Introduction

"The world isn't run by weapons any more, or energy or money, but by little ones and zeros, little bits of data. It's all just electrons. ... There is a war out there old friend, a world war; and it's not about who's got the most bullets, but who controls the information, what we see and hear, how we work and think. It's all about the information." Sneakers. MCA Universal, 1992

Information warfare (IW) has recently emerged and become increasingly important to the United States military and intelligence community.1 It has become a buzz word of the media and cyberworld, and it will become the tool of our nation's enemies. The technology and innovations that have developed over the past century have rapidly become something that most people take for granted. Most citizens in the industrialized world have become dependent on technology without even acknowledging it. We operate in an electronic age. Computers, phone lines, satellites, and televisions are all forms of communication on which people rely daily. Economically, we rely on banks that store currency not as gold bullion, but as digitized bits of information. We use ATM machines, electric stock brokers, cash registers and bar-code scanners as if they have always existed, and will always exist. We travel in cars, buses, commuter rail and airplanes that rely on electricity or the microcircuit to operate. In fact today it is hard to think of any national infrastructure that is not somehow dependent on modern technology, including electronic power grids, water supply systems and the financial institutions of America. Thus, if opposing actors could somehow obtain control of this technology, they would wield considerable power and influence upon those who relied on it: the technologically advanced first world nations, including the dependent citizens of the United States (U.S.).

Now step back and imagine a situation in which you could not use one, many, or all of the things that are based on technology for a day, week, month or even year. Then take this example and imagine what would happen to the U.S. military. Our technologically advanced naval ships would be dead in the water, stealth planes would be grounded, missiles would remain safely tucked away inside their silos, command and control networks would be frozen, and the only defense the U.S. has shut down. Or, consider the what it would the result would be if the military technology and civilian information networks still remained operative, but instead of the U.S. controlling them, an enemy, terrorist or an unknown entity could control these networks? According to Vice Admiral John McConnell, the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), "We're more vulnerable than any nation on Earth" (Waller 1995, 44). Consider something intentional and larger in scope than the Computer 2000 Problem in the hands of a national enemy.2 [See Figure I.1]. These are the pragmatic dilemmas that our nation's leaders must come to grips with in order to formulate appropriate policy for the U.S.

As the world goes forth into the future, however, the U.S. mind-set should not remain too focused on what could go wrong tomorrow with IW. Instead, the U.S. need to continue to plan for what can go wrong today. For example, in 1997, conventional terrorists stormed into the Peruvian Embassy and the world with their violently dangerous cause. When terrorists released simple chemical and biological nerve agents in the Tokyo subway in 1993, the results were both gruesome and absorbing. When the Oklahoma City bombing occurred, or when the World Trade Center was bombed, the people of America started to recognize the threats of conventional terrorism, both domestic and international, in a heartfelt manner. As citizens of the U.S., we woke up to the possibility that terrorism can be in our backyard. In the future, however, imagine if conventional terrorists would use IW to further their objectives by causing chaos in the civil, political and international order. The result of this would be the realization of a new threat to everyone in the U.S. What I will prove, however, is that while conventional terrorists will continue to be threats to the international order in the future, conventional terrorists who use IW to achieve their goals will actually become a greater threat to society. These people, called information terrorists, have characteristics substantially different and distinct from conventional terrorists. As such, I will show that when conventional terrorists use IW, they actually become a subset class of IW. After explaining the threat of information terrorism, I will address possible solutions to combat information terrorism.

Since most of the mainstream publications within the information warfare field have simply classified terrorists who use IW as a tool, as just terrorists with better tools, this thesis will explain how terrorism is significantly changed because of the use of IW. I will begin by specifically trying to describe and explain the definition and characteristics of both information warfare and conventional terrorism in chapter one.

Using the agreed upon fundamental characteristics of both IW and terrorism, I will set forth to show that the conventional terrorists who use IW will no longer be terrorists in the current terminological usage, but a subset of information warriors called information terrorists, and a new threat to the nation's national security. This will be done separately by identifying and describing in chapter two the current tactics and operations of terrorists, of those who use IW techniques, and how they compare and contrast. In chapter three I will explore the difference between the targets of conventional terrorism and the objectives toward which information warfare might be suited. In chapter four I will subsequently examine who might use IW or terrorist tactics to achieve their goals and how they would be organized. Lastly, chapter five helps to more clearly draw out the distinction between conventional terrorism and information warfare by examining the justifications for choosing IW over conventional means and explaining why choosing IW fundamentally changes the nature of conventional terrorism. This establishes a relationship that creates information terrorism. Having established a significant new threat, in chapter six I will discuss how current strategies and solutions for dealing with conventional terrorism are inadequate to deal with information terrorism. I will also predict what policies would work. Finally, I will conclude by summing up that terrorists who use IW are no longer either conventional or terrorists as we know them today; therefore information terrorism must be combated differently than conventional terrorism if the U.S. is to survive as a global power in the information age.