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Between World Wars
After World War I representatives of the victorious powers
met in Paris to devise a peace settlement that would protect future generations
from another such conflict. All agreed that a new framework or system was
needed in international relations. Each power, however, had different views
as to what that framework should be. From their compromises emerged treaties
of peace, the chief of which was that with defeated Germany signed at Versailles
on June 28, 1919. Based on the assumption that Germany and her allies had
been the disturbers of the status quo, these treaties attempted to place curbs
on their future actions. Articles 160, 180, 181, and 198 of the Treaty of
Versailles, for example, forbade Germany to have an army of more than 100,000
men, a fleet of more than 36 combatant vessels, or any submarines or military
or naval aircraft, or to maintain fortifications or military installations
within 50 kilometers of the east bank of the Rhine. In addition, the defeated
states were to be required to pay large sums as reparations for damages that
the victors had suffered during the war.
But these punitive clauses were not supposed to form the
keystone of the new system. That was to be the League of Nations, the organization
whose Covenant was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles and in the treaties
of St.-Germain-en-Laye with Austria, of Neuilly with Bulgaria, of Trianon
with Hungary, and of Sevres with Turkey (superseded by the Treaty of
Lausanne). With the victorious nations as the original members of the League
and with provision for the admission of other states, including eventually
even the Germans and those who had been on their side, its Assembly was expected
to provide a forum for the airing of all international issues. In the event
of any aggression by one state against another or any breach of one of the
peace treaties, its Council was to mobilize all members, large and small,
for a collective effort to keep the peace.
Neither the punitive clauses of the treaties nor the Covenant
worked out quite as their authors had hoped. Although the Germans complied
with most of the restrictions imposed on them, they recovered rapidly in relative
strength. At Rapallo on April 16, 1922, they signed with the other outcast
of Europe, the Bolshevik USSR, a treaty providing for mutual renunciation
of claims and future economic cooperation. The victors meanwhile fell out.
The British and French disagreed about Middle Eastern issues and about the
amount of reparations that should be exacted from Germany. So sharp did their
exchanges become that by 1923 it was commonly assumed that if there were another
war it might well be one between Britain and France. As for the United States,
its Senate declined to ratify the Treaty of Versailles; it took no part in
the League and withdrew into self-imposed isolation, denying that it bore
any responsibility for the maintenance of peace in Europe.
By the latter part of the 1920's, the guarantees of peace
were somewhat different from those that had been envisioned in 1919. The articles
of the Treaty of Versailles designed to keep Germany in check were supplemented
by defensive alliances between France and certain of Germany's eastern neighbors:
Poland (Feb. 19, 1921) and the nations of the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia
(Jan. 25, 1924), Romania (June 10, 1926), and Yugoslavia (Nov. 11, 1927).
At a conference held in Locarno on Oct. 5-16, 1925, the German government
entered into treaties (signed in London on December 1) with France, Britain,
Belgium, and Italy, guaranteeing the existing Franco-Belgian-German frontiers.
On Sept. 8, 1926, Germany was admitted to the League. The peace thus rested
on three sets of undertakings: the pledges of mutual support between France
and her allies, the guarantees exchanged at Locarno, and the promises of collective
action made by those nations that subscribed to the Covenant. Events of 1931
and later years were to prove all these safeguards frail.
BREAKDOWN OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM
Manchurian Incident
On Sept. 18, 1931,
a small bomb exploded underneath a section of track on the South Manchuria
Railroad. The Japanese Army, which under long-standing agreements policed
the railroad, used this incident as a pretext for launching operations aimed
at conquering all of Manchuria for Japan. The Chinese government, which had
nominal sovereignty over the area, protested to the League of Nations. Some
supporters of the principle of collective security saw an opportunity for
the League to prove that it was capable of stopping an aggressor. The majority
of member governments, however, did not, feeling that the fate of Manchuria
was not of vital concern to them, or that the Japanese had some justice on
their side, or that action by the League might harm moderates in Tokyo who
were trying to hold the army in check. In the upshot the Council passed two
resolutions, one on September 30 and the other on October 23, urging the Japanese to cease their military operations and enter into
direct negotiations with China and appointing a special commission to investigate
the situation and help the parties reach a settlement.
Paying little attention to the League's advice, the Japanese
continued their operations. When the Chinese organized a boycott of Japanese
goods, they went even further. Reinforcing the garrison which they already
maintained at Shanghai, in January 1932 they seized control of that city.
By May they had been persuaded by League mediators to reach a truce agreement
with the Chinese in Shanghai, from which their forces were gradually withdrawn.
In the meantime, however, they had convened in Manchuria a rump assembly and
had it proclaim the independence of the region, now to be called Manchukuo,
on February 18. The new state, which came into existence officially on March
1, signed with Japan on September 15 a treaty making it a virtual ward of
that country.
The first Western nation to show umbrage over these events
was the United States. Despite its isolationism it had a long tradition of
interest in the Far East. When the League Council convened to hear the Chinese
protests, the American government sent an official observer to Geneva. The
view in Washington at that time was that Western powers ought not to do anything
that might aggravate the political situation in Tokyo, but Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson subsequently became convinced that there ought to be some
general assertion of opposition to Japanese aggression. Although himself in
favor of threatening Japan with collective sanctions, he had to reckon with
the stubborn pacifism of President Herbert Hoover. The most that he could
do was, on Jan. 7, 1932, to dispatch a formal note to Tokyo, declaring that
the United States would not recognize Japanese sovereignty over territory
acquired by force. This formulation was termed variously the Stimson Doctrine
and the Hoover Doctrine. Although one of the arguments used by opponents of
League action had been the fact that the United States was not a member of
the organization, the American initiative attracted little immediate support.
When asked by Stimson to make a similar declaration, the British government
declined. Not until after the evacuation of Shanghai did British statesmen
even suggest that the League might adopt the Stimson Doctrine as its own.
The sessions of the League Assembly in the fall and winter
of 1932-1933 were devoted largely to the Manchurian issue. The commission
of inquiry, headed by the 2d earl of Lytton, made its report, stating that
while the Japanese had possessed some grievances their action had been excessive,
that the establishment of an independent Manchukuo had not been in accordance
with the wishes of the people, and that Japanese forces ought to return the
rail lines, restore the status quo ante bellum, and negotiate a new
understanding about Manchuria with the Chinese. After prolonged debate the
Assembly adopted on Feb. 24, 1933, a resolution refusing to recognize Manchukuo
and calling on the Japanese to retire. The only result was to bring on March
27 the resignation (effective in two years' time) of Japan from the League
of Nations. The system of collective security created by the Paris peace treaties
had been tested and been found wanting.
Economic Issues
In the meantime, a
severe economic depression had developed. A crash of the New York stock market
in October 1929 had been followed by a rapid decline in American production,
employment, and foreign commerce. The repercussions were soon felt in all
countries that traded with the United States and also in those where American
funds were invested. So far flung was the network of American commercial and
financial relationships that by 1931 people were speaking of a world depression.
It had soon become clear that most European governments
would be unable to continue making payments on World War I debts. Ever since
the early 1920's, British statesmen had been urging that the United States
forgive all or part of what was owed by her wartime allies, proposing that
they in turn remit some or all of the payments due them from Germany as reparations.
The American government had rejected this proposal, but in 1931, faced with
the depression, President Hoover relented and arranged for a one-year moratorium
on both debt and reparation payments. Seeking reelection in 1932, he dared
not repeat the experiment. Some of the debtor states were forced to default.
In the end all but Finland did so, and the result was not only to embarrass
the governments involved but also to strengthen isolationist feeling in the
United States.
Eventually almost all the affected states sought solutions
for their economic problems in independent, nationalistic action. Seeking
a commercial and financial advantage over other countries, the British abandoned
the gold standard and devalued the pound in 1931. Through agreements reached
in a conference held at Ottawa on July 21-Aug. 21, 1932, they also abandoned
the tradition of free trade and established preferential tariffs for the Commonwealth.
The American government deserted the gold standard in 1933 and in the same
year caused the failure of the London Monetary and Economic Conference by
declaring that it would not join in an agreement to stabilize exchange rates.
Fascist Italy adopted more drastic measures, instituting rigid economic controls
and creating jobs by enlarging the armed forces and accelerating weapons production.
Germany, which was ruled after Jan. 30, 1933, by the National Socialist (Nazi)
dictator Adolf HITLER, went even farther in the same directions. The community
of nations envisioned in the Paris peace treaties dissolved into an anarchy
of jealous states seeking national advantage and national self-sufficiency.
Rise of Hitler
By far the most ominous
event of these depression years was the emergence of Hitler in Germany. A
psychopathic personality, he rejected all conventional moral standards. In
his book Mein Kampf (2 vols., 1925-1927) and in later speeches he had
disclosed his abhorrence of such concepts as equality and majority rule, his
hatred of Jews, his belief that "Aryans were a "master race
entitled to dominate others, and his conviction that the state had a right
to use any means to achieve its ends. He had also set forth his views on foreign
policy. He held that Germany should expand in order to bring within it all
Europeans of German nationality. Saying also that the German people needed
Lebensraum (space for living), he indicated that it was to be found in
eastern Europe. At the same time he declared that Germany had to have "
a final active reckoning with France. His words showed
that he desired German hegemony over Europe and would have no scruples about
the methods he used.
The other nations of Europe viewed him with alarm but also
with uncertainty. Few could believe that he really meant what he said, or
that once in office he would not become more restrained, more conventional,
and more prudent. At first his actions justified this opinion. While he carried
out the domestic programs he had advocated, succeeding soon in abolishing
all but the forms of democracy and constituting himself fuhrer (leader)
of the German people, externally he followed courses somewhat at odds with
what he had said and written. In token of peaceful intentions he even negotiated
with Poland an agreement relating to the large German minority in that country.
In a joint declaration issued on Jan. 26, 1934, the German and Polish governments
promised for a period of 10 years not to resort to war to solve differences
and not to intervene in behalf of members of their nationality groups who
were not legally citizens of their states.
Until the summer of 1934 the only actions of Hitler that
excited international apprehension were those concerning armaments. As part
of the campaign to revive the German economy, he undertook to increase production
by heavy industry, particularly those branches that would make the greatest
contributions to a war effort. In May 1933, he asked the other League powers
to allow Germany to move immediately toward the "equality which had
been promised her for the distant future. The French refused, pointing out
that the promise had always been conditioned on the development of effective
international controls. Hitler replied by declaring on October 14 that Germany
would proceed to arm herself with or without consent. He announced on the
same day his nation's withdrawal (effective in two years' time) from the League
of Nations. But the effect of these actions was softened by an offer to France
of a bilateral pact in which Germany would agree to limit its army to 300,000
men and its air force to 50 percent of that of France and to accept some measure
of international control. Although the French refused this offer, taking the
position that they should not sanction German rearmament even in principle,
the fact that the offer had been made left it unclear whether or not Hitler
was bent on carrying out the external programs outlined in Mein Kampf.
The first strong indication that this might be the case
came in July 1934 in Austria. That country had a National Socialist Party
modeled on Hitler's and more or less openly supported by German officials.
In the spring of 1934, the party increased its agitation. Then, when Chancellor
Engelbert Dollfuss was assassinated on July 25, it attempted a coup d'etat.
German official statements and troop movements made it seem that the coup
would have active support from across the frontier. The Austrian Nazis had,
however, overestimated their strength. Dollfuss' successor, Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg,
quickly consolidated his power. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini meanwhile
declared that Italy would not tolerate a change in the status of Austria and
moved Italian troops to the Brenner Pass. Whatever plans the Germans had were
frustrated by these actions.
Stresa Front
The French became increasingly
apprehensive as evidence accumulated to indicate that Hitler planned much
more formidable forces than those of which he had spoken in October and November
1933. On March 10, 1935, one of his officials disclosed that the projected
German Air Force would be larger than the French. Six days later, Hitler himself
proclaimed the reinstitution of compulsory military service.
To cope with the prospective peril, the French had begun
to mature a strategy. Foreign Minister Louis Barthou summarized it as an effort "
to group the European interests that could be menaced by the rapid revival
of Germany. Although Barthou was assassinated at Marseille on Oct. 9,
1934, in company with King Alexander I of Yugoslavia, his policy was carried
on (albeit somewhat irresolutely) by his successor, Pierre Laval. To begin
with, in January 1935, Laval held formal conversations with Mussolini, seeking
a common Franco-Italian front. These conversations were welcomed by the Italian
dictator. Soon after the emergence of Hitler he had proposed that Italy, France,
Great Britain, and Germany agree to procedures by which they alone, bypassing
the League of Nations, might revise the Treaty of Versailles. The French and
British had declined, and the resultant Four-Power Pact initialed at Rome
on June 7, 1933 (signed on July 15), provided for nothing more than consultation
on matters of mutual interest. Now the growth of French apprehension about
Hitler gave Italy more leverage.
Mussolini's principal aim was to circumvent the provisions
of the League Covenant that might give protection to Ethiopia, for he had
been trying unsuccessfully since the early 1920's to make that nation an economic
colony of Italy, and at some point before 1933 he had decided to attempt its
forcible conquest. He feared that, since Ethiopia had been admitted to the
League in 1923, it might be able to win that body's support, but he recognized
that if the British and French did not join in collective resolutions and
sanctions, these would be ineffectual. A clash between Italian and Ethiopian
troops at the watering hole of Wal Wal on Dec. 5, 1934, had just given him
a potential casus belli. To Ethiopia's appeal for League arbitration
he had rejoined that he would settle the incident exclusively in Italy's interest.
Now the trip of Laval to Rome, seeking Italian support against Hitler, gave
him the opportunity to bargain for the acquiescence of France and perhaps,
through France, of Britain.
The formal convention signed by Laval and Mussolini on Jan.
7, 1935, said nothing about Ethiopia: it merely resolved certain issues with
regard to French and Italian colonies already existing in Africa. Mussolini
declared later, however, that Laval had given him verbal assurance of a free
hand in Ethiopia, and Laval himself admitted that he had promised not to interfere
with Italian economic penetration there. The Frenchman professed not to have
made any commitment with regard to political or military penetration, but
what was said and left unsaid gave Mussolini warrant for interpreting the
conversations as he did, and he accelerated preparations for war, apparently
much less concerned now about interference by the League.
Laval had gotten what he had sought. Another convention,
signed on the same day, affirmed that France and Italy would jointly keep
watch on events in Austria and confer about common action
if that nation were imperiled, and it was agreed that Mussolini should invite
the British to a meeting at Stresa, with the object of adding them to the
anti-German front. This conference, held on April 11-14, 1935, was a
partial success. All three governments joined in a commitment to oppose, "
by all practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may
endanger the peace of Europe. While this commitment was qualified by
a provision requiring the use of League machinery, it seemed a direct warning
to Hitler. The Stresa declaration was followed, moreover, by action to open
a League debate on the question of whether or not Germany's reinstitution
of compulsory military service constituted a unilateral breach of the Treaty
of Versailles. On April 17, the Council, with only one abstention (that of
Denmark) voted in principle its condemnation of all unilateral violations
of treaties and referred the German case to the Assembly.
Meanwhile, Laval began negotiations with the ambassador
of the USSR in Paris. On May 2, they announced the signature of a five-year
pact pledging mutual assistance in the event that either nation was the victim
of aggression. This was followed on May 16 by a similar pact between the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. Coupled with the earlier treaties that allied Poland
and the Little Entente with France, these accords seemed to close the ring
around Nazi Germany, and they were accompanied by movements within all the
major European governments to increase spending on armaments. In June 1935,
the French ambassador in Berlin, Andre Francois-Poncet, reported
the German leaders to be more "defeated and discouraged than he had
ever seen them.
Anglo-German Naval Agreement
The so-called
Stresa front was short lived. Some members of the British government reacted
to the evidence of German rearmament by drawing the moral that the nation
should detach itself and avoid such enforced involvement in war as that of
1914. Finding the German government full of protestations of goodwill for
Britain, members of this group reasoned that the course of prudence was to
eliminate all potential Anglo-German issues. One that had embittered relations
between the two countries in pre-World War I years had been naval rivalry,
and when the Admiralty reported exchanges with the Germans that revealed the
possibility of a bilateral compact on the relative size of the two fleets,
considerable official sentiment developed in favor of following it up. This
was done, though in the most closely guarded secrecy, and on June 18, 1935,
a naval pact with Germany was signed. It provided that Germany could build
a fleet of capital ships equal in tonnage to one third, and a fleet of submarines
equal to 60 percent, of that of the Royal Navy. In view of the fact that the
Treaty of Versailles had set other limits on German naval strength and had
forbidden the construction of submarines, these terms constituted acceptance
by Britain of Germany's repudiation of those articles. Coming barely two months
after the Stresa accords, this pact gave evidence that the nations apparently
joined against Germany were in fact far from united.
Nor did the Franco-Soviet accord prove more durable. Laval
had always doubted the wisdom of the Barthou policy and inclined toward the
view that France might be better off in league with Germany than against her.
On Jan. 13, 1935, the plebiscite promised by the Treaty of Versailles had
taken place in the Saar, with more than 90 percent of the voters opting for
reunion with Germany, and Laval not only accepted the verdict with good cheer
but made the point to diplomats that France would not necessarily be intransigent
in all matters that affected Germany. Instead of seeking prompt ratification
of the Franco-Soviet Pact by the French Parliament, he held it over (it was
carried through that body by his successor, Albert Sarraut, in February 1936),
meanwhile evading all suggestions from the Soviet capital of a military convention
to supplement it and to make clear how it might be carried out. The Soviets
were pressing Laval onto delicate ground, it is true, for a military convention
would involve such issues as whether or not Soviet troops could move across
Poland or Romania, and Laval, who had become premier on June 7, 1935, was
looking forward uneasily to a national election and to the possibility that
the opposition Popular Front, of which the Communists were part, might profit
from a closer Franco-Soviet tie. Nevertheless, his hesitancies provided further
evidence that the unity of Europe against Germany might be an illusion.
Italo-Ethiopian War
Although the British
at Stresa had given Mussolini no assurances that they would acquiesce in his
conquest of Ethiopia, their reticences had been so interpreted by him, and
he was strengthened in this view when, in June 1935, Anthony Eden, minister
for League of Nations affairs, came to Rome to suggest that Britain might
cede to Ethiopia part of British Somaliland so that Ethiopia might in turn
appease Italy by ceding to it some land adjacent to Italian Somaliland. Eden
even suggested that a way might be found to make Ethiopia a virtual economic
protectorate of Italy. Mussolini soon learned that these gestures did not
necessarily mean what he thought. When he rejected Eden's proposals and continued
preparations for war, the British government moved warships into the Mediterranean
Sea as if in preparation for a League vote of sanctions against Italy. On
September 11, after Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare addressed the League
Assembly and declared firmly that Britain would be "second to none
in fulfilling her obligations under the Covenant, Mussolini was faced with
the very contingency that he thought his diplomacy had prevented: the possibility
of League intervention in behalf of Ethiopia. He nevertheless moved forward.
When Emperor Haile Selassie ordered Ethiopian mobilization on September 29,
he responded by proclaiming national mobilization in Italy. On October 3,
his armies attacked from Eritrea and thus opened war.
In Geneva the League Council, immediately heard the protests
of Haile Selassie's representative. On October 7, with Italy alone abstaining,
it voted to condemn Mussolini's aggression as a resort to war in defiance
of Article 12 of the Covenant. Referred to the Assembly, this resolution on
October 11 won the support of 50 of the 54 members, only Italy and her client
states, Albania, Austria, and Hungary, opposing it. It remained for a Coordination
Committee of the League to determine what sanctions should be imposed. Here
practical rather than moral issues arose, for, as a totalitarian state that
had endeavored for more than a decade to achieve national self-sufficiency, Fascist Italy could withstand almost all forms of moral and
economic pressure. The only sanctions that would do it serious injury would
be closure of the Suez Canal, which would block the sending of reinforcements
and supplies, and stoppage of the one vital commodity that Italy had to import
in quantity, oil.
Fearing that closure of the canal would lead to war with
Italy, the British government, which controlled the waterway, had little inclination
to take that step. As for oil, it was doubtful whether a League decree could
be effective in view of the fact that the leading producer, the United States,
was not bound by the Covenant. Although Congress had enacted a so-called Neutrality
Act (signed on Aug. 31, 1935), which required embargoes to be laid on exports
of munitions to nations at war, it did not apply to petroleum products. While
President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared on November 15 that oil and other
commodities were "essential war materials and ought to be included,
there was no assurance that American exporters would adopt such a "moral
embargo, or that if they did not, Congress would amend the law to cover
these items. The American government encouraged the League powers to expect
cooperation but could not guarantee it.
When the Coordination Committee brought in its report on
October 19, it made only five relatively mild recommendations for sanctions
against Italy: embargoes on shipments of arms to her; bans on loans and credits;
bans on imports from her; embargoes on exports to her of transport animals,
rubber, and a variety of metals; and joint aid to nations that suffered economically
as a result of taking these steps. Voted on separately in the Assembly, they
were approved by majorities respectively of 50, 49, 48, 48, and 39. Since
their practical effect would be slight, the chief hope was that the display
of unity in world opinion would impress Mussolini and cause him to change
his course. It did not.
Hoare-Laval Plan
As Italian military
operations continued, sentiment grew, especially in Britain, for more effective
action. Between January and June 1935, a so-called Peace Ballot, a national
referendum supported by the British League of Nations Union and allied groups,
had yielded 6,784,368 votes endorsing the principle that, if one nation insisted
on attacking another, the other nations should combine to employ not only
economic but also military sanctions (10,027,608 favored economic sanctions
alone). Although this total encompassed a substantial percentage of the electorate,
the result had been discounted by most politicians on the ground that the
ballot had probably not been understood fully by its signers. Now, however,
they began to consider that it had been more significant. Campaigning in a
general election, spokesmen for the government felt obliged to use increasingly
vigorous words in speaking of what Britain and the League would do. Returned
on November 14 with an overwhelming majority of seats in the House of Commons
(431 to 184), the Conservative cabinet was under pressure to live up to its
promises.
Those ministers who were dubious about the whole policy
of sanctions found this pressure especially onerous. They urged a further
effort to induce Mussolini to abandon the war and thus, they hoped, to rescue
Britain from the predicament in which she was likely soon to find herself.
Precisely what was said and agreed on within the cabinet remains unknown.
The result was, however, that Hoare set off in early December for a skating
holiday in Switzerland, and that he paused for two days (December 7-8)
in Paris for intensive conversations with Laval. The result of these conversations
was an agreement on proposals to be made secretly to Mussolini. He was to
be asked to halt the war with the understanding that Italy would receive from
Ethiopia the northeastern section of the Tigre, part of the desert of Danakil,
all of the Ogaden region, and "exclusive economic rights in the country
south of 8 degrees north latitude and east of 35 degrees east longitude. All that
Italy would yield in return would be a corridor giving Ethiopia a camel track
to the sea across almost impassable desert. This plan offered Italy almost
everything that she could hope to obtain by continuing her campaign.
Convinced that the application of further sanctions would
lead to a general war harmful to French interests, Laval had devised these
terms. He had also developed the strategy to be followed. The plan was to
be put before Mussolini first. After he accepted, it was to be shown to Haile
Selassie. When the Ethiopian ruler rejected it, the French and British would
be able to say that he had refused peace, and could not only oppose the imposition
of further sanctions but also call for the lifting of those that had already
been voted. Whatever the outcome for Ethiopia, the crisis between the League
powers and Italy would have been bridged, and some facsimile of the Stresa
front might be put together again. Even before they could be put into diplomatic
cables, however, the terms of the plan leaked to the press. From partisans
of Ethiopia and the League there arose an instant and loud outcry. The British
and French governments were accused of preparing to betray the interests of
a small nation, to sacrifice the principle of collective security, and reward
an aggressor. So strong was feeling in Britain that Prime Minister Stanley
Baldwin felt compelled on December 18 to request Hoare's resignation and soon
afterward to appoint as his successor Eden, the champion of the League. In
France, Laval's government barely survived a vote of confidence in the Chamber
of Deputies on December 29. From the United States, where sentiment for effective
embargoes had been rapidly growing, came a torrent of criticism of British
and French shortsightedness.
Mussolini had meanwhile given indication that he would not
in any case accept less than the total conquest of Ethiopia. In January 1936,
there was discussion within the League of adding an oil embargo to the sanctions.
Despite the events that had followed the release of the Hoare-Laval terms,
however, official French and British opinion was still opposed to such action.
The decision was for delay, pending the outcome of Roosevelt's efforts to
amend the American neutrality laws. Since nothing encouraging was done by
Congress, nothing at all was done by the League. As it turned out, the limit
of its capacities had been reached in the vote of sanctions of October. As
winter turned into spring, the Italian offensive in Ethiopia gained momentum.
On May 5, 1936, Fascist troops marched into the capital, Addis Ababa. Four
days later, Mussolini proclaimed the war ended and Ethiopia part of Italian
East Africa. By summer most of the League powers had concluded that they could
only accept as a fact the extinction of Ethiopian sovereignty, and the Assembly
agreed that sanctions against Italy should be suspended as of July 15. The
League's machinery for maintaining collective
security had proved ineffectual.
Rhineland Coup
An even more significant
demonstration of this fact came before the Italo-Ethiopian War was liquidated.
Seeing the split within the Stresa front, Hitler decided to act in the Rhineland--to
repudiate the articles of the Treaty of Versailles that declared that region
permanently demilitarized. When he communicated this decision to his generals,
they were appalled. In their view the German Army was still comparatively
weak, and the air force had relatively little offensive capability. They warned
the fuhrer that the French had the power single-handedly to drive a German
force from the region and impose humiliating terms. Hitler's response was
a simple assertion that the French would not move. He ordered the requisite
preparations made.
The legal pretext he found in the Franco-Soviet Pact of
1935. By committing France to act against Germany in the event of German aggression
against the USSR, Hitler could argue, this pact constituted a repudiation
of the Locarno treaties, in which France had promised never to make war on
Germany except in obedience to resolutions by the League of Nations. It also
constituted a threat to Germany, he could say, and therefore, despite the
Treaty of Versailles, gave warrant for action in self-defense. On March 7,
1936, shortly after the French Assembly's ratification of the Franco-Soviet
Pact, he exposed this reasoning in diplomatic notes and in a speech to the
Reichstag. He announced that German troops were moving into the demilitarized
zone. At the same time, he offered as measures of reassurance to sign nonaggression
pacts with France and all Germany's neighbors, east as well as west; to concert
with the French a new demilitarization agreement, applying to both sides of
the frontier; and to reenter the League of Nations.
The French government was shocked. Premier Sarraut responded
with a forceful radio address, declaring, "We shall not leave Strasbourg
under the German cannon. As he later testified, however, he and his colleagues
were uncertain as to what they would in fact do. Reports by military men on
France's capacity to repel the German force were generally pessimistic. The
army, they said, was inadequate. It would be necessary to call up reservists
in order to fill its ranks. Overestimating the German bomber force, they warned
that Paris and other centers lacked the air defenses to prevent devastating
raids. Their judgments thus reinforced the feeling that had been instinctive
among the principal members of the cabinet--that France dare not act
alone, and that perhaps she should not act even if she received support from
abroad.
One capital with which they were particularly concerned
was Warsaw. On the day of Hitler's announcement the Polish government gave
them reassurance that in the event of a clash it would stand by the alliance
of 1921 and proposed immediate conversations. Two days later, on March 9,
however, it declared that it accepted the German thesis and regarded the reoccupation
of the Rhineland as a legitimate response to the Franco-Soviet Pact. Their
objective may have been merely to emphasize that Polish support of France
would constitute action above and beyond the 1921 treaty, but the impression
given the French government was that the Poles were playing a double game,
and that France could not rely on them. The other nation whose support would
be crucial to the French in a clash with Germany was Great Britain, and while
the British government was more forthright than the Polish, it gave France
even less encouragement to stand fast. Eden declared the German action to
be inexcusable but not threatening, especially in view of Hitler's offer of
nonaggression pacts. Calling for a meeting of the League Council, he said
that no decision should be taken beforehand by any government. The only promise
he made was that Britain would support France if she were attacked by Germany
in the period before the League acted.
The French government was thus informed by its two most
important allies that it could not expect backing if it replied to the Germans
with force. Some members of the Sarraut cabinet found this news not unwelcome.
Perhaps most did, for they faced a general election in May; they felt that
a call-up of reservists would cost them votes; and, in view of the identification
of their Popular Front opponents with antifascism, they feared that any crisis
with Germany might have the same effect. The French press, also preoccupied
with domestic affairs, raised little clamor for action. Consequently, on March
11, Sarraut backed away from his earlier position, announcing that the cabinet
had decided to seek a solution within the framework of the League of Nations,
working in conjunction with the othr signers of the Locarno Pact. The League
did in fact discuss a resolution condemning the German action. Nothing came
of this discussion, however, and the Rhineland question was lost to sight
in the pell-mell rush of other events. Hitler's coup had succeeded. Not only
the machinery of the League but also the French system of alliances lay in ruins. There were no longer any collective guarantees of the
peace, and the end of the truce of 1918-1919 was in sight.
END OF THE LONG ARMISTICE
Spanish Civil War
Hardly were the
Ethiopian and Rhineland crises out of mind when a new storm swept the stage.
In Spanish Morocco on July 17, 1936, so-called Nationalists launched a revolution
against the Popular Front government of the five-year old Spanish Republic
(garrisons in Spain proper rose the next day). Championing ideas much like
those of the Fascists and Nazis, they applied immediately to Rome and Berlin
for aid. The republicans or Loyalists (as they became known) with equal alacrity
applied for help to Paris, where the May elections had given victory to the
Popular Front and made Leon Blum, a Socialist, premier in June. From the outset
the Spanish Civil War was a European problem.
Italy and Germany both agreed promptly to act. Italian ships
and planes were soon aiding Nationalist troops to cross from Morocco to the
Iberian Peninsula, and before long Italians and Germans were actually fighting
in the Nationalist ranks. On November 28, Mussolini signed with the Nationalist
leader, Gen. Francisco Franco, a pact providing that Italian aid should be
recompensed by economic cooperation, political cooperation in the western
Mediterranean, and "benevolent neutrality on the part of Spain in
a general war. Later, on March 20, 1937, Hitler entered into an agreement
with Franco that promised consultations in the event of a European war and
guaranteed the export to Germany of quantities of Spanish provisions and raw
materials.
At first the French government was disposed to give aid
to the republicans, and, indeed, Premier Blum immediately authorized sales
of aircraft and munitions. But counsels of caution soon came to the fore.
With little of the regular army loyal to it, the Spanish Republic seemed unlikely
to survive. Since the Spanish Popular Front was somewhat more radical than
the French, its cabinet was viewed askance by some members of the Blum government.
Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned furthermore that assistance
to the republicans would probably lead to increased Italian and German assistance
to the Nationalists, and that the eventual outcome might well be a general
European war. This last consideration was pressed on the French by their British
allies. Many in the majority Conservative Party felt that Britain's position
should be "a plague o' both your houses. While most Liberals and Labourites
praised the republic and damned the Nationalists, few argued that British
interests were involved in the civil war. The Baldwin cabinet therefore had
mass support in adopting the position that the aim of the democracies should
be to quarantine Spain and prevent the conflict from spreading.
Torn within and under pressure from London, the Blum cabinet
decided to take a similar stand. On Aug. 1, 1936, it proclaimed a policy of
nonintervention, declaring that the Spaniards should be allowed to fight out
their war without aid in men or materiel from any other country and
asking all other governments to join in this course. A total of 27 nations,
including Italy and Germany, agreed, and an international Nonintervention
Committee was established in London to keep watch on the fulfillment of these
pledges. In actuality the committee never proved effective. The Italians and
Germans continued more or less openly to assist Franco, and the Soviet government,
despite its promise to the contrary, contributed men and supplies to the republicans.
Even the French wavered from time to time, leaving the Pyrenees frontier open
on two occasions (in November 1937 and April-May 1938) for shipments
to the republic. Among the European powers only Britain was faithful to the
pledge. The United States, though not a party to it, followed the British
by applying its neutrality laws to the civil war. Partly because Soviet and
French aid to the republic was considerably less than Italian and German aid
to the Nationalists, partly because of military advantages on Franco's side,
and partly because of divisions among the Loyalists, the Nationalists eventually
triumphed. By the end of March 1939, Franco was master of nearly all of Spain.
The Spanish conflict was not the match that touched off
a new world war. It did, however, make tensions more acute. Even among those
in Britain, France, and the United States who continued to regard nonintervention
as a wise policy there were some who felt that Spain represented one more
victory for the totalitarian states, and that this fact brought nearer the
moment when their career of success would have to be checked. Among the Italians
and Germans it strengthened the illusion that the democracies were weak willed
and would not resist.
Sino-Japanese War
As the Spanish Civil
War rounded out its first year, a crisis arose in another part of the globe.
Ever since they had created the satellite state of Manchukuo, the Japanese
had been discussing further steps toward national expansion. Moderate factions
had advocated the use of peaceful means, particularly the application of economic
pressure to China, coupled with efforts to induce the Chinese government to
accept a client status. These measures had, however, been only partially successful.
Extremist groups had become increasingly restless, and the government had
edged steadily toward a more forceful policy.
On April 18, 1934, the official spokesman for the Foreign
Office, Eiji Amau, announced that any effort by a Western power to aid China
would be opposed by Japan. In effect, this declaration was a Japanese Monroe
Doctrine for eastern Asia. In December, Japan gave notice that she would no
longer be bound by the Washington Naval (Five-Power) Treaty of 1922, which
had stipulated that Japanese tonnage in capital ships should not exceed three-fifths
that of Britain or the United States. After attempting unsuccessfully in 1935
to arrange for the secession of the northern provinces of China and the establishment
there of another satellite state, the Japanese government on Aug. 11, 1936,
devised a new statement of "fundamental principles of a national policy,
declaring Japan's destiny to be the dominating force in all of eastern
Asia.
Most of the powers with interests in the Far East failed
to respond with any vigor. The United States contented itself with mild diplomatic
protests, and while the British spoke of extending help to China, they made
no move to do so. Only the Soviet Union acted in such a way as to indicate
that it might at some point resist a Japanese advance. On March 12, 1936,
it signed a mutual defense pact with its client state, Outer Mongolia (Mongolian
People's Republic). More important, Soviet
dictator Joseph Stalin advised the Chinese Communists to make peace with the
central government and form a common front. Faced with these gestures by the
USSR, the Japanese government seized on a proposal from the Germans and on
November 25 signed with Hitler an Anti-Comintern Pact. This agreement stipulated
nothing more than that the two governments exchange data about, and collaborate
in suppressing, Communist activities. Inevitably, however, other governments
suspected that it contained secret articles making the two nations allies.
The result in both London and Washington was to quicken apprehension concerning
possible Japanese aggressive moves. In April 1937, the British government
began belatedly to supply financial and technical assistance to China, and
American officials talked openly of doing likewise.
Rising prospects for foreign support of China, coupled with
various domestic developments, led the Japanese government to decide that
it could no longer achieve its objects by peaceful means. On July 7, 1937,
taking advantage of a minor clash at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping (Peking),
the Japanese Army opened a large-scale invasion of China. The other powers
still did not act. Britain and the United States delivered diplomatic protests,
and on October 6 the League Assembly voted to condemn Japan's action but not
to brand it as aggression and not therefore to invoke sanctions. Speaking
at Chicago on the previous day, Roosevelt had said that an "epidemic of
world lawlessness was spreading and suggested that, as with an epidemic
disease, it might be met by a "quarantine. It soon became clear, however,
that he would not go on to advocate combined action against Japan. Instead
a meeting was called in Brussels of the 18 nations that had adhered to the
Nine-Power Treaty, signed in Washington in 1922 and promising respect for
the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity
of China. From this meeting issued, on November 24, nothing more than an exhortation
to Japan to mend her ways. The Soviet Union for its part was caught up in
a domestic crisis, the result of which was a purge of the leading generals
in the army. In August 1938, its forces did engage in a 10-day skirmish with
Japanese troops that had infringed the Soviet border. Aside from sending a
trickle of aid to the Chinese, however, no power did anything more.
The Japanese were able in 18 months to overrun the area
around Peiping, the central Yangtze Basin, and most of the coast of southern
China. By the end of 1938 they controlled the richest portions of the country
and exercised sway over nearly half its population. In uneasy cooperation
with the Communists the Chinese central government was organizing itself for
prolonged resistance, and, in fact, war was to continue for more than eight
years. Nevertheless, the Japanese aggression seemed at the time to have been
an overwhelming success. And in view of the association of the Japanese with
the Germans (and after Nov. 6, 1937, with the Italians) in the Anti-Comintern
Pact, their triumph seemed another score on the side of the totalitarian states,
another encouragement to them, another warning to the democracies.
The Axis and the Anschluss
Even before
the Sino-Japanese War the French and British had begun to take some action.
Military authorities in both countries estimated (probably erroneously) that
the Germans had a long lead in preparations for war. To bring themselves abreast
the French decided in October 1936 to undertake a four-year rearmament program,
and the British followed their example. The two governments also gave fresh
thought to the possibility of redressing the balance by finding allies. Aware
of the isolationism of the United States, suspicious of Soviet communism,
and apprehensive that in any case the army purges of 1937 might have weakened
the USSR, they turned inevitably to the idea of allying themselves with Italy--of
recreating the Stresa front. Mussolini, however, had been drawing closer to
Hitler. After both independently gave aid to Franco, discussion arose about
the possibility of cooperation in wider spheres. Hitler, who had prophesied
a German-Italian entente in Mein Kampf, made the first overtures.
In October 1936, the Italian foreign minister, Conte Galeazzo Ciano, visited
Germany and arrived at vague understandings on common action against international
communism. On November 1, reacting viscerally to the British decision on rearmament,
the duce made a speech. In it he spoke of a "vertical line between Rome
and Berlin that was "not a partition but rather an axis round which
all European states animated by the will to collaboration and peace can also
collaborate. Seizing on his words, commentators soon coupled Italy and
Germany as the Axis powers.
They were not yet formal allies. Indeed, from the French
and British standpoint, it seemed that they were far from being so. After
the settlement of the Ethiopian affair, Italy's paramount interests appeared
once again to lie in the Danubian region. And it was there that Hitler seemed
most likely to make his next move. He had continued to give strong backing
to the Austrian Nazis. In February 1938, through pressure on Chancellor von
Schuschnigg, he forced the appointment of Nazis to key posts in the Austrian
government. He and they talked openly of an Anschluss: a political union.
It remained to be seen whether Mussolini would react again as he had in 1934.
The Italian dictator did in fact sound out the British government on the possibility of an accord. He did not ask that Britain guarantee
support against Germany, but merely that it recognize his conquest of Ethiopia
and reach an entente with him on Mediterranean issues. This would be enough,
he implied, to enable him to stand up to Hitler on the Austrian question.
Whether he was in earnest or not remains doubtful. In any event, Foreign Secretary
Eden took the view that an understanding with Italy was impossible without
the termination of Italian intervention in Spain. Although the majority of
the cabinet disagreed with him and he resigned, there was so much support
for his position in the House of Commons that the government felt compelled
to go slowly.
Meanwhile, Hitler moved. On Nov. 5, 1937, he had disclosed
his thoughts to some of his principal political and military subordinates.
The next six to eight years, he said, would bring Germany to the peak of her
relative power. Thereafter rearmament by other nations, coupled with the obsolescence
of German weapons, would mean that any change would be for the worse. "
Germany's problem could only be solved by means of force, he declared,
and "it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of space
at the latest by 1943-1945. The first steps would be the conquest
of Austria and Czechoslovakia. After that the schedule would depend on circumstances.
Morally sure that Italy would not resist, he had made preparations to act
against Austria. His demand for the installation of Nazis in key posts in
that government was a first step. When Schuschnigg made a sign of defiance,
announcing a projected plebiscite in which the Austrian people would register
their desire to remain independent, Hitler sent an angry ultimatum demanding
its cancellation. Encouraged by Schuschnigg's compliance, he then demanded
that a Nazi be installed as chancellor. When rebuffed, he directed Dr. Arthur
Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Nazi minister of the interior, to proclaim himself
head of a provisional government and invite German intervention. This was
done. German troops crossed the border early on March 12. On the following
day, Anschluss was proclaimed, and on March 14 Hitler himself was in Vienna.
Having received no encouraging reply from London, Mussolini had acquiesced,
telling Hitler's envoy that "Austria would be immaterial to him. Since
the British had taken the position even in 1934 that Austria was not a direct
concern of theirs, they contented themselves with a strong diplomatic protest.
The French, embroiled in a domestic crisis and having only a caretaker cabinet,
were incapable of even contemplating action. In the series of successes of
the dictatorships the conquest of Austria was the most rapid, the most complete,
and the most feebly opposed.
Czech Crisis
It was clear to all the
world that Czechoslovakia was now in peril. German garrisons ringed its western
frontiers, and the German press and radio thundered about persecution suffered
by the German minority there. In the Sudetenland, where most of this minority
resided, a constant clamor was maintained by Nazi sympathizers whose leaders
plainly took their orders from Berlin. Reacting to evidence of German troop
concentrations, the Czechs on May 20, 1938, ordered the mobilization of reserves
along the German frontier. Their French ally stood by them, warning the Germans
not to attack. The British ambassador in Berlin added reinforcement by reminding
the German Foreign Office that Britain was an ally of France, and the Soviet
government declared that it would live up to its alliance with Czechoslovakia.
This so-called May crisis proved short lived, for on May 22, Hitler sent to
Prague assurances that he was not concentrating troops and that he had no
aggressive designs.
Although this episode was frequently cited later as an instance
in which firmness by the other powers had forced Hitler to back down, the
fact was that the crisis was illusory. While the fuhrer intended eventually
to move against Czechoslovakia, it had not been in his mind to act so soon
after the Anschluss. On April 21, he had ordered the High Command of the Armed
Forces (OKW) to bring up to date plans for a Czech campaign, but the work
was not completed until mid-May. Hitler was, in fact, giving his approval
to this document on the very day when the Czechs mobilized, and the first
words of his covering letter were, "It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia
in the immediate future without provocation, unless an unavoidable development
within Czechoslovakia forces the issue. If the May crisis had any
result, it may have been to anger Hitler and incline him to advance his timetable.
His associates testified later that he was furious at having to give assurances
to the Czechs, and on May 30 he revised his directive to read, "It is my
unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near
future. Perhaps, too, the false sense of having been at the very brink
of war had a palsying effect on the governments that had momentarily seemed
so firm.
In succeeding weeks and months the British showed an increasing
disposition to arrange some appeasement of the Germans. Neville Chamberlain
was now prime minister, having succeeded Baldwin on May 28, 1937, and he was
strongly of the view that the Germans had many legitimate grievances, that
it would not be in the interest of the world for the powers to insist obstinately
on maintaining the status quo, and that every conceivable step should be taken
to avert war. His position in the May crisis had actually been a good deal
less firm than it seemed, and he took pains afterward to make this plain.
Through newspaper leaks he let it be known that Britain saw merit in the German
position on the Sudetenland. On Aug. 3, 1938, he dispatched the 1st Viscount
Runciman to Czechoslovakia to devise a formula that might satisfy Hitler.
On September 7, in a widely noticed editorial that was probably inspired by
the government, the London Times went so far as to suggest that the
Sudetenland might be allowed to secede and unite itself with Germany. Hitler
had meanwhile fixed October 1 as the date on which German forces were to move
on Czechoslovakia. By early September, increased agitation by the Sudeten
Nazis and the German press and radio gave notice that some kind of climax
was approaching. At a party rally in Nurnberg on September 12, Hitler
delivered a tirade against the Czechs. Observers reported infantry and armored
units moving to the frontiers, and this time there was no question of the
fact.
Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg
To
avert the impending crisis, Chamberlain resolved to meet face to face with
Hitler. Although he was 69 years old and had never been in an airplane before,
he telegraphed the German dictator offering to fly over at once, and on September
15, Hitler met him at Berchtesgaden. There the prime minister asked if Germany would be satisfied by the cession to her
of the Sudetenland. When assured that this was the case, he promised to press
such a solution on the French and the Czechs. He returned to London sure that
a basis for peace had been found and convinced, too, as he noted in a private
memorandum, "that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given
his word. On September 18, the premier and foreign minister of France,
Edouard Daladier and Georges Bonnet, came to the British capital. Although
in the past they had said repeatedly that France would stand by Czechoslovakia,
the question of whether or not to repeat this assurance had been debated in
their cabinet throughout the day of September 13 without a decision being
reached. Their military advisers had warned that the French armies alone could
not carry out offensive operations, and that France would still be defenseless
in the face of German air attacks. The Czech Army, though 800,000 strong,
was not credited with ability to maintain prolonged resistance. Only Soviet
troops were in a position to come directly to the aid of Czechoslovakia, and
although the USSR had indicated that it would dispatch such troops, they could
arrive only by way of Romania or Poland. Both of these countries had indicated
firmly that they would not grant rights of passage, and the Poles had said
on September 12 that they would not honor their alliance with France if France
were swept into war on account of Czechoslovakia. Daladier and Bonnet were
eager therefore to explore any road that might lead to peace. They gave approval
to the formula that Chamberlain had brought back from Berchtesgaden, and on
September 19 the British and French governments joined in urging the Czechs
to accept it.
The initial response from Prague was negative. The government
of President Eduard Benes was well aware that in sacrificing the Sudetenland
Czechoslovakia would lose not only valuable resources and industrial plants
but also her only natural defenses against Germany, and Benes had thus
far employed every device to prevent its loss. But this initial response was
not the final one. Fearful as they were of the Germans, Czech leaders were
even more frightened of the Russians. Further dispatches from London and Paris
impressed on them the fact that even if the Western democracies went to war
in their behalf, British and French troops would not come to Czechoslovakia.
Soviet troops, on the other hand, might do so. There were persistent hints
from Moscow that they would force their way through Romania or Poland. The
general feeling among Czech leaders was that, if so, they would never withdraw.
The cabinet, or at least some part of it, decided that the course of wisdom
was to accept the sacrifices urged by the British and French. Declaring that
he was acting with the knowledge of Benes, Premier Milan Hodza
communicated secretly with Bonnet, requesting a statement that France would
not defend Czechoslovakia if the Anglo-French proposals were rejected. With
this in hand, he indicated, it would be possible for the cabinet to justify
acceptance of them. Bonnet complied, and on September 21 the Czechs gave notice
that they would agree to the terms which Chamberlain and Hitler had devised
at Berchtesgaden.
Delighted, Chamberlain arranged for another meeting with
the fuhrer, this time at Bad Godesberg on the Rhine. When he arrived
on September 22, however, he found to his dismay that the Berchtesgaden terms
no longer satisfied Hitler. The German now demanded not only that the Sudetenland
be ceded to Germany but that it be turned over to her immediately: before
2 pm on September 28. Since Chamberlain had envisaged a survey of the area
by an international commission and German-Czech negotiations to determine
new boundaries, this meant the ruin of all he had arranged. On September 23,
he left for home, heavyhearted and doubtful that war could be averted.
Munich
For the next few days, Europe
seemed on the verge of war. The Czechs mobilized. Daladier and Bonnet came
again to London, where they were assured more or less definitively of British
support. They in turn promised backing to the Czechs. On September 26, Hitler
spoke at the Sportspalast in Berlin, proclaiming in violent language that
the Sudeten issue would be solved in a matter of days, if necessary by force.
On the following day, the British cabinet ordered partial mobilization. Air-raid
shelters began to go up in London. Chamberlain expressed his attitude in a
radio address to the British people. "How horrible, fantastic, incredible
it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because
of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing!
Grasping at straws, he wrote again to Hitler and sent a message to Mussolini
requesting Italian influence on behalf of a peaceful settlement. President
Roosevelt on September 26 appealed to Hitler to negotiate with the other Europeans.
While the German leader had hoped that France would not
act and had counted on the British not to do so, he told intimates that he
was ready to make war if it proved necessary. His generals were almost unanimous
in holding that Germany was not in fact ready to fight against Czechoslovakia,
France, Britain, and probably the USSR, but Hitler appeared to have little
regard for their opinions. On the morning of September 28, he seemed prepared
to carry out his threat, come what might. Before the 2 pm deadline, however,
he received Chamberlain's new message, a communication from the French ambassador
which indicated that France would go to almost any length to avoid war, and
a message from Mussolini proposing an Anglo-French-German-Italian conference
to compose the issue. Informing the Western governments that he would postpone his deadline until October 1 (the date fixed by his
original plans), he agreed to accept the duce's suggestions.
The conference met at Munich on September 29-30. A
new plan was put forward by Mussolini. Since it had actually been drawn up
in Berlin, Hitler said that he found it a satisfactory basis for negotiation.
Chamberlain and Daladier accepted it with few amendments. The four leaders
affixed their signatures, and Chamberlain returned to London to declare that
he brought back "peace with honour, adding, "I believe it is peace
in our time. The Munich agreement stipulated that the Germans should
occupy the Sudetenland by October 10; that an international commission, representing
the four powers and Czechoslovakia, should arrange the transfer and draw new
boundaries not only there but also on the Czech-Polish and Czech-Hungarian
frontiers; and that afterward all four powers would guarantee these new frontiers.
Dominated by the Germans, the commission awarded to Germany all the border
area that had been shown as German in the Austro-Hungarian census of 1910.
This included approximately 10,000 square miles and 3,500,000 persons. The
commission also approved Polish seizure of the Teschen
region, which took place on October 2, and on November 2 awarded to Hungary
a strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia. The deed to the Poles covered about
400 square miles and 240,000 persons; that to Hungary, about 5,000 square
miles and 1,000,000 persons.
End of Appeasement
Hitler, of course,
was not satisfied with the Munich settlement. On October 21, only three weeks
after signing the accord, he advised his generals that one of their next tasks
would be "liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Another
was the seizure of Memel, a port on the Baltic Sea which had
been taken from Germany and placed under League of Nations auspices in 1919
and had been seized by Lithuania in 1923. While plans for these undertakings
were being prepared, he opened a diplomatic offensive on still another front,
notifying the Polish government on October 24 that he wished revisions in
the statute for the Free City of Danzig, road and rail corridors
through Polish territory to connect Germany with Danzig, and extraterritorial
rights in these corridors for German subjects.
In western European capitals, even while joy over Munich
was at its height, there was some suspicion about Hitler's future intentions.
Daladier was skeptical from the outset that the settlement would
last. Reports from intelligence sources soon aroused similar doubts in members
of the British government. Official and public opinion in both countries veered
toward the view that appeasement had been given its final trial--that
the Munich accords were the last concessions that could be made, and that
further demands by Hitler would call for forthright opposition. In March 1939,
this changed mood was put to the test. Hitler had paid no attention to diplomats'
warnings of it. The French had signed with him on Dec. 6, 1938, a joint declaration
guaranteeing the Franco-German frontier and promising the settlement of future
differences by consultation. The British had made overtures for economic accords.
Though meant as earnests of desire to make the Munich settlement work, these
gestures were interpreted by Hitler as further evidence of spinelessness,
and when he next acted, he did so more brazenly than on any occasion in the
past.
Having given encouragement earlier to Slovakian separatists,
on March 11, 1939, he sent Austrian Nazis to Slovakia to order the Slovakians
to proclaim their independence and ask him to become their protector. In the
meantime, the Czech president, Emil Hacha, asked to see the fuhrer.
He was invited to Berlin and given an audience in the early morning hours
of March 15. An almost incredible scene ensued. Hitler told Hacha that
there were only two choices: Czechoslovakia could ask to be occupied peacefully,
or it could be invaded and its people made to suffer. The fuhrer's deputies
literally chased Hacha around a table, trying to force him to sign
a proclamation requesting establishment of a German protectorate. When the
aged Czech fainted, he was revived with injections. Finally he signed. Hitler
immediately ordered his troops to move, and on March 16 he was in Prague,
proclaiming that Czechoslovakia no longer existed. Both the Czech and the
Slovakian regions became German protectorates. In accordance with a prior
understanding the largest part of the Carpatho-Ukraine was turned over to
Hungary.
The reactions in Western capitals were mixed. The fact that
Hacha had invited German intervention made it hard for the French and
the British to do more than protest the violation of the spirit of Munich.
On the other hand, even the firmest believers in appeasement were shocked
by Hitler's seizing new territory after having said so vehemently that he
had no further ambitions and especially by his taking into the Reich 10,000,000
persons who were not of German nationality. The majority of the French cabinet
now agreed immediately that, when he moved again, Hitler would have to be
stopped by force. At Birmingham on March 17, Chamberlain declared that if
the recent German action proved merely a prelude to other attacks on small
states, Britain would join in resisting "to the utmost of its power.
The nation most likely to be Hitler's next target was Poland.
On January 9, Hitler had renewed his demands with regard to Danzig, coupling
with them a secret communication suggesting that Poland might in return obtain
eventual cessions of territory in the Soviet Ukraine. On February 1, the Poles
refused. On March 21, however, Hitler notified them in threatening language
that the Danzig issue would have to be settled. Two days later, German troops
seized Memel. The French and British had already indicated that they were
prepared to negotiate an alliance with Poland. The chief stumbling block was
the question of whether or not the USSR should be included. Through the commissar
for foreign affairs, Maksim M. Litvinov, the Soviets had expressed a desire
to be a party to the alliance. Polish leaders, however, looked on this offer
with apprehension fully equal to that which had been shown by the Czechs.
While exhibiting eagerness for ties with the British and French, they still
said firmly that they would not permit Soviet troops to cross their soil.
Although most members of the French and British cabinet wanted to form a common
front with Poland and the USSR, they concluded that it would be dangerous
to wait for a change in the Polish stand. On March 23, as a warning to Hitler,
the two governments had declared that they would defend Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland against any attack. This pledge had been made without any
quid pro quo, and Daladier and Chamberlain decided that their simplest
course was to follow the same procedure with regard to Poland. The British
prime minister asked if the Poles would have any objection. They said no,
and on March 31, Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons:
In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence
and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist
with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves
bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They
have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that
the French government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand
in the same position in the matter.
On April 7, Mussolini, imitating Hitler's tactics, invaded
Albania. The British and French governments on April 13 extended their guarantee
to Greece and Romania. Abandoning their earlier policies altogether, they
now stood ready to go to war automatically if the dictators committed new
acts of aggression.
Nazi-Soviet Pact
The Western powers
were still desirous of having the USSR on their side. All hope of attaching
Italy to their cause had disappeared. On January 4, Mussolini had told Hitler
that he was ready to negotiate a comprehensive alliance. Although this so-called
Pact of Steel, pledging each nation to join the other immediately in war,
was not completed until May 22, Mussolini meanwhile made no secret of where
he stood. Chamberlain and Daladier had received some encouragement from the
United States. Roosevelt had opened a campaign to repeal the Neutrality acts
of 1935-1937 so that American supplies would be available to Britain
and France if war came, but he was to find it impossible for the time being
to carry Congress with him. In any event, there was no likelihood whatever
of early American intervention in their behalf. If there was to be another
power allied with them, it could only be the USSR.
Despite Polish opposition, the French and British had continued
to discuss a pact with the Soviets. On April 15, the French suggested that
the two Western powers and the USSR sign a treaty containing pledges of mutual
assistance in the event of war. Thus, while the Soviets would not have any
engagement with Poland, they would be obligated to fight for her if the French
and British did so. After a long delay resulting partly from concern about
Poland's role, partly from distrust of the Soviets, and partly, in all probability,
from latent hope for a war between Nazis and Communists in which the democracies
could stand aside. Chamberlain's cabinet agreed to the French plan. The proposal
was made to the Russians, and on May 27 negotiations
began in Moscow. Troubled from the outset by the issue of whether or not the
three-power agreement should explicitly recognize a Russian right of passage
through Poland, the negotiations eventually foundered. They were finally suspended
on Aug. 21, 1939.
In the meantime, other negotiations had been in progress
between the Soviets and the Germans. After giving various subtle indications
that Munich had undermined his hope of cooperation with the Western powers,
Stalin on March 10 made a speech summarizing the principles of his foreign
policy as: (1) To continue to pursue a policy of peace
and consolidation of economic relations with all countries.
(2) Not to let our country be drawn into conflict by warmongers,
whose custom it is to let others pull their chestnuts out of the fire.
On May 3, Litvinov was replaced by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, a man who
had had no part in the effort to win alliances with the democracies. Speaking
with the German ambassador on May 20, the new foreign commissar remarked that
mutually profitable economic agreements might be reached if a suitable "
political basis were established.
Although Hitler understood these hints, he was slow to act
on them. Not until late in May did he authorize exploratory conversations
about a trade pact and related matters. After these went on for some weeks
without result, on June 29 he abruptly ordered that they be broken off. On
July 18, he learned of Russian proposals for resumption of the talks. Eight
days later, his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, spent an evening
sounding out some Russian officials who were in Berlin. Encouraged by the
results of these and other conversations, Hitler decided on a bold gamble.
On August 14, he had Ribbentrop propose to the Russians "a speedy clarification
of German-Russian relations in due course clarifying jointly territorial
questions in Eastern Europe. Now the supplicated rather than the suppliants,
the Soviets raised a number of practical issues. In each instance, Hitler
responded satisfactorily. By August 20, terms had been agreed on, and on August
23, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a nonaggression pact in Moscow. The published
text bound both governments to refrain from aggressive action or attack against
each other, to lend no support to a third party should either "become the
object of belligerent action by one, and to join in no "grouping of
Powers whatsoever which is aimed directly or indirectly at the other Party.
A secret protocol stipulated that if "territorial and political transformation
should take place in northeastern Europe, the boundary between German
and Soviet spheres should follow the northern border of Lithuania and the
line of the Narew (Narev), Vistula (Visla), and San rivers in Poland.
Thus was a temporary diplomatic revolution effected. The
Nazi and Soviet dictatorships became allies. Among the great powers only the
British and French remained as potentially active opponents of German expansion.
After the signature of the pact with the USSR, Hitler reportedly exclaimed, "
Now, I have the world in my pocket!
Final Crisis
On April 3, Hitler had
directed his generals to prepare a plan of campaign against Poland, with September
1 as its probable starting date. On May 23, in a conference with top-ranking
officers, he disclosed that his intention was to use the Danzig question as
a pretext and "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
Meeting Mussolini's foreign minister at Obersalzberg on August 12-13,
Hitler stated that he intended to move against Poland before the end of the
month, and that he was confident that Britain and France would not intervene.
He expressed this conviction to others. After learning that the pact with
the Soviets would become a reality, however, he convoked his generals at Obersalzberg
and, in the course of a long, rambling speech, told them that while he did
not foresee war in the west it was a risk that had to be run. In any event,
he said, delay worked to Germany's disadvantage. If the British and French
did nothing about Poland, he intended to strike against them soon after the
Polish campaign was over. Economically and militarily, he said, they would
profit from further respite while Germany would not. He ordered that the armies
be ready on August 26 to move against Poland and, if necessary, to hold the
western frontier against an Anglo-French attack. But on August 25, two days
after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the French warned him once again that they would
stand by Poland, and on the same day Chamberlain announced the signature of
a formal Anglo-Polish alliance. Hitler wavered. Saying that he needed time
for negotiation, he ordered the postponement of the operation.
His chosen pretext had been alleged grievances of the German
population in Danzig. Clamor there for annexation by Germany and for establishment
of road and rail corridors had been augmented since July as a result of the
dispatch to the city of several hundred Nazi agents provocateurs.
Citing the evidence of this agitation, Hitler addressed to Chamberlain a long
appeal for understanding and sympathy. Obviously hoping against hope that
a peaceful solution would emerge, the British prime minister pressed the Poles
to make every concession. They agreed reluctantly to negotiate about the issues
Hitler raised. When their ambassador in Berlin gave notice to this effect,
however, Hitler refused to deal with him unless he had full powers to reach
a settlement on the spot. Exploiting this pretext, he declared to the British
and French governments that it was not he but the Poles who were rejecting
diplomacy. When the government in Warsaw ordered mobilization on August 30,
the German press and radio cried that it was planning an attack. On the following
day, there occurred a small incident on the German side of the Polish frontier.
According to Hitler's subsequent speech, Polish soldiers attacked a German
radio station at Gleiwitz (now Gliwice). Actually the attackers were Germans
outfitted in Polish uniforms, commanded by an SS officer, and acting on orders
from Berlin.
Hitler had already given the final directive for the invasion
to begin at dawn on September 1. It was well under way before he delivered
a radio address throwing all blame on the Poles and saying that he had had
to meet force with force. When the French and British demanded that he recall
his troops, he refused. On September 3, Chamberlain and Daladier gave formal
notice to Germany that a state of war existed. The long armistice of 1918-1939
was over.
Ernest R. May
Associate Professor of History
Harvard University
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