Ma'ariv (Rosh Hashanah supplement) in Hebrew 20 Sep 98 pp 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 54, 55
    Interview with Lieutenant General Sha'ul Mufaz, IDF Chief of Staff, by Ya'aqov Erez

[passage omitted] [Erez] As chief of staff, how would you prevent a surprise such as the Yom
Kippur War?

[Mufaz] I think the combination of preparedness, foresight, and experience currently
possessed by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Intelligence Branch creates a situation that
would enable us to identify any change and to provide strategic deterrence. Today we have
both the means and the manpower. I hope that in future we will also be able to identify
changes and provide the strategic deterrence. In the tactical sphere, we believe we will be
able to provide the necessary time span of days and hours.

[Erez] Are you calm on that score?

[Mufaz] Perhaps calm is not the right word. Are we doing our best to provide an answer and
deal with strategic changes? I think we are.

[Erez] The threats today are of a completely different nature. We are no longer dealing with
the movement of a Syrian division on the Golan Heights, something you can spot from Mount
Hermon or elsewhere, rather with an enemy located much further away who can suddenly
launch a missile that nobody is aware of in advance and regarding which there is no early
warning. This is the strategic surprise we are apt to face at the present time.

[Mufaz] I believe that at the present time we need much more resources -- both in terms of
manpower and materials -- for being able to provide an answer to all the threats, both in terms
of deterrence and retaliation. This is one of the reasons that has caused us to say for years
that the gap in resources is large. It is inadvisable to say today that our reliance on
technology and first rate manpower allows us to recognize and analyze changing situations.

[Erez] At the present time, are you capable of gathering sufficient information about the
strategic threats?

[Mufaz] If we receive the appropriate resources, we can cover the gaps that we deem vital.

[Erez] Are you referring to the sphere of deterrence?

[Mufaz] I am referring to all spheres. I don't want to emphasize this or that sphere. It will be
irresponsible of me to say that the gap in this or that sphere is wider than in another sphere.
Today we are facing a very serious gap, and if we don't manage to close it in the next few
years we may be assuming unreasonable risks.

[Erez] We are approaching 2000. Will we be able by this date, or perhaps even earlier, to
obtain the necessary early warning for avoiding any more strategic surprises?

[Mufaz] It is inadvisable to answer this question in a straightforward manner. Let me put it this
waywe are relying on our early-warning ability, as well as on our deterrence capability and
our ability to strike back.

[Erez] I have heard such talk before the Yom Kippur War. People told medon't worry, we have
early-warning. I saidwhat are you talking about, look where the Syrians are. They told
medon't worry, we have early-warning. I want to tell you, Mr. Chief of Staff, that you must act
under the assumption that there is no early-warning. We have learned from our brief and
painful history that when they decide to assume all the risks, they may surprise us. This is
why I am asking you whether today you have enough resources for obtaining early-warning?

[Mufaz] If you are asking whether today we are making use of additional capabilities in the
spheres of deterrence, early-warning, and retaliation, the answer is positive.

[Erez] The defense minister asked the Treasury for an additional budget of two billion shekel,
and you will perhaps receive half a billion. Is this enough?

[Mufaz] I told both the inner cabinet and the prime minister that in order to provide an answer
to the growing threats, we need the additional budget. Over the last few years the IDF's
budget has been cut and it was forced to cancel projects. These facts created a severe and
intolerable gap, and if we cannot gradually bridge this gap we may be assuming
unreasonable risks.

[Erez] What do you mean by unreasonable risks?

[Mufaz] There is no accurate definition, but I think we should ask ourselves whether we can
provide a reasonable answer to these risks. I think that ensuring our existence is more
important than living conditions. We must reach a decision, because the threats developing
on the horizon -- I am referring mainly to Iran and Iraq and to the possibility of various
coalitions there -- are real.

We possess systems that are 25 years old and that were refurbished for the last time after the
Yom Kippur War. This includes our communications system and other systems, and it is time
we replaced them. We are facing a gap that we will find very hard to close even if we
implement the most drastic steps.

Our power is based, however, on our manpower. In this sphere we are also competing
against the outside environment. Our army is becoming more and more technologically
oriented, but the civilian sphere is constantly tempting our highly trained technological
officers. If we don't manage to deal with this, we will lose these officers to the difficult-to-resist
temptations. In my opinion this could cause unreasonable dangers. [passage omitted]

[Erez] What's your reaction to the public commotion caused by the Four Mothers organization,
demanding an IDF withdrawal from south Lebanon?

[Mufaz] Look, I think we should look at it from a wider perspective. The only reason for our
presence in the security zone is to provide security to the north. The day we can provide the
same level of security from the international border, I will have no argument with anybody. I
believe, however, that we have still not reached that point. To all those who advocate
unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon I say that such a withdrawal would constitute an
unreasonable risk verging on a gamble. A state and an army don't take unreasonable risks
and don't gamble on human life. I maintain that if we deploy along the international border we
may create a situation wherein the residents of the north will face great risks to the point of not
being able to continue with their normal lives.

[Erez] Why are we continuing to operate in Lebanon as we used to do during your period
there? The nature of the fighting in Lebanon has changed. Today we are not fighting against
Palestinians but against Hizballah, and this war has the nature of a guerrilla war.

[Mufaz] I prefer the present situation to our dragging Syria into a confrontation against us in
Lebanon, and perhaps to expanding the confrontation to the Golan Heights. As for our modus
operandi against Hizballah, we must remember that a regular army is fighting terrorists,
guerrilla fighters. There can be no decision and victory is won by points. I don't think any
other army would have reached the IDF's achievements in its war against the guerrillas in
Lebanon.

Everyone is entitled to say that everything must be done to minimize our casualties in south
Lebanon. Indeed, we must do everything to minimize our casualties, but I cannot promise that
it is possible to fight terrorism without any casualties. The IDF's action -- taking the offensive
initiative -- is conducted under the restrictions of Operation Grapes of Wrath understandings
and our desire not to harm innocent Lebanese citizens. I think that altogether, the IDF is
operating correctly. However, there is always room for improvement. [passage omitted]

[Erez] We have still not spoken about the IDF in future, in the 21st century.

[Mufaz] We intend to strongly emphasize the combat forces, both regular and reserve forces.
We also plan to emphasize the Air Force and Intelligence Corps. We are going to implement
structural changes in the army, to decrease the size of the commands and strengthen the
combat echelon. We are examining a whole series of issues relating to this reorganization.
We will want to harness technology in every area in which it can improve our ability, both
during overall war and routine security missions. We have already carried out extensive work
on the IDF's combat doctrine.

[Erez] Has this issue been under discussion for a long time?

[Mufaz] Certainly. We want to finalize it by 2000. By that time we will build a force that will suit
our operational concept. We will need to deal with the issue of a technological working
environment that saves resources and assists the commanders; an environment that makes it
possible for us to reach better decisions both during routine and war periods. There are many
things that should be distributed within the army and put under the direction of the lower
echelons rather than the top command. We like to talk about how to manage resources -- of
how to teach the officers to manage the resources they possess, as well as to inculcate the
norms of a learning environment that can learn from its mistakes and grow accordingly. We
must see a positive rather than a negative learning curve in the army.

We will strongly emphasize technology and research and development, which I consider
extremely important. Our army is becoming more and more technological. We will be required
to maintain a stable manpower base for the technological systems we consider decisive on
the battlefield, because these are extremely expensive systems requiring a very high level of
competence, and we cannot replace the manpower operating them every year or two.

Special stress will be put on ethical organizational aspects, on appropriate behavior and on
preserving human lives at the professional echelon. This is no less important than weapons
and technological systems, because our ability to attain all our objectives will be mainly
determined by the quality of our people.