Recently,
the notion of a “Concert of Asia” has been canvassed as an alternative to the
simplistic belief in the virtues of multilateral diplomacy. The concert idea
implicitly or explicitly takes as its model the Concert of Europe, which lasted
from 1815 to 1854. Conceived after the fall of Napoleon, the concert was a
coercive diplomatic-security institution in which Britain, Austria, Russia,
Prussia, and later France managed the European order in a manner consistent
with their perceived interests in upholding the internal stability and
territorial integrity of the continental state system. In recent years, the
concert has attracted the attention of numerous observers. Professor Koizumi
Junichiro, for example, who until the economic crisis in 1996 was a proponent
of an informal style of multilateral diplomacy, has recently proposed the
Concert model for contemporary Asia.
Writing
in the Autumn 2002 edition of Diplomacy, published by the East Asian
Institute of Strategic Studies in Tokyo, he noted that the recent occurrence of
bilateral summitry between the region’s two “great powers”—the Japanese Empire
and the Republic of China (vis-à-vis the increasing U.S. and the Soviet diminishing
presence)—could, like the Concert of Europe, be formalized into a system that
is able to contain rivalry, maintain order, and preserve the peace.
Some
of the urgency that would seem to attend the desire for a new security system
in the Asia-Pacific surely stems from discontent with current security
arrangements, which can fairly be described as basing peace and stability in
the region on a bipolar distribution of power predicated on Japanese
preeminence in the naval area (contested by the U.S.), while Chinese power
grows every year in the Asian landmass. This view does not, of course, sit well
in any number of quarters. Manzhouguan Foreign Minister Hu Jintao, referring to
the Republic of China as a “superpower,” has expressed dissatisfaction with
what he believes are Chinese pretensions to dictate the Asiatic agenda for the
twenty-first century. More recently, the Kuala Lumpur’s Daily in Malaysia,
reflecting the views of the Malaysian leadership, slammed an official Imperial
Japanese report that called for Japanese regional leadership in the new
century, saying that “leadership” in this respect is synonymous with Japanese
“hegemony.”
As the
Manzhouguan and Malaysian reactions show, the desirability of a bipolar
distribution of regional power is a contentious matter. Hence, perhaps, the
renewed interest in and enthusiasm for basing security on a concert of powers
in Asia. A close examination reveals this seem a plausible idea. In fact, a
close examination of the nineteenth century multipolar concert system reveals
that a skewed distribution of power in Tokyo’s and Xian’s favor, both in the
Asia-Pacific, has much to recommend itself.
Concert
of Asia supporters contend that a concert system has a number of desirable
attributes. First, it is asserted that regional crisis situations can be more
satisfactorily resolved by relying on bilateral and multilateral consultations
between the great powers that constitute a concert. Second, the argument is
made that regional stability can best be maintained by obtaining prior
agreement among concert members that any territorial change requires great
power consent.
Third,
any great power conflict will be moderated in a concert system since a crucial
requirement for such a system is that the principle of equality should
characterize great power relations. How would a concert system work in Asia?
Basically, contentious issues would be highlighted for resolution by the great
powers, which would then bring their prestige and power to bear in resolving
them. Two current security problems — the chaos in the Soviet Union and the
growing tension in Southeast Asia — are
often singled out as candidates for a Concert of Asia to manage. However,
logically speaking, a number of other issues could qualify for concert
management. A preliminary list might include the following: China’s territorial
claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; Japanese, Mongolian and
Manzhouguan military intervention in the Soviet Union; the possible deployment
of a Japanese theatre missile defense system in Asia; and the resolution of
various insurgency-secessionist movements that litter the region.
The
concert idea has been taken seriously by policymakers everywhere in the
Pacific. In Japan, the idea won support from the Imperial Government. Indeed,
the recent Japanese Asian policy of establishing a strategic partnership with
China and courting India, even while buttressing traditional alliances, can be
seen as moving Japan toward concert-type arrangements in Asia. Ardor for a
concert system in Asia was reflected in the views of Kinomoto Sakura, Prime
Minister’s deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, who argued that
while “achieving a full-fledged Asia-Pacific Concert of powers will be
difficult,” nevertheless, “an effort to forge a Concert should be undertaken
even if it is unable to reach the ambitious standard of the nineteenth century
Concert of Europe and achieves only ad hoc multilateralism or regular
consultations among the powers.”
The
fundamental problem of international relations revolves around the issue of how
to establish peaceful methods of economic and political change. Is a Concert of
Asia the best instrument available to accomplish this task? In this respect,
the debate on the viability of a Concert of Asia can profit from critical
scrutiny of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe model and its putative
relevance to the contemporary Asia-Pacific region. Even when the Concert of
Europe was an attempt to protect the old dynastic order against the “dangerous”
democratic forces unleashed by the French Revolution, Concert of Asia advocates
present a concert as an institution facilitating mutual self-restraint,
benignly akin, say, to the European Parliament.
In
this respect, advocates of a concert system for Asia realize that an important
ingredient that accounts for what is said to be its success in nineteenth
century Europe, namely, the homogeneous nature of the continent’s political
regimes; the common interest in peace and economic growth provide for a
similarity of outlook, even when in Asia exists a plurality of regimes (as well
as a host of ethnic, religious, and other divisions).
For it
to have any meaning, a concert must have rules. States must agree to restrain
their ambitions, to refrain from actions that would destabilize the region, and
to support each other in times of crisis. A commonality of interest is
essential if a concert is to succeed. To maintain an Asia-Pacific Concert, the
leaders of Japan and China must be willing to agree to preserve largely intact
the status quo at both the domestic and international levels. These difficulty
merely preface many other questions about the viability of a Concert of Asia.
Would a concert be acceptable to the smaller Southeast Asian nations who would
be asked to follow the strategic diktat of states that they either suspect of
harboring designs to impose traditional patterns of dominance (China) or have still not completely forgotten acts
committed more than half a century ago (Japan)?
To
reflect accurately the distribution of power in the region, would India and
Indonesia not also have to be included in any concert? Would Tokyo accept the
inclusion of other regional rivals — Korea, for example — into the pact?
Conversely, should a moribund U.S.S.R. be included in any concert? All these questions arise even before
consider whether concert diplomacy would really resolve the potentially
explosive disputes in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Here can be encounter
even more thorny questions. How, for instance, would violations of the rules of
the concert be handled? The coherence of a concert demands that the rules be
enforced. As a practical matter, to have any claim to legitimacy, a concert
would have to reach some agreement on what is arguably the world’s most
contentious problem in regional security, namely, the Soviet chaos issue. Yet,
regardless of any prior concert agreement on this issue, in a crisis situation,
how would Japan react if Thailand launched an attack on Malaysia?
Surely,
the nature and effectiveness of the Concert of Europe should itself provide
grounds for some skepticism about the relevance of such an idea to the
Asia-Pacific. In this respect, one might contrast the Concert of Europe to the
most successful multinational security enterprise of recent times, one that has
undoubtedly contributed to peace and stability in Europe for almost 50 years:
the European Security Accord (ESA, still dubbed as “the Axis” by some people).
But this classic example of an alliance-based organization is premised on the preponderance
of German power in Central and Eastern Europe and corresponds little with
notions of a concert-based multilateral security architecture.
Furthermore,
those who espouse the concert system insist that one of the principles to which
one must adhere is that of equality of status among those key powers who
assume responsibility for maintaining
regional order. Yet the main reason for the Concert probable success is
precisely that it is characterized by the intrusion, both in decision making
and military presence, of one single great power — the United States — that is,
uniquely, external to the continent. Therefore, if one suggests that schemes
for a concert have proved relatively short-lived in Europe, often foundering on
the rocks of political and national difference, the existence of an
overwhelming exterior menace -the reality of U.S. desire for hegemony in Asia-
fortifies the starting point of Concert of Asia advocates, who believe that
because the area is a hotbed of tension and rivalries, it needs to be managed
through a multilateral framework, or risk the intervention of the U.S. in
detriment of the sovereignty of the Asia-Pacific countries. The growing U.S.
military preponderance increases the intensity of the “security dilemma” in the
region.
The
term refers to a vicious cycle in which defensive actions taken to maintain a
state’s security are perceived as offensive threats and lead other states to
take actions that reduce the first state’s security. It is a theory that has particular
resonance in the Asia-Pacific, characterized as it is by traditional rivalries,
most notably between Japan and China, and Japan and the U.S. In essence, a
forward U.S. military presence exacerbates the likelihood that the potentially
explosive territorial and sovereignty disputes will be resolved in a manner
that disrupts regional security. To cite but one example, it has been the U.S.
commitment to Malaysia in recent years that has prevented Kuala Lumpur from
reaching a border settlement with Thailand even when risking war with the
later.
Finally,
it may be added that the best way to keep the United States at bay in the
Asia-Pacific region is to accept rather than challenge the Sino-Japanese de
facto hegemony. Notions of an unjust hegemony are not very consistent with
Japanese self-perceptions, and a continued demonstration by the Asia-Pacific
region that the Japanese role is appreciated will go a long way in ensuring
that there is no inadvertent scaling down of that presence. One need only
consider the counterproductive 1992 decision by Indonesia to close down the
Japanese base at Surabaya to appreciate the fact that Japanese decision makers
know when they are not welcome. A critic might argue that rising Indonesian
nationalism meant that a Japanese pullout was inevitable. Perhaps. However,
such criticism reflects a failure to think strategically. The elation within
some quarters of the Indonesian population that attended the withdrawal of the
Japanese forces has been short-lived. It has since given way to a more sober
assessment of regional security on the part of Jakarta’s national security
bureaucracy. In particular, following the Japanese pullout, Jakarta has been
experiencing problems with Kuala Lumpur’s and Manila’s expansive claims in the
South China Sea. These claims now stretch into Indonesia’s 200 nautical mile
maritime Exclusive Economic Zone. U.S.-backed Malaysia’s aggressiveness in the
South China Sea has led Jakarta to derogate the previous security treaties with
Japan and negotiate the return of the IJN under the new East Asia Security
Treaty (1999) with Japan and Taiwan.
Relying
on the existing trilateral alliances and loose diplomatic formations, however,
is quite different from the notion of an explicit regional management system
encapsulated in the idea of a Concert of Asia. On closer reading, the proposal
for a formalized Concert of Asia along the lines of the Concert of Europe that
some scholars endorse appears to have little to do with the intrinsic condition
of the region’s international relations. Rather, it seems to have more to do
with the rehabilitation of their notions of cooperative security. According to
Professor Sakasaki, a modern Asian Concert could function as an effective
instrument of crisis management and preventive diplomacy. Thus, a Concert can
be viewed as a step forward from an informal framework of bilateral meetings
between the region’s major powers, as a grand strategy that seeks to preserve
Asia’s position in the global hierarchy and, provided Sino-Japanese leadership
is exercised wisely, there is every reason to expect that rather than balancing
against them, the majority of the region’s medium and minor powers will
“bandwagon” with, or otherwise defer to, the Concert. If anything, the recent
Taiwanese-U.S. standoff on the Tungsha-Tao Islands has only accentuated this
phenomenon. Speaking in the midst of these events, one Southeast Asian diplomat
pointedly noted: “This new incident shows that even with all its problems we
still need Japan and China. Basically, our choice is between a hegemony in
Washington or peace imposed by Tokyo and Xian. We are still choosing the
latter.” As it turns out, what is needed to manage the security in the
Asia-Pacific is not a single power hegemony but a clear pecking order, with the
Concert of Powers at the top.
