Introduction

          After 17 days of fierce fighting between the Hizballah and Israel during the April 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath, killing 200 individuals after reciprocal bombardments of civilian areas by both sides, the Lebanese Shi´ite movement emerged relatively undamaged and confident, significantly strengthened as the unrivaled protector of Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli occupation as well as the effective provider to the local South Lebanese residents. ”I promise and threaten this enemy”, said Hizballah´s Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah at an 1996 election rally in eastern Lebanon, ”that any new aggression against Lebanon will drag the occupying Israeli army back into mud and into a quagmire where bombs are not made of iron but of human bodies”(Reuters, 13 September 1996). Despite Hizballah´s performance and bulliant mood, riding on a wave of public support following Israel´s ill-fated killing of 105 Lebanese civilian refugees at the village of Qana, Hizballah´s continuing ”war of liberation” against Israeli forces failed to translate into any political inroads in Lebanon´s September 1996 parliamentary elections. In fact, Hizballah´s representation in the new 128-member parliament amounted to seven members of parliament (MPs) and three supporters compared with the previous eight MPs and four supporters who had represented the movement effectively as opposition to the Hariri government and Amal during the last four years (Usher, 1997:59-67). In many ways, the inability of the Hizballah to convert its popular resistance struggle against Israel in southern Lebanon into political currency was largely the outcome of Syria limiting any expansion of the movement´s influence through meddling with electoral districts which served to disadvantage the movement and the fact that Rafiq Hariri based his electoral campaign around the slogan ”Moderation Against Extremism, raising fears within Hizballah ranks that perhaps new legislation would be instituted to curb its activities (Trendle, 1996). Hizballah´s political status quo has meant that the movement is forced to concentrate all its energies towards the struggle to liberate Lebanon from Israeli occupation, as evidenced by the increased number of resistance operations from 99 in 1991 to 750 attacks in 1996, including the 489 Katyushas launched alone during April 1996 (Jerusalem Post, 7 January 1997). Despite Hizballah´s belligerence in physical violence as well as in bellicose rhetoric, refusing to accept Israel´s existence and calling for ”the liberation of Jerusalem”, the movement has shown a remarkable degree of pragmatism, flexibility and sophisticated awareness of the requirements of the internal Lebanese, as well as regional, environment. This limits as well as expands its maneuverability in highly fluid situations given the complexity and multiplicity of actors as well as agendas at work. This tightrope has not always been easy for the Hizballah to balance with its ideological goals as the movement confronted the challenges posed to its survival, role and even growth as a movement by a post-civil war environment.
          Hizballah´s transformation from a small rag-tag militia, skillfully combining terrorist and guerrilla warfare techniques with effective social action on the local level in the chaos of Lebanon´s civil war, towards establishing and even reinventing itself as a formidable, as well as legitimate political, military and social force on the Lebanese scene in the 1990´s, in what has been described as the movement´s ”Lebanonization” process, (Chartouni-Dubarry, 1996:59-62) has been a difficult but highly successful process played out in different stages. This current three-pronged strategy, which is designed to preserve Hizballah´s uniqueness and source of power within Lebanon, rests largely on the continued ability of the movement to credibly confront its enemies and pursue its ideological objectives, whether as a legally based and uncompromising anti-establishment opposition to Hariri´s government and policies, or as the provider and protector of the residents of southern Lebanon against the continued Israeli occupation. The latter occupy a central place for the Hizballah, stating that its primary goal of its ”resistance project” is to force the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon at all costs ”by exhausting the enemy on the human and material levels through daily military operations” (Monday Morning, 3 March 1997). Unlike Hizballah´s previous challenges, a fundamental dilemma facing the movement at the present is that the successful achievement of an Israeli withdrawal would without doubt represent one of the greatest victories in alignment with its ideological objectives but, at the same time, it would remove its underlying revolutionary character and identity as well as momentum in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Lebanese Shi´ite community. ”We are not only a military movement”, proclaimed Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, ”we have popular roots everywhere. No one will be able to uproot us, no matter what happens”(AFP, 24 February 1994). Yet, at the same time, Sheikh Nasserallah acknowledges that ”the upcoming battle, the battle for normalization, is much tougher than the military battle and will require greater efforts and capabilities” (Voice of the Oppressed, 3 October 1993).
          The question is not whether the Hizballah would survive as demonstrated by its skillful ”Lebanonization” process but rather the way it will be able to grow as a movement without the ability to confront its Zionist enemy in practical terms and the manner in which it intends to project itself  to its socio-political constituency over the longer term. This double-edged sword for the movement represents one of the last yet perhaps one of the most difficult unwritten chapters of the current ”Lebanonization” process of the Hizballah. It is clear that the movement pursues its ideological struggle to ”liberate Jerusalem” in incremental stages over a long timeframe, firstly in a Lebanese context and then towards liberating Palestine, which it views as primarily as a Palestinian responsibility (The Independent, 10 November 1993). Yet, becoming primarily a political party would dilute its revolutionary character and identity, moving it towards becoming another version of the Amal movement while possibly threatening to produce factionalism within the movement (al-Shira, 27 September 1992). Eventhough it is clear that the Hizballah´s command leadership and chief ideologue has gradually introduced, in their mobilization speeches, the necessity to actively confront Israel on the economic level in southern Lebanon if a withdrawal occurs and the movement faces disarmament, (Voice of the Oppressed, 3 October 1993) it remains to be seen whether the movement would become absorbed by the process of peace if the movement only retains a political and social dimension to its activities. It is clear that the Hizballah is preparing itself for the prospects of disarmament once the Israelis withdraw as part of a settlement between Syria and Israel, by confidently proclaiming that it has developed contingency plans for the outbreak of peace with the Islamic Resistance adopting new methods including ”the use of cold weapons (not firearms) in order to confront the Zionist regime”(IRNA, 13 January 1996). Deciphering clues of the dynamics of this process towards effectively ”disarming” the Hizballah and its future as a movement is inherently difficult given the multidimensional complexity of internal and external factors affecting the movement´s behaviour and prospects, ranging from converging as well as conflicting Syrian, Iranian and Israeli agendas. Apart from the necessity to contextualize these multifaceted dimensions affecting the movement´s behaviour, it is equally necessary to recognize that any fuller understanding of the movement´s current or future political strategy cannot be achieved without deciphering the interrelationship between its military, political and social components. In many ways, Hizballah´s political participation continously serve to assist and reinforce the other spheres of the movement´s activities as long as the Israeli enemy remain on Lebanese territory and as long as the Lebanese political system remain unchanged, limiting the movement´s ability to translate grassroots support into political seats.

The Influence of Hizballah in the Local and Regional Context

          The Hizballah is one of the most feared militant enemies of the West yet among the least understood organisations which is quite surprising given that the movement is part and parcel at the heart of peace negotiations between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. In a worst-case scenario, uncontrolled Hizballah violence could trigger a wider confrontation between Israel and Syria. In the past, the Hizballah has also often been characterized as a terrorist group which is loosely organised. Such misleading characterizations ignores the fact that the organisation´s main activity has been on the social welfare front, fulfilling a legitimate role as a provider of a vast network of services to the politically marginalized and economically disenfranchised Lebanese Shiite community. While the Hizballah lobby for the increased redistribution of resources to the ”dispossessed” Shi´ite community through its parliamentarian representatives and while the effectiveness of social services machinery was most visible during and after IDF Operation Accountability in 1993 and Grapes of Wrath in 1996, Hizballah´s hearts-and-minds campaign has been an integral component of its strategy and success from the movement´s genesis. In fact, the Hizballah repaired over 1,000 homes damaged by Israeli attacks during 1988-91. Similarly, the Hizballah is not composed of loose radical Islamic groupings but has developed a highly sophisticated hierarchial organisational structure, where decisions are taken from the top command leadership, who themselves have formal and informal channels to both Iran´s and Syria´s civilian and military establishments. This web of relationships have been difficult to uncover but fundamentally impacts on Hizballah´s behaviour in all spheres of its activities (Ranstorp, 1994). Equally within the organisation itself, the shifting roles and positions of individual clergymen, either in charge of command leadership functions or portfolios or ”attached” to the Hizballah in advisory or affiliate capacity, have been fluid and complex in character yet crucially determines the way in which the movement behaves in response to present and new situations as well as challenges. This complexity is perhaps best illustrated by the enigmatic role of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who occupy a central role for the movement as its spiritual guide and, at the same time, transcends the movement and Lebanon in terms of religious stature and following (Kramer, 1997:83-181). Fadlallah also serves as a bridge for the movement in its contacts with other parties (al-Diyar, 19 December 1993). As explained by Sheikh Fadlallah himself, ”I live in a warm atmosphere surrounded by the youth of ”Hizballah”, whom I consider my sons. However, and since the inception of Hizballah, I was never part of its organizational structure” (al-Majallah, 17 June 1995).
          A second reason for examining Hizballah more closely is that the organisation´s violence has often been considered to be random in nature, either against the West or against Israel. On the contrary, there are well-defined mechanisms and reasons why the Hizballah turn on and off the violence, most often in alignment with changes in its environment or in alignment with carefully calibrated strategies. This is evident from the movement´s statements, repeatedly outlining the conditions regulating martyrdom operations (Kramer, 1992:30-47). The Hizballah is an extraordinarily sophisticated organisation which is not only attuned to the environment within which it operates in Lebanon but has consistently demonstrated that it is well-attuned to Iranian, Syrian, and even Israeli politics. On the most basic level, there seems to be a close correlation between an escalation of Hizballah guerrilla activity against Israel either in response to breakdowns in Syrian-Israeli negotiations or in response to the curbing of Hamas activity on the West Bank and Gaza by the Palestinian Authority or Israel. Although the actual spark that ignited Grapes of Wrath was related to the Israeli detonation of an explosive charge, killing a child and wounding three, in the south Lebanese village of Bira´shit on April 8, there had been a preceding gradual escalation of Hizballah resistance activity in relation to a downturn in Syrian-Israeli negotiations and the crackdown on Hamas following its spate of suicide-attacks inside Israel, killing 136 people between 24 February and 4 March 1996. The correlation between the situation in Lebanon and Palestine in alignment with Hizballah´s ideological struggle to ”liberate Jerusalem” was evident by the accidental detonation of an explosive device at an East Jerusalem hotel on 12 April by a newly recruited Hizballah operative, revealing that the movement had retained its terrorist capability despite the reorientation of the movement during the 1990s (The New York Times Magazine, 10 November 1996).
          A third reason for examining Hizballah is to understand why it has been so difficult for either Israel, Beirut, or Syria to find either a military or diplomatic solution to the problem of Hizballah. As Operation Grapes of Wrath, which cost US400 million, proved Israel cannot militarily defeat the Hizballah through airstrikes or conventionally on the ground without sustaining mass casualties or risking a wider confrontation with Syria. Similarly, the Lebanese government cannot act against the Hizballah without Syria´s consent and, in turn, Damascus cannot move militarily against Hizballah without seriously jeopardizing its relationship with Iran or the stability of Lebanon´s political and economic rehabilitation under Syrian supervision. While the Hizballah is no military match for the Syrian military and intelligence, who currently invest over half of its intelligence resources tracking and mapping Hizballah arms depots in the event of a disarmament of the movement, any Syrian confrontation with Hizballah could seriously jeopardize Lebanon´s rehabilitation process as the movement is formidable enough to cause a lot of trouble.
          At the same time, it is important to recognize that Hizballah leaders are aware of the fact that the organisation does not function in a vacuum but within an environment that imposes certain restrictions on its freedom of action. Firstly, Hizballah is restricted by the fact that it cannot act against Syria´s agenda and control over Lebanon nor directly against the wishes of the Beirut government. To do so would risk direct confrontation. Secondly, Hizballah realizes that it cannot seek to dominate other communities due to the sectarian composition of Lebanon, which imposes limitations to its quest of establishing an Islamic Republic (Journal of Palestine Studies, 1997:67). Thirdly, while Hizballah has scored notable successes on the battlefield and in the social sphere, its actual support within the Lebanese Shiite community is still limited in relation to the strength of its competitor Amal, though some observers advocate that Hizballah would win in the Biq´a and would achieve over 60 percent of the vote in the South in a straight Amal-Hizballah electoral battle (Usher, 1997:67). Fourthly, Hizballah´s concentration on social services requires vast financial resources and in order to sustain it and even expand it over a longer period of time is largely dictated by the continued injection of Iranian aid, which has steadily decreased over the years amidst growing political and economic difficulties in Iran (Foreign Report, 4 May 1997).
          Apart from identifying factors restraining Hizballah´s freedom of action, it is essential to bear in mind that the movement in its actions and messages operate simultaneously towards an internal and external audience. In the first week of January 1997, Hizballah´s TV-station al-Manar (the Beacon) announced that the movement considered 1996 to be ”the year of the resistance”, qualifying it to be a major success as its Islamic Resistance fighters had carried out more than 750 operations in southern Lebanon in which 29 IDF soldiers and 47 of its own men were killed (Jerusalem Post, 7 January 1997). While it is clear that the Hizballah has scored notable military gains past year in terms of the quantity and quality of its resistance operations in the South, it is less clear in other areas. In a limited sense, Hizballah did attain some achievements following Grapes of Wrath such as the written understanding which de facto recognized its right to attack Israeli forces in security zone (an improvement from understandings following Israel´s July 1993 Operation Accountability). Additionally, Hizballah´s continued military struggle against Israel enables it to portray itself as the defender of the population of southern Lebanon, the opposite effect intended by the Israeli operation. In fact, Hizballah leaders repeatedly stress that the movement has never taken the initiative ”in attacking or acting against civilians in northern Palestine”, rather it has ”always fought back in defence and in reaction to the occupation army´s actions against civilians in south Lebanon” (SWB, 11 April 1996). However, when Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah proclaims 1996 to be an unqualified success for the organisation as the year of the resistance, it only provides a partial picture as it has not translated into any significant or tangible military or political advantages for the organisation. Nor does it provide any clearer picture of the means and methods the Hizballah aims to employ in relation to the present and future realities of the Lebanese environment. An area where the Hizballah can proclaim unqualified success during 1996 is its achievement of a psychological edge against its conventionally more powerful enemy Israel and its proxy militia the South Lebanese Army (SLA). This psychological edge is not limited to its military activity but must be seen in alignment with Sheikh Nasserallah´s incremental and broader strategy of making the movement more open and acceptable to other Lebanese confessional communities and to the world at large.

Hizballah´s psychological warfare

          Symbolism and the projection of messages to internal and external audiences have occupied a central place for the Hizballah throughout its evolution. This has been most visible in the centrality and steady growth of Hizballah martyrology reminding followers of sacrifices already made, ranging from posters of Musa al-Sadr, the assassinated Hizballah leader Abbas al-Musawi to Islamic Resistance combatants who sacrificed themselves in military operations against IDF or SLA. The latter is reinforced on a daily level as each Islamic Resistance unit is named after previous or present martyred fighters. At its most basic and visible level, Hizballah´s logo, set against a yellow background signifying captivity, reinforces daily to its followers the religious legitimacy and historical authenticity of the movement, as the martyr Husayn´s raised arm wielding an automatic rifle is integrated into the name Hizballah while the Quranic verse the movement derives its name from is depicted above its logo. The mere fact that weaponry occupy the central place raises the issue of how the movement will project itself in the event of a disarmament as it would seem its main raison d´etre revolves around the ability to confront. Apart from reinforcing its sacred legitimacy by distinguishing itself from other groups in Lebanon, Hizballah also reminds its followers through its logo of the future direction of the movement towards the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon. This awareness of symbolism and the projection of messages to a variety of audiences have extended into the realm of psychological warfare through its media apparatus as an auxiliary instrument which amplifies and reinforces Hizballah´s physical violence against its enemies. Although the Hizballah has traditionally utilized its newspaper al-Ahd or its TV-station al-Manar to provide commentary and news coverage of its activities, the movement has been extraordinarily adept at using and exploiting new technologies, such as the Internet, which simultaneously serves to further legitimizing the movement, to reach a broader audience both within and beyond Lebanon on a daily basis, to raise additional funds from within and outside Lebanon, and to intensify its psychological warfare options against its enemies (The Daily Star, 4 November 1997). In fact, the Hizballah has utilized the Internet as an intelligence gathering tool, whereby it collects information and retrieves articles from the Hebrew press about Israeli undercover units operating in southern Lebanon.(The MidEast Dispatch, 18 February 1997) It also represents an enhanced way in which the movement without using violence manages to engage the enemy, as evident by their claim that Israel  attempted to interfere or block the newly-established Internet site. (al-Manar, 14 March 1997) At the same time, the use of new technologies present a new form of platform for the movement in projecting not only itself in a new and controlled fashion but also the position and influence of key ideologues, most notably exemplified by the establishment of Sheikh Fadlallah´s own official web-site covering his Friday sermons and related issues to the Lebanese Shi´ite scholar´s line of thinking to a broader audience.
          In the first days of January 1997, the Hizballah announced the establishment of al-Manar´s own home-page on the Internet dedicated to ousting Israel´s occupying forces in southern Lebanon, providing daily news in Arabic, English, Hebrew (and soon French), utilizing high-quality of graphics with extensive pictures of so-called ”Israeli terrorism” and military operations of the Islamic Resistance. Al-Manar´s site will also soon be offering video-clips of guerrilla ambushes of the IDF taped by Hizballah cameramen. The way in which Hizballah has quickly and skillfully exploited this new technology to amplify its operations against its enemies reveal the extent of which the movement considers this as an auxiliary weapon in efforts to sow fear and dissent among enemy military ranks as well as continuously raising awareness and debate over the costs of Israel´s continued occupation of southern Lebanon. Whether the Hizballah uses new and old propaganda techniques in tandem with its resistance operations, this is skillfully and simultaneously employed by the movement against the South Lebanese Army and the Israeli Defense Forces as well as Israeli public opinion.
          Firstly, Hizballah´s vast media apparatus has been active against the 3,000-man strong South Lebanese Army, which acts as a buffer between Israelis and its enemies in the north. This psychological warfare has been waged innovatively in conjunction with improved armed operations against SLA units with a steady rate of bombings, ambushes, mortar and rocket attacks and hit-and-run raids, causing at least 19 SLA casualties during 1996. A serious breakdown in SLA security with the recent handover and execution of its security chief, Ahmed al-Hallaq, has had a demoralising effect, exacerbated by a series of defections within its ranks (Venter, 1996a). Infiltration within SLA ranks has been exploited by Hizballah who capitalize on increasingly deteriorating SLA morale by regularly publicising and distributing the names of SLA officers with promises of punishment. With SLA´s intelligence-gathering activities effectively undermined, the Hizballah also entice defections with promises of financial inducements coupled with pardons (Foreign Report, 17 April 1997) but insists that a return ”must take place before the Zionist withdrawal” (al-Manar, 14 March 1997). In fact there is a special information unit within Hizballah which highlights SLA soldiers returning to their people. (Ha´aretz, 15 December 1996) As such, Hizballah continue to sow fear within SLA ranks what will be their fate in the event of a concluded Syrian-Israeli peace treaty or a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. ”We call on all those who have joined Agent Lahd´s militia”, broadcasted Sheikh Nasserallah through the Voice of the Oppressed, ”to withdraw, seek forgiveness, and return to their homeland and people. This is the chance of a lifetime for them to become humans again instead of being worn out defensive barriers which will soon be crushed under the feet of the mujahidin” (Voice of the Oppressed, 26 May 1992). The effectiveness of Hizballah´s strategy surfaced amidst SLA fears of an imminent unilateral Israeli withdrawal when SLA leader Antoine Lahad threatened its ally that over half of SLA fighters would join the Hizballah should Israel pull-out of Lebanon (al-Manar, 13 October 1997). In an effort to further demoralize the SLA and institutionalize in political and local  terms the legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance, Sheikh Nasserallah announced in early November 1997 the creation of the Lebanese Brigades of Resistance to Israeli occupation (LBRIO), open to any Lebanese irrespective of their religious or political affiliations though it remained operationally subordinate to the regular Islamic Resistance units. This move further undermined the economic attractiveness of remaining with the SLA, whose salaries are permanently indexed against Hizballah, especially as future martyrs of the LBRIO and their families were promised to receive full Hizballah support, namely a house, medical care, education and monthly pensions of at least 350 US dollars (The Daily Star, 4 November 1997).
          The Hizballah is also waging effective psychological warfare against serving IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon. It has increasingly utilized its own camera-crews to record the efficiency of its attacks against IDF soldiers and posts, which it regularly broadcasts on its TV-station al-Manar from Beirut and al-Fajr from Biqa and, at times, distributes to foreign media (Venter, 1996a/b). These media outlets has become increasingly important for the movement given the Hariri government´s limited award of licenses to Lebanese broadcasting stations and these will remain untouched as long as the movement continues to focus on publizising its resistance against Israel (Christian Science Monitor, 21 October 1996). In particular, daring resistance operations boosts the morale of its own fighters and undermines the morale of IDF soldiers, who recently in some instances have been seen fleeing from advancing Hizballah fighters (Ha´aretz, 15 December 1996). The movement also regularly publicize the aquisition of new and upgraded weaponry in a concerted effort to instill a degree of uncertainty for IDF units without actually using them. This psychological warfare, combined with qualitative improvements in Hizballah tactics with more IDF casualties, demonstrate that the Hizballah is very aware of the real effect of dead IDF soldiers on Israeli public opinion, as it raises criticism about Israel´s need to stay entangled in Lebanon. This was evident following the February 1997 crash of two IDF CH-53 helicopters on mission over southern Lebanon, leaving 72 Israelis dead, to which Hizballah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem responded  ”will strengthen internal debate and the struggle inside occupied Palestine about the presence of Israeli troops in Lebanon, and it will increase the opinions calling for withdrawal” (APS Diplomat Recorder, 15 February 1997). Similarly, the Hizballah exploited the so-called al-Insariyah operation, when the movement ambushed an Israeli commando landing and killed the 11-man strong team on 5 September 1997, through publishing pictures of the dead soldiers through its media outlets. As such, Hizballah has concentrated its efforts to improve its intelligence-gathering and steadily maximize IDF or SLA casualties by varying operational techniques, which in 1996 resulted in the highest level of IDF casualties in Lebanon since 1985 (The Independent, 2 January 1997). At the same time, the Hizballah has minimized its own casualties by adapting themselves to Israel´s increasingly technological warfare. This has led the Israelis to frequently raid Hizballah´s radio-station, Voice of the Oppressed, and to strive towards a psychological edge by publicizing at the end of last year the existence of an elite Israeli unit, Egoz designed exclusively to combat Hizballah units (Jane´s Defence Weekly, 11 December 1996:17). It was allegedly Egoz units on a reconnaissance mission near the Qana UN-headquarters that came under Hizballah fire, triggering Israeli support-fire which killed over 100 civilians (The Independent, 14 December 1996). Despite the accuracy of this, Hizballah´s radio-station quickly exploited this by stating ”that it knew how to crack walnuts (Egoz) as they were hard on the outside and soft inside” (ibid). Equally, the Hizballah is cognizant that its war of attrition against the IDF is a serious drain on Israeli resources, estimated to cost Israel over one million US dollars every day (according to a UNIFIL source) while the continued Israeli presence has caused so far over 400 IDF casualties with nearly 750 wounded since 1985 (Venter, 1996a; Blanche, 1997). The Hizballah faced, according to its operational chief Nabil Kaouk, ”an enemy terrified of every house, tree, bush or boulder” (The Guardian, 4 March 1997).
          Thirdly, Hizballah´s recognition of the importance of psychological warfare was highlighted by Sheikh Naim Qassem, who recently explained that it was not the military use of suicide-bombers that led to the Israeli withdrawal in 1985 but its deterrent effect on Israeli public opinion (Ha´aretz, 14 August 1996). This was evident during the Operation Grapes of Wrath, when Hizballah broadcasted on al-Manar news of a contingent of 70 suicide-bombers ready to be dispatched against Israel, (SWB, 16 April 1996) and when Sheikh Nasserallah made a direct appeal to northern Israeli residents: ”you have the power to prevent Katyushas falling on your heads”(Ha´aretz, 14 August 1996). Equally, Sheikh Nasserallah took the opportunity to reinforce the same message to Hizballah followers at a commemoration ceremony for a martyred fighter in the village of Al-Ain, reminding them that ”the day Israel will come to make the mistake of initiating a new adventure in Lebanon, it should know that the bodies of our combatants will be transformed into human bombs against its tanks” (Jerusalem Post, 12 January 1997). The effectiveness of Islamic Resistance operations in comparison to its enemies is projected and reinforced through its media outlets and public statements as well as by its newly-established Internet site operating under the auspices of the Islamic Resistance Support Association, which provides detailed and daily chronological information about Hizballah´s military operations and Israeli ”terrorist” actions with monthly charts outlining the casualty rate on both sides. This web site illustrates the depth of Hizballah´s strategic and tactical thinking of the underlying motivations behind Israel´s decision to launch Operation Grapes of Wrath, while projecting back to its constituency reasons for Israel´s failure. Both Hizballah and Iranian clerics take great pride in the fact that the movement is the only force that has ever accomplished the defeat of Israel in 1985 as well as the United States the preceding year (al-Nahar, 5 June 1985; MidEast Mirror, 14 February 1997). At the same token, Hizballah leaders are deliberately vague in public about revealing its position in the event of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. Sheikh Nasserallah has continuously reaffirmed that Hizballah ”is keeping its position secret (on) what will happen at the Lebanese-Israeli border. It is not up to Hizballah to provide security guarantees. Let them move and then we´ll see” (APS Diplomat Recorder, 13 February 1997). This ambiguity serves a number of purposes not only for the movement itself but also for Syria´s agenda in negotiations with Israel. As admitted by Nasserallah himself, revealing its position publicly vis-a-vis an Israeli withdrawal would be ”wasting a powerful card of Lebanese and Syrian negotiators because the enemy is demanding security guarantees” and it remains concealed in order to prevent any attempts of seperating the Syrian-Lebanese tracks.
          Fourthly, Hizballah´s broadcasts projects an image of the movement being a true defender of the Lebanese people and the only effective spearhead against Israel´s continued military occupation. This image is enhanced by broadcasts, announcing that it moved in with its al-Jihad al-Bina´a (Holy Struggle for Reconstruction), a Hizballah-charity, and its vast social services networks, rebuilding 5,000 homes in 82 villages in the aftermath of Operation Grapes of Wrath while repairing the infrastructure damaged by Israeli fire (Venter, 1996c). This boosts Hizballah´s position vis-a-vis the Beirut government and its popularity with the local population, especially as the movement usually provide emergency aid and rebuild war-damaged homes to local residents well before the arrival of any UN-assistance (Harik, 1994). This well-oiled social services machinery is firmly entrenched at the grassroots level to muster political support, as evident by the movement´s slogan ”we will fight poverty as ruthlessly as we will resist the Israeli occupation” proclaimed on banners throughout villages across southern Lebanon (Christian Science Monitor, 11 September 1996). In fact, the Hizballah capitalized on the overwhelming support it received from all segments of the Lebanese population during Operation Grapes of Wrath by placing advertisements in local papers urging financial support either through general funding contributions or partly financing the cost of bullets, Katyushas or the equipment of an Islamic Resistance fighter (Jaber, 1997:196-7). However, a majority of Hizballah´s social contributions occur without fanfare or publicity, especially its continued financial compensation to the families of the 1,145 martyred fighters killed fighting Israel since 1982 (Mideast Mirror, 11 November 1996).
          Finally in a broader sense, the Hizballah has cultivated a gentler image towards the West in an effort to reinvent itself as a legitimate political, social and cultural organization through a variety of means especially in the Beirut and the Biq´a area. Hizballah banners in Arabic, French, and English at the entrance of Baalbek, welcoming foreign tourists, while allowing the sale of alcohol in restaurants (Christian Science Monitor, 29 April 1996; Wall Street Journal, 19 November 1991) is in sharp contrast to its previous attitudes of banning anti-Islamic behaviour (Harris, 1985). The movement has also continuously projected reassurances that Americans ”have nothing more to fear” in Lebanon (AFP, 5 January 1995) and that Hizballah´s problem is not with the American people but with its leaders and administration (Christian Science Monitor, 21 May 1996). Hizballah clerics, most notably Sheikh Fadlallah, has also toned down the issue of violence, exemplified by his criticism of Islamist´s actions in Algeria and the issue of self-flagellation during Ashura (al-Safir, 9 September 1994; al-Majallah, 17 June 1995). Equally, Hizballah´s projects a new ”openness” as an organisation  and has publicly toned down its call for an Islamic revolution, realizing the limitations imposed by the multi-confessional political system although it continues to advocate its abandonment. In a way, the decision to participate in the elections, explained Sheikh Nasserallah, served ”to prove to friends and foes alike that Hizballah is not a group of combatant youths, but a popular trend with a vast base in Lebanon” (Ettela´at, 13 February 1993). Similarly, Hizballah´s tone down of its rhetoric in pursuing the establishment of an Islamic Republic is an integral part of a process of cultivating a gentler image and improve relations with the internal non-Shi´a audience whilst recognizing the unique sectarian composition of Lebanese society and difficult conditions surrounding the near achievement of its ideological goal. As publicly outlined by Sheikh Nasserallah, the movement recognizes that it cannot impose Islam by force. Hizballah leaders have publicly advocated that its vision of a post-sectarian Lebanon would guarantee freedom of thought and expression and the freedom to chose any system of government (al-Hayah, 17-18 April 1992). In fact, the call for the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon is nowhere to be found in Hizballah´s 1996 electoral programme. Similarly, Sheikh Fadlallah and other Hizballah clerics have been deliberately vague over the exact contours of an Islamic Republic in pluralistic Lebanon (Fadlallah, 1992). ”We have become convinced”, explained Hizballah legislator Hussein Hajj Hassan, ”that the Lebanese people do not want an Islamic republic, and that this system cannot be enforced amidst sectarian diversity” (AP, 9 January 1997). In a wider sense, Hizballah can distinguish itself from other Lebanese parties through its unique military, political and social activities which allows the movement to project itself as the moral force, defending the dispossessed and downtrodden segments against ”humiliation and slavery to the Zionists” (Voice of the Oppressed, 21 August 1993) and corruption and favoritism within Lebanese regime in an effort to achieve ”equality and establishing the just state”(al-Manar, 20 June 1997), as well as freedom and dignity to all citizens. This moral superiority is amplified by periodic criticism of the Hariri government of failing to provide for the poorest segments of Lebanese society or involving itself seriously with the Islamic Resistance in southern Lebanon (al-Sharq al-Awsat, 11 March 1996). In a broader sense, the Hizballah projects broader justification for its guerrilla activity to a wider audience, invoking the historical examples of the French people´s resistance against Nazi occupation and the resistance of the American people against the colonialists in order to illustrate that the Islamic resistance is ”a legitimate, legal, and ethical right” (al-Manar, 20 June 1997; FBIS, 1 September 1993).
          The inherent sophistication of achieving a psychological edge through various techniques by the Hizballah as an auxiliary instrument to amplify its violence is symptomatic of the way in which the movement has adapted and transformed itself in organisational, tactical and strategic terms in order to confront profound changes posed by the post-civil war environment in Lebanon. Almost overnight, the Hizballah shed its orientation from holding hostages towards pursuing a dual track policy of focusing its efforts in resisting Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon while deciding to integrate into mainstream Lebanese politics. This process of transformation from revolutionary purity towards pragmatism has been difficult for the movement yet necessary in order to it safeguard its position and even guarantee its long-term survival as a major force in Lebanon.

The Transformation of Hizballah´s Political and Military Strategy

          Prior to Hizballah´s decision to participate in the first post-civil war Lebanese parliamentary elections in August-September 1992, Muhammad Fannish, a leading member of the newly-instituted Politbureau, encapsulated the movement´s inherent awareness of the need to adapt itself to changing circumstances without compromising its ideological objectives. Instead he stated, ”the movement is driven, through such an understanding, to change the present, develop capabilities, surmount obstacles, and define the means appropriate for continuing on the road towards objectives” (FBIS, 15 May 1992). While Hizballah´s mastery of political violence served as an essential ingredient in its rapid and calibrated transformation from a small rag-tag revolutionary militia into a major military and social actor during the chaos of the civil war, it gradually became a handicap to the movement as the Lebanese environment moved towards peace with the conclusion and the impending implementation of the Taif accords. This accord in itself effectively undermined the vacuum in which Hizballah had operated, especially as the movement faced disarmament along with other militias by April 1991. In the eyes of the Hizballah, the Taif accords also served to legitimize and institutionalize a Maronite-Sunni dominance under Syrian patronage in the resuscitation of the Lebanese state and political system, effectively marginalizing the Shi´ite community (Zisser, 1996:90-110). For the Hizballah, the Ta´if accord failed to eliminate the shortcomings of the old system as it maintained a sectarian character and ”the factors that caused the wars and riots and rendered the fatherland prey to occupation forces” (al-Majallah, 15 August 1993). Yet, given the fact that Hizballah´s creation and its remarkable growth could not have been achieved without its strategic allies, Iran and Syria, and given the reality that the movement could not effectively confront the extension of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, either politically due the Taif accord or militarily due the existence of 35,000 Syrian troops, the Hizballah gradually realized that accommodation rather than confrontation was the only answer to these new realities. This realization had been already reinforced during the 1987-1990 Amal-Hizballah confrontations, ending with joint Syrian-Iranian intervention, when a series of incidents demonstrated that Syria would not hesitate to use military force against the movement if it refused to bow to al-Asad´s agenda and hegemony over Lebanon. Although Hizballah leaders urged in consultation with Iran to actively support confrontation against the Ta´if accords, the movement was gradually convinced by Iranian officials that it could only safeguard its hardwon gains by coexisting and accepting the rules as laid down by the Ta´if accord to avoid being marginalized and pressured as a movement. Instead, Iran urged the movement to actively participate in molding the future Lebanese regime through party representatives and confront the Ta´if accords from within.(Ibid)
          At the same time as the conclusion of the Ta´if accords disadvantaged Hizballah´s position, the movement was simultaneously hit by a series of challenging events towards the end of the 1980s which threatened to undermine its hardwon success as a formidable military and social organisation.  A first major crisis for the movement occurred with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 which resulted in the marginalization of the Iranian revolutionist faction and attempts by Rafsanjani to make Hizballah more pliable in his efforts to rehabilitate Iran from political and economic isolation (Mideast Mirror, 11 December 1996). The latter could be seen by the fact that Rafsanjani tried to assert control over Hizballah by replacing Pasdaran units in Lebanon more pliable to official Iran and by the fact that he appointed his brother Mahmud Bahramani as the director of the Syria and Lebanon desk at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (al-Majallah, 15 August 1993; The Echo of Iran, February 1990). This produced political factionalism within the Hizballah over the direction of the movement with the visible emergence of several trends divided over how to handle several issues, such as Amal and the Western hostage issue, along more moderate or militant lines. In addition, the death of Khomeini and later the demise of Sayyids Abolqasem Kho´i and Reza Golpayegani, the two most supreme Shi´a religious authorities in Iraq and Iran, produced also sharp political differences over the supreme leadership of the Shi´a community within the Hizballah, especially as Sheikh Fadlallah skillfully challenged Khameini´s religious credentials in an effort to project himself beyond the Lebanese arena (The Middle East, February 1995:12; al-Shira, 27 September 1993). This illustrates that the Hizballah is not a monolithic body with total subservience to Iran but rather a coalition of clerics, who each had their own views and networks of followers as well as ties to Iran´s clerical establishment. The main differences between leading Hizballah clergymen are over methods rather than aims, as evidently displayed by the 1988 dispute between Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli and Sheikh Fadlallah over the question of the feasibility of the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon (La Revue du Liban, 30 January 1988; Ha´aretz, 22 February 1988). The acceleration of political differences within Hizballah´s command leadership threatened the movement´s cohesiveness following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and increased political factionalism in Iran.
          A second crisis came with the conclusion of the Syrian-sponsored Taif peace plan which confronted the organisation with the prospects of being disarmed, losing its military ability to confront Israel which served as a major source of legitimacy and power for the movement. This was also problematic for Iran as it too faced the prospects of losing its only and indirect ability to participate militarily in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This fear of disarmament coincided with peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors which due to Syrian participation not only safeguarded the movement as a bargaining card but also threatened to potentially sacrifice Hizballah´s military presence in the process and cast the movement in direct confrontation with the Syrian as well as the Lebanese authorities. The willingness by Lebanese and Syrian authorities to use force against the Hizballah was illustrated both in September 1993 when the Lebanese army killed 9 Hizballah members in defiance of a ban demonstrating in West Beirut against the Oslo accords and in March 1994 when Syrian military arrested eleven Hizballah fighters during the course of violent demonstrations to mark Jerusalem Day, handing them over to Lebanese authorities (FBIS, 9 May 1994). As such, the Hizballah faced limited maneuverability under the Ta´if framework and had to avoid direct confrontation with either Syrian or Lebanese authorities.
          Thirdly, Hizballah´s success had partially been based on its penchant for secrecy and organisation but it would be difficult to remain an underground movement in the post-civil war Lebanese environment (AbuKhalil, 1991:392). At the same time, there was also a increased realization that the Western hostages held by the Hizballah had outlived their usefulness and it needed to get rid of them prior to the end of Perez de Cuellar´s term of office expired towards the end of 1991, partly to bolster Iran´s position with the UN Secretary-General regarding the findings of UN Resolution 598, in particular the question of responsibility for starting the Iran-Iraq war, but also as both Iran and Hizballah distrusted the incoming Boutros Ghali because of his close relationship with Egypt´s Anwar Sadat and his involvement with the Camp David peace process (The Independent, 11 & 20 December 1991). Shedding its terrorist image by engineering the release of Western hostages in return for tangible rewards for the movement, Iran as well as Syria would ultimately require re-organisation of the movement´s organisational structure and a re-orientation in order to meet the new challenges and demands imposed by the post-civil war Lebanese environment in order to guard its gains and extend its growth.

Changes in the Organisation

          While Hizballah´s national Majlis al-Shura was established in 1986, no particular leading cleric emerged as undisputed leader until the ascendancy of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli in late 1987, a noted radical with particularly close personal ties with Ali Akbar-Mohtashemi in Iran. Sheikh al-Tufayli´s position as leader of the Hizballah remained uncontested until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, when the organisation faced unprecedented challenges within Lebanon and, consequently, displayed intensified rivalry between Hizballah clergymen over the position and direction of the movement. As a result of meetings held in Teheran in October and December 1989, Hizballah submitted to a major structural changes, as evident by the establishment of an Executive or Supreme Shura (al-Hayat, 27 November 1989). While the composition of the new Executive Shura corresponds with the Majlis al-Shura, the former decision-making body assumed the second highest authority of the Hizballah and set mainly strategic matters in the overall administration of the movement. It also led to the establishment of a ”Politbureau”, a supervisory committee composed of fifteen clergy in charge of Hizballah´s coordination of recruitment, propaganda and support services on the regional and local level (Foreign Report, 13 June 1991; The Lebanon Report, 1993:6). These changes has meant a Lebanonization of the Hizballah where the control of the movement has been made more open and expanded (al-Majallah, 15-21 August 1993). Yet the main clergymen who exercise control over the movement are the ones responsible for a specific committee or portfolio. As such, the position of the Secretary-General and his deputy, elected every two years, are fundamental to monitor as they directly control all the affairs of the movement and are ex-officio in charge, and have direct access to, clerical commanders of the regional Majlis al-Shuras (The Lebanon Report, 1993:6). For example, the Deputy Secretary-General is in charge of the financial and military affairs of the movement (Foreign Report, 13 June 1991).
          In 1991, Hizballah stood at a critical juncture and the election of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, the former head of the Islamic Resistance, came in response to a quid pro quo arrangement between Hizballah and Iran and Syria which permitted the movement to maintain their armed presence (SWB, 2 May 1991). As it claimed to be a resistance movement rather than a militia, the Hizballah focused much of its energy towards southern Lebanon and escalated its attacks against Israel to justify its existence. Unlike his predecessor, Sheikh al-Musawi appeared to be more pragmatic as evident by the fact that he presided over Hizballah through the denouement of the Western hostage crisis while he readjusted the movement´s grand strategy from creating an Islamic Republic of Lebanon through armed struggle to a willingness to participate in mainstream Lebanese politics. In order to engineer this readjustment through increased control of the movement´s cadres, Sheikh al-Musawi reduced the number of members on the Majlis al-Shura to eight clergy, compared to over twenty members under al-Tufayli´s reign. Although his pragmatism was a reflection of Hizballah´s effort to confront the challenges posed by a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics and that the position of Sheikh al-Musawi was closer to the line of Iran´s Hashemi Rafsanjani than that of his clerical colleagues within Hizballah, it was also the result of increased Iranian influence and pressure (The Independent, 10 September 1991; Los Angeles Times, 22 February 1993). Unlike his predecessor, Sheikh al-Musawi had previously voiced his explicit opposition against Ayatollah Montazeri while pledging close allegiance to Ayatollah Khameini and Rafsanjani. However, al-Musawi´s process of transforming the Hizballah to meet the new requirements of the Lebanese environment was abruptly curtailed on February 17, 1992, when he was assassinated by Israeli missile-firing helicopters after attending an annual memorial service in the village of Jibshit in order to mark the eight anniversary of the death of Sheikh Harb. In an attempt to assure its own cadres that al-Musawi´s death had not seriously affected the organisation, Hizballah immediately announced the election of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah as its new leader.

The Role and Influence of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah

          Despite the fact that the Hizballah command leadership is composed of high-ranking clergy, it is Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah that has skillfully led the difficult transformation of the revolutionary movement into a major political, social and military player within a post-civil war environment. In many ways, Sheikh Nasserallah´s reign represents a gradual generational shift within the Hizballah´s command leadership away from the radical old guard, who founded the movement, to a younger circle of cadres, who are more adept and attuned to the changes necessary to survive within Lebanon after the civil war (al-Majallah, 15 August 1993; al-Shira, 27 September 1993). His rapid rise through the ranks have been extraordinary, given his young age as well as his undistinguished religious stature within the movement compared to Sheikhs al-Musawi, al-Tufayli, and Yazbek. Unlike his predecessors, Sheikh Nasserallah comes from southern Lebanon rather than the Biq´a area, highlighting the movement´s renewed resolve in combating Israel. Hailing from the south Lebanese village of Bazuriyah, he served as the mobilization officer within Hizballah in the Biq´a and led its fierce fighting with Amal between 1987-1990, which he initiated and spearheaded over the control of the Iqlim al-Tuffah area (al-Shira, 8 November 1993). However, the seriousness of the challenges confronting the organisation within Lebanon meant that Nasserallah has undergone a transformation during his tenure as Secretary-General in terms of pragmatism of his ideological views. Having been noted for his hard-line views with previous links to Iran´s revolutionist faction while vocally opposing Syria and fighting with Amal, Sheikh Nasserallah´s reign has been marked by closely cultivating the movement´s relations with Syria and even cooperation with Amal at times while projecting a more ”obedient” image in his dealings with official Iran (al-Safir, 4 August 1993; Yediot Aharanot, 19 April 1996). This awareness of internal Lebanese requirements has been evident from the fact that he appointed Hussein Khalil as his personal counsel in 1995 and the other leading positions he appointed have notoriously good relations with Syria (Intelligence Newsletter, 17 June 1993). In many respects, he is also considered to be more independent than previous leaders, having recently been appointed Khameini´s personal representative in Lebanon, and in touch with the dispossessed Shi´ites and their concerns.
          Nasserallah´s reign as Secretary-General of the Hizballah has led to a number of changes within the organisation in order to assert his full control over its affairs (Intelligence Newsletter, 16 March 1995). Although Sheikh Nasserallah was only elected after the 1992 assassination of al-Musawi, through Iranian influence and intervention, he had shrewdly waited in the wings within the leadership ranks. Despite the fact that Nasserallah received a majority vote in the Malis al-Shura elections in May 1991 to the post of Secretary-General of the movement, which he yielded to Sheikh al-Musawi out of ”humility”, Sheikh Nasserallah bolstered his own position within the Majlis al-Shura as he held control over finances and military matters, thereby restricting the maneuverability of Sheikh al-Musawi and turning himself into the real de facto leader (al-Hayat, 21 May 1991; al-Qabas, 20 July 1989).
          Under Nasserallah´s reign, the organisation was forced to step up its resistance activities against Israel. This meant stockpiling weaponry and employing new guerrilla tactics to confront the IDF and SLA in the security zone, especially in infiltrating villages and cultivating local support. Hizballah also decided to separate the Islamic Resistance in July 1993 from the political framework, a move instigated for operational expediency and for security reasons following a series of assassination attempts of key leaders (The Independent, 1 April 1995). Nasserallah stressed his commitment to the armed strategy of the Islamic Resistance, most notably through the creation of a new organ, the al-Jihad Council, bringing in all various factions under a central umbrella to coordinate all anti-Israeli activity, headed by Sheikh Hachem Safieddine (The Lebanon Report, March 1993:6). This meant he could skillfully control any dissident factions, most notably al-Tufayli´s Biq´a valley wing, both as a means to prevent any attempts of independent action against Israel through bringing this hard-line faction´s fighters and commanders strictly into the fold and, at the same time, demonstrate resolve to the organisation´s cadres of his resolve in combating Israel in southern Lebanon. This had become necessary as Sheikh al-Tufayli and his hard-line followers had vehemently objected to Hizballah´s decision to participate in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections which translated into independent resistance attacks against Israel in an effort to undermine Nasserallah´s position and control over the movement (The Foreign Report, 5 November 1992). The failure of Sheikh al-Tufayli to regain the leadership post of the Hizballah in its leadership elections in May 1991, February 1992, April/May 1993, and July 1995 have led to an erosion in the influence of the radical camp of the movement, most apparent by the relegation of Sheikh Tufayli to a position as a mere member of the main Majlis al-Shura without any specific portfolio (Intelligence Newsletter, 17 June 1993). As admitted by Sheikh al-Tufayli in a July 1994 interview with L´Orient Le Jour: ”I am an ordinary militant, and I do not participate in decision-making. This has been true since the time of the (1992) legislative elections” (L´Orient-Le Jour, 30 July 1994). In fact, Hizballah officials (in interviews with the author in November 1997) have recently disassociated themselves from Sheikh al-Tufayli, whom they describe as being a ”former Hizb´allah member”. Sheikh Nasserallah´s control over the Hizballah was further bolstered following the September 1997 IDF killing of his 18-year old son, Hadi, who served in an elite Islamic Resistance unit, and he is expected to maintain in charge of the movement after the April 1998 Hizballah congress, despite ”unwritten” internal leadership regulations barring the same Secretary-General from serving three consecutive terms in office.
           The Hizballah under Nasserallah also skillfully expanded its social services sector in several steps in order to extend its political and social powerbase, especially through increased lobbying in parliament on behalf of the Shia community and by Iranian infusion of humanitarian aid to the movement. Hizballah´s role as a provider to the often poor and illiterate Shia population in the midst of the civil war and continued neglect by Lebanese authorities has been an essential ingredient to its social and political popularity and in entrenching as well as extending its position as a social protest movement (Trendle, 1993:12-3). In many ways, Hizballah´s social undertakings have eclipsed the Lebanese governments own efforts for the local Shia community. In fact, the Lebanese Ministry of Interior have granted official recognition and legitimacy to several of the movement´s social services institutions, most notably by registering the Relief Committee, the Islamic Health Committee, and Jihad al-Binaa in 1988 (Jaber, 1997:145-68). The sheer nature and scale of Hizballah´s investment in its social networks, ranging from building and running schools, clinics, pharmacies, digging wells to repairing war-damaged houses, underlines the primary reason why the movement has been able to rapidly attract grassroots support and grow as a movement while translating it into political support during the 1992 and 1996 Lebanese parliamentary elections. The centrality of social activities was manifest in the movement´s 1996 political manifesto, tackling vast social and educational issues. Yet, Hizballah´s skillful compensation for the shortcomings of the state in filling the social vacuum is marginally threatened over the long term by the current process of Lebanon´s economic rehabilitation, especially in financially maintaining its current level of social networks and programmes. Although the Hizballah finances these social institutions and programmes through firmly established internal collection procedures, ranging from khums and zakat, and has been making recent efforts to become financially self-sufficient without external support, (FBIS, 6 May 1996; al-Shira, 4 January 1993) the scale of Hizballah´s social activities could not be possible without external Iranian support, either through the Relief Committee of Imam Khomeini, the Martyr´s Foundation or the many independent Iranian bonyyads, operated by more radical clergy (IRNA, 4 May 1996; Mideast Mirror, 12 August 1993). Despite Iranian financial aid to the movement, it is worthwhile to note that Sheikh Fadlallah administrates independently an orphanage and provides aid to the poor Shia community in Beirut (The Times, 12 May 1990; al-Shira, 18 January 1993). At the same time, he is careful to point out that Iranian charitable contributions ”does not represent a sidelining of the Lebanese state” (al-Safir, 7 June 1996), a statement made in connection with overt tension in the Lebanese-Iranian relationship over Iranian infusion of aid prior to the 1996 Lebanese elections (Foreign Report, 13 June 1996). However, Hizballah´s reliance on Iranian aid is perhaps most significant in the military sphere in the continued provision of military equipment and humanitarian aid. For example, after Israel´s 1993 Operation Accountability, Sheikh Nasserallah pledged his movement would repair war-damaged houses and infrastructure, conducted under the auspices of Jihad al-Binaa and costing an estimated 8.7 million dollars (Jaber, 1997:168). Yet, the Hizballah leader is careful in countering claims of Iranian military shipments through Syria, stressing publicly that ”Syria has not allowed a single weapon to pass through its territories to Hezbollah´s bases since its participation in the Madrid peace conference in 1990” (MENA, 3 May 1996; al-Majallah, 15 August 1993). Equally, the Hizballah points out that the Iranian Pasdaran does not fight in southern Lebanon, rather its presence in the Biq´a area revolves around education and training (FBIS, 9 May 1994; AFP, 28 June 1991).
          Finally, perhaps Sheikh Nasserallah´s most important contribution as a leader has been his role in steering the Hizballah into the political arena through parliamentary participation, a move which initially threatened to openly divide the movement. Having skillfully out-maneuvered al-Tufayli and other internal opposition while securing the firm backing of both Khameini as well as Sheikh Fadlallah, (FBIS, 30 October 1992) Hizballah radically shifted its focus when it entered the political game in September 1992.

Hizballah´s Political Agenda and Maneuvering

          In many ways, Hizballah´s entry in the first Lebanese post-civil war political elections in September 1992 was a carefully calibrated strategy on several fronts. Firstly, Hizballah´s presence in politics with eight representatives meant it could become legitimized in order to guarantee its survival and would protect it against any external or internal efforts to dissolve it. For example, Hizballah´s fear of external retaliation figured prior to the complete closure of the Western hostage file in December 1991 as it repeatedly sought official US assurances against any moves against it in revenge. More importantly, Hizballah recognized that defending its ”resistance project” in southern Lebanon required political backing which could only be mustered from within through its own representatives (Ettela´at, 13 February 1993). As explained by Sheikh Fadlallah, ”we know full well that a number of senior political figures within the Lebanese government are totally opposed to the resistance. They plan, work, and pray for any opportunity to undermine the resistance and to foil its objectives” (FBIS, 1 September 1993). As such, the movement could publicly and practically prevent any Lebanese government moves to restrict its military activities, an issue made harder by the fact that Hizballah´s legitimacy as a resistance movement was significantly enhanced following Operation Grapes of Wrath with the April 1996 understandings (Christian Science Monitor, 29 April 1996). The movement could also effectively and officially prevent any attempts by Israel to modify the April 1996 understandings, banning both parties from attacking civilians (Monday Morning, 3 March 1997).
          In many ways, Hizballah´s integration into mainstream politics meant also that the movement´s was not solely dependent on its military for its identity. Equally, Hizballah´s parliamentary representatives provided it with a legitimate means to vigorously campaign to abolish confessionalism and with an opportunity to mold a future deconfessionalized political system with a long-term view to resuscitate the project for an Islamic Republic of Lebanon (Los Angeles Times, 22 February 1993). This project strives to end political confessionalism one day in order to present the movement with an opportunity ”for a Muslim to be president of the Lebanese republic” (Hamzeh, 1993:334). Viewing confessionalism as the root causes of all evil in Lebanon, Hizballah´s post-sectarian vision of Lebanon also embraces the establishment of a state with a freely chosen government where a distribution of power is allocated ”on the basis of competence” and according to the ”will of the people” in an effort to guarantee freedom of expression and religious belief (al-Hayah, 18 April 1992). This political vision was originally elaborated in Hizballah´s publication of its manifesto in 1985 (Norton, 1987) and does not signify a significant departure from its underlying principles but represent rather a gradual effort to ”remove obstacles to Islam´s peaceful application to the lives of people through discussion and debate, without coercion or the use of force” (The Times, 12 May 1991). As such, Hizballah´s political platform has temporarily abandoned its calls for the creating of an Islamic republic to avoid provoking sectarian prejudice and fears as ”conditions may not be ripe for reaching that goal and accomplishing its desired purposes at the present time” (al-Hayah, 18 April 1992). Towards these ends, the Hizballah views the Ta´if accords as a bridge to transfer ”Lebanon from a stage of bloody conflicts to a new stage of internal peace” (al-Manar, 20 June 1997).
          At a minimum, Hizballah´s anti-establishment position, campaigning against government corruption and economic policies, reinforces its image as the champion for the oppressed and dispossessed. Countering the perception of endorsing confessionalism through participating in its institutions as the movement´s deputies rejected acceptance of any positions in the Lebanese government, Hizballah deputies periodically distance themselves from the Lebanese government by refusing to twice to pass a vote of confidence in Hariri´s government, initially as it avoided to endorsing armed resistance in southern Lebanon, and by rejecting the 1996 budget (Chartouni-Dubarry, 1996:61). Hizballah´s political astuteness is evidenced by the fact that it ”seldom raises Islamic-related claims, whether on political or merely ethical grounds, focusing much more on constitutional matters” (Ibid). In fact the movement has gone out of its way to allay any fears of its revolutionary aspirations, cultivating a closer Islamic-Christian dialogue as recently displayed by its open letter to Pope John Paul II (Zisser, 1996:103). As explained by Sheikh Muhammad Fannish, ”to consider the Islamic republic a political system currently being proposed by the Islamic movement in Lebanon would be contrary to the truth and an ideological misconception that has no basis in the position, platform, and statements of that movement” (al-Hayah, 18 April 1992). In a similar fashion, the Hizballah strongly emphasize that the movement is entirely Lebanese in character rather than a foreign entity directed by Iran in order to reinforce its internal legitimacy within Lebanon. As reinforced by a member of the movement´s Politbureau, ”Hezbollah is a Lebanese party, with a Lebanese leadership and Lebanese decisions. When it makes a decision, it takes the interests of Lebanon, not Iran into consideration” (FBIS, 22 April 1996). Yet, for the Hizballah, this amounts to a de facto recognition of Lebanon´s sovereignty and a commitment to its territorial integrity rather than a manifestation of a wider pan-Islamic goal (Gunning, 1995). The recognition of Lebanon´s territorial integrity has been underscored by Sheikh Fadlallah, who elaborated that ”I want my country to be free and independent and to deal with Iran and other countries on the basis of protecting Lebanon´s interests” (al-Safir, 7 June 1996). As such, the Hizballah declares its commitment towards the unity of its people and the preservation of domestic peace rather than conflict urging vigilance against internal (the Lebanese government) and external (American and Israeli) plots against Lebanon and its people as well as against Lebanon´s alliance with Syria, as exemplified by the movement´s restraint from retaliating for the killing of 9 members in September 1993 (al-Ahd, 17 December 1993) and its handover of the Sheikh Abdallah barracks in the Biq´a to the Lebanese army (Kayhan International, 22 December 1990).
          Secondly, Hizballah could also more effectively campaign for increased redistribution of resources for the poor Shiite community, increasing its popularity and taking some strain off its resources from Iran (AP, 9 January 1997). ”Our presence in parliament”, explained Sheikh Nasserallah, ”is for the sake of the oppressed.” As such, the Hizballah campaigns against Hariri´s ambitious reconstruction policies, arguing it will accumulate vast foreign debt and ”be forced to approach the World Bank and international organizations and become beholden to those governments and organizations that have given it loans” (FBIS, 1 March 1993). Opposing Hariri´s economic policies on the grounds of priority as it continues to ignore development problems, Hizballah urges that the state´s economical role must achieve harmony between activating the public sector, on the one hand, and ”the necessity of not deserting the state´s responsibilities towards the citizens and public utilities, especially what concerns supporting the steadfastness of the areas confronting the Zionist occupation” (Hizballah 1996 Electoral Programme). The movement´s deputies charge both the Hariri government as well as Amal with neglecting the welfare of the Shi´a community, often bypassing assistance provided by the Council of the South and distributing aid across different class as well as sectarian lines  (Palmer, 1996:55). As such, Hizballah´s provision of humanitarian aid ”without discrimination between one citizen and another, or one sect and another” (al-Manar, 20 June 1997) reinforces the movement´s message and commitment to abolish sectarianism in reality. Yet, at the same token, Hizballah welfare services assists indirectly with the economic rehabilitation of Lebanon. ”We have been encouraged”, said Dr Muhammad Baqr Fadlallah, ”to take the burden off the government´s shoulders” (The Times, 12 May 1990). The adoption of a policy of restraint and, at times, cooperation, has enabled the Hizballah to rapidly become a major powerbroker on the Lebanese scene, which has served to undermine the position of the Amal. As such, the movement has spearheaded and called for an effective plan of opposition to the present government in expectation of a suitable opportunity for change by urging discussion and common action among oppositional parties (Monday Morning, 3 March 1997). This was evident by Hizballah´s 1996 initial electoral alignment with oppositional forces against the government of Rafiq Hariri, such as with communists and other leftist forces, in the Biq´a and in the South which threatened the defeat of Nabih Berri´s Syrian-supported Amal movement (Issues, December 1996). After Syrian intervention on the eve of the last two-rounds of the elections, Hizballah was forced into a tactical alliance with Amal in the campaign in southern Lebanon after Hizballah-Amal war of words threatened to translate into real confrontation on the ground, especially as Hizballah had surprisingly lost its two seats in Mount Lebanon and Beirut districts to Amal and was determined to increase its representation in southern Lebanon from two to four seats (Trendle, 1996). After gaining these four seats in the South, Hizballah´s joint list with Amal in the Biq´a returned three further candidates, bringing the movement´s total parliamentary representation to 7 MPs and three non-Shi´i supporters. Despite Hizballah´s reduced electoral strength, the fact that the movement´s rhetorical confrontations with the Hariri government have not led to violence is a firm demonstration of the movement´s political maturity, realizing that it cannot afford to jeopardize its hardwon political and social gains nor its resistance role in southern Lebanon. It is also a demonstration of the limits of Hizballah´s maneuvering within the framework of the wider Iranian-Syrian relationship and the limits to the movement´s ability to extend as well as present itself as an alternative oppositional force amidst sectarian politics and Syrian hegemony (Usher, 1996; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997:155).
          Veiling itself as the champion of the poor and dispossessed, the Hizballah has gained notable respect from all quarters from Shi´a and non-Shi´a alike for the professionalism in its political conduct, amplified by its conduct on the ground and its role as an impeccable and incorruptible moral force (Christian Science Monitor, 5 December 1996). In fact, Hizballah leaders have reiterated that the movement ”do not oppose in a blind way or for the sake of opposition only; if the (Hariri) government offers a project useful to the people, we support it.” Hizballah´s deputies have been careful in coordinating their positions with its command leadership as a unified front to avoid weakening its position and rumours of division within the party (al-Diyar, 19 December 1993).
          Hizballah´s integration into mainstream Lebanese politics accords it with a legitimate means and a platform to confront areas of Lebanon´s external relations, especially working against the government´s negotiations with the Israeli regime. ”Israel want to impose a peace accord in return for its withdrawal from our territory”, declared Sheikh Nasserallah, ”an accord that resembles the 17 May accord signed with Amin Jumayyil. We reject this accord and demand that Israel withdraw unconditionally from Lebanese territory” (FBIS, 1 March 1993). Rather than becoming subservient to foreign interests, the Hizballah advocates further political and economic integration of Lebanon with its Arab and Islamic environment in an effort to resist American hegemony and penetration of the region and to continue its support for the resistance to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. As such Hizballah has pledged to continue ”not to recognize Israel even if the entire world does”, (Radio Lebanon, 2 October 1993) and that ”compromises with Israel do not bind other nations and they do not have to recognize such a surrender” (FBIS, 1 March 1993). The movement views suspiciously Hariri´s reconstruction policies as gearing itself towards an eventual peace settlement with Israel. However, in return for the Lebanese government´s pledge to make no political or territorial concessions to Israel until it withdraws from Lebanon, the Hizballah has stated indirectly that it would focus on party politics and accept disarmament once Israel withdrew from the entire zone (The Independent, 10 November 1993; AP, 28 December 1995). As explained by Sheikh Nasserallah, ”we are not a political, security or military alternative to the state” (MENA, 3 May 1996). In other areas, Hizballah´s political platform endorses aspects of the Hariri government´s foreign policy, especially in safeguarding Syria´s military role in preserving internal stability and in confronting the newly-established strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel (Kayhan International, 22 December 1990).
          While Hizballah´s political participation represent a new chapter in successfully reinventing itself from extremism to moderation and as a means to safeguard its hardwon achievements over the last fifteen years, it has also revealed a series of limitations for the movement in extending its position in the future as merely a political party. While Hizballah´s electoral success in the 1992 elections could be attributed to a combination of factors, ranging from a highly sophisticated electoral machine supported by Iran, the boycott of the elections by oppositional candidates and parties in certain district to the highly popular social services provided by the movement (Hamzeh, 1993), the outcome of the 1996 elections underscored the fact that Hizballah cannot expect to make any further significant political inroads. This setback does not meant that the movement will abdicate its political role as a major oppositional force to the Hariri government, rather it will continue to hammer away at perceived weaknesses, to work towards eroding Amal´s popularity and influence, and forge tactical alliances with other confessional parties towards these ends while working to safeguard the role of the resistance in southern Lebanon. For the Hizballah, the 1996 electoral experience safeguarded the movement´s role as a potent political force and social provider but was a demonstration that the Lebanese political game is strictly determined and controlled by Syria. As such, Hizballah´s political fortunes are inextricably tied to its ”resistance project” in southern Lebanon as a guarantor to maintain its position, role and momentum as a movement within Syrian-controlled Lebanon.
          It is likely the Islamic Resistance will continue to improve its operational techniques and manage to inflict further IDF and SLA casualties, especially as the 1996 ”understandings” is advantageous for this type of low-intensity warfare against a conventionally more powerful enemy and as it will continue to serve as a useful bargaining tool for Syria in its negotiations with Israel. For the Hizballah, its resistance activity represent a vital ingredient in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Shi´ite community. While Hizballah´s popularity would be boosted by forcing the Israelis out of southern Lebanon, it simultaneously represent a wider problem for the movement as it would lose, to an extent, its confrontational character and revolutionary past. Yet, Hizballah leaders repeatedly makes it clear that it will accept disarmament once its enemy  withdraws from occupied areas and that it would accept the extension of Lebanese authorities in charge of security. As encapsulated by Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, ”when the Zionist enemy withdraws from the occupied areas, we will not be the authority in charge of security. We have a (Lebanese) state, and it will exert its security authority there. As for what will happen after a withdrawal, let the Israelis withdraw and then we will see” (Mideast Mirror, 14 February 1997).

Conclusion

          The Hizballah is a remarkably changed organisation in the 1990s compared to the previous decade and has managed to reinvent itself from a militant revolutionary organisation into a formidable political, cultural, social and military force in the post-civil war environment. This so-called ”Lebanonization” process of the Hizballah, which Sheikh Fadlallah defines as ”examine the prevailing circumstances in Lebanon and formulate its strategy within that framework, making allowances for Lebanon´s particular circumstances, its confessional sensitivities, its perception of its environment”, (Fadlallah, 1995:67) is a trademark of the movement and visible in the close interrelationship between its political, social, and military activity, capitalizing on opportunities to position itself and extent as a movement while exercising pragmatic judgement of the prevailing conditions and limitations imposed on the movement by Syria´s agenda and the confessional nature of Lebanon´s political make-up. Hizballah´s reinvention as a movement with an entry into mainstream Lebanese politics cannot be considered an abandonment of its earlier ideological and revolutionary principles. And while one can argue that the movement operate simultaneously towards an external as well as internal audience in the rhetorical sphere, it is clear that the Hizballah operate to safeguard its existing and future political and social achievements. It is important to recognize that the movement has always worked according to an incremental strategy over a long time-frame and is patient. As recognized by Sheikh Nasserallah, ”Israel must disappear and will disappear (because) it is an entity based on oppression and aggression. It must disappear in the name of justice; it represents evil, and evil will be conquered one day. I don´t know when that will happen, in five years, 10 years or 50 years” (APS Diplomat Recorder, 15 February 1997) In the meantime, the Hizballah is continuing to fulfill a legitimate role as a major political, social and military movement, especially as the provider and protector of the lowest segments of Lebanese society neglected by the Hariri government´s reconstruction efforts.
          Despite Hizballah pledges to be ”the vanguards of the confrontation against normalization”, (FBIS, 14 October 1993) especially following the event of an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, recent internal Lebanese developments indicate that the completion of Hizballah´s Lebanonization process is far from over, especially given its political status quo following the 1996 parliamentary elections when it lost the seats of 2 MPs, ”clipping the movement´s wings” (Usher,1996) and given visible internal dissension within the movement over its direction between al-Tufayli and Nasserllah, the former charging Hizballah deputies with  ”complicity” with the Hariri government and neglect of the Shi´a community in the Biq´a area (Monday Morning, 30 June 1997). In a move resembling the independent resistance attacks against Israel in the autumn of 1992 by the al-Tufayli faction in response to Hizballah´s decision to participate in the Lebanese political system, al-Tufayli has challenged not only Sheikh Nasserallah and Hizballah´s command leadership but also the Hariri government by announcing the establishment of a rival movement called ”Revolution of the Hungry” on 4 July 1997 in the Baalbek-Hermil area. In an effort to reassert himself politically as well as socially due to his marginalization within the Hizballah for his radical and uncompromising line, Sheikh al-Tufayli declared that the aim of his wide-scale movement was to revolt and force the Lebanese authorities to ”act to save the badly deteriorating economic conditions in the country” (SWB, 7 June 1997) as it was responsible for ”hunger, widen poverty and ignorance, waste public funds; steal; apply the law of the jungle, branish the weapon of repression in the faces of the disinherited” (Monday Morning, 30 June 1997). Adopting civil disobedience as a course of action through non-payment of taxes and peaceful demonstrations, al-Tufayli´s campaign of the ”Revolution of the Hungry” presents not only a problem for the Lebanese authorities, as evident by the infusion of 97 million US dollars for rural development in destitute regions of the Biq´a as well as in Akkar in northern Lebanon, (Futures TV, 4 July 1997) but has served to marginally threaten the cohesiveness of the Hizballah´s as a movement, as evident not only by friction between Sheikhs Nasserallah and al-Tufayli but also the initial intercession by Sheikh Fadlallah between Nasserallah´s command leadership and al-Tufayli on equal terms (SWB, 2 July 1997) While al-Tufayli´s movement with 3-5,000 supporters cannot be considered a serious power-struggle within the Hizballah leadership, especially as Sheikh Nasserallah has recently molded the movement´s portfolio positions with individuals more loyal to him and the fact that al-Tufayli´s followers are composed of mainly Brital-villagers, radical militants as well as some criminal elements wanted by the Lebanese authorities, it nevertheless demonstrates that the movement is still grappling with internal problems over the direction of the movement (L´Orient-Le Jour, 4-7 July 1997). At a minimum, the rift between al-Tufayli and the Hizballah movement at large is illustrative of the fact that the ”resistance” project occupy the most central position for the movement, for some at the expense of dealing with the accelerated poverty of the Biq´a area especially following the forcibly curbing of drug cultivation. This can be further gauged by the fact that the highest echelons of Hizballah´s leadership all come from the South rather than from Beirut and the Biq´a, the latter being the origin of where the movement was founded in 1982 (The Lebanon Report, No.3, Fall 1997). Another likely explanation for al-Tufayli´s move may represent a Syrian attempt to balance the various forces within Lebanese politics or as a way to signal to Iran, Hizballah and the Hariri government that it firmly controls Lebanese affairs, especially likely when considering that al-Tufayli could never have been allowed to launch his movement without Syrian knowledge and consent. Equally, one cannot discount that the public rift between Nasserallah and al-Tufayli may represent an orchestrated move by the Hizballah itself to further its political and social gains at the expense of the Lebanese state as the movement cannot expect to make any further political inroads under the current Lebanese political, social and military status quo. What is clear in the almost Byzantine nature of Lebanese politics is that Hizballah has reached its peak in political, social and military terms. A major dilemma for the future of the movement is that the achievement of its military objectives (in the event of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal) will fundamentally shake the movement to its very foundation, possibly producing gradual fissures in the cohesiveness of the movement. While it is clear that the Hizballah is here to stay as a legitimate force on the political and social scene, the movement´s future (and its ability to grow) is inextricably linked to the dynamics of Syria´s confrontation with Israel, the movement´s ability to retain armed struggle, and the long-term success of Lebanon´s rehabilitation process. It is therefore not surprising that the Hizballah will closely conceal its cards whether to continue armed struggle even after the land in the South is liberated in order to avoid facilitating an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and to seperate the Lebanese from the Golan tracks in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. In some ways, Hizballah is hostage to its own fortunes.
 

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