In the fall of
68 the 192nd was given 2 Korean pilots so that they could fly with us and
observe our techniques. Each of the slick platoons got one and ours
was named Cpt. Kim. After bouncing around for
a few flights with other pilots it became my job to fly with Cpt. Kim.
I found Cpt. Kim to be a very intelligent
person but there were 2 problems that I had to deal with. The first
was his English. He could speak English but I had to listen really close
and anticipate what he was trying to say in order to understand him.
As our time together wore on his English improved quite a bit. I learned
quite a bit about Korea and his life there as well as the Korean outlook on
the war.
The second problem was a big one;
he could not fly worth beans. The ability was there as well as an intense
desire but it seemed as though he was self-taught. I don't know
where he got his flight training but it was extremely poor and as a result
most of our training was simple helicopter basics. Because he
could not handle the ship very well it would jeopardize both the crew and
ship to use him in combat so almost all our flights were Ash & Trash types.
Fortunate for me Cpt. Kim had a sense of humor and understood the situation.
On one particular flight we had
to pick up some U.S. types at the end of the runway at the HQ pad and Cpt.
Kim was having a little trouble hovering. We finally got there and he
got it down but we had to wait a short while for our passengers. Because
of the sun we had our dark visors down. Our passengers finally got
on board and I let Cpt. Kim have the ship for takeoff while I talked to the
tower. Because we were on the short end of the runway Cpt. Kim would
need to pull in a little more power than usual in order to clear the small
hooch's there. He did that just after passing through translational
lift but forgot to kick in left pedal, to compensate for the additional
power, which would keep us pointed in the right direction. Because
no pedal was added the chopper torqued around and started flying sideways.
This upset the CE a little because he was not used to being in front of everything,
which was the pilot's job. The passengers as well were aware that this was
not your normal takeoff. I was still on the controls and gave Cpt. Kim
a few seconds to think about it then gave the left pedal a push, which straightened
us out. I then looked over at Cpt. Kim and even with the visor down
he knew what kind of look I had on my face, he said "Sorry". I knew
what was happening but had to let him embarrass himself a little so it would
sink in and he would learn by it. Though we were in no actual danger
Cpt. Kim didn't know that but knew he had just screwed up. It did sink
in and with the ship now pointed in the right direction we began the mission.
The guy in charge of the mission
picked Cpt. Kim to talk to about the mission. Normally we just yell or extend
the helmet mike and hit the floor mike button for passenger conversation
but Cpt. Kim promptly took off his helmet and gave it to the officer.
When that officer saw Cpt. Kim's smiling face he about died. His lower
jaw had dropped well below his Adam's apple and I knew he had figured he
had gotten on the wrong ship and was probably going to die in a crash as
a result. I think the takeoff had a
little something to do with it. We were still flying into the sun
and with my visor down he could not tell if I was Korean as well.
When I finally spoke he told me he was sure happy to hear an American's voice
coming from that seat. We both had a good laugh over that one.
In the fall of 68 the rules of
war changed, some think due to a trader high up in command. All the
pilots were gathered together and informed that as of now we could not shoot
back if shot at because the stray bullets might hit friendly troops in the
area. If we were shot at we were supposed to call the local commander
who then would call the district commander for that area who then would call
the Vietnamese commander for that area and if there were no troops in the
area we would be given the OK to return fire. Going through all that
would probably take a day or two. They also told us our call sign was
now changed from our respectable "Pole Cat" to "Filmore Signet", what a sorry
call sign. That lasted a couple of weeks because it really screwed
things up with all the outpost and pickups. We went back to "Pole Cat"
on our own and nothing was ever said again about it.
Cpt. Kim and I were given the mission
to relocate a Vietnamese outpost on High Way 1 to a new location just 10 miles
south also on High Way 1. We were somewhat north of Phan Thiet but
out of radio range because of a poor radio. The flights lasted only
about 8 minutes or so and Cpt. Kim was having a ball doing all the flying.
We had done about 10 or so flights when the outpost we were working for gave
us a call. We were told that someone on a motorcycle had just stopped
by and told them that a U.S. jeep had just been ambushed down the road and
that 2 Americans and a Vietnamese lady had just been shot. They
asked us to check it out. It just so happened
that we were on the empty return trip when we got the call and only about
3 minutes away from the ambush. We spotted the jeep but didn't see any
bodies because they had been picked up by someone just behind the jeep when
they saw the VC hightail it into the large expanse of swail grass to the
west of the highway. We found out later that the 2 Americans were AWOL
GIs from
Saigon that had stolen the jeep and were headed north with
one of their girlfriends.
We circled the jeep from about 500 ft
and notified the outpost what we had found. Then low and behold I noticed
lines in the swail grass. It seems that when one goes through the grass
it results in the blades tilting slightly. You can't see it from the
ground but from the air it looked as if someone had drawn a line to each of the 4 VC that were now trying to hide in the grass. We
had them dead to rights but couldn't shoot. I got some altitude and
tried to call back to base but couldn't get anyone. Just then 2 of the
guys started to run for it. They had about 3/4 mile of swail grass to
go through before hitting a train track that separated the grass area from
the tree line. The lead guy had a white hat and all 4 had rifles.
I ordered the CE to open fire with the fire directed just in front of the
guy with the hat. I was hoping he would think we were just bad
shots and lay down a while so we could gain some time and make some more calls.
He figured it out and just kept running. We used up our machine gun
ammo just as he made it to the tree line. Because we were getting low
on fuel we had to return to Phan Thiet. About 15 minutes out of Phan
Thiet I got a hold of someone else's gun ships and put them on to the location
and outpost frequency.
As we landed at the fuel pit, I had
my 3rd tail rotor failure and had to set her down right there. Unbeknownst
to me an oil can had bounced through one of the circular relief holes in
the tailboom bulkhead area. It wedged vertically directly under the
left pedal hydraulic servo, which resulted in a frozen pedal. I ordered
everyone to get what they could and follow me. We then went to the closest
ship on the line, found that it was flyable and promptly stole it. By
the time we got back to the ambush the gun ships from the other company were
already there and they were granted permission to fire from who knows where.
I directed them to a "U" shaped patch of trees where the VC with the white
hat had gone in and they blew it up. I doubt he was still there.
We did follow out the other lines in the grass and found one of the VC hiding
under a little trestle where the train tracks when over a small gully.
Troops from the compound came out and picked him up.
Cpt. Kim was cool during the entire
thing. He later told me he would have shot them all when we first spotted
them. I often wondered about how I would have felt if the old rules
had still been in effect and I was able to order those 4 VC killed.
I wondered also about the VC in the white hat and what he must have been
thinking about, us catching him red handed and not finishing the job.
We finished our resupply of the outpost
and returned to base. Cpt. Kim had a little trouble figuring out why
we were so limited by rules that were so obviously planted by the enemy.
The OPS officer told me about the oil can and then told me not to steal
any more of his ships.
Except for getting in and out of the
rather tight chopper revetments I let Cpt. Kim do virtually all the flying
and his flying did improve quite a bit. I reported such to OPS and
they let us pull out one of the ranger teams that were in the nearby jungle.
I let Cpt. Kim spot the team then told him how to set up for the extraction
and he took us in. I bet flight-lead watching from above was rather
concerned about the extraction knowing it was Capt. Kim down there.
On short final I took over with him also on the controls and we were in
and out in about 2 seconds. It was about as perfect an extraction as
one could hope for. We didn't even have time to put a skid down before
all of them were in and the CE gave us the "Go" command. Coming out
of there I saw two trees that had a gap between them that I could fit the
chopper through. Going through that gap would give me an additional
second or two of increased airspeed versed climb for the cyclic climb I would
be doing once I hit max air speed so as to get out of shooting range. With
the rotor just over the tops of those trees I went through that gap, which
probably caught both the crew chief and his door gunner by surprise, the
fit was tight but the room was there so I took it. Within seconds of
clearing that gap we hit the elevator "UP" button and up we went at max climb.
Cpt. Kim then got the ship back. As we were climbing out he commented
on how professional we Americans were and at such a young age. I think
he also said that he was glad he was working with us instead of against us.
I look back now and his commet becomes even more important to me. I
think he was initially somewhat dismayed at getting me, but a really young
Warrant, as his training pilot, him being a Captain. Because I was staying
with him longer than with the other pilots, he was getting comfortable with
me but still saw me as just a bottom-of-the-line baby-sitter pilot experience
wise. I feel that rather tight extraction surprised him since I was
going to be the one going in and not a much more seasoned pilot specializing
in such, which he expected. What I believe surprised him even more
was that even I, just a mere kid, could do such an extraction like it was
just another day on the job. He now realized that we all were like
that and this mere kid of a pilot was indeed the "real" thing.
I sometimes wonder how he made out flying
wise when he returned to his own unit. Less than a year later I asked
for and received a tour of duty in S. Korea. That is a story for another
time.
The End
.