Dear friends and=20
helpers,
The following is an=20=
overview=20
of the US Navy/marine mammal destruction story, as written by Hawaiian attor=
ney,=20
Lanny Sinkin. Since/during the October 28th deadline for public comment, The=
US=20
Navy has agreed to "harass and take marine mammals for a period of five=
=20
years" through 80% of the world's oceans. This could have DEVASTATING=20
consequences. We need to get this out to the media, bombard The White House,=
and=20
basically make a huge noise. We only have a short time frame. The Navy are=20
planning to use sonar upto ONE BILLION times stronger than that used in prev=
ious=20
experiments, which killed thousands of dolphins and whales, harmed hu=
mans=20
and God knows what else!
&nbs=
p;
Please use the addresses at the end of the document.=20
Also:
Oprah Winfrey: Fax: 312-=
829=20
2134
&=
nbsp; =20
Tel: 312-633=20
0808
HELP HELP HELP HELP HELP HELP HELP HELP HELP HELP HELP=20
HELP
-----Original Message-----
Fro=
m:=20
Lucia Gillot <bigheart@earthlink.net>
=
Date:=20
Monday, November 08, 1999 7:22 AM
Subject: The US Navy's blind=
=20
obliteration of ocean life.
U.S. Navy Low Frequency Sonar - Action Alert
The=
=20
following article is offered as an additional aid to understanding the
U.=
S.=20
Navy proposal to deploy a loud, low frequency sonar system in 80% of
the=20
world's oceans. The article emphasizes the evidence emerging from=20
the
tests of this system off Hawai`i and the deliberate omission of=20
that
evidence from the draft environmental impact statement.
The U=
.S.=20
Navy's $100 Million Mistake:
Low Frequency Sonar and the Health of th=
e=20
Oceans
by Lanny Sinkin
When you make a mistake, you really hav=
e=20
two options. You can come clean,
take your lumps, learn the lesson,=
=20
forgive yourself, and move on or you can
pretend you did nothing wrong, c=
over=20
your tracks, even lie and hope you are
not discovered.
While the f=
irst=20
path is preferable from many points of view, the larger the
mistake, the=20=
more=20
difficult it becomes to admit the mistake.
That's the problem for the=
=20
United States Navy. Their mistake is an
investment of something lik=
e=20
$100 million in a low frequency sonar system
designed to detect silent=20
submarines. The investment was a mistake because
it turns out the n=
ew=20
system is a threat to numerous marine species,
including endangered speci=
es,=20
and to the marine environment itself.
The first mistake the Navy made=
was=20
to ignore the need both legally and
ethically to evaluate the potential=20
environmental impacts of their new
sonar system before bringing the syste=
m to=20
the point of deployment.
The story begins in the early 1980's when th=
e=20
Navy became concerned that a
new generation of submarines would not be=20
detected by the extensive U.S.
network of underwater listening devices.=20
Previously, these passive systems
could provide sufficient information to=
=20
locate and track submarines. More
silent submarines and noisier oce=
ans=20
made such detection less likely.
During the 1980's, the Navy=20
evaluated alternative technologies for
responding to this perceived threa=
t.=20
By 1987, every technology except low
frequency active acoustic (LFAA) son=
ar=20
had been ruled out.
At that point, the Navy began extensive design,=20
testing and development of
an LFAA system.
Unfortunately, the Navy=
=20
failed to initiate an environmental impact process
at the same time. =
;=20
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
federal agencies are=20
required to initiate the preparation of an
environmental impact statement=
=20
(EIS) at the time a threshold decision is
made to pursue an activity havi=
ng=20
potentially significant environmental
effects. NEPA also forbids th=
e=20
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources prior to the =20
completion of an EIS.
Under Executive Order 12114, the Navy was also=20
required to prepare an
overseas environmental impact statement (OEIS), if=
the=20
proposed activity
would effect common global areas, such as ocean waters;=
the=20
environment of
a foreign nation; or protected global resources.
Fo=
r=20
more than ten years, the Navy designed, built, and repeatedly tested
LFAA=
=20
systems without preparing the required EIS or OEIS. There is a=20
real
question whether such documentation would ever have been prepared, i=
f=20
the
Navy had not been caught violating NEPA and numerous other federal=20
laws.
In 1995, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) learned t=
hat=20
the Navy
was on the verge of deploying their low frequency system, known=20=
as=20
SURTASS
LFA, in 80% of the world's oceans. NRDC sent a letter to th=
e=20
Navy pointing
out the numerous environmental laws violated over the past=20
eight years by
the Navy and essentially threatening to take the matter to=
=20
court, if the
Navy persisted in acting illegally.
By that time, th=
e=20
Navy had spent tens of millions of dollars on the
development of SURTASS=20
LFA. Today, the total figure stands somewhere in
the neighborhood o=
f=20
$100 million, including a nearly complete ship being
built to carry the=20
active sonar system.
In the face of the NRDC threat, the Navy agreed=20=
to=20
prepare an environmental
impact statement. The Navy called together=
=20
scientists familiar with the
marine environment. Not surprisingly,=20=
the=20
Navy discovered that sound is a
very important part of the daily life of=20
whales, dolphins, and other marine
life. The extremely loud, low=20
frequency sounds that the Navy intended to
broadcast could potentially in=
jure=20
or kill such marine life.
Had the Navy stopped to consider the marine=
=20
environment before leaping into
development and testing of SURTASS LFA, t=
his=20
obvious truth would have
emerged at the beginning of the process.
=
The=20
Navy also discovered that loud, low frequency sound in the water can
have=
=20
adverse effects on human beings. Again, that information is=20
not
startling or unexpected.
The Navy had three choices at that po=
int=20
- stop the program, prepare an
OEIS/EIS, or have NRDC go to court. =20
Rather than scrap the program or risk
facing a judge in such a flagrantly=
=20
illegal situation, the Navy opted to
conduct some studies and prepare the=
=20
necessary documents.
An EIS by law must include a "no action&quo=
t;=20
alternative, i.e. the possibility
that the agency would conclude not to=20
pursue the action after evaluating
the environmental impacts. In th=
e=20
draft OEIS/EIS (DEIS) issued in July
1999, the Navy claims that those=20
preparing the DEIS were independent and
could have chosen the "no=20
action" alternative. That claim must, however,
be taken with 1=
00=20
million grains of salt. The existing massive investment
in a system=
=20
considered the only alternative for meeting a threat to
national security=
=20
would create tremendous momentum for a decision=20
favoring
deployment.
With that background, the Navy funded scienti=
sts=20
to research the impacts of
LFA on marine life and humans in the water.&nb=
sp;=20
The marine life research took
place in three locations over a two year=20
period. That research is
documented in a technical report issued by=
the=20
researchers. The researchers
examining effects on humans issued a separat=
e=20
report based on additional
studies. The Navy relied on these studie=
s in=20
preparing the DEIS issued in
July 1999.
Unfortunately, the draft=20
demonstrates without question that the momentum
for deployment compromise=
d=20
the integrity of the process. As just a few
highlights of the=20
deficiencies in the DEIS:
While the scientists conducted the initial=20
marine life tests off California
and Alaska with little public awareness=20=
or=20
response, the third phase test
in Hawai`i set off a storm of protests.&nb=
sp;=20
That phase intended to test the
effects of SURTASS LFA on Humpback Whales=
=20
during their breeding season. The
announcement of the tests beginning led=
to=20
organized efforts to place
swimmers in the water around the broadca=
st=20
boat to prevent use of the LFA
on the whales.
Four separate lawsui=
ts=20
against the Navy and others were filed in federal
court. One led by=
the=20
Ocean Mammal Institute challenged the failure of the
Navy to have prepare=
d an=20
EIS before initiating potentially harmful testing.
A second challenged th=
e=20
testing as a violation of the spiritual rights of
native Hawaiians, who h=
old=20
the whale sacred. A third suit by the Hawai`i
County Green Party=20
claimed that evidence from the tests themselves
demonstrated that whales=20=
were=20
being driven from their breeding grounds and
humans were being injured.&n=
bsp;=20
A fourth suit sought damages for a whale watch
boat company forced to cut=
=20
short its season by the disappearance of the
Humpback Whales.
Thes=
e=20
suits were declared moot by the courts when the Navy stopped=20
testing,
promised that there would be no more testing, and left Hawaiian=20
waters. The
courts never reached the merits of the evidence regarding the=
=20
threats posed
to marine and human life by SURTASS LFA.
The technic=
al=20
report prepared by the scientists and the DEIS itself
completely ignore=20
almost all of the evidence presented to the Hawaiian
courts.
The=20
Hawaiian tests began at the end of February 1998 and continued=20
through
March.
Neither the DEIS nor the technical report on the te=
sts=20
discuss the numerous
reports from whale watch boat captains and others=20
regarding the unusual
disappearance of whales from the testing area begin=
ning=20
at the start of the
tests in the first two weeks of March 1998. The capta=
ins=20
making the
observations had a total of more than 125 years of whale watch=
ing=20
in
Hawaiian waters.
During the litigation, the scientists attempte=
d to=20
dismiss the boat
captains' evidence presented by characterizing the evide=
nce=20
as "anecdotal."
In their technical report, they simply avoid=20
discussing the evidence at
all. Nor does the DEIS mention the capta=
ins'=20
reports.
No one associated with the preparation of the technical repo=
rt=20
or the DEIS
made any attempt to contact the whale watch captains to elici=
t=20
further
information or otherwise follow up on the information provided by=
=20
the
captains.
The technical report does cite aerial surveys locati=
ng=20
Humpback Whales by
Professor Joseph Mobley during March. The scient=
ists=20
attempt to rely on
Dr. Mobley's data to support a conclusion that the wha=
les=20
behaved normally.
Yet the technical report completely ignores the consist=
ent=20
findings in the
earliest Mobley surveys (March 1 and 8, 1998) that there=20=
were=20
no whales
seen in the exact area identified in the technical report as th=
e=20
primary
LFA test site and an abundance of whales outside the test=20
area.
In previous years, there was an abundance of whales found by Mo=
bley=20
in the
test area as well.
Here was evidence that the whales were=20
staying out of the testing area
while remaining in the vicinity of the=20
island. Even more importantly, this
evidence strongly suggested tha=
t=20
the LFA had driven an endangered species
out of a favorite breeding=20
area. One would think that would be at least
interesting to the=20
scientists studying whale response to LFA. Nevertheless,
in their discuss=
ion=20
of the Mobley surveys, the scientists simply ignore
that part of Mobley's=
=20
findings.
Months after the testing ended, Dr. Mobley claimed that the=
=20
transits
randomly selected for aerial observation resulted in no observat=
ions=20
taking
place in the area where the absence of whales appeared on his 1998=
=20
charts,
i.e. the primary LFA test area. If the claim is true, then=20=
the=20
Mobley
surveys cannot be used by the scientists to claim the whales remai=
ned=20
in
the test area because Mobley now says he did not count whales in=20
that
specific area. The only value in the Mobley studies is to=20
demonstrate that
there was an abundance of whales outside the testing are=
a=20
during the first
two weeks of March.
Accepting Dr. Mobley's discla=
imer=20
as true, the only evidence available
regarding the presence or absence of=
=20
whales in the test area during the
earliest testing days is the limited=20
observation data from the two Navy
ships involved in the testing and thei=
r=20
shore observation post and the
numerous observations of the whale watch=20
captains and others outside the
scientific team. A complete technic=
al=20
report and DEIS would have addressed
all the evidence and discussed the=20
question of an absence of whales from
the test area in terms of all the=20
evidence.
That the technical report and the DEIS do not discuss the=20
captains'
observations is one of many indicators that facts will not be=20
allowed to
impede a predetermined deployment decision.
While judic=
ial=20
rulings have taken most of the value out of the National
Environmental Po=
licy=20
Act, two principles at least have survived - the
decision-makers must=20
consider the evidence before them and provide an
opportunity for the publ=
ic=20
to comment on the decision-making process. By
excluding highly rele=
vant=20
evidence known to the Navy; their contractor,
Marine Acoustics, Inc.; and=
the=20
scientists preparing the critical
underlying report(s), the DEIS violates=
=20
both these principles. There is
every reason, therefore, to expect=20=
a=20
court to rule that the process must be
reopened to consider such=20
evidence.
The failure to address the evidence of whales leaving the=20
testing area is
matched by a similar failure to address the evidence of a=
=20
swimmer in the
water suffering traumatic physical harm from insonificatio=
n by=20
the SURTASS
LFA.
During the litigation, Ms. Chris Reid, a naturali=
st=20
living on Hawai`i
studying dolphins, submitted an affidavit stating that=20=
she=20
was exposed to a
broadcast from the SURTASS LFA and experienced adverse=20
physical effects for
a period of months after the exposure. A docto=
r=20
who examined Ms. Reid
shortly after the exposure compared her condition t=
o=20
that of a trauma
patient in a hospital ward.
In the litigation, th=
e=20
scientists admitted that Ms. Reid was exposed to an
LFA broadcast. =20=
The=20
scientists did not, however, provide the underlying
data regarding that=20
exposure nor any analysis of the possible effects on
Ms. Reid.
At=20=
no=20
time since Ms. Reid and her doctor filed declarations in the
litigation d=
id=20
the scientists conducting the study or any one else
associated with the D=
EIS=20
process make any attempt to contact Ms. Reid or
her doctor for further=20
information or to conduct any physical examination
of Ms. Reid.
A=20
separate technical report addresses the bioeffects of LFA on humans.
That=
=20
report does not mention Ms. Reid's experience.
Data on the effects of=
low=20
frequency sound on humans in the water is very
limited. One would think t=
hat=20
scientists studying that question would be
highly motivated to investigat=
e=20
and report upon Ms. Reid's experience. The
thundering silence in the=20
technical report and DEIS regarding Ms. Reid is
yet further evidence of a=
=20
predetermined decision - deployment - not to be
disturbed by any=20
evidence developed failing to support that decision.
The disappearing=
=20
whales and the damage to Ms. Reid represent only part of
the evidence of=20
adverse impacts of SURTASS LFA submitted in the Hawaiian
litigation. =
;=20
Other than a passing reference to one event, the technical
reports and th=
e=20
DEIS ignore all of that evidence.
Further evidence that the Navy did=20=
not=20
take its obligations under the law
seriously, even after getting caught b=
y=20
NRDC, is that the DEIS was rushed
to completion before all the relevant=20
studies were completed and available
to the public.
The technical=20
report by the scientists studying the effects on marine life
states: &quo=
t;We=20
have only started to analyze the data ...."
The technical report=
on=20
the bioeffects on humans relies on numerous studies
conducted in the last=
two=20
years. In the references section, those studies
designated as=20
preliminary reports are "for internal use only." =20
Those
studies consist of seven of the critical studies upon which the=20
report
relied.
Whatever the reasons for withholding these reports,=
the=20
fact remains that
critical reports upon which a major component of the DE=
IS=20
is based are not
available publicly for comment.
Finally, the Draf=
t=20
supposedly presents three alternatives: no action,
deployment with limits=
, or=20
deployment without limits. The Navy states its
preference as deploy=
ment=20
with limits (Alternative 1). The problem is that
the Draft defines=20
those limits in two very different scenarios.
In the first scenario,=20=
only=20
the passive (listening) element of the SURTASS
LFA system is to be used i=
n=20
"geographically- restricted areas." Those
areas are coast=
al=20
waters; biologically important areas, such as breeding
grounds; and areas=
=20
where divers are likely to be present.
In the second scenario, the=20
activities within the geographically-restricted
areas are described in te=
rms=20
of a sound field that "does not exceed 180
dB" within 22=20=
km=20
of any coastline nor in offshore biologically important
areas outside the=
22=20
km zone and "does not exceed 145 dB" in the vicinity
of known=20
recreational and commercial dive sites.
There is obviously a major=20
difference in an alternative that would limit
use of SURTASS LFA to only=20
passive missions in geographically-restricted
areas and an alternat=
ive=20
that would permit broadcasts up to 180 dB and/or
145 dB in=20
geographically-restricted areas. The two conflicting scenarios
is=20
simply one more measure of the rush to complete the EIS process so
deploy=
ment=20
can begin.
Based on these obvious deficiencies, environmentalists and=
=20
others are
already calling upon the Navy to withdraw the DEIS and prepare=
a=20
new draft
OEIS/EIS that deals honestly with the available evidence, provi=
des=20
time for
the scientists to complete their work, and presents clearly the=20
choices for
public comment. See http://manyrooms.com/martingale.htm.=
=20
The deadline for
comments is October 28, 1999.
There is little rea=
son=20
to be optimistic that the Navy can go full steam
astern at this point.&nb=
sp;=20
Lurking in the technical report by the scientists
hired by the Navy are s=
uch=20
statements as: "Responses did not scale
consistently to received lev=
el,=20
and it will be difficult to extrapolate
from these results to predict=20
responses at higher exposure levels."
Translation: The scienti=
sts=20
were only able to test the SURTASS LFA at
sound levels mostly below 140=20
decibels. The reactions of whales at those
levels were not=20
consistent. Those levels are far below the planned
deployment level=
s=20
reaching to 235 decibels, which happens to be more than
one billion times=
=20
louder than the tests.
Such statements by their own scientists make e=
ven=20
an honest treatment of
the Navy's funded studies a challenge to=20
deployment. To seriously consider
all the other adverse information=
=20
gathered those outside of the hired
scientists could well doom the=20
system.
One can have pity for the poor naval personnel faced with thi=
s=20
dilemma.
They thought they were protecting national security and, therefo=
re,=20
doing
the right thing. The mistake was not considering the=20
environmental
consequences ten years ago. Life in the ocean and the=
=20
marine environment
should not pay the price for that mistake.
The=20=
only=20
question remaining is whether the Navy will admit their mistake,
cut thei=
r=20
losses, and eliminate yet another threat to an ocean environment
already=20
stressed by human toxins, wastes, noise, and induced climate change
or pl=
ay=20
the national security card as trump to any concerns about the
health of t=
he=20
ocean environment, the creatures living in that environment,
or humans=20
visiting that environment.
Only a concerted effort by citizens to con=
tact=20
their favorite environmental
organization to urge them to get involved in=
=20
stopping SURTASS LFA and to
contact their congressional representative to=
=20
demand accountability to the
law for the Navy and its system can stop the=
=20
juggernaut barreling out to
sea and convince the Navy to do the right=20
thing.
The author is an attorney in Hilo, Hawai`i who filed two of th=
e=20
four
lawsuits against the Navy during the Hawaiian testing.
Lanny=20
Sinkin
P. O. Box 944
Hilo, Hawai`i 96720
(808) 969-7768
light@ilhawaii.net
To secure a=
copy=20
of the draft EIS and the technical reports on which the
DEIS relied,=20
contact:
Mr. J.S. Johnson
Attn: SURTASS LFA Sonar OEIS/EIS Program=
=20
Manager
901 North Stuart Street, Suite 708
Arlington, Virginia =20
22203
Fax: (703) 465-8420
Critical evaluations of the SURTASS LFA=20
appear at:
http://www.nrdc.orghttp://www.oceanmammalinst.comhttp://www.=
angelfire.com/ca/fishattorney/lfaslinks.html
http://www.manyrooms.com/new=
sroom.html
President=20
Bill Clinton
White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.,
Washington, D.=
C.=20
20500; Ph. (202) 456-1111, Fax (202) 456-2461;
e-mail -- president@whitehouse.gov
Vice=20
President Albert Gore
White House, 1600 Pennsylvania=20
Ave.,
N.W.,Washington, D.C. 20500;Ph. (202) 456-1414, Fax (202)
456-24=
61;=20
e-mail -- vicepresident@whitehouse.gov
Representative=20
____________
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. =20
20515
Senator _____________
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. =20
20510
Secretary William Cohen
1000 Defense
The=20
Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301
The Honorable John H.=20
Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D.C.
FAX: (703)=20
614-3477