Chapter II: Operational Tactics

There are three possible relationships between the tactics used by conventional terrorists and the tactics used by information warriors. One relationship is that there is no difference between the tactics used by conventional terrorists and information warriors. Essentially the tactical operations of the two are interchangeable, and just as the conventional terrorist can be an information warrior, an information warrior could be a terrorist. The second relationship is that the conventional terrorist is nothing like the information warrior in the first place and cannot, or would not, use IW as an operational tool. No terrorist organization would use IW because it would interfere with their organization's goals, and no information warrior would use conventional terrorist weapons or act in such a violent manner. The third relationship is that in the information age, tactics between conventional terrorism and IW will eventually interact in a manner that is neither entirely inclusive or exclusive to one another and form a class of information terrorists.

I will review the evidence for each interpretation drawing from an initial analysis of the tactics used by both information warriors and conventional terrorists in general. I will then pose the three possible relationships and interchanges of tactical behavior. Most of this chapter will be descriptive of the tools of both IW and conventional terrorism in order to explain the distinctions in subsequent chapters. This predictive analysis will show that conventional terrorists who use IW tactics in their operations are no longer either conventional terrorists or information warriors. They are information terrorists.

Basic IW Weaponry and Applications

First, IW can be used as a digital or physical tool (Devost 1997, 3).1 For example, using electronic warfare to disrupt a telephone switching station in Nebraska would be an IW attack using a digital tool, whereas dropping a missile on the station would be considered an IW attack with a physical tool. Second, IW can be based on either a digital or physical target. While inserting a virus into the code and corrupting the information that controls the station would have been an IW attack on a digital target, the missile would have attacked and destroyed a physical IW target. These distinctions between tools and targets, and digital or physical means, help to differentiate the tactical operations used by information warriors and conventional terrorists against information or information systems. Thus, this chapter will primarily focus on digital tools for IW, and physical tools for conventional terrorism because these are the mainstay devices and tactics that each side has used in the past (Schwartau 1996, 23-25; Seger 1990, 53). It will also be important to keep in mind that although much of the discussion will be about the offensive uses of IW, defensive uses can be just as important.

Additionally, depending on the tactical operation of IW and the motives behind the operation, IW tactics can either be the means or the ends in and of themselves. For instance, just as electronic warfare could be used to attack a bank to make public confidence deteriorate (means), military deception could also be used to change the enemy's deployment plans themselves and for no other purpose (ends). Alternatively, IW could be the means to a means to an ends.2 For example, if electronic warfare is used to break into a bank and electronically transfer a million dollars into a Swiss account, it would be digital IW. If that money is then used conventionally to buy machine guns and bullets, which are then used in a coup d'état, this is really just one example of the devastating impact IW could have as a means, as a means to an end, and as an end for the conventional actor. So what types of means (e.g. IW weapons) could be used in an attack and how do they affect the nature or outcomes of terrorism? This section will answer these questions by examining the different types of IW weapons and explaining how the use of them by the conventional terrorist result in the creation of the information terrorist classification.

Theoretically, since the definition of IW and one's goals can encompass so much, there are virtually an endless amount of possible IW tools. There are, however, three main categories of digital tools that either break into information systems, steal or manipulate information, or both destroy information and information systems. Again, how any of these tools are used is the vital question. Once the tools and tactics of the information warrior and also the conventional terrorist have been fully described, the tools will be used to explain whether a new category of information terrorists is necessary if terrorists use IW tools and tactics.

First, hackers and crackers can employ a variety of digital IW tools to attack and penetrate information and systems.3 While the term hacker is usually reserved for a clever software programmer, crackers are those who use their skills to break into computers and use the information gained (Freedman and Mann 1997, 57). The tools used are nearly always digital, but the programming goals differ. Some of these digital tools include Trojan horses, worms, logic bombs, trap doors, chipping, nanomachines, microbes, sniffers, and other insidious and malicious software (Haeni 1995, 15-17).

A favorite cracker program called Crack systematically determines passwords, which are often the only line of defense in the cyberworld, by using a dictionary and hybrid words or patterns (Freedman and Mann 1997, 57). In the search for valuable information, or sniffing, even early into the 1990's this was a mainstay cracker program. Trojan horses are programs that appear to be one thing yet have an ulterior programming goal. If the Year 2000 problem4 had been designed intentionally it would have been the ultimate Trojan horse because of its global prevalence. Crackers also use a software program which is designed to wait and be activated at some indefinite point in the future, commonly called a logic-bomb. Although most logic-bombs are forms of viruses, such as the Michelangelo virus, they can also be set to provide back doors to users at a later time (Devost 1995, 21-24).

Another IW tool, chipping, can be a bit more methodical and insidious than any of the above for an attacker (Schwartau 1996, 254). Integrated circuits, memory chips and CPUs run the world's computers. All of these controlling mechanisms, however, are simply tiny computer chips programmed to achieve a goal: the RAM remembers and the CPU thinks. Similarly, since chip specialization and modification are inexpensive, and will become even more so, if one causes the chip to malfunction on cue or to act in a manner the designers did not intend, it is referred to as chipping. Chipping is "the silicon Trojan horse of microelectronics" (Schwartau 1996, 262). Program it to do 'X' and 'X' it will do without question. Should millions of these tiny chips actually be developed and distributed for airplanes, for instance, that later fail at certain altitudes, then chipping would be very a powerful IW tool.

Second, considering the nature of the information warrior discussed earlier, van Eck monitoring probably best meets the needs of an attacker to not only break through a system but also to steal or manipulate information. Van Eck is invisible, passive, untraceable, inexpensive, disposable, remote controlled, and insidious -- all primary qualities that meet the information warrior's needs (Schwartau 1996, 221-231). Ever since the discovery in the 1960's by the NSA in a program called TEMPEST,5 van Eck monitoring has become the ultimate in electromagnetic eavesdropping. Since all pieces of electronic equipment emit digital signatures via electrons, van Eck monitoring can essentially capture whatever is electronically coming from them, regardless of whether a monitor is turned on or if it is in a secure, unconnected location. Van Eck detects and monitors low-level electronic emissions, and the best van Eck machines can actually manipulate and control the technological activities and information within remote information systems. It has been suggested that the FBI used this digital tool to catch CIA-agent-turned-Soviet-mole Aldrich Ames (IASIW 1996; Schwartau 1996, 18).

Finally, some of the most famous IW tools to destroy information and information systems include HERF, EMP/T, and some viruses. High energy radio frequency (HERF) guns are designed to make an information system inoperable by disrupting or destroying a target temporarily or permanently (Schwartau 1996, 275-296; Devost 1995, 17). The concept behind HERF weapons easily allows an attacker to create denial of service to a target.6 Plus, HERF weapons are unbelievably easy to build and operate. Depending on the concentration and strength of the radio transmission, the power source, range and accuracy, a HERF gun can overload a target system so that the ones and zeros are destroyed or the people relying on them are killed. In the meantime, as chaos ensues, binary schizophrenia7 sets in as people begin the extremely difficult task of identifying the cause of the problem, and the person who fired the gun has time to vanish. While a HERF attack is significantly different from a terrorist attack in form, the outcomes of the two could be the same. For example, if TWA 8008 suffered a massive systems failure in flight, it would be possible that a HERF assassin was the cause, but it would be impossible to determine. There is simply have no way of knowing.

EMP or EMP/T, electromagnetic pulse transfer bombs, on the other hand, are permanently destructive in nature and thousands of times more powerful than the strongest HERF gun (Devost 1995, 18). Since the first nuclear tests when EMPs were discovered, governments have been concerned with the non-nuclear creation of an EMP device.9 According to classified sources, several governments have developed EMP/T technology small enough to carry in a briefcase. In fact, in Desert Storm the U.S. used Tomahawk cruise missiles tipped with EMP/T devices in order to avoid and electronically destroy Iraqi radar (Campen 1992; Discovery Channel 1998). Although in 1980 a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report indicated that essentially all NII systems were susceptible to EMP, even after the partial creation of the Ground Wave Energy Network (GWEN),10 an EMP/T bomb in the United States in or over an urban or populated area within such as Wall Street, Disney World, or O'Hare International Airport, would be catastrophic in nature and end result (Waller 1995, 41).

Basic Conventional Terrorist Weaponry and Applications

Since conventional terrorism by definition is the method and not the end result of an action, this section will describe the methods or weaponry that terrorists routinely employ and explain why they would use them. Considering terrorism has a longer traceable history than IW, it is important to begin by understanding the premeditated violent nature of terrorist actions. Following this and the basic nature of the operational tactics of terrorists, I will describe specific methods or weaponry of the terrorists and later explain how they compare with IW tactics. Terrorist targets, the people employing the tactics, and the justifications and reasons behind conventional terrorism shall be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Terrorism, which can only be offensive by definition, is simpler to understand tactically than IW, which can be both offensive and defensive in nature. Although few databases keep accurate records of both domestic and international terrorist attacks worldwide, reliable databases indicate that between 500 and 800 international attacks occurred per year in the 1980s alone, with the Middle East occupying 10 to 11 percent of all attacks against U.S. interests, with Latin America incidents also on the rise (Wilkinson 1990, 7; Derrer 1992, 86). While sabotage bombings of airliners are more rare than conventional land bombings or attacks, according to the ITAC they often account for the majority of the fatalities. In other words, conventional terrorists tend to almost always attack physical targets, as opposed to digital targets, with physical tools. Thus, opposite IW tools, terrorist weapons are traditional and physical in nature and a person has to physically create or use a tool, such as a bomb, rather than digitally use a tool.

Conventional terrorists can also be either state or non-state-sponsored. Although this may not directly relate to whether a conventional terrorist using IW is the same, different, or a new class altogether, it does allow one to measure the terrorist groups' capabilities. For instance, traditionally state-sponsored terrorist groups would probably have more access to nuclear material and the required specialist expertise to make use of nuclear materials, while both state and non-state sponsored terrorists might have access to chemical and biological agents.

In 1993, when Islamic terrorists detonated a conventional bomb at the World Trade Center in New York City, the structural damage to the building was virtually insignificant when compared to the fear which spread across the nation, and the damage to the flow of information estimated at over one billion dollars (Bowman 1994, 7; Devost 1995, 42). This bombing was an example of a conventional terrorist attack having information-based value.11 Just because an attack had information-based value, however, does not mean that the attack was IW.

While targets vary and often determine the terrorist tool used, there are three categories of conventional terrorist tools or tactics that conventional terrorists use. First, destructive physical attacks or tools take the form of hijackings, bombings, arson, shootings, sabotage, and assassinations. Second, extortion-type tools include kidnapping, hostage taking, raids, ambushes, hoaxes, and coercive bargaining. The third and most feared category of tools that a terrorist could possess are those which can induce mass destruction. Chemical, biological, and nuclear tools fall in this category.

Bomb and bomb incidents are by far the most common conventional weapon of terror and destruction "accounting for approximately 80 percent of terrorist related violence" (Bolz 1990, 25). Whether it is the threat of a bomb, an actual explosive device, or the explosion itself, or whether the bomber is an amateur, professional or psychopath, a bomb in the right place and time can cause massive panic and chaos. In 1996, a bomb went off in the Centennial Park in Atlanta, Georgia during the Summer Olympics. Although the cause and perpetrator of the incident were never discovered, the residual effects of the incident, including the fear of bombs throughout the remaining games, the media's swarming false attack on Richard Jewel, and general the fear of terrorism, weakened the cultural fabric of the United States. Additionally, bombs are the most-use because bombs and the tools to make a bomb are relatively cheap, easily hidden (including letter bombs), can be detonated using few if any people at the target site, and pre-incident publicity allows a group to both claim credit and ensure the media focus attention on the scene (Bolz 1990, 79-81). Bombs are also used to make a statement or send a general message to a target of influence. U.S. officials agree that the creation and destruction of a bomb on board of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 by the Iranians was a response to the Iran Air 555 incident, where a naval ship shot down an Iranian jumbo jet (David 1997; Derrer 1992, 110).

Sabotage has also become a rising terrorist tactic when confronting urban industrialized nations such as the United States (Seger 1990, 49-50). Similar to a virus in the right location, a bullet fired into the transformer of Montana's Flathead irrigation project caused 1,500 gallons of oil to leak from the transformer, destroying a $300,000 piece of equipment and blacking out a 50-mile square area for nine hours (Douglas and Livingston 1987; Seger 1990, 49). Even the IRS has taken extensive anti-terrorist measures because it fears it may be a target of anti-tax groups in the U.S.

Of course, traditional destructive tools like ammunition, submachine guns, riffles, pistols, shotguns, heavy machine guns, free flight armor-piercing missiles, grenades, mortars, mines, and anti-aircraft missiles, are often readily available and usable by the conventional terrorist in this category as well (Clutterbuck 1994, 26-54, 111-124).

The second main category of tools a conventional terrorist would use are for extortion, either of money, favors, or political reasons. The tools include kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, assassinations, and coercive bargaining. The most notorious incident within this category was a hijacking that occurred on a TWA Boeing 727 (Flight 847) from Athens to Rome before landing in Beirut in 1985 (Derrer 1992, 112-113). The Shia fundamentalists used the attack to demand the political release of over 700 Shia prisoners captured during and since the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1982 (Clutterbuck 1994, 178; Cline and Alexander 1986, 1). What made the incident powerful for the terrorists was the U.S. media who used the event to draw viewers. Kidnapping is different from hijacking in that the terrorists use secret hide-outs, often in urban areas, to manipulate a more particular or practical goal (Bolz 1990, 81, 91-98).

Unfortunately, since the 1970s, it has increasingly become more feasible for terrorist organizations to build and manufacture the third category of terrorist weapons: both crude and sophisticated chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (Seger 1992, 50-51; Clutterbuck 1994, 53). Some call this category "megaterrorism."12 In the coming millennium, conventional terrorists are expected to use chemical and biological agents at an astounding rate (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 228-230). The results of these attacks are gruesome and carry a wealth of influence everywhere in the world. Chemical and biological tactics have become known as the poor man's atomic bomb because of their relative ease of construction and ability to hide in an array of vessels. In 1986, a Dutch scientist was able to produce about 60 pounds of mustard gas from a $240 dollar investment. 60 pounds of mustard gas would be enough to threaten a medium-size city (Seger 1992, 51). The several Tokyo subway attacks of the early 1990s are the most pressing examples of where tactics in this category have been applied by conventional terrorists. Other agents, like anthrax, could be dispersed by aerosol through an air-intake or air-conditioning unit of a major building killing everyone inside. Couple any one of the tactical tools described above with an intense suicidal loyalty to an organization's cause, and the possible fulfillment of terror on a civilized population is enormous.

While nuclear material may be more prevalent in the global black-market following the break up of the Soviet Union, many conventional terrorist organizations find the costs prohibitive, both financially and in the expertise needed to construct a professional level bomb. However, nuclear capabilities in the hands of conventional terrorists do exist. Some believe that even with the possession of a nuclear device, conventional terrorists (or at least their leaders) realize that the political deterrence factor applies as much to them as to nation-states (Clutterbuck 1994, 53). The probable overwhelming retaliation and anti-terrorist effect that such an occurrence would produce will likely to keep this weapon of mass-destruction out of mainstream terrorist activity.

Finally, what may be the most important tool that a conventional terrorist needs is a global medium to convey their political goals, preferentially with live television (Long 1990, 118-120). The goal of terrorism is not to injure people. The goal of terrorism is the righteous promotion of a cause, some political or other agenda. Terrorists are the "Have Nots" who have not succeeded traditionally in a Western system under Western rules. Thus, if no one knows that a group was taken hostage or that terrorists have killed people on a deadline, then the attack would serve neither the life of the victim nor the terrorist's cause. On the other hand, counter-terrorist experts already know that one way to give into a conventional terrorist group is to let the situation become run by the media's viewpoint and the ensuing "public opinion" (Bolz 1990, 49-47). Once this occurs, the conventional terrorist has succeeded in promoting the organization's cause and making the world the victim. Sometimes when people write about the tools of terrorism the focus is almost always on the violent weapon used, but the media is by far their most powerful tool. Kill one and you will get the attention of millions, but only if the right medium can promote the cause (Seger 1990, 15).

No Difference between Tactics of Conventional Terrorists and Information Warriors

After describing in detail the operational tools and tactics that are available and used by both conventional terrorists and information warriors, there are three possible relationships of what happens when the terrorist uses IW tools or tactics that need to be explained. The first possible relationship is that there is no difference between conventional terrorists and information warriors who use IW tactics and tools. A conventional terrorist using IW tactics is nothing more than an information warrior, and an information warrior using the tools is nothing more than a conventional terrorist. Several explanations support this line of thinking.

First, if conventional terrorists employ IW tactics it would drastically broaden the otherwise limited range of terrorism. Terrorists would go from only being able to attack information systems with physical means, to being able to employ all that digital tools can offer them. Also, because conventional terrorism is traditionally about using violence as a means to achieve their goals, since IW can be both a means, an ends, and a means toward a means to achieve a violent outcome, the possibilities become limitless for the conventional terrorist who uses IW tactics. Strategically, in other words, it would be foolish for conventional terrorists to remain as limited as they are now tactically in the 21st century.

Does this mean, however, that continuing to move with the times by employing tactics like an EMP/T bomb or HERF gun essentially changes the nature of terrorism? Isn't a rose still a rose? After all, terrorist tactics used by the Assassins in the 11th century were substantially different than those used in modern times.13 So it makes sense that conventional terrorists would naturally use new IW means to achieve their goals so long as terrorists can still create terror. As a result, this reasoning suggests that conventional terrorist tactics and information warrior tactics are interchangeable.

If conventional terrorists are able to use the first category of IW tools, such as chipping, logic bombs, or Trojan horses, there are some good comparisons to make. Although there is no physical weapon within the arsenal of conventional terrorism similar to chipping, both IW and terrorism exhibit specialization but it is how they apply their specialization that varies. With chipping, circuits are programmed for specific operations insidious to the apparent use of the chip. Thus, within IW the specialization of tactics is based on method (e.g. using one virus over another) or based on the separate areas of expertise of the actors. For conventional terrorist groups specialization takes the form of classes of leaders, followers and bomb experts (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 63; Bolz 1990, 75). The distinction, of course, is that conventional terrorists use people to specialize, while information warriors use information or information systems to show specialization.

In the second category of IW tools and tactics that steal or manipulate information, however, several characteristics strongly contrast with the tools and tactics that conventional terrorists use. Van Eck monitoring is a pure form of IW14 that possess the characteristics of being invisible, passive, untraceable, disposable, inexpensive, and remote controlled. Conversely, the fundamental necessities of conventional terrorism require terrorist tactics to be active, traceable, and capable of higher visibility. Terrorists flourish with visibility and attention. Without tactics that give attention to their cause, terrorists would not likely use an IW tool or tactic such as van Eck monitoring. Thus, not all IW tools or tactics are wholly compatible with the necessities of conventional terrorism to create terror, and tools like van Eck monitoring would actually change the very nature of conventional terrorism if used.

The third category of IW tools, those that can destroy information and information systems, are probably the most likely to be used by conventional terrorists because of the similarity to conventional tools. HERF and EMP/T are comparable to conventional physical bombs. They are cheap and easy to build, pose minimal risk to oneself, can be hidden effectively in a variety of locals, and can produce high yields. For instance, if terrorists attack the miles of cable and computers that run Disney World,15 they will likely kill hundreds of people, and attack an even stronger symbolic cultural icon of America than possible with conventional tools (Hanle 1990, 117; Long 1990, 124). Similar to conventional terrorists using bombs, once conventional terrorists using IW are able to fully select the target with fewer restrictions, the media will do the work of promoting the cause.

Additionally, just as conventional terrorists could use an information warrior's tools, with the right motivation information warriors could also use IW to achieve the goals of conventional terrorists. For instance, an information warrior could take out digital control of a few chemical shipments and deliver them to a conventional terrorist's warehouse for use in chemical or biological bombings, take control of a plane from the ground for use in hijacking or hostage taking, or sabotage any number of industrial information systems. Plus, the information warriors could crudely achieve IW goals with the use of the tools of conventional terrorism. A bomb could effectively destroy a power or phone nodule, albeit with less sophistication and more effort than through digital means. What is interesting is that both information warriors and conventional terrorists can and often do attack information and information systems. Thus, validity exists behind the reason that conventional terrorists using IW tactics are no different in kind.

Complete Opposites

The argument could also be made that conventional terrorism and IW methods of warfare are two distinct waves of fighting and are inevitably dissimilar. While conventional terrorists currently operate in Heidi and Alvin Toffler's second industrial wave of warfare, information warriors operate in the third information wave of warfare (Toffler 1993, 38-80).16 Following the Toffler's reasoning, just as the nature of a nation changes when a second industrial wave nation moves from one form of warfare to another by employing IW, one can argue that the nature of terrorism itself changes when terrorists operating in the second wave likewise move themselves into a new third wave of terrorist activities by incorporating IW tactics.

In addition to the distinction between information terrorism and conventional terrorism based on the distinction created by second or third wave of warfare, a number of other contrasts between conventional terrorism and those who use IW exist. First, in its purest form, anyone who uses IW tactics relies entirely on the organization and use of ones and zeros.17 This contrasts heavily with conventional terrorists who relies primarily on loyal followers and weaponry. Thus, when IW tactics are used, there is simply less dependency on other people for support than with conventional terrorism.

Second, the distinction between physical tools and digital tools is important. With physical tools, terrorists must be able to obtain some level of direct and immediate access to a target to use them. Digital tools must also have access to their target, but it is considerably more effortless to gain digital access than physical access to the same target. The information warrior can cross borders electronically, becoming a trans-national and international threat from the comfort of home. A contrast also exists between an information warrior's ability to be both offensive and defensive, which is yet another sign of how the battlefield changes, verses the conventional terrorist's ability to only go on the offensive with their tactics. Thus, if conventional terrorists would use IW tactics, it would change the boundaries of the battlefield and the nature of conventional terrorism.

A third and very important contrast is that for conventional terrorists who use IW as a tool, the degree to which media interest fluctuates depends on the target and the means used. Naturally, human victims receive a disproportional ratio of attention, air time or coverage in the media than damage caused from a digital attack. The conventional terrorist uses the media by claiming responsibility for highly publicized acts. The terrorist who uses IW most likely will continue to rely on the media, but the nature of their interaction and interest will be more limited since information and information systems are primarily attacked rather than people. A counter argument to this could be that with pure IW tactics, a terrorist group could use PSYOPS to give the world the perception of an attack without the reality of one. This would be similar to the 1998 movie Wag the Dog, in which the media portrays a fictional battle, and the public believes it.

Finally, digital tactics do not appear to have the direct psychological impact that conventional terrorists depends. An information warrior's possible indirect result of injury, such as crashing a power grid knocking out traffic lights causing accidents presents a stark contrast to the very direct and immediate result of injury should a bomb explode on a tourist's bus. These reasons suggest that the tactics of IW and conventional terrorism are very different from one another, and thus conventional terrorists cannot simply decide to use IW tactics without changing the nature of terrorism.

A Conclusion of Non-exclusivity

Conventional terrorists who use IW techniques and tactics are neither identical to the conventional terrorists nor interchangeable with general information warriors. Instead, this distinction supports the creation of a classification, called information terrorism, as a sub-category of IW. According to Devost, "information terrorism is the nexus between criminal information system fraud or abuse, and the physical violence of [conventional] terrorism (Devost 1997,1). As terrorists become more technologically sophisticated it is likely that they will increasingly use IW tactics to achieve their goals. During the likely crossover between the second and third waves of terrorist activities, the informational terrorist will continue to use both physical and digital tools pursuant to their end cause. But once the transformation is complete, however, the third wave information terrorist will operate in the pure world of IW tactics. What makes information terrorism more powerful than conventional terrorism is partially due to the operational tactics of IW. Since information terrorists will still have the goal to cause fear, usually through violent acts to injure or kill people, IW tactics enable information terrorists to do this more efficiently. This is because traditional defenses have hardened their security against physical attack, but information systems that people rely on just as much are not protected adequately. It is also important to keep in mind that information terrorism is a sub-category of IW because IW tactics as a whole can only directly damage or destroy information or information systems--not people. In other words, the motive to cause fear through violent attacks, albeit using IW tactics, is different enough than the broader category of IW to classify information terrorism as a subset of IW. Other advantages that make information terrorism a greater threat than conventional terrorism and IW are discussed in detail in chapter five.

Since information terrorists will be using different tactics and means of attack than conventionally, the strategies that will need to be developed to counter the information terrorist threat may be similar to other IW strategies, but will be very distinct from strategies against conventional terrorism. In the meantime, without an in-depth examination ambiguous labels of cyber-terrorism, and other simplistic taxonomies of this complex phenomenon should have reduced usage. Thus, when conventional terrorists do use IW tools or tactics the actions are no longer simply terrorism or IW, but information terrorism. Since IW tactics are only about attacking information and information systems, information terrorism is best defined as using IW tactics to better promote a conventional cause through greater fear and terror. Distinctions should reasonably follow that information terrorism is distinct from full fledged IW, from information-espionage, or information-blackmail. Presently, however, the ambiguously large category of IW is necessary to encompass a variety of information attacks. This is due to the fact that currently we cannot distinguish the motive for attack until usually the perpetrator is caught. This in itself makes a clear analysis of information terrorism as a distinct subset of IW difficult. Nonetheless, without the basic characteristics of conventional terrorism, such as the ability to create fear to promote a political cause, an act cannot be called information terrorism. At the same time, if an attack does have conventional characteristics but also utilizes IW tactics, it can no longer be conventional terrorism either.

CHAPTER I

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CHAPTER III