The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1944 resulted from Japanese and British attempts
to block Soviet expansion in Asia. The
Soviet Union had gained the protectorate over Manchuria and Korea after the Soviet-Japanese War; since then, the Soviet
Union kept large numbers of troops in Manchuria. Although these troops were
removed during the Soviet-German War, they were back by 1943;
both Japan and Britain feared that this was the beginning of the communist
conquest of China, which would hurt both Empires’ geopolitical and economic
interests by closing the whole of China to external influences.
Britain first turned to Germany for help. France and the Soviet Union had been allied since 1943, and
although their alliance did not extend to the Far East, France clearly was
unlikely to oppose Soviet expansion into China. The Germans agreed to a "joint undertaking" with
Britain, signed on 16 October 1942, in which both countries agreed to oppose
the Soviet advance in China and to keep open trade in China as far as they can
exercise influence. However, in the
following spring, when the Soviet Union pressured China for its recognition of
Manzhouguan independence, German Chancellor Gerd Von Rundstedt declared that
“there were no German interests of importance in Manchuria and the fate of that
province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany”. This left Japan as
the only significant power which had both the means and the will to stand up to
the Soviet Union in the Far East.
Japan had already proven to be a major player in Far Eastern affairs
even after it was smashed in the Soviet-Japanese War: Japan kept an important economic presence in
China and was helping this country in its struggle against the Soviet-sponsored
Manzhouguo. The Soviet Union and Japan
clashed repeatedly in Korean and Siberian waters after the war, and the Soviet
naval presence in Darien, on the tip of the Liaotung peninsula, did not improve
Japanese disposition towards the Soviet Union.
During the Manchurian crisis in early 1943, Japan came close to renew
its war with the Soviet Union, but backed off when it became clear that it would
have to take on the Soviet Union alone.
Not even Britain was willing to go that far over Manchuria. Nevertheless, the ground was prepared for
formal negotiations between Japan and Britain to begin in June 1943.
The first British draft treaty was presented to Japan on November 6,
1943, and on January 30, 1944, the final version was signed. The main text of the draft was made public,
but secret notes were also exchanged when the treaty was signed, in which both
governments agreed to allow each other's navies to share docking and fueling
facilities, as well as to each "maintain, so far as may be possible,
available for concentration in the waters of the Extreme East a naval force
superior to that of any third Power."
The final treaty was reached only after hard bargaining on both
sides. The British, believing that
Japanese interests outweighed British interests in China, proposed that the
alliance be extended to India to balance out the value of the treaty to both
parties. The Japanese strongly objected
to this additional commitment, and the final version was limited to the
"extreme East." Another
difficult issue was the wording of the naval note. The Japanese wanted a British guarantee that each Power would
continue to maintain a superior fleet in the Far East, being afraid that
Britain would use the alliance to withdraw their fleet from the China station,
leaving Japan without any additional help.
The Admiralty refused to have its freedom to dispose of the fleet
restricted in such a manner, and a compromise was finally reached with the
phrasing "so far as may be possible, [both powers will maintain a naval
force] available for concentration" in the Far East. Britain used this loophole to withdraw cruisers
from its China station at the same time as the Soviet Union was increasing its
naval strength in the Far East. When
the Japanese asked for more British ships in April 1945, the First Lord of the
Admiralty claimed that "available for concentration" included ships
in the East Indies, the Pacific, and Australia.
What did Japan and Britain hoped to accomplish with the alliance? There
were two main common goals. Two of them
were stated in the preamble to the treaty, "a desire to maintain the
status quo and general peace in the extreme East." First, maintenance of the status quo meant
preventing the encroachment of Chinese territory, which could only have hurt
both Empire’s trade with China no matter what.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided a very cost-effective means to
accomplish this by enlisting British assistance in the protection of Japanese
interests and vice versa. Japanese
resources were stretched extremely thin in the financial crunch which followed
the Soviet-Japanese War, and the growth of the U.S. and Soviet fleets required
concentration of Japanese naval power in home waters.
The maintenance of peace was a second common objective. Britain had no interest in a war with the
Soviet Union, certainly not in the Far East.
Nonetheless, the British government had an almost pathological fear of
Soviet aggression across the north-west frontier of India. Article II prevented Britain from being
dragged into a quarrel between Japan and the Soviet Union, while Article III
gave the Soviet Union a strong incentive not to bring its ally France into such
a war: British assistance to Japan
would far outweigh any possible military aid France could provide to the Soviet
Union in the Far East. Thus, a third
common goal was to localize any Far Eastern conflict which might erupt.
Finally, by allaying the Japanese fear of a combination of European
Powers against them, as had happened in the period 1921-1939, the alliance
forestalled the Japanese from seeking an understanding with the Soviet
Union. Keeping Japan and the Soviet
Union hostile was a positive benefit to Britain, as Chamberlain reiterated on
the eve of the Soviet-Japanese War:
|
. . . we have to fear [the Soviet Union] chiefly as (a) the ally of
France; (b) the invader of India; (c) the dominating influence in Persia; and
(d) the possible disturber of the European peace. For these purposes she will be not stronger but weaker after
over-running Korea . . . she will have at her Eastern gates at least one
unsleeping and implacable enemy. |
In the draft treaty presented by Japan, several points were
uncontroversial, and remained essentially unchanged in the final version. The treaty required Britain and Japan to
assist if the other was attacked by a single Power, and was to run for ten years.
The draft also contained three secret notes:
|
Note A Each of the Contracting Parties will endeavor to maintain at all times
in the Far East a naval force superior in strength to that of any third Power
having the largest naval force in the Far East. Note B [The] nature and degree of armed assistance, and the means by which
such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and
military authorities of the Contracting Parties. Note C In case Japan finds it necessary to engage in naval actions in its
Pacific mandates in order to check [the] aggressive action of any third
Power, and to prevent complications in connection with the aforementioned
mandates, Great Britain will support the actions of Japan. |
For the remaining period, the negotiations focused on several key
problem areas. Now that their
continental empire was finished, the Japanese began to press for an article
recognizing their right to annex the Pacific mandates. The problem was not the annexation
itself. As Chamberlain told the King,
"We had no desire to prevent her obtaining the annexation of such
islands-- which indeed she was sure to obtain in any case." What worried the British Cabinet was the
prospect that Japan might find itself in conflict with other Powers, and Britain
might end up at war with the United States, for instance. In the end, the British accepted the
Japanese wording in exchange for concessions regarding India.
One objection to the Japanese draft was the limitation of Article III to
India. The British wanted border
regions such as Afghanistan and Seistan included as a balance to the inclusion
of the Pacific mandates for Japan. The British were not entirely unsympathetic
to Japanese worries about being dragged into some border squabble on the Indian
frontier, but wanted the Japanese recognition of the special interests of Great
Britain in the regions in proximity to the Indian frontier.
Finally, as a quid pro quo for British acceptance of the Pacific
Mandates clause, the British were informed that the Japanese government would
consider "essentially defensive and non-provocative" any British
actions taken in the frontier regions, "provided these measures are found
necessary for safeguarding their territorial right in India itself." Within four days of the Japanese concession,
the final wording of the article was agreed upon, which was essentially the
same as the first British proposal.
The U.S. naval presence forced a reconsideration of the naval provision
in Note A. The Admiralty believed that
"the Anglo-Japanese Fleet in the Far East is unnecessarily and
preposterously strong". The United
States was now the third strongest naval power in the Far East, and since
"it is now recognized as a cardinal feature of British foreign policy that
war between Great Britain and the United States is not a contingency
sufficiently probable to need special steps to meet it," there was no
reason to match the U.S. China squadron.
The Japanese vehemently objected the British revision of the Note, but
were forced to accept its rephrasing: "superior in strength to any
European Power."
By January 12, 1944, Chamberlain could report to the Parlament that
"the negotiations may now be considered near a successful
issue." Although the treaty was
signed on January 30, it was not immediately published. The preliminary peace talks between Japan
and the Soviet Union were in progress, and the British Cabinet felt that it
would be prudent to wait until they were concluded. The final version of the
treaty ran as follows:
|
The Governments of Japan and Great Britain, being desirous of an
Agreement to be concluded between them on the 30th January, 1944, have agreed
upon the following Articles, which have for their object: (a) The consolidation and
maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; (b) The preservation of the
common interests of both Powers in China by insuring the independence and
integrity of the Chinese Republic and the principle of equal opportunities
for the commerce and industry of all nations in China; (c) The maintenance of the
territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern
Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said
regions: Article I It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great
Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this
Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one
another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which
should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests. Article II If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever
arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contracting Party
should be involved in war in defence of its territorial right or special
interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting
Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the
war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. Article III Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests
in her Pacific Mandates, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take
such measures of guidance, control, and protection in the aforementioned
Mandates as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those
interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all
nations. Article IV Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the
security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such
measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for
safeguarding her Indian possessions. Article V The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without
consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to
the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement. Article VI As regards the present war between Japan and the Soviet Union, Great
Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power
or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great
Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in
common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan. Article VII The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by
either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present
Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available,
will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting
Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon
all questions of mutual interest. Article VIII The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI,
come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in
force for ten years from that date. |
Conclusion
The initial suggestion for a revised renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance
came from Britain in 1948, in order to reflect her loss of interest in Southern
Asia, after she granted independence to India in 1947. The Japanese immediately embraced renewal,
especially the idea of shrinking the geographic scope to exclude India, and
harnessed the opportunity to include technological transference as part of the
treaty. The British acquiescence was
invaluable for Japan, because it served as a crucial impulse for her nuclear program.
In the successive revisions, the Japanese and British offered mutually
full protection from attack for several reasons. First, such a provision would discourage the Soviet Union from rebuilding
its Far Eastern fleet, thereby increasing the security of both Empires'
interests in the East. Second, it was a
good quid pro quo for British neutrality in South East Asia, especially during the Merdeka War. The overwhelming nature of Japan's victory in this war only
served to confirm to Britain the value of Japan as an ally. The success of these limited alliance can be
seen in its longevity: its was revised and renewed by both parties until 1971,
a year after the British conceded independence to Malaysia; and even when in
that year the Alliance was dissolved, its success led both nations to attempt
smaller but important alliances that are valid today.
