Tuesday, November 24, 1998
In South Lebanon, another change in tactics
By Amos Harel, Ha'aretz Military Correspondent
Entrenched by the northwestern edge of the south Lebanon
security zone, the Rotem outpost is now completely
protected. A reinforced concrete roof covers the space
between the rooms. The mortar fire, coming every few days
from Hezbollah and Amal guns in an adjacent wadi, hardly
make an impact. This, in a cement-shell, is the IDF's
situation in Lebanon in late 1998: a protected, jacketed
army conducting missions in the decreasing maneuvering
room left by the political echelon.
Officers don't know what to do with the space created
underneath. Until a few years ago, soldiers played
basketball here. Today no one ventures out without helmet
and flak jacket.
Installing additional protective measures is currently the
main project in Lebanon. Without them, IDF casualties
would have been much higher this year.
Since early this year, there have been over one thousand
incidents of enemy fire (some anti-tank weapons, mainly
mortars), which is five times more than two years ago.
Thus, these measures are a function of change in fighting
methods. As usual, when the army identifies a problem
(often, too late) it goes all out to solve it. Millions have been
invested in reinforcing outposts, making them nearly
impenetrable.
But it's just another vicious cycle characteristic of the
conflict in Lebanon. In the end, Hezbollah, because of the
IDF's defensive actions, will have to seek newer, deadlier,
fighting methods and then the IDF will seek new solutions
and so on.
The familiar rituals recur with tragic regularity. Three Golani
soldiers killed last week by a Hezbollah landmine some 30
meters away from Tel Kaba'a outpost in the central sector,
or yesterday's three soldiers were wounded by mortar fire.
Each time, the incident briefly reopens public debate over
Israel's presence in Lebanon. But up north, they aren't so
sure that the public elsewhere understands what's really
going on in the security zone.
Up north, they think the media is exaggerating the situation
and they expressed reservations about the news coverage.
One soldier commented that "there are more soldiers
guarding Hebron settlers than there are in this area." Yaniv
Granot, a Nahal soldier from Rehovot, thinks the media is
presenting "an unreliable, defeatist picture. The media
represents a particular interest - to get the soldiers out of
here as soon as possible, and it writes things so that will
happen."
What Granot doesn't know is that the army is actually to
blame for the remote media coverage of Lebanon. Since
the beginning of this year, correspondents' visits to the
security zone have been sharply curtailed.
But, this is approach is misguided. Hezbollah is using the
Israeli media vacuum for its own purposes, and the IDF,
perhaps unjustly, is perceived as having something to hide.
Sometimes the "Four Mothers" movement, which wants an
immediate, unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, seems to
have more effective public relations than the IDF
spokesperson in Lebanon.
A casual survey of soldiers in various places inside and out
of Lebanon indicates that most 19 and 20-year-olds in the
security zone are clear about their mission and have no
reservations.
Nahal soldiers manning the Rotem outpost say the problem
is at home. "Most parents know we are in Lebanon. It's
better that they know. But I know soldiers who would rather
not tell them," says Ramat Gan resident Amir Lev. "My
parents are really proud of me," says Yaniv Granot. "They
won't try to stop me from going to Lebanon, but, of course,
serving here raises political questions at home." Another
soldier, Amir Lev stated that "there's too much time to
dream about a clash, but it's absolutely clear that I'm here to
protect the communities. I came to fulfill this mission, not to
seek adventure."
Their previous mission was in Gaza, and like every soldier
they know, they prefer Lebanon, all for the same reasons.
"Here the mission is clear. You see someone in front of
you, you have to fire at him. In Gaza, coping is much
harder," says Granot. "The population there is difficult, both
from the point of view of its behavior and its goals." Is he
talking about the Palestinians? "Are you kidding?" he
answers, "the settlers!"
How is victory measured in Lebanon? Amiram Levine's
analysis referred to the status quo, not to a decisive result.
The IDF is ostensibly there to protect residents of the north,
he argued in internal army discussions, but the fact that the
Shiite organizations are not firing katyushas is not
necessarily because we are preventing them, but because
we are not annoying them too much.
If we kill too many of them (the distinction between civilian
and military is blurred in Lebanon), they will respond with
katyushas. A kind of balance of fear has been created
whereby neither side is interested in making its opponents'
lives too miserable. Levine felt that the way to maintain low
IDF casualties required an ongoing offensive that would
keep Hezbollah away from the security zone. The current
method favored by the defense minister and chief of staff's
is to reinforce outposts. But, will this lead to an
abandonment of the offensive initiative, which would in turn
create a new vacuum and renew Hezbollah efforts?
"We get many attacks here," says western brigade
commander Colonel Alon, "for every mortar bomb fired at
us, I can fire 100 back, but if the 99th hits a house in the
village and costs us katyushas on Nahariya, that's
dangerous. There are days when we respond aggressively
and days when I give an order to swallow it because I want
100,000 tourists to visit Goren Park on Rosh Hashana."
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chair,
Likud MK Uzi Landau, has another solution. "The real
problem is the policy imposing controlled rules of
engagement on the IDF. We don't even ask ourselves how
the opposite side freely dispatches terrorist organizations
unhindered. We need to change the rules in Lebanon to
create symmetry with the Syrians. Syrian soldiers can also
be hit by explosive devices and the Syrian economy in
Lebanon can also be affected."
Earlier this year, the IDF saw some improvement. Dozens
of Amal and Hezbollah fighters were injured after the army
made tactical adjustments in its assault patterns. The
volume of operations was huge. This was urged by Amiram
Levine in pre-retirement interviews. But lately, the IDF has
been striking less frequently at the guerrilla fighters. Did the
spirit of change depart with Levine? Some army officials
note extreme caution in operations and fear its impact on
tactics and morale: "It's easier to explain the death of a
comrade in a clash in which terrorists were killed than a
death from a roadside charge or mortar. The soldiers
cannot be allowed to feel as though they are punching
bags."
But a senior officer says, "we haven't changed anything, but
when you send soldiers on a mission, you calculate very
carefully the necessity and risk entailed. This approach
applies to every security zone operation, not just to those
beyond the dark mountains."
Behind these remarks lies the IDF's usual trap in Lebanon.
Northern Command is in an impossible bind. IDF-initiated
operations may entail heavy casualties, but staying holed
up in the outposts gives Hezbollah greater freedom of
operation and lead to more losses.
Meanwhile, the document advocating departure from
Lebanon, prepared by the previous head of the Command
staff, Brigadier General Shai Avital, is practically forgotten
and the prime minister's withdrawal initiative according to
resolution 425 is more frozen than his smile when meeting
with Yasser Arafat.
Last week, military intelligence chief Amos Malka reiterated
the mantra that Hezbollah will not be satisfied with a
unilateral IDF withdrawal to the international border and
that whoever thinks otherwise is "naive or fantasizing." But
this week several ministers said that if the IDF says us
unilateral withdrawal is possible, it must be considered.
An officer not involved in ongoing Lebanon operations says
Northern Command is overall doing a fine job of carrying
out its mission. "As long as the number of casualties
doesn't exceed the average, the army is doing what the
political echelon expects of it; the rest is a matter for the
ministers. Occasionally, it seems to me the senior officers'
problem is one of ego: they take upon themselves
responsibility for things that should be politicians'
responsibility.
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