting Robyn Dixon’s March of ’02 article, “…Georgia, a frail former Soviet republic, has struggled to get out from under often belligerent Russian interference. But despite close U.S. links and about $900 million in American aid over the last five years, the country has stumbled because of colossal bribe taking and other malfeasance in the government, the police and the military. Analysts and Western advisors now suspect that most of the aid was stolen…” [476] Wikipedia’s profile of Shevardnadze notes his “…close relationship with the United States, which saw him as a counterbalance to Russian influence in the strategic Transcaucasus region. Under Shevardnadze's strongly pro-Western administration, Georgia became a major recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid, signed a strategic partnership with NATO and … securing of a $3 billion project to build a pipeline carrying oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. At the same time, however, Georgia suffered badly from the effects of crime and rampant corruption, often perpetrated by well-connected officials and politicians. Shevardnadze's closest advisers, including several members of his family, exerted disproportionate economic power. … Although it was unclear precisely what role foreign powers played in the toppling of Shevardnadze, it emerged shortly afterwards that both Russia and the United States had played a direct role. …it emerged that the Open Society Institute of George Soros had arranged contacts between the Georgian opposition and the Yugoslav Otpor (Resistance) movement, which had been instrumental in the toppling of Miloševiæ. … According to the then editor-in-chief of The Georgian Messenger newspaper, Zaza Gachechiladze, "It's generally accepted public opinion here that Mr. Soros is the person who planned Shevardnadze's overthrow.” [477] An interesting article dated Dec. of ’03, written by Alfred Mendes, was found on the bilderberg.org website. “In late 2000, Shevardnadze invited George Soros - whom he had known since the 80's - to Tbilisi to set up the Open Society Georgia (an offshoot of Soros's Open Society Institute), 'with the stated aim of building democratic institutions and civil society.' On that trip, Soros met Shevardnadze's Justice Minister, Mikhail Saakashvili - who some months later, and now disillusioned with Shevardnadze - quit the government & went into opposition. …Mikhail Saakashvili…in April 2003…had been invited to attend a 'discussion' chaired by the Nixon Center in Washington. … The Center is funded through a combination of corporate and individual donations in addition to foundation grants." The following are among the center’s list of board members: Henry A. Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, James Schlesinger and John Deutch. “Oil companies BP and Statoil said the ouster of Shevardnadze did not represent any threat to their plans to ferry Azerbaijan's huge oil and gas reserves to Turkey via oil and gas pipelines through Georgia, known as Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum. .... Saakashvili sought to dampen the enormous expectations raised by the former opposition's victory... 'I want to tell every family of Georgia that in three weeks, in two months, extraordinary changes won't happen,' he said." Mendes also adds that Saakashvili studied at George Washington University and earned a degree at Columbia Law School. [478] This is interesting; from journalist Mark Irkali, a New Jersey native who moved to Georgia in the early 1990s. “…Saakashvili's predecessor has been given a light sentence: he's not charged with any crime at all. … and actually promising him lifelong immunity from prosecution, … Shevardnadze faces no tribunal and no indictment. He has total liberty and freedom of movement…” Irkali implies that Shevardnadze’s punishment, living with guilt, is what he justly deserves. He also adds that the American media and U.S. representatives such as Robert Byrd, Mitch McConnell and Sam Brownback once considered Shevardnadze a freedom fighter and a hero. [479] According to Wikipedia, Saakashvili had initiated policies to fight internal corruption while serving as Justice Minister under Shevardnadze. Ineffective in this capacity, he resigned in Sept. of ’01. Saakashvili responded to rigged Parliamentary elections in ’03 by calling for a mass demonstration, which is where the Open Society Institute comes in. Appearing as a spontaneous uprising, 100,000 people gathered in the streets to protest Shevardnadze. The source adds that after becoming President, “there have been some concerns about Saakashvili's authoritarian tendencies. Some small protests have been broken up by heavy-handed police officers, and a new media bill, has sparked controversy.” [480] It’s apparent that Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” lacked the characteristics of a grassroots movement. The focus now shifts to a particular official associated with Georgia’s security aparatus, Irakli Alasania. In Quinn Judge’s Oct. of ’02 article he states that the arab radicals “…brought in many hundreds of thousands of dollars for their operations, using couriers who arrived every other month or by wire transfers to front companies in Tbilisi. Georgia’s crackdown on the Pankisi Arabs began in May, led by Irakli Alasania, the 28 year-old, U.S.-Ranger trained deputy minister of State Security.” [481] Recall the ’02 article cited from the NISAT website stating that Georgian “…state security personnel have for a long time now looked after arms smuggling.” Alasania’s resume includes many high-ranking State security related positions. “He worked at the Ministry of State Security of Georgia from 1994 to 1998 and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs…through 1998-2001. He served as the chief of security service staff at the Security Council of Georgia from October 2001 to February 2002, and held a post of the First Deputy Minister of State Security from February 2002 to February 2004. In March 2004, he was appointed a Deputy of Defence and remained on that post until July 2004, when he was moved to serve as an Assistant Secretary at the National Security Council of Georgia.” [482] From Georgia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry is an Oct. of ‘05 press release that mentions Alasania in the context of U.S. support to eradicate the Islamic fringe from the Pankisi. “America's 'Georgia train and equip programme' (GTEP) provided $64 million of military assistance to Georgia's conscript army in 2002. The operation was so successful that Irakli Alasania, the youthful former head of the Georgian intelligence services who ran it, became known as the 'lion of Pankisi'.” [483] Recall the Oct. of ’05 St. Pete article pertaining to Shamil Basayev’s connections to the terrorist organization “Yarmuk” which has been committing frequent attacks throughout the region, a group trained by Ruslan Gelayev in Pankisi. Another Oct. of ’05 article written by Ian Mather (The Scotsman) also leaves no doubt that the situation hasn’t changed. “The 1,000-mile, $3.6bn Trans-Caucasian oil pipeline … will deliver one million barrels a day to western markets … Security is the responsibility of officials from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, who represent a region of enormous political instability. … In Georgia it crosses the Pankisi Gorge, home to Chechen rebels…” [484] The following is interesting information provided by Zeyno Baran (CSIS, Director of Caucasus Project, Washington D.C.), written in March of ’02. “Georgia's policy makers brought the country to the brink of renewed war in Abkhazia by moving several hundred Chechen fighters out of Pankisi to try to reduce tension. The Georgian government had realized the need to remove the Chechen fighters from Pankisi, but no other country was willing to take them in and extraditing them to Russia without proper security guarantees was not possible. The Georgian Ministry of Interior and State Security forces then apparently decided to move these fighters from Pankisi Gorge across northern Georgia to Abkhazia. These fighters then made their way into the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, which is another lawless area that the Georgian government cannot control. Clashes soon followed involving the Chechens and allied Georgian partisans against the Abkhaz.” Recall that Russia supported Basayev’s efforts to aid the separatists in Abkhazia, weakening Georgia’s attempt at independence from Moscow. Baran, offering possible explanations as to motive, suggests “…that some in Georgia may have mistakenly thought they could use these fighters, led by the notorious Chechen field commander, Ruslan Gelayev, to reestablish control over the breakaway republic of Abkhazia… Developments in Abkhazia finally led to the dismissal of the Georgian ministers of the interior and state security. When moving from Pankisi to Abkhazia, Gelayev and his men were seen in vehicles belonging to these ministries.” [485] So, Georgian authorities could have placed Gelayev and hundreds of other Pankisi-based fighters in custody, but moved them to Abkhazia to fight separatists aided by Basayev's army that killed thousands of Georgian civilians. The following material corroborates Gelayev’s ties to Georgian intelligence. At the Caucasus Foundation website is a Glasnost media interview (’02) with two Dagestani men who were former members of Gelayev’s group that went to Abkhazia. When asked about Gelayev, they stated that his “…aides said the Georgian authorities were trying to drive him out of Pankisi gorge because he had begun posing problems for both Shevardnadze and foreign states. But they later reached some agreement.” [486] Reciting the John Hopkins study; ”In the fall of 2001, unrest returned to Abkhazia, when Georgian paramilitaries supported by Chechen irregulars under field commander Ruslan Gelayev entered Abkhazia from the Kodori gorge… The cleanup of the Pankisi Gorge in 2002 and the reshuffle of the power ministries led to a change in drug routes in Georgia, but no decrease in trafficking is likely to have taken place. According to Avtandil Ioseliani, the head of Georgian intelligence, drugs which had previously entered Georgia mainly from Chechnya now arrive from Dagestan and Azerbaijan.” [487] Sanobar Shermatova (Moscow News) wrote in ‘02 “…Gelayev makes no secret of his close contacts with Georgian intelligence services…” [488] From the Caucasus Foundation is a news brief (’02) titled: “Georgian Intelligence helps Chechen flight.” The brief states, “Chechens from Sokhum jail made safe to Georgia thru Georgian Intelligence," stated Deputy Abkhazian Interior Minister Leonid Gabliya.” Reportedly four militants under Ruslan Gelayev’s command were taken prisoner or arrested, and then they were able to secure “…an URAL type vehicle by Georgian Intelligence help.” [489] Not to imply a connection, but what may be interesting to note here is that according to Wikipedia’s profile of Shamil Basayev, one of the villages where his army massacred hundreds or perhaps thousands of civilians was “Sukhumi”, apparently the same district where Gelayev’s men were jailed. Chechen warlords commanding brigades on opposing sides of the Abkhaz conflict would appear to be an orchestrated battle featuring mercenaries. None of this directly ties Alasania to the widespread corruption, to Gelayev, or to other Chechen warlords. It’s interesting however, that he appears to have been repeatedly promoted through Georgia’s various security agencies during this same time period. He later became the Chairman of the Tbilisi-based Abkhaz government-in-exile with the objective of reclaiming Abkhazia for Georgia.
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