Palestinian Authority, Israeli Rule
By Mouin Rabbani

Apart from a privately organized reunion for Israeli, Palestinian and Norwegian veterans of the covert Oslo negotiations, the third anniversary of the 13 September 1993 Israeli - Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP) passed without notice. In Israel, the recently installed government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was in no mood for festivities. This is only partly because it had been elected in 29 May on a platform which unambiguously rejected the partnership between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) embodied by the DOP. More to the point, Netanyahu had only days previously shaken hands with Yasir ‘Arafat in full public view, in that brief instant parting company with a year’s worth of sound bites promising that relations with the Palestinians would be fundamentally different under his regime. Notably, neither Ariel Sharon nor any other ultra-rejectionist cabinet member saw fit to tender their resignation in protest. Any ceremony proclaiming the merits of political accommodation and coordinated action against Palestinian radicalism would therefore have only heightened the new government’s reputation for shallow opportunism and the opposition’s calls for Netanyahu to beg for forgiveness at Yitzhak Rabin’s graveside.

In the autonomous Palestinian enclaves, it would probably have required armed force to assemble a crowd large enough to make speeches commemorating the DOP media-worthy. Despite the redeployment of the Israeli military out of large sections of the Gaza Strip and most West Bank cities, and the assumption of power within these areas by the Palestinian Authority (PA), Israeli control over Palestinian lives is exercised with greater vigor than at any time since the occupation began in June 1967. Where the DOP initially enjoyed general popular acceptance, there now remain only a handful of Palestinians prepared to defend it in private. Although most ascribe their disillusionment to the conduct of the Israeli authorities, the performance of the PA or both, an increasing number are concluding that Israeli and Palestinian practices are on the whole consistent with the accord and the arrangements it has produced. Even so, gradually, appeals for the faithful implementation and proper stewardship of the DOP are giving way to demands for its fundamental reconsideration.

In contrast to most Palestinian exiles, who virtually from the outset rejected the DOP because it failed to address their rights and in so doing relegated them to the furthest margins of the Israeli-Palestinian equation, the popular reassessment of this agreement within the occupied territories has been a slower and altogether more complex process. Although the DOP provides for neither the decolonization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, nor Palestinian self-determination, the majority of Palestinians in these territories accepted the PLO’s argument - that in the context of the ‘New World Order’ this was an offer which could be neither refused nor improved upon, and that despite its shortcomings, it created a new dynamic which would ultimately result in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. No less importantly, repeated PLO proclamations that the transitional phase would above all be characterized by tangible improvements in the quality of life (specifically personal security and economic prosperity) were eagerly embraced by a population driven to utter desperation by the relentless escalation of Israeli repression and a stagnant intifada - for more details see Graham Usher (1993).

The warm welcome accorded to Yasir ‘Arafat and his entourage of soldiers and bureaucrats when they entered Gaza in July 1994 revealed the high hopes that Palestinians continued to attach to the DOP, even though little had been achieved in the intervening months to inspire popular confidence. Largely isolated from direct contact with the PLO apparatus throughout the period since 1967, residents of the occupied territories generally retained an idealized notion of its character and capabilities. Those with a more nuanced view tended to assume, for any variety of reasons, that the PA would be more responsive to popular opinion than the PLO and additionally felt a moral obligation to give the historic leadership an opportunity to succeed. Only a small minority insisted that ‘Arafat and his lieutenants signed on to the DOP primarily in order to revive their own flagging fortunes and would be reduced to junior partners in the administration of Israeli rule.

The rude awakening experienced by many Palestinians during the first year of autonomy did not fundamentally alter the popular consensus in favour of the DOP. When all was said and done, autonomy was considered the lesser of two evils when compared to direct Israeli occupation, while PA mismanagement and misconduct could be rationalized as the `product of inexperience and individual maleficence’, and the deteriorating economic situation attributed to `Israeli restrictions and the donor community’s inertia’. At the same time, Palestinian expectations were visibly lowered and further depressed by the continuation of Israeli policies, which seven years earlier had produced the intifada. The PA’s inability to confront a very palpable Israeli hegemony, set against its very public cooperation with Israel’s security forces - most notably the ‘joint patrols’ - increased the damage to its reputation.

With hindsight the period between the signing of the 28 September 1995 Interim Agreement (or ‘Oslo II’) and the suicide bombings, carried out by the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and Islamic Jihad in February and March of 1996, represents the high point of the DOP. Faced with mounting criticism of its strategy, performance and conduct, the extension of autonomy to West Bank cities allowed the PLO to claim that Gaza Jericho was only a beginning, while the January 1996 elections for an 88-member Palestinian Council and Yasir ‘Arafat as ra’is of the Palestinian Executive Authority endowed the PA with sorely needed political legitimacy.¹ The smooth transition from Rabin to Peres, after the former’s November 1995 assassination by a Jewish extremist and Israeli public reaction to this event, increased hope among Palestinians that Israel was serious about reaching a genuine peace. Meanwhile, the Palestinian opposition’s decision to boycott the self-rule institutions, and implicit neglect of the bread-and-butter issues within the domain of these institutions, led to its further marginalization and increased dissent within its diverse ranks.

The unprecedented Israeli siege of the occupied territories imposed in the wake of the suicide bombings constituted a turning point for Palestinian public opinion. Essentially, the hermetic closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the policy of ‘separation’ subsequently pursued by Israel, served to remove any remaining ambiguities about the nature of post-Oslo Israeli-Palestinian relations. Equally, this period - which saw an unprecedented PA campaign against anyone and anything currently or formerly Islamist - left little to the imagination vis-a-vis the PA’s own role within this relationship. And in conclusively demonstrating that Palestinian economic fortunes remain a function of the Israeli-Palestinian balance of power - that is to say at the total mercy of Israel -’separation’ has reestablished for Palestinians the connection between political context and quality of life which the PLO had done its best to sever. That the siege was imposed and institutionalized by the most liberal government in Israel’s history undermined the DOP’s credibility even further.

While Palestinians were subject to a myriad of Israeli restrictions, affecting virtually every aspect of daily life prior to autonomy, the Interim Agreement has formalized the fragmentation of the occupied territories into zones of Palestinian and Jewish settlement - and the atomization of Palestinian society - resulting from Israel’s post-1967 policy of `creeping annexation’. This is most evident in the West Bank, where only approximately 3 per cent of the total surface area, comprising the majority of Palestinian towns, is under full PA control (that is, `Area A’). Because the towns are non-contiguous and given that the Israelis remain in command of the road network connecting them, all movement of goods and persons in and out of (or between) these enclaves can be interdicted at will. In the villages, most of which fall within `Area B’ (altogether comprising approximately 27 per cent of the West Bank), the situation is more serious. Here, the PA has only civil and police powers, while Israel remains responsible for `internal security’ - the meaning of which it is free to define. According to the terms of Oslo II therefore, Israel can - and routinely does - continue with land confiscation, mass arrests, demolition of houses, defoliation, prolonged curfews, arbitrary violence and any other measures it sees `legally’ fit to impose on the pretext of security. As the roads connecting villages to each other, nearby towns and often their agricultural lands remain in Israeli hands, periods of ‘internal closure’ have been particularly devastating, with villagers unable to tend crops and livestock, market perishable goods, purchase foodstuffs or obtain essential services such as hospitalization, which are available only in the towns. The realities of power in ‘Area B’ are underlined by reports of Israeli soldiers preventing Palestinian policemen from reaching villages to mediate violent family disputes and even placing them under curfew along with the rest of the population.

The largest portion of the West Bank, about 70 per cent of its surface area, is classified as ‘Area C’. Comprising of Jewish settlements (including the centre of Hebron), water-rich areas, border regions, main roads, and most lands outside Palestinian municipal and village boundaries (but also several Palestinian villages), `Area C’ is a contiguous whole which surrounds both `Area A’ and ‘Area B’ in their entirety, and parcels them into isolated enclaves. Pursuant to Oslo II under exclusive Israeli control, it is not subject to restrictions regarding the further expansion of Jewish settlements or indeed anything else. No less importantly and in accordance with the Interim Agreement, jurisdiction over the settlements has been formally transferred from the civil administration of the military government within the occupied territories to the state apparatus within Israel, consolidating their position as integral, undifferentiated components of Israeli territory and public administration. ‘Area C’ also includes the numerous `by-pass roads’ that were constructed during the past several years, at an enormous cost in terms of Palestinian land-loss - in order to erase the boundaries between Israel and the settlements, to provide easy access between settlements in a manner which `by-passes’ Palestinian enclaves and to physically isolate the latter. In mid-September 1996, a new road costing US$40 million, including the largest tunnel yet constructed by Israel, was opened in the West Bank, in order to integrate the Gush Etzion settlement bloc near Bethlehem more fully with metropolitan Jerusalem. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert asserted that this road, which reduces the distance between the two communities to a ten-minute drive, would make Gush Etzion `a permanent part of Israel’ (Palestine Report 1996:4). To emphasize this point, Hebron Mayor Mustafa Natshe was forbidden from using this road several days later.

Although `internal closure’ has thus far been imposed as an extraordinary rather than a permanent measure, the separation between East Jerusalem and its annexed environs - comprising roughly 20 per cent of the total surface area of the West Bank - and the rest of the West Bank has been fully institutionalized. As a `final status’ issue, Jerusalem is in fact simply excluded from the terms of the Interim Agreement. Without an Israeli permit, which as a rule is virtually impossible to obtain, Palestinians may neither enter the Jerusalem area nor pass through it. Permanent military checkpoints on most primary and secondary roads leading out of the West Bank, backed up by other forms of border surveillance, constant patrols within Jerusalem, along with stiff fines and prison sentences for violators (to say nothing of vicious physical assault by members of the notoriously thuggish mishmar ha’gvul or border police), have ensured that few Palestinians venture today into, the city. Ironically, it is a city which has, throughout the occupation functioned as their political, economic, cultural and institutional capital, and to which they enjoyed virtually unrestricted access, that is, prior to Oslo. Advanced surgery at al-Maqasid hospital, prayer at al-Aqsa Mosque or the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and shopping on Salah-al-Din street, activities that West Bank Palestinians could undertake at a moment’s notice until recently, have now become the stuff of nostalgia and dreams.

The closure and the associated Israeli ‘final offensive’ against the Palestinian community within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries have driven the latter to the brink of defeat. Severed from daily contact with the West Bank population, which is approximately ten times its own size and the main market for its goods and services, and encircled by a triple ring of rapidly expanding Jewish settlements, East Jerusalem has become a ghost town with an economy in name only. Increasingly certain that they will never live under Palestinian administration unless they move to Ramallah, and in order to elude Israel’s systematic and accelerated campaign to deprive Jerusalemites of residency and property rights, a growing number (how many it is impossible to determine) are in the process of resolving what they perceive as a hopeless predicament by applying for Israeli citizenship or simply emigrating abroad. Such measures to secure individual futures in turn only strengthen Israel’s control of the city and its outskirts. The widespread despair and feeling of powerlessness - reflected in the reportedly steady rise of property sales to institutions representing Jewish settlers – has all but overwhelmed more steadfast Palestinians, reducing them to waging a desperate struggle to prevent further erosion of Arab rights in the city, rather than, as most initially hoped, using the DOP to turn the tide against Israeli colonization.

While past experience (for example, the period prior to the intifada) suggests that such despondency eventually translates into popular resistance, mass action has in the past generally failed to reverse previously inflicted damage.

The Gaza Strip, a contiguous if oddly shaped entity, 80-5 per cent of which is `Area A’ - with most of the remainder classified as `Area C’ - is where self-rule began and consequently the laboratory for Israel’s post Oslo policies. Technically immune to `internal closure’, it has instead been transformed into the world’s largest prison camp. Entirely surrounded on three sides by several layers of electrified razor wire and a heavily patrolled coastline on the fourth, entry and exit of goods and persons is strictly controlled by a series of permanent Israeli and Palestinian checkpoints. In principle, only senior PLO and PA officials (`VIPs’), a select number of Palestinian businessmen and drivers with prior clearance, and a constantly varying quota of married fathers over the age of 30 with `clean’ security records and permits to contribute to the Israeli economy may pass.<sup>2</sup> The latter, who require employment in the Israeli labour market primarily because of Israel’s systematic `de-development’ of the Gaza Strip, have been left with no other means of subsistence - for further details, see Roy (1994). Therefore, they must leave and return on a daily basis, through a separate and considerably more arduous crossing point. In practice, Israel has on several occasions prevented Yasir ‘Arafat from leaving Gaza, banned several senior PA officials from doing so for prolonged periods - including Social Affairs Minister Intisar al-Wazir (`Umm Jihad’) for attempting to smuggle several students to Birzeit University in the West Bank - and routinely prevented most or all workers from reaching their jobs for prolonged periods. With respect to goods, Israeli products as a rule have unrestricted entry to the Gaza Strip, while imports from other countries often experience bureaucratic `warfare’ and associated highly exorbitant storage costs. For example, the PA was recently forced to burn US$3 million worth of sheep carcasses donated by Saudi Arabia on the occasion of the Muslim feast of ‘Id al-Adha after these spoiled while awaiting entry permits. Israel’s policy on Palestinian exports similarly seeks to ensure continued dependence upon Israel and prevent the emergence of a distinct and recognizably Palestinian economy. According to Palestinian economists, it is both quicker and cheaper to import Spanish rather than Gaza tomatoes in the West Bank, while efforts to build trade relationships independent of Israel are routinely sabotaged. In one instance, a Palestinian agricultural cooperative was reportedly informed that if it did not sell its strawberry crop to the state marketing agency, AGREXCO, at a higher price than that being offered by a European importer, the strawberries would not be allowed passage to the Israeli port of Ashdod on ‘health grounds’. It appears likely that economic considerations have played their part in Israel’s refusal thus far to open a ‘safe passage’ between the Gaza Strip and West Bank, as stipulated in the agreed-upon Interim Agreement.

While the various forms of closure are imposed on security pretexts, senior Israeli military and intelligence officers have pointed out that no suicide bomber has ever applied for a permit to enter Israel, and that no Palestinian with a valid work permit has been convicted of `terrorist’ charges. Such officers are inclined to see closure as a misguided and ultimately counterproductive political response to an essentially military challenge on the ground. Other observers have argued that closure is, or at least has become, a political strategy rather than a security tactic, the economic consequences of which - for example, massive unemployment in the Gaza Strip, widespread poverty throughout the occupied territories and a rapidly growing PA budget deficit which is paralyzing its ability to deliver services³ - makes further violence more rather than less likely.

Although no longer physically present, Israeli administration remains very much in evidence within the PA areas as well. Birth certificates, identity cards, driving licenses, bureaucratic application forms of various sorts and even Palestinian passports must all be registered with and approved by the military government in order to attain official status (and often retain Hebrew alongside Arabic on Palestinian documents as a means of controlling the Arab Palestinian population). The difference here is that Palestinians outside Jerusalem now conduct such procedures through the PA rather than directly, leading to considerable delays and frustration, and numerous reports of favoritism and administrative corruption.

Because the relevant international conventions and safeguards are not incorporated into the DOP, which furthermore has no enforcement mechanisms, Israel has been able to continue disregarding applicable standards of international conduct, and thereby make the gross imbalance of power between itself and the PA the Agreement’s operative terms of reference. It is aided in this by an international community even less inclined to intervene today than in days past. This is partly because the PLO has itself accepted the existing arrangements but, more importantly, the USA (with Western Europe characteristically acquiescing despite its misgivings) views Israeli regional hegemony as vital to its geopolitical interests and the region’s stability, and consequently will allow nothing to obstruct Oslo’s continued implementation.

If the PA could initially count on public support in the occupied territories, because most inhabitants had simply not read the DOP or believed it would be overtaken by an inexorable dynamic leading to Palestinian statehood, its prestige has been shattered by reality. Instead of the much-vaunted improvements in the quality of life intended to underpin the interim stage, most Palestinians are today significantly poorer than before Oslo. What Palestinian leaders have endlessly hailed as the inevitable prelude to ‘a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem,’ is in fact a succession of isolated enclaves physically detached from Jerusalem. With the PA additionally incapable, in fact as well as in perception, of effectively challenging Israeli policies or mobilizing the `international community’ to do so, the belief that no agreement at all would have been preferable to the present arrangements is slowly but surely gaining ground.

The PA’s own approach to government and state-building, its relationship with Israel and the role of the opposition have all contributed substantially to the growing pessimism. Best characterized as an elected autocracy, the PA’s ra’is possesses a seemingly limitless capacity for micro-managing the public and private sectors, and some would say, consequently, an equally impressive ability to co-opt, marginalize or otherwise out-maneuver his critics with comparatively little violence, though not without acrimony. ‘Arafat brooks no opposition to his own person or position as uncontested leader, and has moved quickly and decisively to crush such dissent by whatever means necessary. Most of the violence and brutality meted out by his security forces - which is documented by the human rights community, and includes the systematic torture of prisoners and at least eight deaths in detention - has been aimed at improving the PA’s standing vis-a-vis Israel and the West, or can be attributed to the machinations of its numerous `security services’ which have all but obtained a license to run amok, rather than directly bolstering his rule. Nevertheless, the relatively widespread campaign of intimidation and the fact that people either care little for the above subtleties, or see repression as primarily directed at those involved in the struggle against a continuing and increasingly intolerable Israeli occupation, have served to further undermine the PA’s legitimacy.

The elections of 20 January 1996, monitored by the European Union and rather hastily certified by it as free and fair⁴, have strengthened perceptions of a ‘vibrant Palestinian democracy’. While the PLO’s traditional pluralism continues to survive in attenuated form, `democracy’ is permitted only to the extent that it respects autocracy. Concerning freedom of expression, for example, Iyad al-Sarraj, the appointed PA ombudsman, was arrested in May 1996 following a critical interview in the New York Times which offended ‘Arafat. Released after submitting a public apology, he was promptly re-arrested after explaining that he never intended to insult the ra’is but otherwise stood by his denunciations of PA misconduct. Charged this time with dealing with drugs, planted in his mental health clinic presumably by PA security, and physically tortured in addition, international pressure was brought to bear, which eventually secured his release. In August 1996, PA security forces confiscated and banned books by the preeminent Palestinian intellectual, Edward W. Said, which unequivocally denounce both Oslo and ‘Arafat (Shanahan 1996:24). If only because their actions have not been officially disavowed and the books remain unavailable, claims by senior officials that this was a rogue operation have been met with disbelief.

The Palestinian media meanwhile promote the personality cult of the leader as faithfully as any of its Arab counterparts, replete with all manner of pomp and circumstance. Palestinian television (coincidentally headquartered in ‘Arafat’s office) broadcasts several songs of praise daily, along with any number of additional eulogies. The media’s responsibilities were emphasized when Mahir al-’Alarm, night editor of al-Quds newspaper, was arrested by the PA’s Preventative Security Agency for relegating to an inside page a statement by Greek Orthodox Archbishop Theodorus likening ‘Arafat to the first Muslim conqueror of Jerusalem, Caliph `Umar bin al-Khattab.

The judiciary has fared little better. As Usher (1996:21-34) has pointed out, the plethora of Palestinian security services - most recently augmented by jihaz amn al-jami’at or the Universities Security Agency - are lawless in the term’s technical sense, in that they and their activities are neither regulated by legislation nor subject to regular legal review. In mid-August 1996, however, the Palestinian Supreme Court agreed to hear a case brought against the PA by ten Birzeit University students, who had been detained without charge or trial since the suicide bombings of February-March. When the court ordered their immediate release, its president, Amin `Abd-al-Salam, was immediately forced into retirement and his ruling ignored. In other cases, suspects have been arrested, charged, tried, convicted and sentenced within hours by the utterly farcical ‘State Security Courts’.

Hopes that the Palestinian Council would act as an effective counterweight to the executive branch have on the whole failed to materialize:

• First, its powers of legislation are substantially restricted by, inter alia, the corpus of Israeli military orders which remain in force,

• Second, ‘Arafat had successfully co-opted several of its most prominent independents and Islamists, including ‘Abd-al-Jawad Salih, Hanan ‘Ashrawi⁵ and `Imad al-Faluji into his cabinet, as the ministers for Agriculture, Higher Education and Communications respectively;

• Third, the Council is thoroughly dominated by ‘Arafat, who typically gets his way and, without exception, disregards decisions he does not like;

• Fourth, ‘Arafat has cleverly resurrected the PLO Executive Committee since the elections and PA critics are seen off with the observation that the PLO represents the entire Palestinian people, and is furthermore the PA’s source of authority, while detractors from within the PLO are informed that the Palestinian Council is the only directly elected Palestinian body.

Even if devoid of results, substantial debate and criticism are however possible within the Palestinian Council. It also appears to be getting more restive in reaction to the growing frustration of its members and popular cynicism - in a recent public opinion survey 46.7 per cent stated that the Council `represents the people well but with no effect’ (Rabah and Shanahan 1996:20).<sup>6</sup> There are certainly prominent PA officials who do take a principled stand in tune with critics from among the general public, against the crass cronyism and corruption of the ‘Arafat-led status quo. As a case in point, ‘Arafat won approval for his controversial new cabinet in the Palestinian Legislative Council by a vote of 55 to 28 and with three abstentions, a year after legislators had demanded that the then sitting cabinet be dissolved due to a widening corruption scandal. The current ‘victory’ was not achieved without a contentious debate and heated criticism, which pointed to the fact that ‘Arafat’s expanded cabinet reshuffle had done nothing to address the serious allegations of widespread government corruption, as it included certain ministers of the previous cabinet who had been the subjects of a scathing report made in 1997<sup>7</sup> by a special legislative investigating committee, which in fact recommended that three ministers be put on trial. In apparent protest at their re-appointment, Hanan ‘Ashrawi (since 1996 the Minister for Higher Education, who had been earmarked in the reshuffle for the Tourism portfolio) and `Abd-al-Jawad Salih refused to take up their posts in the new cabinet, which included an additional ten new ministers whom many suspect of having being `bought off’. Complaining against the rampant corruption and mismanagement of the Middle East peace process according to US and Israeli dictates, `Ashrawi (who will continue to represent Jerusalem in the Palestinian Legislative Council) warned in a CNN interview, that the substantial vote against the cabinet was ‘a warning signal ... that this government has to face the serious expectations of the people’. She also told Reuters that ‘I believe when people called for change they didn’t ask for additions. They asked for change in the ... status quo, but what we see now is maintaining what existed [and] adding people to it.’ And to reporters in the West Bank Town of Ramallah, she said, `I assured President ‘Arafat that once he conducts ... genuine reform, I will be willing to help him.’ According to Associated Press, Minister of Agriculture `Abd-al-Jawad Salih announced his resignation by calling the cabinet reshuffle a ‘tragedy’ and saying that ‘Arafat had thwarted efforts to fight corruption by protecting high-ranking officials.

A subsequent poll showed that almost 57 per cent of Palestinians believed that the cabinet reshuffle would not improve the PA’s performance, while more than 71 per cent intimated that corruption would either increase or remain at the same level. And according to a Reuters report, even some members of ‘Arafat’s own FATEH faction, which dominates the legislature, voiced criticism - with one leading activist cynically suggesting during the debate, that ‘Arafat be named as the permanent “God” of the Palestinian people’, a statement that almost brought about a fist fight. Independent lawmaker Hassan Khreisheh said that legislators had come under intense pressure over the past few days to approve the government and that ‘The vote wasn’t democratic ... it was according to games played outside the institutional framework through encouragement and intimidation at times.’ He stated: ‘I will never give my confidence to a government that was formed with this mentality.’

Although the Palestinian Council may eventually develop into a significant forum, the more likely sources of opposition are to be found on the streets of Palestine. Denied the all-too-visible perks and privileges of self-rule, but paying a terrible price for the DOP’s implementation - including tax arrears Israel was unable to collect during the intifada but which are now being collected by the Authority - many have come to view the PA and its omnipresent security forces with bitterness and contempt. Undermobilized and provided with no meaningful role in national reconstruction, the process of state-building for such people is all too easily obscured by the realities of easy money being amassed by monopolists and others popularly derided as ‘mafias’. People no longer speak of the venality of individual PA officials and hangers-on, but rather point their finger at the apparatus itself. While Palestinians do not belittle the significance of being able to walk certain streets more safely than before and enjoy a day at the beach, `this is not what we fought and died for’ has become a national refrain. According to a recent poll, 68.5 per cent of those describing themselves as `not well-to-do’ are pessimistic about their future. By contrast, 54.9 per cent of the ‘well-to-do’ remain optimistic (Rabah and Jamal 1996:10-11).

Throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the feeling of abandonment is palpable. The Islamist opposition (held responsible for provoking the closure and contributing to Netanyahu’s rise) and the radical left (whose basically unmodified political sloganeering seems primarily irrelevant to everyday realities) are on the whole not considered viable alternatives to the PA. Asked which Palestinian movement they trust most, 34 per cent chose FATEH, 6.5 per cent HAMAS, 2.8 per cent the PFLP and 29.4 per cent ‘I do not trust anyone’ (Rabah and Shanahan 1996:22). When asked which leader they trust most, 38.5 per cent chose ‘Arafat, 3.0 per cent Shaikh Ahmad Yasin, 1.4 per cent George Habash and 20.5 per cent `I do not trust anyone’. The mainstream FATEH movement, which has become increasingly marginalized with ‘Arafat’s transformation from the leader of a national movement to head of government and with the attendant decline of factional politics, must itself be considered a potentially volatile force. A broad national front - including elements from FATEH, the Palestine People’s Party (the pro-Oslo former Palestine Communist Party), independents, along with sections of the Islamist and secular opposition - may yet coalesce around a programme of self-determination and democracy, but faith in Oslo and a piece of the PA pie would first have to be definitively terminated (and particularly in the case of FATEH it must achieve its independence from the PA) for this to occur.

Overall, the outlook for Palestinian democracy is bleak. Many democrats fear that if reforms (they are currently unable to impose) are not institutionalized before ‘Arafat’s departure from the scene, the following deluge will be characterized by a bitter war of succession in which - aside from foreign interference - politics will play a relatively minor role compared to petty power rivalries and the frenzied struggle for access to the sources of wealth for the long term.

Nevertheless, so long as continued Israeli hegemony remains the basis for Israeli-Palestinian relations, Palestinians will continue to struggle for their national rights. This is because Palestinians are not simply fighting for an ideal, but against a reality whose removal is a prerequisite for the resumption of normal life and freedoms. The conviction that neither Peres nor Netanyahu were ultimately prepared to transcend Palestinian authority under Israeli rule left many Palestinians basically indifferent to the outcome of the 1996 Israeli elections. Once Netanyahu, flanked by right-wing hardliners Ariel Sharon (of Shabra and Shatilla `fame’), Rafael Eitan and Benny (the son of Menachem) Begin, actually assumed office, and with more precision and clarity than his predecessors, enunciated a programme that left no room for doubt as to his real intentions, the mood turned increasingly sour as the last vestiges of hope disappeared rapidly within the first 100 days of Likud rule. Over a period of several months, as Netanyahu and his ‘Strangelovian’ sidekick Dore Gold trotted the globe and sweet-talked into the global media’s microphones in order to peddle their peculiar interpretation of ‘reciprocity’, its meaning was made very clear on the ground in diametrical opposition to the spirit of Oslo:

• Labour’s settlement expansion would be accelerated and even extend to the Gaza Strip;

• the closure would be extended, not removed;

• no additional redeployment from either Hebron or ‘Area B’ and `Area C’ would occur until the unilateral concession made by gullible Israeli doves, the Interim Agreement, was renegotiated.

With his constant refrain of no statehood, no Jerusalem, no return and more settlements, Netanyahu sent a clear message that the final status was already in place and not subject to further negotiation. He not only made ‘Arafat appear totally powerless, but in his gravest error to date, pretended that the latter did not exist, reducing him to a supplicant and repeatedly humiliating him. Routinely coating his rejectionist policies with multiple layers of provocation, something the more politically aware and experienced Peres generally avoided, Netanyahu turned the occupied territories into a boiling cauldron. Furthermore, the PA came to be increasingly seen as a direct accomplice to these extremist policies, cooperating with Netanyahu’s army of occupation, protecting the expansion of Jewish settlements and receiving absolutely nothing in return, while preventing Palestinians from fighting back. In the summer of 1996, clashes between demonstrators and PA security forces in the northern West Bank appeared to be a foretaste of things to come.

The standing ovation Netanyahu received from the US Congress for explicitly rejecting compromise over Jerusalem only strengthened ‘Arafat’s conviction that a crisis would be required to ensnare Netanyahu, concentrate American minds and strengthen his position among the Palestinians. He thus first went over Netanyahu’s head, obtaining a public commitment from Israeli President Ezer Weizmann to meet him if the Prime Minister would not and then followed this up with a call for a national commercial strike on 29 August 1996. Within days it produced the long-awaited encounter, but nothing else. When this was followed by the Israeli demolition of the Burj al-Luqluq centre for handicapped children within Jerusalem’s Old City and loudly announced plans for additional settlements, culminating in the extension of a tunnel excavated alongside the Haram al-Sharif complex into the heart of East Jerusalem, the long fuse that was lit on the White House lawn three years previously touched a powder keg of popular Palestinian bitterness and frustration.

What followed from 23 to 26 September 1996 was neither an organized uprising nor an entirely spontaneous revolt.

Rather, the opening provided by the PA’s calls for Palestinian protests was utilized by students at Birzeit University (with the backing of FATEH’s shabiba movement) to take on the Israeli military, despite initial attempts by PA forces at the scene to prevent them from doing so. When Israeli soldiers at the al-Bira checkpoint responded with indiscriminate gunfire against the stone-throwing students, several PA policemen were shamed by the demonstrators into returning fire to defend them or otherwise joined the fray. Immediately thereafter, the West Bank Commander of the Palestinian police, Haj Isma’il Abu-Jabr, almost ignited his second civil war when he arrived to threaten those who continued firing with punishment. He was unceremoniously chased away and other orders to desist were similarly ignored. Subsequently, the Preventative Security Force (jihaz amn al-wiqa’i), which is almost entirely composed of hardened FATEH militants from inside the occupied territories, joined the exchanges of fire with Israeli troops, as an organized force.⁸

The clashes, which actually began in East Jerusalem the previous day, quickly spread to Bethlehem, the Gaza Strip and finally the rest of the West Bank. Involving civilian demonstrators and security forces alike on the Palestinian side, and heavy machine guns and helicopters on the Israel side, the pitched battles resulted in approximately 80 Palestinian and 15 Israeli dead, and 1200 Palestinian and 50 Israeli wounded - the worst bloodshed the occupied territories have witnessed since the June 1967 war.⁹

Despite having encouraged Palestinian protests, the PA leadership was reeling from the intensity of events and its inability to control either its forces or population. Nevertheless and with characteristic acumen, ‘Arafat quickly turned the crisis to his advantage. Holding out against Netanyahu’s desperate appeals for a meeting and thus turning the tables, he forced the amateurish Israeli leader to publicly demonstrate that Israel remained committed to its partnership with the Palestinians and that it viewed ‘Arafat as the key Palestinian player in this relationship. ‘Arafat then quickly moved to quell the protests and rein in his forces, holding out the prospect of progress at the Washington summit as an incentive. For the moment at least and despite the dismal failure of the summit, his own standing and particularly that of the security forces have soared.

The September 1996 rebellion, while revealing internal fractures within the PA, appears to have consolidated the relationship between it and the new Israeli government. Both sets of leadership have made it clear that the continued implementation of Oslo is their strategic priority. The problem is that in the absence of meaningful progress on the ground, there is a very real possibility that Palestinian streets will eventually explode once again, perhaps augmented by another round of active participation by armed elements from within the PA. In such a scenario, if the new security arrangements in place are upheld, this makes a direct confrontation between the PA and Palestinian citizens virtually inevitable. If this disintegrates into armed conflict and Israel attempts to reoccupy the enclaves, Palestinians are quick to point out that it took Israel only six days to defeat the Arab world but six years to conquer the Gaza Strip - which is reportedly full of unregistered weapons smuggled in or sold by Israeli agents provocateurs in early 1994 in anticipation of a inter-Palestinian civil war.

Few who have followed developments in the `peace process’ thus far, particularly since the imposition of `separation’, can realistically claim that it will result or could have resulted in anything approaching Palestinian self-determination. Rather, what is emerging is a series of `Arabistans’ reminiscent of the Bantustans of the apartheid era in South Africa, ruled by a native authority but subject to overall Israeli politico-military control. These may yet and probably will be extended territorially in the context of a permanent settlement, but in functional terms they are most unlikely to change. Netanyahu’s October announcement that Israeli troop redeployment in Hebron will be followed by an immediate transition to final status negotiations should be interpreted in this context and if the PLO rejects the `New Middle East’, the current situation will be frozen in place like a festering sore. Even then, however, it is almost impossible to conceive of circumstances - including the above scenario - in which the PLO would renege on Oslo and its renunciation of resistance, and return instead to an active, armed struggle against occupation. Therefore, so long as Israeli rule continues to accommodate Palestinian authority, the future of the DOP will come to rest upon the ability of Israel and the PA to jointly control an increasingly disillusioned and restive Palestinian population.

Epilogue

Almost from the moment it was signed on 13 September 1993, the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP) or `Oslo agreement’ has by common consensus been `in crisis’ and `on the verge of collapse’. Since the election of Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel in May 1996, these dire warnings have gradually been replaced by the more morbid diagnosis of a `clinically dead’ or more simply ‘deceased’ process. Simultaneously, opportunities for renewed global euphoria and self-congratulation, such as that presented by the adoption of the Protocol Concerning the

Redeployment in Hebron on 15 January 1997, are increasingly fewer, farther between and shorter in duration. Rather, it is the armed confrontations which erupted throughout the occupied Palestinian territories in September 1996 which are viewed as the shape of things to come.

From the perspective of Palestinian national rights and Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, the above nuances are somewhat trivial, because Oslo was a dead letter from the outset. The essential prerequisite for a durable resolution of this conflict, namely Palestinian self-determination, was purposely left unmentioned in both the DOP and each of the subsequent Israeli-Palestinian agreements. No less importantly, these texts have consistently been implemented in a manner designed to make the prospects for its attainment ever more remote. It is in this respect worth remembering that:

• Oslo was the brainchild of the ‘dovish’ wing of the Israeli Labour Party;

• all but one of the relevant agreements were concluded prior to the November 1995 assassination of Yitzhak Rabin;

• since his assumption of power Netanyahu has made more compromises with Oslo than it has with him.

In practical terms, Netanyahu’s main deviation from his predecessors has been in the substantively insignificant realms of attitude and rhetoric. The more germane policies of accelerated colonization, economic warfare, systematic abuse of human rights and an increasingly formalized system of apartheid were, along with the fundamental Zionist principle of non-recognition of Palestinian national rights, inherited from the most left-wing or ‘liberal’ government in Israeli history. While the Netanyahu regime’s methods are certainly more aggressive in style, hostile in intent and provocative to say the least than those of the suave Peres, the available evidence conclusively demonstrates that the former basically picked up where the latter had left off. Repeated claims by the extremist-militant settler lobby, that the previous government was in fact more responsive to their demands than the current one, only serve to underline the point that in its broad outlines Netanyahu’s programme is novel only in so far as it is being implemented by a relative novice to the game of realpolitik. It remains to be seen whether the removal of Netanyahu from office in May 1999 will substantially alter Israeli positions.

While the crisis in Palestinian rights is real enough, it is not this which has been exercising the minds of most commentators and causing them to predict Armageddon. Rather, their concerns are for the integrity and sustainability of what is conventionally termed the peace process itself. From this perspective, a tangible, reciprocal, and most importantly, dynamic process of expanding self-government for Palestinians and increasing security for Israelis, which culminates in a permanent settlement based upon the principle of land for peace, forms the inviolable prerequisite for the successful implementation of Oslo. The fundamental breakdown of this formula, symbolized by Israel’s systematic procrastination in redeploying its forces away from Palestinian population centres and represented most visibly by Palestinian suicide bombings in Israeli cities, is widely considered a harbinger of catastrophe. Some observers have opined that the relevant agreements are themselves too vague and self-contradictory to produce the required results, and were thus a recipe for failure all along. More often, however, the gloomy forecasts derive from a perceived refusal by the parties directly involved to respect deadlines and commitments explicitly agreed upon, and by their violations of what is held to be the spirit of Oslo. Netanyahu’s current insistence on retaining absolute control of a minimum 60 per cent of the West Bank, at least throughout the interim phase, and the refusal by his US patrons to force the implementation of the further Israeli troop redeployments as agreed upon in the Hebron Protocol and simultaneous insistence on a monopoly of sponsorship of the Oslo process, are likened to the final nails in the ‘Nordic coffin’.

To the extent that adherents of Oslo view it as a framework for the comprehensive resolution of the conflict between Zionism and the Palestinians, and more generally as a key link in producing an overall Israeli-Arab settlement, it has indeed failed them. Thus, while Oslo’s proponents generally consider a two-state solution as the most desirable, if not the only viable formula for a permanent settlement, they are faced with the uncomfortable reality that the only ‘partitionist’ solution on offer is one in which the pre-1967 boundaries have become wholly irrelevant. Rather, the West Bank and Gaza Strip (excluding Jerusalem and its environs) have themselves already been effectively partitioned into an emaciated and fragmented Palestinian entity, along with a recently contrived Jewish province known to its inhabitants as ‘Judea-Samaria-Gaza’ and which has been wholly absorbed by the Israeli state. The Palestinian entity, a state in name only and an ethnic reservation in all but name, will furthermore exist within rather than alongside its more powerful and less generous neighbour. Needless to say, this reality has put existing Arab-Israeli peace treaties under considerable strain, rather than paving the way for additional agreements and expanding opportunities for crossregional trade, the manufacturing industry, tourism and other forms of cooperation, such as in science, technology, education and the arts.

It is of course true that the dispossession of the Palestinian people long preceded Oslo, but the `Bantustanization’ of the question of Palestine is its direct and intended outcome. In this regard, few arguments are as disingenuous as those which place the blame for the current crisis solely or primarily on Netanyahu’s shoulders (as if it began only after his May 1996 election) and which guilefully claim that had the Labour Party been reelected, Peres would in effect have entirely reversed the course that both Rabin and he had chosen from 1993 onwards. It is indeed true that Israeli negotiators during the Rabin-Peres years made numerous intimations to their eager (to say nothing of gullible) Palestinian interlocutors at Oslo and during subsequent sessions, which collectively could be interpreted as a commitment to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242 in a manner not entirely inconsistent with the international community’s interpretation. More importantly, however, such confidences were never made formal and any resulting documents never ratified, whilst the official agreements which did result from such negotiations, each superseding its predecessor, progressively constricted the possibilities for meaningful decolonization and loosening the Israeli stranglehold over the Palestinian polity. The metamorphosis of Oslo’s withdrawal clause into a three-stage redeployment, the scope of which was subsequently left to Israel’s sole discretion by the United States, is but a case in point. No sooner did the ink on such agreements dry than their implementation, determined primarily by the gross imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, which removed from any form of international arbitration, ensured that in the absence of an Israeli civil war or full scale Arab-Israeli hostilities, UN Resolution 242 would in reality remain but ink on a meaningless piece of paper.

While Oslo has set back the cause of Palestinian self-determination by at least a generation, it has also failed to develop into a process leading to a viable Israeli-Palestinian `permanent settlement’ and is therefore in a seemingly permanent state of crisis, nevertheless it would be a mistake to conclude that its demise is imminent. The revolutionary transformation of Israeli-Palestinian relations heralded in the Norwegian capital was ultimately the product of more significant changes in the regional and global balance of power, symbolized by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and establishment of US hegemony worldwide, the Gulf crisis and the bankruptcy of the PLO. As such, the Israeli-Palestinian arrangements which have been established since 1993 will more likely than not survive in their fundamental respects so long as the current regional and international orders perpetuate themselves.

With the Palestinians being incapable of challenging the status quo and Israel refusing to offer a permanent settlement acceptable to any Palestinian leadership intent on surviving legitimately on an electoral mandate, and the USA having made a strategic choice to substitute the illusions of process for the requirements of peace, the current impasse will continue for quite some time. More to the point, what is today an impasse is likely to become a permanent arrangement of sorts, or rather a pattern of relations, sustained by and ultimately dependent upon the regional and global balance of forces which produced it in the first place. In this scenario, further political violence initiated by various detractors of the de facto partition of the occupied territories and further procedures of normalization among those of its beneficiaries are to be expected. A piecemeal expansion of the territory under PA rule, together with a unilateral and successful declaration of Palestinian statehood within these enclaves (perhaps giving way in due course to Jordanian supremacy in at least the West Bank ‘Arabistans’), and Israeli annexation of a sizeable portion of the occupied territories, are developments which can all be easily contained within the current framework, even if accompanied by periodic frenzies of organized blood-letting. While the possibility of full-scale hostilities leading to mass expulsions along the lines of 1948 and 1967 can of course not be dismissed, barring extreme developments, an Israeli politician proposing the reconquest of Jabalya and the Nablus Qasaba is more likely to be sent to a psychiatric ward than to the elected office of prime minister.

Ultimately, the balance of power which has resulted in the formalization of Palestinian dispossession must and will change, if sanity and justice are to prevail at the end of the day. Indeed, there are subtle indications that every `latest’ crisis with Iraq and with small bands of Islamist radicals means that the question of Palestine continues to play a central role in regional politics and retains a capacity to serve as a unifying factor for the Arab and Muslim world. Stronger yet, it appears to be a catalyst for the reordering of regional and perhaps eventually of international alliances. To simply conclude, however, that several million Israelis can never succeed in permanently subjugating several hundred million Arabs and that in view of the current disheartening situation, any strategic change is by definition welcome, would be disastrous. If the conflict were merely one of numbers, Israel would never have been established and bad situations, furthermore, seem to have a habit of getting worse. Instead, Palestinians must seek to actively influence the impending changes to their advantage and in doing so, they must themselves propose agendas, rather than continue to be relegated to the margins of the designs of others:

• First and foremost, the Palestinian people must reestablish a national framework on sound democratic foundations with a pluralistic/multicultural content, which accommodates or rather reunites its increasingly disparate and apathetic elements. Unless and until this cardinal challenge is effectively addressed, the remobilization of the Palestinian masses is a non-starter and internal strife a constant threat, rendering all other efforts futile and doomed to failure.

• Second, the strategic choices and partnerships made during the past decade need to be critically reassessed and appropriate conclusions drawn. The propositions that Palestine will be liberated by Saddam Hussein, Uri Savir or Dennis Ross have all been tried and failed miserably. Rather, it was as the common cause of the Arab world, as the international symbol of the struggle against dispossession, military occupation and Western hypocrisy, and as a result of alliances with popular movements within Europe and North America, that the claim for Palestinian self-determination became internationally accepted and Israel came to be a pariah state. While unprecedented access to the corridors of power in Washington and elsewhere may be a welcome addition, it is a poor substitute. Furthermore, one need only look at the Zionist experience to conclude that the neglect of basic strategic alliances reduces rather than enhances the meaning of such access.

• Finally, Palestinians need to think imaginatively about the struggle for self-determination. Statehood, which during the past decade has effectively displaced self-determination in official Palestinian parlance, is probably imminent but in its present form certain to be meaningless as an adequate response to the question of Palestine. Partition, which in fairness to the proponents of statehood was considered to be the same, had much to recommend it between 1974 and 1993, but as a result of Oslo it is no longer a viable option. The reason for this is the incontrovertible transformation of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories into a Mediterranean version of South African-style apartheid. A struggle against apartheid requires diverse strategies and different resolutions than a struggle against military occupation. It is time that these options are considered seriously by those engaged in the struggle for democracy and justice for all in this embittered and deeply divided land.

Notes

1. Ra’is, which can be translated as both ‘president’ and ‘chairman’, is for this reason the term used to designate ‘Arafat’s status in the otherwise English language Interim Agreement. The Palestinian Executive Authority is the PA’s executive branch (i.e. cabinet and the Palestinian Council, informally known as the Legislative Council is a PA body - not to be confused with the Palestine National Council (PNC), which serves as the supreme authority of the PLO.

2. The same holds true for passage from the West Bank to Israel, but on account of the longer border and hilly terrain, this practice is much more difficult to enforce.

3. The financial costs of closure adding up to several million dollars a day US$6 million according to a PA estimate during periods of full closure, far outweigh the total volume of donor assistance. The costs of closure, are moreover, generally borne b individual families and firms1 whereas donor assistance is largely disbursed to the PA and other institutions, many of them from bilateral or multilateral sources. Also, donor assistance cannot cover long-term structural damage in terms of reduced investment, delays to infrastructural projects and the like. The vast increase in the PA’s budget deficit (in early September 1996 it was US$136 million, or approximately 40 Per cent of the annual budget is primarily on account of reduced tax receipts.

4. While voting day appears to have been free of systematic irregularities, the electoral process raised basic questions about the freedom and fairness of the elections1 which still remain to be addressed.

5. ‘Ashrawi is a well-known Palestinian spokeswoman, as well as being a respected human rights and women’s rights activist and educator.

6. Public opinion polls are by nature problematic and particularly so in circumstances such as those in Palestine. Nevertheless, questions which do not directly address the leader’s status or basic policies often provide a useful indication of popular thinking.

7. This report categorically stated that corruption, mismanagement and inefficiency were rampant throughout the PA and estimated that nearly 50 Per cent of its annual budget of US$800 million was being squandered. While the general thrust of this milestone is accurate, it is lacking in many of its details.

8. Subsequent claims to the effect that ‘Arafat had the night before ordered his praetorian guard, Force 171 to ‘defend themselves’ if fired upon are in my view ex post facto rumors intended to demonstrate that the PA was in full control of events and should therefore be credited for them. At the same time it does appear that the PA once confronted with the irreversible fact of imminent involvement by sections of its security forces, provided tacit authorization.

9. According to the Palestinian human rights community, 60 Per cent of the injured suffered head and chest in1juries, and 40 Per cent of the injured were children. Moreover, most Palestinian dead appear to have been killed by single bullets, indicating a shoot-to-kill policy carried out by Israeli snipers with or without official sanction rather than indiscriminate fire.

References

Palestine Report 1996: ‘Israel Confiscates 1,000 Acres’ vol. 2, no. 14, 6 September, p. 4.

Rabah, J. and Jamal, M. 1996: ‘Well-to-do Palestinians More Optimistic’ in Palestine Report vol. 2, no. 14, 6 September pp. 10-11.

Rabah, J. and Shanahan, C.1996: ‘JMCC Public Opinion Poll’ in Palestine Report vol. 2, no. 13, 30 August, pp. 20.

Rabbani, M. 1996a: ‘Palestinian Authority, Israeli Rule: From Transitional to Permanent Arrangement’ in Middle East Report vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 2-6, 22.

Rabbani M. (with Aarts, P.) 1996b: ‘Palestijns gezag onder Israelische Overheersing’ in P. Aarts and M. Rabbani editors), Waar ligt de grens? Kritische beschouwingen over het Vredes roces tussen Palestina en Israel, Coutinho: Bussum.

Roy, S. 1994: TITLE Washington, DC: Institute of Palestine Studies.

Shanahan, C. 1996: ‘PA Bans Books by Edward Said’ in Palestine Report, vol. 2, no. 13, 30 August, P. 24.

Usher, G. 1993: ‘Why Gaza Says Yes, Mostly’ in Race and Class, Jan-March, no. 35, P. 68.

Usher, G. 1996: ‘The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services1 in Journal of Palestine Studies vol. XXV, no. 2, Winter, pp. 21-34.