Conclusion

"The stuff of novels today may be the stuff of headlines tomorrow." -- Dr. Brian Jenkins1

Research in the field of IW is vitally important to the continued global success of the United States. The U.S. is dependent on information and information systems everywhere in a variety of national information infrastructures. The ability to attack such information and information systems makes IW a powerful tool. On the other hand, while conventional terrorism has already been deeply researched, it still creates fear and terror when violent actions are carried out unpredictably against U.S. interests and fatalities occur. IW can itself be dangerous, but when conventional terrorists abuse the information super-highway, the most dangerous uses of IW are both possible and probable. The question that this thesis sought to answer was what happens to conventional terrorism when terrorists decide to use IW means to achieve terrorist ends. In order to investigate the hypothesis that IW changes the fundamental characteristics of terrorism, an examination of the actors, the tools, the targets, and the motivations behind the choice of IW was necessary.

This analysis clearly demonstrated that there are important and meaningful differences at every level when conventional terrorism and IW were compared. These differences, amidst some similarities, make any transition from conventional terrorism methods to IW methods problematic and dangerous. First, conventional terrorists operate in groups to promote a political cause. With IW, however, the level of technological sophistication and possibilities for individually-caused destruction eliminate the necessity of the group. This quality of IW essentially spreads the threat of information terrorism out and makes it harder to centralize. Even in a situation where terrorists do use IW in a group, information terrorism operates with a horizontal hierarchy, as opposed to the vertical hierarchy of conventional terrorist groups. The horizontal power structure allows terrorist attacks to occur with an unprecedented level of efficiency and speed. This potency is also due to the fact that the leaders who use IW are essential members in the planning and execution of attacks. Also the need for active support in terms of financing or conventional weaponry diminishes greatly, if not completely, for information terrorists. Thus, decreased dependency on others makes information terrorism more dangerous by removing the financial limitations that conventional terrorists have. The added fact that the individual members of both conventional terrorism and IW share similar personality characteristics, such as a need to gain attention, shows that while the structural organization of conventional terrorism changes significantly when IW is involved, the actors and their tendencies toward violent or extreme actions do not change significantly. This essentially means that when conventional terrorists use IW, they are more efficient as actors in their ability to carry out their individual or terrorist group's cause. This efficiency of attack makes information terrorists more dangerous to the U.S. than conventional terrorists who are limited by using conventional means.

The second reason that the combination of conventional terrorists using IW is dangerous and problematic is that while the tactics of IW differentiate the way an attack destroys a target, by no means do the tactics chosen limit the harm that can be done. In fact, IW actually broadens the potential damage that information terrorists can cause by enabling them to reach otherwise protected citizens through indirect means. Although IW tactics and targets are digital and conventional terrorist tactics and targets are generally physical, strong arguments support the idea that the tactics used by both conventional terrorists and information warriors are neither completely similar or dissimilar. For instance, the tactics are similar in that both a conventional bomb and EMP/T bomb could destroy a target. However, the tactics are dissimilar in the way that they destroy a target. The conventional bomb is usually aimed at human beings, and the EMP/T bomb is aimed at information or information systems, such as the NII. This is a distinction between direct and indirect attacks. Whereas IW directly targets information or information systems, and fatalities are secondary, conventional terrorists directly murder people with the bomb. Thus, if part of the goal of the conventional terrorist is to create terror by killing people, it may seem as though IW restricts this. However, the exact opposite is true. As the victim-targets harden their defenses, it will only be natural for information terrorists to bring about fear through indirect methods that can cause the same amount of damage, and in fact, bypass many of the traditional defenses that protect the U.S. from conventional terrorism. Hence IW enables information terrorists to use different means of attack to assault information targets with better efficiency. Inasmuch as these tactics make or demonstrate that information and information systems are vulnerable, the people who rely on the information and information systems also become vulnerable. Conventional terrorism, however, has been unable to consistently create terror as traditional targets harden their security defenses. Thus, information terrorists are a greater threat to the U.S. because IW provides them the ability to consistently attack U.S. citizens with indirect means.

The mix of conventional terrorism and IW is both dangerous and tactically advantageous because it combines deadly motives and the need for fear and attention with the most powerful and probable tactics of IW. These tactics enable information terrorists to easily transgress geographic and physical boundaries which limit conventional terrorists. At the same time, conventional terrorists would use IW because the cost of conducting an information attack, in proportion to the cost of conducting a conventional attack, is extremely low. Also, IW provides anonymity to the attacker, enhancing the effect of binary schizophrenia, without limiting an information terrorist's ability to later claim credit for the attack. As a result, the low-cost/high-yield ratio is even more beneficial to the terrorist who uses IW than one who does not. While these reasons solidify that a conventional terrorist would choose to use IW, they do not require an entirely new class. Information terrorism is also not exactly the same as IW, however, but becomes a sub-category of IW. For example, not all information warriors want to cause fear or promote a cause, but all information terrorists do want to use IW to cause fear, preferably by directly attacking the information systems that will indirectly have fatal results for those who rely on it. This is different from pure IW.

The determination of a threat different from conventional terrorism also mandated a brief analysis of solutions and strategies. The analysis of past and present strategies to combat potential information threats demonstrated that the U.S. is extremely ill-prepared for an information terrorist attack. As the U.S. has taken intermediate steps to strengthen IW defenses, the greatest hurdle faced now is time. The U.S. NII is extremely vulnerable and will remain vulnerable for many years. As our electronic civil defenses are improved following the PCCIP report, the U.S. must continually reevaluate the nature of security and power with a cross-disciplinary approach that ensures other conventional problems do not also transcend into the information sphere. Partnerships must be developed and maintained between the private and public sector, possibly using hackers as national resources, in order to protect all parts of the NII. Changes in both domestic laws and the addition of international IW and technology-related treaties must be made at the same pace as technological improvements while remaining conscious of possible Constitutional concerns. These legal flaws are another reason why information terrorism is a greater threat than conventional terrorism.

Despite the advantages of information terrorism, conventional terrorism will exist for some time in the future. It is likely that larger terrorist groups will begin having tactical cells that specialize in IW. As time progresses, IW cells will either take over conventional organizations, or separate into smaller information terrorist groups or even become individual information terrorists. The Aryan Nation, for example, may be the first to delve into information terrorism due to their members' skills and familiarity with information technology. While IW makes terrorism more potent than conventional terrorism, is also spreads the threat. General information attacks from hackers will also continue, but until motives can be determined, no incident should be dismissed as juvenile. Instead, all information attacks must be considered as potential threats from an information terrorist or information terrorist organization, who essentially will have the best tools with the worst of intentions. If the U.S. does not act now to combat the threat of information terrorism, the fear and damage that information terrorists can cause by attacking information and information systems within the U.S. will be debilitating. Information terrorism has been shown to be both different and more potent than conventional terrorism. Until the idea of information terrorism is accepted as a true national security issue, and IW enters mainstream thinking, information terrorists will have strong leverage against the United States because every citizen will be at risk.

CHAPTER VI

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