The article written by Don Wesley-Brown regarding the Scott Fletcher property now under consideration by the State of Georgia for a Civil War Battlefield Park is filled with so many unsupported contentions, sweeping generalizations and outright inaccuracies that it makes it difficult for one to believe that a newspaper with the reputation of the AJC would afford so much space to such pseudo-history. The only proper response is with a focused and well-documented presentation of the facts.
What follows is detailed documentation, mostly from primary sources, that conclusively proves that a major portion of the Battle of Resaca was fought on the Fletcher property. None of this will mean anything, however, without a brief explanation of the military art of entrenching in 1864.
By the time of the Atlanta Campaign, soldiers on both sides had grown accustomed to digging hasty earthworks and trenches in order to hold ground and prepare to receive an assault. It was common to take advantage of certain terrain features such as ridges and winding hillsides to form “angles” that would jet out from these works and create the opportunity for cross-fire by infantry and artillery that would prove devastating to any advancing linear formation. It was also common to dig numerous rifle pits in front of the main works in order to accommodate skirmishers to attack the enemy as they advanced.
Now that this is understood a second, perhaps more important, point must be made. There are today, as you read these words, two sets of trenches on the Scott Fletcher property. One set is west of Camp Creek valley, where the Federals dug in during the Battle of Resaca. A second set is located EAST of Camp Creek in a wooded area whose timber rights belong to the Bowater Land Company. This eastern set of trenches was not, contrary to Mr. Wesley-Brown’s assertions, completely destroyed by the construction of I-75. In fact, they run for almost one mile in length in varying distances west of the interstate highway.
This is well documented by two methods. First, this second set of trenches was catalogued in 1995 by the Jaeger Company in a study of the entire Resaca Battlefield as part of the National Park Service’s Battlefield Protection Program. Secondly, until Mr. Fletcher acquired the property it was possible to obtain permission to physically walk these trenches and to see the rifle pits. They are there, today, as you read these words.
Here is what is crucial to understanding the importance of this second set of trenches. The rifle pits are located on the WEST side of the trenches. Facing the trenches that are across Camp Creek. This means that beyond any doubt they are CONFEDERATE trenches. Rifle pits were NEVER placed behind earthworks. The evidence exists in tangible detail today. There is no need for Mr. Wesley-Brown to produce intentional confusion about something that is a physical fact and that has been documented in a study commissioned by the National Park Service.
As to the question of how much fighting took place on these currently intact historically significant landmarks, let us turn to concrete documentation. General Judah’s Union division of General Schofield’s Corps, with other supporting units, attacked across the pristine field that still exists at Camp Creek from the first set of trenches to the second on the afternoon of May 14, 1864. They attacked portions of General Cleburne’s division of General Hardee’s Corps among other southern units. Renowned historian Albert Castel summarized the attack in his award-winning book “Decision in the West” published in 1992.
Castel writes in present tense regarding the entire affair: “Baird, an experienced and competent thirty-nine-year-old West Pointer from Pennsylvania, wants to halt in order to re-form his division and reconnoiter the enemy’s position with a view to ascertaining its strength. Before he can do so, however, Brigadier General Henry Moses Judah’s division of the XXIII Corps plunges by and even through his ranks. Seeing some of his regiment being carried along by Judah’s troops, Baird feels compelled to order his division to charge too. It cannot, however, catch up with Judah, who is far ahead of Cox’s division on its left. Consequently Judah’s battle lines attack alone and unsupported. They are ‘met with terrific fire from the (enemy) batteries and rifle pits,’ writes Colonel Lyman Spaulding, whose 23rd Michigan is part of the first line. In spite of this they continue advancing ‘on the run’ until they reach Camp Creek, whereupon they take ‘refuge.’ The air is ‘full of bullets and bursting shells,’ and Spaulding finds it ‘impossible to shout orders’ loud enough to be heard.
“Baird’s division, as it scrambles down the ‘almost vertical slope’ of the ridge, like wise encounters such withering rifle and artillery fire that it takes shelter beneath the ‘muddy bank’ of Camp Creek. One officer tries to keep the attack going by yelling, ‘ You are the men who scaled Missionary Ridge, and you can carry this!’ but nobody budges. It is just as well, for opposing Baird are Cleburne’s fighters, who had held their sector on Missionary Ridge back in November against several times their number of Grant’s best.
“While these things are transpiring, Schofield’s other assault division, Cox’s, approaches the Confederate lines to the north; thus slackening the fire against Judah’s men.
“Like Baird, Cox decides to attack at once in order to support Judah. However, it takes, two, three, and finally four assaults just to dislodge the Rebels who are covering the west branch of Camp Creek, so stubbornly do they adhere to their well-located rifle pits.
“Sherman’s attempt to push back Johnston’s right thus ends around 3 p.m. in total futility: Schofield and Palmer did not even encounter it per se, but instead merely butted against Cleburne’s, Bates’, and a portion of Hindman’s divisions in the center-right. Judah’s headlong charge has produced has produced approximately 700 dead and wounded, Cox has lost 66 killed and 486 wounded, and Baird’s casualties total 135.” (Pages 159 – 161)
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| This is a portion of a map from Phil Secrist's book "The Battle of Resaca." It shows the area of the battlefield destroyed by I-75 construction and the area still intact on the Scott Fletcher property including the primary military actions there on May 14, 1864. |
The Official Records of the war (the primary source of information to the serious researcher of this period) offers several sections that highlight the fighting which took place on the Scott Fletcher property. Portions of the following were quoted by Mr. Castel above and are offered here so the reader might see them in full context and draw personal conclusions.
From Brigadier-General Absalom Baird’s report: “It would appear that General Schofield’s left, in open ground, did not encounter the same [terrain] difficulties of his right, and pressing forward, the implusion was communicated along the line to his right and carried my left brigade along with it. It was the affair of a moment, and before I could learn (at 300 yards’ distance upon the right) of the condition of affairs, it was too late to stop the movement. Descending about 100 feet the almost vertical slope of the ridge, our men emerged into an open valley [note: Camp Creek valley on the Fletcher property], and into direct view, at short range, of the rebel works, and immediately received a fire of artillery and musketry. The tired veterans of this division, who never failed to accomplish anything that was possible, did not falter, but pushed forward until they reached the creek. Few got beyond this. Many stuck under the miry banks of the stream, and the few isolated groups that got beyond, not being sufficient to sustain themselves, were soon driven back. It was at once apparent that this effort had failed and was at an end, and most of the men were withdrawn to the summit of the ridge to be reformed. A few, unable on account of the sharp fire from the rebel works to leave the banks of the creek, remained there until dark, doing valuable duty as sharpshooters.” (Atlanta Campaign OR Report No. 147: pages 735-736)
Perhaps it was reading sections like the one above that led Mr. Wesley-Brown to his mistaken conclusions. This was a supporting attack on the Union right flank. Other reports, like this one from Brigadier General Nathaniel C. McLean of Judah’s division, explain the more intense fighting that took place on the Fletcher property.
“About 1 o’clock I received preemptory orders from my division commander, Brigadier-General Judah, to advance and storm the rebel works. …at length [we] reached a ridge, the top of which was within musket-range of the earth-works which crowned the hill fortified by the enemy. They here opened fire upon us, but my men steadily advanced, passing over a fence at the foot of the hill, when they came upon a plain [note: Camp Creek valley on the Fletcher property] exposed to the full fire of the enemy from artillery and musketry. As soon as the cleared ground was reached our whole line started forward with a tremendous shout for the rebel works. Never did men more gallantly breast storm of death which was hurled upon them from every quarter, and their advance continued until they were broken by a bog and creek into which they plunged more than waist deep. To climb to the opposite bank under such murderous fire was more than they could do, especially when we found the works so strong that with the force then attacking there was not the slightest chance of success. Under these circumstances we were forced back, leaving fully one-third of the attacking party killed and wounded on the field. A large number of the men found protection under the banks of the creek, and from there kept up a constant fire upon the men who worked the artillery in the rebel works, and succeeded in compelling them to load their guns lying down. They remained here until after dark, when they returned to their regiments. Both of my lines were engaged in the charge, and every regiment suffered severely.” (Atlanta Campaign OR Report No. 311: pages 581 – 582)
The Report of Brigadier General Milo S. Hascall also clearly substantiates the fact that there was heavy fighting on the Fletcher property. “On reaching the crest of the hill, I found the troops engaged to great disadvantage, some still exposed to fire, others seeking shelter by lying by the creek, and others were bravely advancing nearer the line held by the enemy. So soon as the situation was fully understood, the remaining troops (one hundred and seventh Illinois) not yet engaged were halted, and those who in the confusion and perfect storm of missiles had broken and gone to the rear were brought forward, while those still at the bottom below were reformed. Another attempt to storm the enemy's works was ordered, but by my earnest remonstrance the order was countermanded. Soon after the troops were withdrawn (those who were not too far to the front or too greatly exposed) to the hill, and then placed in position and works erected [note: the western set of works on the Fletcher property]. Batteries were afterward placed into position, and, under cover of their fire, many of the wounded and dead were brought off; very many, however, were too far to the front to be carried off until darkness covered the stretcherbearers in their work. The rations were out, and the men, from excitement and exposure, were greatly weakened.” (Atlanta Campaign OR Report No. 324: page 610)
The Confederate positions on the Fletcher property also afforded the opportunity to employ crossfire artillery upon General Cox’s assault on the north end of Camp Creek valley. In his report Cox mentions the fighting on the Fletcher property and specifically its implications for his own division’s assault upon Confederate trenches that were, in fact, partly destroyed by the construction of I-75. Cox wrote that, due to the failure of Judah’s attack, his right flank [part of which was situated in the northeast corner of the Fletcher property] was: “exposed to a galling artillery fire, as the ridge on which we were had its shoulder bare when it came into the valley [note: Camp Creek valley on the Fletcher property], whose curve gave the enemy an enfiladeing fire upon us. His infantry sought also to drive us out of the position we had captured, and the fighting was heavy for an hour or two.” (see Phil Secrist’s, “The Battle of Resaca,” Mercer University Press, 1998, page 23)
There is little in the way of reporting about this attack from the Confederate side. By this stage of the war the southern Army of Tennessee either did not keep many detailed records at the unit level or those records were destroyed in some manner before they could come to the light of history. Nevertheless, in his 1908 book “Cleburne and his Command,” Captain Irving A. Buck makes the following reference as to the fighting on the Fletcher property: “Early on the morning of the 14th Cleburne, on foot reconnoitered the ground in his front, going across the valley to the edge of the stream, a hazardous and imprudent thing, as the hill beyond the stream [note: Camp Creek on the Fletcher property] was heavily wooded, and soon afterwards occupied by the enemy, who immediately opened upon Cleburne’s command a heavy fire. In the afternoon they made several attempts to charge across the open level ground [note: Camp Creek valley on the Fletcher property], but uniformly without success, notwithstanding one of their commanders was heard to appeal to his men and incite them by saying, ‘You are the men who scaled Missionary Ridge, and you can carry this!’ But all to no effect, for they were then confronting the men who repelled every assault upon the part of the line held by them in the battle. His men would advance a short distance into the open, and quickly recoil under the fire of Cleburne’s veterans.” (Page 211)
There are other entries throughout the Official Records and other sources pertaining to the fighting which took place on the Fletcher property on May 14, 1864. These suffice for our purposes of proving that the fighting there was not a skirmish but a full-scale attack, though badly coordinated. There are several interesting things worth noting in these accounts.
Firstly, the vast majority of casualties that occurred in this attack were in and about Camp Creek itself. In other words, the Fletcher property is not important just because of the relatively pristine earthworks constructed by Union and Confederate forces on the ridgelines lining the creek to the east and west. It is important because the space BETWEEN the entrenchments is where most of the more than 800 Union dead and wounded lay on May 14, 1864.
In addition, a portion of the Confederate positions still intact on the Fletcher property offered supporting fire upon Cox’s right flank , thus serving to aid in the defense of a region of the Resaca battlefield that has been partially destroyed by I-75. It can be reasonably assumed that part of Cox’s reported 552 casualties must be attributed to fire coming from Confederate support along the Fletcher property upon Cox’s right flank. (If you recall, Castel mentions above that one result of Cox's advance was "thus slackening the fire against Judah’s men," meaning the southern forces were directing fire north after the thrust from the west was repulsed.) As Cox’s report reveals, there was also some infantry action taking place on this flank. This flanking attack was made possible because of the “bare ridge” that the Confederates occupied from which they repulsed Judah’s repeated attacks across the Camp Creek valley.
The foregoing evidence conclusively proves that 1) a large assault took place across Camp Creek valley involving elements of at least three Union divisions, 2) the fighting was heavy, leaving hundreds of dead and wounded in and around Camp Creek itself by nightfall on May 14, 1864, and 3) the Confederate positions on the Fletcher property also contributed to the demise of Cox’s attack further north on land that was partly destroyed by the construction of I-75.
The only relevant question remaining is simply “Are the Confederate entrenchments mentioned in the above reports still on the Fletcher property today?” There are a number of historians and enthusiasts that have walked upon these entrenchments. Many photos have been taken of them. They are a primary reason for the attempts to preserve the historical integrity of the site.
In a controversial subject such as this, however, it is unfortunate that the honest word of educated individuals is not enough to substantiate the claims made above. Many, like Mr. Wesley-Brown, assert with great passion that no fighting of significance took place on the Fletcher property. The public at large has no definitive means by which to measure who is correct in these matters and the whole situation becomes much more muddled than is necessary.
In 1995, however, the National Park Service Battlefield Protection Program commissioned the Jaeger Company, a reputable historical firm, to evaluate the entire Resaca Battlefield area including the Weaver (Fletcher) property, the Chitwood farm and all other areas where fighting occurred between May 13 – May 15, 1864. They catalogued all entrenchments at that time. The Confederate works were clearly noted just west of I-75 ranging from within a few hundred feet of the interstate to much greater distances. The interstate development DID NOT destroy the vast majority of these entrenchments, almost one mile in length. What WAS destroyed was a portion of the line of Cox's attack and the Confederate artillery emplacements above Hardee's line.
More importantly, the Jaeger Company itself, not the Georgia Civil War Commission, nor the State of Georgia, nor anyone else, recommended that the State attempt to acquire the Weaver (Fletcher) property as THE BEST possible site for a Civil War Battlefield Park in Resaca. It is sad that this fact has not been more publicly acknowledged. But, the truth is that all the preservationists from the beginning have acted upon this independent third-party evaluation of all the historical information.
Now, as to some of the specifics of Mr. Wesley-Brown’s article in the July 31 AJC. It is permeated with errors that suggest a highly self-centered and myopic perspective. As to the Fletcher property, quote: “Only minor skirmishing took place there.” That has been categorically proven inaccurate.
He says that he confirmed this absurd conclusion by use of “a bronze map of the Battle of Resaca, which had been erected by the federal government in the 1930’s.” This map was constructed in Washington, D.C. under little historical supervision by one of many public works projects during the Depression. It was meant to be more of a general overview of the battle, not a historically accurate representation of military operations.
Quote: “I told the chairman of the commission that the property they were trying to save was not the actual battlefield, and if he would go over to the park on U.S. 41, only 10 minutes away, he would see the truth of my statement. He refused to go.” This may be an attempt to elicit support from the general public. Playing the poor, victimized historian who knew the truth but no one listened routine. The fact is that the commissioner in question, like many others, was aware of the purpose of the map off U.S. 41 in Resaca and that it is not accurate in its subtle details (nor was it ever meant to be more than a general guide.) To have pushed the issue in such a manner does not reflect well upon Mr. Wesley-Brown’s credentials.
Quote: “I brought my maps, originals printed in 1894 by the federal government. They did not bring theirs, nor did they look at mine.” This is untrue. Several members of the Friends of Resaca looked at these maps and were immediately struck by their numerous inaccuracies, having lived in the Resaca area for years. Most obvious, the maps have no correlation to the actual topography of the area. One example of their numerous errors is the fact that they are completely wrong in their depiction of the flow of the Oostanaula River. The maps, though published in the “Official Records Atlas” over a century ago are valueless, especially when compared with the much more recent and historically painstaking research of the Jaeger Company regarding the battlefield.
Quote: “When I-75 was constructed, the highway department completely destroyed the Confederate defense lines…” Again, this is disproved by numerous personal investigations, photographs, and a National Park Service survey of the property in question. The trenches are there today. The rifle pits are clearly visible on their WEST side (meaning in front). This means the trenches faced WEST and were, in fact the Confederate trenches mentioned in the official reports quoted above. Mr. Wesley-Brown is unaware of the physical evidence because he has never personally seen these trenches himself. Nor did he ever walk over to view them when it was possible to obtain permission to do so (prior to Fletcher’s acquisition of the property.)
Quote: “For more than three years, the Department of Natural Resources and the Georgia Civil War Commission had an opportunity to simply write a check for the Weaver property. There was a ready, able and willing seller.” The fact is, as is proven on this website, an official offer for the property in question was made in January 1998, five months prior to Scott Fletcher’s acquisition of the land. Click here to read the original offer by the State in its entirety. This offer was never officially declined, a matter that warrants further investigation in itself. Fletcher did not offer any more money per acre for the property than the State did in its official offer made several months before.
Quote: “Now in a moment of sour grapes, some are urging the state to condemn Fletcher’s property…” It is Mr. Wesley-Brown who suffers from “sour grapes” in this matter, as he is the only member of the Civil War Commission ever to resign without the respect of a single commission member or serious historian of the Atlanta Campaign in this state. He is the one with the ax to grind, due to his constant bickering with the commission and the State’s refusal to appropriate resources on projects that he personally deems more important in the New Hope Church area. Mr. Wesley-Brown has a personal agenda and his interest in the Resaca matter has to do with matters other than any alleged historical astuteness.
Quote: “Why not purchase the Chitwood farm, with complete documentation as the site of the major battle of Resaca?” First of all the Jaeger Company study disagrees with Mr. Wesley-Brown. Secondly, the historical integrity of the Chitwood farm is not threatened in any way at this time. Mr. Fletcher has been quoted in the media as stating that he cares more about making carpet than about the Civil War, that he has no intention of sharing his historically significant property with the public, and that he hopes to build a golf course upon the land. The Chitwood farm, on the other hand, has been part of a driving tour of the Battle of Resaca for several years, its owners make it reasonably available to the public today, and it is in no way threatened as a historically significant site. Finally, the Chitwood farm is not as accessible as the Fletcher property to the general public (given the relative proximities to I-75), an important consideration when the State decides to establish a successful public park operation.
All in all the preponderance of evidence shows that the Fletcher property is the site of an important assault in the battle of Resaca. Those who contend the actions there were mere skirmishes do harm in two ways. First, they discredit themselves personally by advocating a historically untenable position without serious respect for the evidence available. Secondly, they do a tremendous disservice to the cause of historical preservation in this State by confusing an already unfortunate situation and undermining the best efforts of this State to act in good faith on behalf of the public’s great and genuine concern for the protection of America’s battlefields.
Finally, it is fitting to point out that there stands today but ONE battlefield marker on the entire historic Battle of Resaca area that was placed by the troops that actually fought there. It was placed, and stands today, on the northeast end of Camp Creek valley on the Scott Fletcher property, by survivors of the 103rd Ohio Infantry Regiment. It is a simple marker, one that indicates the "high-tide" of Judah's full-scale assualt upon the Confederate trenches. No one knows when it was placed there, only that its weathered condition indicates it has graced that ground for many decades.
I ask Don Wesley-Brown one simple question. If your historical analysis of the Battle of Resaca on the Fletcher property is correct, why is the Fletcher property the only point of all the Resaca battlefield commemorated by the troops that actually fought the battle?
The answer, of course is that it is hallowed ground. The 103rd Ohio thought it so. So do many other Americans today.
