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THE BLUE AND THE GREY or
BUTTERNUTS AND BLUE
or BLUE ON BLUE?

When the War Between the States erupted at Fort Sumter, few Southerners in the Trans-Mississippi West were ready to march into the field. Yes, unrest and dissatisfaction with United States policies had driven the South into a fever pitch of secession, but that was politics, not war. With secession, military posts in the Indian Territory were quickly abandoned by Union troops. Fort Washita, Fort Arbuckle, and Fort Cobb were stripped of all their military stores, which were carried north to Union Kansas. Other military posts in the Trans-Mississippi, such as Fort Smith and Little Rock Depot, met similar fates, draining the area of the Trans-Mississippi of military supplies.

When the call to arms came, men of the Trans-Mississippi West answered with exuberance. They came equipped with what ever they could scrounge--accouterments, livestock, uniforms, wagons, and weapons--with promises of clothing, weapons, and pay to follow from the newly formed Confederate government. Advertisements or "call to arms" for volunteers seen in newspapers throughout the Trans-Mississippi made promises of supplies and arms, such as:

However, the Confederate quartermasters in the Trans-Mississippi did not have a stockpile of uniforms and arms nor were there armories or many clothiers and milliners in the region. Out of necessity, depots established at Washington, Arkansas, Jefferson, Texas, and Tyler, Texas, began compiling the necessities of war. Materials were purchased from Mexico, England, France and even the United States [through third parties or on "the black market"].

Soon, the "call to arms" advertisements changed.

For the most part companies were raised by towns or counties and boasted their pride either by name or by dress. Thus units were called "Camden Knights," "Polk County Invincibles," "Morehouse Guards," or the "Red River Dragoons." And James Fremantle observed in 1863,

Even when the Confederate desire for military uniformity in dress was presented, it was often overlooked in favor of more pressing needs such as firearms and food. This was an ever present consideration throughout the war in the Trans-Mississippi. Colonel Demorse of the 29th Texas had this to say about uniforms in 1862,

The money he was to spend on uniforms he paid to his men as a clothing stipend. Others complained that the quartermaster department was unable to supply them with uniforms or anything else.

" The men were in a very destitute condition as to clothing, and (owing to your

change of the line of operations from the North Fork road to the Fort

Smith road) temporarily out of flour." HDQRS. FAGAN'S DIVISION,

The quartermaster department in the Trans-Mississippi worked as hard as possible to secure supplies for the fighting man--but the importance of operations in the Trans-Mississippi was insignificant to the high command when compared to the crisis at Richmond or Vicksburg. Consequently, the men in the Trans- Mississippi were placed on the bottom of the priority list. Quartermasters in the Trans-Mississippi were left with the unenviable task of securing arms and clothes by any means at hand. As the effects of the blockade became evident, the Trans-Mississippi depots became manufacturing centers, as did the penitentiary at Huntsville, Texas.

This correspondence from the Chief of the Clothing Bureau in the Trans-Mississippi Quartermaster Department indicates that even when the equipment to manufacture cloth for uniforms was present, capable manpower was not always readily available. The following advertisements in local newspapers testify to the desperate task facing the quartermaster.

The Quartermasters also relied heavily on home manufacturing of goods.

Funding in the Trans-Mississippi was predominately done through the issuance of Confederate bonds backed with cotton instead of gold. As the war progressed--or regressed for those living and fighting in the Trans-Mississippi--the cotton bonds held less and less value. Unable to secure quantities of clothing from the government, the Confederate soldiers in the field were left for the most part to fend for themselves.

If not from the government, where were supplies to come from? As witnessed by the following, the soldiers turned to their families and their hometowns for help.

Through letters, newspaper advertisements, and from the government itself pleas went out to the citizenship.

"Our poor Osages are almost necked for want of clothing."

In some areas of the Trans-Mississippi, the conditions surrounding the fighting-man's home were intolerable for their families. Missouri, Arkansas and particularly Indian Territory were plagued with vendettas, feuds, and the treachery of bushwhacking. Those families that could remove themselves to the safety of relatives did so early in the War. Those that were steadfast either from necessity or from perseverance often felt the wrath of vengeful armies, bushwhackers, or vendetta driven citizens.

Caught in the seat of war, no matter how much the people from home wanted to help supply their fighting men--they were struggling to supply themselves.

In the Indian Territory, where robbery and murder, looting and burning were practiced by both armies on the citizens and their homes, J. S. Murrow, a Baptist missionary wrote,

Conditions at home were often as bad as--or worse than--those in the field.

The men in the field often turned to more creative ways of supplying their needs. George Washington Grayson wrote:

For many soldiers however, the thought of wearing Federal blue was unsettling so for want of going cold, they would try to "boil the blue out" of the cloth. But as the war continued objections to wearing the blue became less and less and the Southern army of the Trans-Mississippi took on a decidedly blue tint.

And another wrote:

Confederates in blue became more and more prominent. Distinguishing one army from the other was not often easy at first glance.

Whether they were in disguise or just happy to have clothing is uncertain. But what is certain is that supplies were few and far between unless they came from the north. Confederates targeted the northern supply trains for two reasons: One of strategy--cutting supplies to the enemy--and the other of need--supplying their own army.

Chaplain George Primrose of the 4th Missouri Cavalry wrote,

In yet another report it is learned,

Confederates wearing Federal uniforms presented many problems for the soldiers of the United States. Witness this caution from Union general Rosecrans to Confederate general Price of the hazards his men faced if captured wearing Federal uniforms.

The rigorous punishment" illuded to in General Rosecrans letter is evidenced in Col. William Phillips report.

The examples cited here are but few of the many accounts of uniforms or the lack thereof, of Confederate soldier in the Trans-Mississippi West. The Trans-Mississippi Confederates were a hardy group of warriors who from the very outset of war were strapped with the burden of providing arms and supplies for themselves. This is not to say that the Confederate quartermasters were unable to supply the men with goods. The men in the field did receive shipments of food, harness, tentage, ammunition, some arms, and even infrequent shipments of clothes.

There is evidence that the Quartermaster Depots in Huntsville, San Antonio and Houston were producing uniforms for soldiers. In the fall of 1862 the Houston Depot received, through the Federal blockade, 12,000 yards of "grey wool" to begin manufacturing uniforms. Maj. Wharton continued to receive goods sporadically through out the remainder of the war. In the fall of 1863 he received 2,400 jackets and 2,916 pair of pants from the Peter Tait Company in Limerick Ireland, followed by shipments in November and December of 1864 for a total of 10,000 suits of uniforms. Of the uniforms from the Houston Depot only 5,000 jackets and 9,000 pants ever made it to Indian Territory. The majority of the uniforms manufactured or received by the Houston Depot were sent to troops along the gulf coast of Texas and as far north as Austin. The Houston Depot was responsible for a total of 20,925 jackets and 40,293 pants by the wars end.

The Huntsville Depot was a prison manufacturing uniforms. The uniforms manufactured here were of the poorest quality, undied and unbleached cotton jean cloth with an osnaburg lining. The penitentiary was to deliver woven fabrics to the clothing bureau for construction of uniforms at Tyler and Houston depots.

This hopeful statement went unrealized, as the penitentiary was only able to produce about 200,000 yards of cloth. As with most governmental bureaucracies politics and red tape often led to frustrations by commanders in the field who desperately needed clothing. Maj. Gen. Taylor wrote Gen. Kirby Smith:

Typical rebuttals would be cast back and forth among commanders trying to lay the blame some where other than their feat.

For a government thrown together in the midst of war the logistical problems of supply were handled fairly well. Resources were the biggest problem, they were far too few for the needs of the fighting men in the Trans-Mississippi. The government shipped clothing, weapons and equipment to the soldiers as quick as it came available. However, these shipments were far from adequate, leaving some companies completely unarmed going into battle with full knowledge that their arms would come from fallen comrades in their front. When faced with situations like this, it is understandable that uniforms were low priority. The Confederate soldiers in the Trans-Mississippi, if not for their military discipline and formations, would have more closely resembled a mob of angry citizens.