Chapter IV: The Nature of the Actors

When organizations and groups of people are analyzed, links are often made to their psychological dynamics to explain the reasoning of why a group works in the way that it does (Pfeffer 1997, 11-13, 81, 118). This is mainly due to the fact that the study of organizations began in the field of psychology.1 Although it would be impossible to leave psychological explanations entirely out of this chapter, I have dedicated chapter five to help fully explain the practical reasons and justifications behind information terrorism. As such, this chapter will focus on the actors and organizational aspects of both conventional terrorism and IW, rather than their cultures or motivations. First, I will analyze the various aspects of the nature of both conventional terrorism and IW. This will include examining terrorist and IW organizations, the characteristics of the members of the organizations, and the structures of the organizations. Second, I will compare and contrast the nature of the conventional terrorist organization with the nature of IW organization, and study how conventional terrorist actors and organizations will significantly change if they adopt IW tactics. The analysis will prove that a distinctly new information terrorist organization is created when conventional actors use IW and that it is more dangerous to U.S. citizens than either conventional terrorists or an IW group.

Terrorists

To understand conventional terrorism, one must identify the actors who carry out the violent tactics against innocent victims. Without an understanding of the actors involved, an effective policy solution can not be formed. Thus, I will examine the differences between individual terrorists and terrorist organizations. After demonstrating that terrorism is carried out by groups more often than individuals, I will analyze the organization and structure of these groups in order to identify the levels, traits, and profiles of individual terrorists.

Conventional terrorists traditionally have operated as members of larger terrorist organizations. Throughout history, "cases in which individuals unaffiliated with any group have carried out major acts of terrorism are rare" (Long 1990, 8). This does not mean, however, that terrorist members have never acted alone while on a mission (i.e. a suicidal bomber). Although only one or two people may carry out a violent tactic or operation, a larger base of people and support exists elsewhere for them. Without the base organization, a single actor or individual would be little more than a criminal or murderer. As such, each terrorist relies on the organization of which the individual is a member.2

Numerous scholars, such as Long, O'Neil, Seger, Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz and Zawodny, have helped to the break terrorist organizational structure down into a distinct linear hierarchy. [See Figure 4.1]. Similar to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the linear hierarchy of contemporary terrorist organizations demands that an extensive leadership and support structure exists if it is to survive or succeed in its goals.3 Thus, the organization is composed chiefly of the hard-core leadership, active cadre, active support, and passive support. In addition to the immediate organization, the environment and the rest of society is important (Seger 1990, 7).4

Leaders in a terrorist organization play important roles. The complexity of the organization depends upon the skills of the insurgent leaders in identifying, integrating, and coordinating the different tasks and rules essential to combat operations, training, communications, transportation, information and supervision (O'Neil 1990, 91). Depending on the scope of the group, leaders may supervise one or two other layers of operators or cells of individuals. If the leader can make the organization large or controlling, it may be called a shadow government because of the hierarchical nature parallel to the legitimate government that would have developed. Additionally, while leaders strategically plan the tactical operations, they do not execute the tactical operations of terrorist cells (Seger 1990, 6-8). Thus, leaders are at the heart of the terrorist organization.

The profile of the leaders emphasizes their ability to plan better than other members. For instance, the leaders often come from higher economic classes and are a dedicated group of professionals, with backgrounds in medicine, law or philosophy. Within the terrorist organization, the leaders also tend to be the most intelligent and charismatic members (Seger 1990, 6-8). They are the center of terror for the group, acting as the catalysts of violent actions. This emphasis on the leaders gives them higher visibility and influence to the internal rank and file, external supporters, and enemies (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 63-68).

The profile of the leaders also enables them to establish and maintain cohesion within terrorist groups. For instance, while secondary leaders play an important part in the recruitment of new members, people are recruited not necessarily because they can contribute to the success of the organization's cause, but because they will be loyal followers (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 63-68). The tightness an organization develops as it recruits more individuals helps the leadership-core develop greater control over the entire membership. If there are disruptions in the cohesion of the organization, leaders often use terror to maintain the solidarity of the people. This is one point where the distinction between the psychology of terrorism and the nature of the organization and actors begins to blur. If there is internal disruption, the leader might kill a rogue member, or, if there is external threats, the leader might create a suicide or attack plan to create a martyr or rally the members in order to increase cohesion. This violence is used by the leader to create or re-establish the idea that terrorism is a battle between the terrorist group and the outside world. Naturally, the us-them conflicts increases the influence that leaders have over the terrorist members and results in greater group cohesion (Madsen 1991, 13-15). Other characteristics of the terrorist leaders emerge, including being more extroverted, narcissistic, hostile, and a willingness to take risks (Long 1990, 17-20). What should be emphasized, however, is that a generic terrorist personality at any level is hard to define.

At the next level within the terrorist organization are the active cadre. These people are often the stereotypical actors that most people think of when they hear the word terrorists. The cadre includes people who work in both the intelligence and tactical operation cells of the group. Depending on the size of the group, there are often very few tactical cells in the field. The emphasis, instead, is on the intelligence collection cells. Within the cadre, psychological traits may differ from the leadership level. The tactical cadre are often the most dangerous members of a terrorist group, often suffering from inadequate personality development or low-self-esteem (Long 1990, 18; Seger 1990, 8). Once the cadre become hooked on the charismatic leader, they are often willing to do anything, including giving up their own lives for their leader and organization's cause (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 34, 37-40, 64-65). Furthermore, if any members of the terrorist organization are sociopaths, they are probably some of the more radical of the cadre because of their extreme need to exhibit violent tendencies (Seger 1990, 7-9).

Outside of the active cadre, the conventional terrorist organization needs both active and passive support. The active support level includes those people who support the cause of the group in ways other than being the actors of violent means. Whether the support is achieved by creating propaganda or by providing logistical or administrative support, neither the leaders nor the cadre could operate efficiently within their organization without active support. Active support can come from either single individuals or constituent groups who provide goods or services to the organization (Bolz 1990, 74-75). Funding for terrorist organizations, often from drug traffickers or nation-states, is one form of active support (Long 1990, 105). This trend toward nation-state and drug cartel sponsorship of terrorism is growing because of the amount of money and arms needed to operate even a small (40-50 person) terrorist organization (Seger 1990, 10). As the second wave of industrialism grows older, dependency on active support should also grow. For instance, Adam's Financing of Terror states that the PLO, a larger organization with membership in the thousands, has a budget of $1.25 billion with over $5 billion in assets (Clutterbuck 1994, 154). Thus, it is clear to see that conventional terrorism depends on active support at many levels.

The final level within the conventional terrorist organization consists of passive supporters. Passive supporters are the enablers of the terrorist group's activities (O'Neil 1990, 70-73). For instance, if people display ideological sympathy or if people in the media devote air-time to an attack, they enable the terrorists to communicate their message to a much broader audience (Long 1990, 105, 120-121). Another example of passive support would be if a nation-state in which a terrorist group is located does nothing to counter-act the actions of the organization.

In addition to analyzing the conventional terrorist organization by level and characteristic traits, terrorist members as a whole do have a general profile. In studies by Russell and Miller beginning in 1977, these characteristics include age, gender, marital status, socio-economic background, and rural verses urban origins. First, according to steady trends over the last few decades, many organizations have cadre that suggest that the age level of terrorists may be dropping from the 22 to 25 age level. In Northern Ireland, for instance, some terrorists apprehended have been as young as 12 to 14 years old. At the leadership level, the age level has dropped from the late 40's and early 50's to as young as the late 30's (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 45-60).

Depending on the type of terrorism, the gender of the actors also varies. In urban terrorist groups from 1966-76, almost 80 percent of the incidents were directed, led and executed by males. Women, however, are not immediately excludable from a terrorist organization. While most incidents tend to follow the same male-dominated pattern, with women often being used in the intelligence gathering cells, some of the most effective leaders have been women. Leila Khalid and Fusako Shigenobu of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army, respectively, are two examples (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 49). Historically, some of the most vicious acts of terror, going back to the French Reign of Terror, were executed ruthlessly by the female cadre. Nonetheless, few groups exceed an overall rate of 10 to 30 percent female members (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 49).

The origin's of terrorists also closely correspond to the location that terrorism occurs. For instance, most conventional terrorists who would attack a metropolitan area would tend to be from an urban geographical location rather than a location that is more rural. In conjunction with terrorist origins matching operating patterns, terrorists tend to also have middle-class or even upper-class socio-economic backgrounds. Of course there are exceptions, such as the IRA whose members usually come from a lower socio-economic class. Furthermore, two-thirds of the members of conventional terrorist organizations tend to have had at least some university training, are university graduates, or are postgraduate student members (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 52-58). Viewing this rate, it is not surprising that a primary recruitment ground is at the collegiate level as drop-outs are identified by passive supporters (Freedman and Alexander 1983, 55-58).

Information Warriors

Since the study of IW is in it's infancy, there has not been any sound analysis of IW similar to that of the conventional terrorism with regards to the nature of the actors. To create a parallel, however, I will examine the differences between individual information warriors and groups of information warriors. This analysis will determine that unlike conventional terrorism, where an individual cannot act alone, with IW, an individual can act alone. Next, I will analyze a theoretical IW organization of individuals to determine if differences exist in the levels, traits and profiles of their members. This dissection will explain that conventional terrorists who use IW as a tool also inherently change the nature of conventional terrorism.

With IW, an entire organization of leaders, cadre, and various support mechanisms are not necessary. Instead, a single individual with the right motivations and skills could sufficiently carry out an attack equally as effective as a group of conventional terrorists. [See Figure 4.2]. Author Cliff Stoll wrote a book describing how a simple computing error of $0.73 cents led to the hunt of a few computer hackers who turned out to be members of the German Chaos Computer Club selling secrets to the KGB.5 This distinction between the actions of individuals and groups is in clear contrast to the fundamental notion and nature of a conventional terrorist organization. For instance, if conventional terrorists and information warriors were to use the same means toward an ends, such as debilitating a power station, the amount of resources and manpower needed would be much greater for the conventional terrorists than for information warriors. A hacker, for example, could individually cover the costs of the attack (no external financial support is necessary), gather intelligence by trash diving, and mastermind the operation of the attack. Even after cyber-threats have been realized, in 1998, a hacker in Jerusalem who went by the screen name, "The Analyzer," broke into the Pentagon. When Israeli President Benjamin Netenyaho was asked about the hacker, with a smile hiding his admiration he replied, "Damn good. Very dangerous too" (CNN Today, 19 March 1998). Thus, to cause a major incident to occur, an entire organization is not necessary for the actor who uses IW.

The importance of this difference is actually quite significant. According to U.S. policy and historical trends, the most effective way to combat terrorism is to either disrupt the organization in its planning stages before conventional terrorists are able to act, or to dilute the importance or effect of an attack and lesson the terror an attack creates (Long 1990, 8-13; Hanle 1989, 200). Many actors organize multinational cooperatives to counter terrorism. Unfortunately, if a conventional terrorist organization, such as the IRA, would take up IW tactics and tools, two negative scenarios could occur that reduces the effectiveness of old policy solutions. In one option, the IRA could significantly reduce or downsize the numbers of conventional actors within their organization to achieve the same level of output. If this would occur, it would be significantly more difficult to intervene and disrupt the information terrorist organization before they would act, especially if a group could be reduced to just a few people. The impact of an attack created by a single individual was demonstrated again in 1988 when a computer worm slithered its way across some 2,000 computers and networks. Had it not been for the fact that the NSA was called in to control the problem and locate the perpetrator they might not have ever discover the cause. Why? Because it was revealed that the NSA Director's son, 16-year old Robert Morris, was the creator (Devost 1995, 21-24). In another option, the IRA could reinvest and train all of its current members in the art of IW, effectively increasing their ability to act and cause terror exponentially in today's technological culture.

What makes these two options possible is the same thing that makes the United States so vulnerable. [See Figure 4.3]. As society becomes more technologically dependent, it is rational to expect that the members of society also become more technologically talented and sophisticated, including the adversaries of a society. From an information standpoint, in the 1940's few people outside of Einstein, Vannevar Bush or those in the Manhattan Project knew how to create an atomic bomb.6 Today, however, such information is readily available off the internet. As a result of greater access to information combined with the destablization in the balance of powers between the Soviet block and the U.S., the threat of nuclear weapons being used is greater. During the Cold War, the world was secure in the knowledge of who had nuclear information or materials. According to President Yeltsin's former National Security Advisor, General Alexander Lebed, however, at least 78 suitcase size nuclear weapons are missing and presumed on the terrorist black-market (Haines 1998). Similarly, because Third World actors can gain access and use IW tools and tactics, it decreases what the security of the U.S. would be if only a few national actors had such capabilities.

Another point that makes the first two options possible is the increase in the power and technological sophistication of potential tools (U.S. JCS 1996-97, 13). The chemical weapon that could have only been built at a military base decades ago, can now be created at home or even ordered by catalog. The same scenario is true for technology. As explained in chapter two, the low-costs of IW technology is unprecedented. To purchase blueprints and build a HERF gun, for instance, can cost less than $250 dollars with items available from any radio shop or computer store (Spectre-Press 1998). The implication of the proliferation of technology and information is that virtually anyone can take advantage of its capabilities, including by using information terrorist tactics.

In a transitory period there is also a third option by which conventional terrorists could use IW. The third option is probably the most imminent danger to the United States because it would occur in the period between the second and third wave of warfare, merging both conventional and IW tactics. The merging option would occur when a conventional terrorist organization adopts IW tactics only as one of many operational tactics from which the cadre could choose. While one tactical cell might have experts in conventional bombs or hostage-taking, a new cell might have experts in IW. To be used effectively, a conventional organization with an information terrorist cell would need to be able to give tactical advice to the leadership. As time would progress, the conventional terrorist group would eventually split between the conventional and information cells. While a conventional terrorist group using IW could choose any one of the three previous options, significant differences exist from any conventional organization.

Similar to the make-up of a conventional terrorist organization, an analysis of the actors in a potential IW organization is important. Although an individual actor could choose any one of the three preceding options, leadership, cadre, and support classes still exist. However, the nature of conventional terrorists changes significantly when using IW. First, an IW organization is mostly horizontal in structure, not in a linear hierarchy as with conventional terrorism. Whereas conventional terrorism requires a clear power structure to work toward a single goal, the information warrior actually is able to achieve the maximum-output level with the highest yield returns if the power structure is open. An open power structure enables the information warrior to manipulate a potential attack plan; as the scenario changes or defenses are enacted, the actors can adapt to new circumstances without needing permission from the leader. For example, it was once calculated that it would take a single person trying to crack a protective 56-bit DES encryption algorithm thousands of years to go through 72 quadrillion possible combinations. At this rate, trying to crash a plane by disrupting air traffic control would be impossible. Using a horizontal structure, however, the DES encryption was broken in just six months by an integrated network of people and systems over the internet (Editors 1997,10). Since encryption and password protection are often the only firewalls7 to stop an information attack, a horizontal structure could efficiently target any encrypted information better than a conventional terrorist.

Leaders within the IW and the hacker community are people who have become the technically adept wizards of computing or electronics. Leaders are the most skilled members of the group. They impress their core following not with charisma, but with their ability to act directly in a situation and prove their worth. Similarly, leaders tend to recruit new members to add talent or special knowledge to the group. Whereas the conventional terrorist leader needs to stay close to the active cadre, the IW leader has the ability to branch away from the main core while still participating in the attack without compromising the group's integrity. Characteristics such as these have been demonstrated by the leaders of Masters of Deception (MOD) and the Legion of Doom (LOD), two of the most notorious hacker groups in the U.S.8 If conventional terrorist leaders needed to coordinate an attack, then they would have to be close to the attack location while not participating in the actual attack. The information warrior, on the other hand, could be on the other side of the planet via modem and still directly participate in the attack. Thus, comparisons between the characteristics of leaders from conventional terrorism with the characteristics from actors who use IW, demonstrate differences between them.

Since a single individual could be an information warrior, it is also important to analyze preliminary data available on the characteristics of the actors involved in IW. Again, this analysis borders on clinical psychology but is crucial to understanding the nature of the individual actors involved. The similarities between the characteristics of those using IW and the characteristics of conventional terrorists is alarming.

According to Dr. Mich Kabay, Director of Education for the National Computer Security Association, some hackers could be suffering from a clinical narcissist personality disorder. He suggests that the classic hacker personality is anathemetic to society, characterized by such traits as: a grandiose sense of self-importance, a preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, need for constant attention and admiration, strong negative responses to threats of self-esteem, feelings of entitlement, a lack of empathy, interpersonal exploitiveness, and alternating feelings of over-idealization and devaluation (Schwartau 1996, 340).

Each of these characteristics described by Dr. Kabay are very similar to the characteristics of individual conventional terrorists (Derrer 1992; Freedman and Alexander 1983). Additionally, hackers tend to be mostly males between 12 and 28, intelligent but did not do well in school, misunderstood, and from dysfunctional backgrounds (Schwartau 1996, 340). The example of Robert Morris, the son of the former NSA Director, is again applicable. Since many of these characteristics of individual members parallel identities of conventional terrorists at both the leadership and active cadre levels, it is reasonable to say that conventional terrorists who use IW may not fundamentally be changing themselves as actors, but rather the organization between individuals changes.

At the active cadre level are even more comparable points between information warriors and conventional terrorists. Just as the conventional terrorist cadre specialize, IW cadre will also develop certain specialties. One tactical IW cell may focus on UNIX-based telephone systems, another may focus on cryptographic locks or sniffing passwords, and so forth.9 As the cadre cells develop these specialties, the leader will weave them together to achieve the ultimate efficiency of a high yield mass IW attack. Larger groups of specialized IW actors will allow a leader to create a larger attack plan on information systems than would be possible from an individual actor.

If the IW cadre are also working within a group, the cadre are not likely to be as dangerous in the physical sense but remain a threat. IW cadre will be able to either cause digital or information-based damage that may be worse to an information-based society than a physical attack. On the other hand, IW cadre may be so far removed from people with the characteristics described above, that deleting an identification number on an air traffic controller's screen may seem insignificant. The reasoning behind this is that IW can take the human aspect out of an attack, whereas with conventional terrorism there is no getting around the violent nature of a terrorist attack. Thus, similarities at the cadre level to conventional terrorism should not be a surprise. This is because within IW group organization structure, the cadre act on a horizontal basis with other actors and share similar characteristics.

The next level within the conventional terrorist organization structure is the active support level. This includes supplies of money, arms, and other goods and services. Due to extensive needs, conventional terrorist groups often have a heavy reliance and dependency on both nation-state and drug cartel sponsorship. In an IW organization, however, there are two possible differences. First, a dramatic shift away from the conventional terrorist's dependency on active support may occur. Since conventional terrorism is limited by the availability of arms and money, if conventional groups opt entirely for IW tactics these limitations disappear. For example, the Chinese Red Army has a large terrorist organization network where a million dollars may not go very far. But if the Chinese Red Army chooses to use IW tactics alone, they would need only a small fraction of a million dollars to be just as effective. In this scenario, the Red Army information terrorists would be on the low end of the cost/yield spectrum.10

On the other hand, as earlier noted, an information terrorist group could deal with this in the opposite manner by using all of the funds previously spent on conventional weaponry for IW means. This example would be seen as the high end of the cost/yield spectrum. While maintaining the same need for money and active support is initially present, it enables the new terrorists to be many times more powerful and also able to find or create their own support to be independent. An example of this would be if the start-up costs to hack into a bank were a million dollars, and so the group is dependent at first to receive the million dollars. But once the bank is hacked and several million of dollars are stolen, then the IW group may no longer be dependent on outsiders for financial or active support. Clearly, the differences at the active support level mandate that information terrorism is different from conventional terrorism.

The final layer from within the conventional terrorist organization comes from passive support. This includes the enablers like the media. While the media will remain important for information terrorists to promote their cause, should the media need to choose between an information terrorist attack and a conventional terrorist attack, the media would choose to cover and report a conventional attack. Thus, information terrorists will have a harder time seducing the media, so the media will play a lesser role in IW or information terrorism than they play with conventional terrorism.11

Conclusion

When conventional terrorists use IW, there are a variety of important and consequential differences that occur at the organizational and individual level that make information terrorism a greater danger to the U.S. in the future than conventional terrorism. At the base level, a conventional terrorist group using IW tactics fundamentally changes the importance of the terrorist organization. Instead of groups, single individuals can mastermind, execute, and reap the benefits of an information terrorist attack. No group is necessary. Even when a conventional terrorist organization does use IW, since in an information terrorist group the chain of command is horizontal instead of vertical, IW allows an organization to operate with greater efficiency and speed. Efficiency of force is also enhanced because IW leaders exhibit qualities very similar to the cadre level by participating in the attacks. This is one distinction from conventional terrorist leaders. However, within the cadre level the information terrorist organization changes depending on which of the three options is chosen. These options included downsizing conventional means and people, reinvesting with IW tools and technology, or merging IW and conventional capabilities. Essentially, the whole organization can change either to the low end of the cost/yield spectrum or to the high end of the cost/yield spectrum simply by the way in which IW is incorporated into the organization. Either way, IW changes the group structure and makes information terrorism more potent than a conventional terrorist organization can be.

The implications of this analysis command that while individual members of both conventional terrorism and IW do share similar qualities and characteristics, the organizational structure of information terrorism is different from the organizational structure of conventional terrorism. The organizational structure is, however, the same or at least very similar to the organization of an IW group. What this means is that while the organizational structure of conventional terrorism is appropriate for using conventional means to attack conventional targets, when conventional terrorists use IW tactics the organizational structure itself must change. Although there are some exceptions, this change is mostly due to the nature of the tactics and operations chosen and not the individuals involved. Thus, since vulnerabilities do exist in the NII, for instance, when using IW the tendencies and motivations of individual actors to attack the NII primarily remain unchanged, but ability to attack is actually enhanced when the organizational structure is shaped to accommodate the use of IW. Since we know that pure information warriors believe that fatalities are secondary results of an attack, this reason, in concert with the power of IW tactics and operations to attack information and information system vulnerabilities that citizens rely on, are what make the sub-category of information terrorism a greater danger to the U.S. than either conventional terrorism or IW in the future.

CHAPTER III

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CHAPTER V