In both the National Security Strategy and, more dramatically, his second inaugural address, President Bush made the extension of freedom and democracy to other countries the linchpin of U.S. security. It is not mere rhetoric, as it has often been in the past, but considered by the president the practical mechanism by which America can best guarantee its long-term security in the world.
Enough has happened in both Afghanistan and Iraq over the past few years to take stock of this strategy — both its implementation thus far and its future prospects. We asked a symposium of conservative writers what they thought about the strategy: as a practical tool for underpinning our foreign and military policy, and as a conservative ideal.
The essence of the Bush Doctrine is wholesome and sound. It is even inevitable: Liberal society appears to be necessary for the full development of the kind of mass capitalist prosperity that provides the surest basis for domestic tranquility in any country. And societies in which this material prosperity shows no sign of appearing spawn all kinds of disorders — not so much among the poorest of the poor as among the educated and semi-educated classes. It also seems that governments unable to procure legitimacy through the promise of mass prosperity and personal freedom must frequently rely on ideologies of political or religious conflict to secure their positions. They poison the international climate to preserve their stability at home.
In a world in which WMD are ever easier to procure, and in which small cadres of terrorists can wield awesome destructive power, the U.S. has a greater interest than ever in the fostering of liberal societies. But no principle, however great and true, will succeed if it is rigidly and mechanistically held and applied. It is perfectly possible to believe in the long-term necessity of liberal society without calling for a plebiscite on the monarchy in Saudi Arabia next week.
The Bush administration has had successes and partial successes, but there are two great and unresolved problems. The first is Iraq, where the administration’s rhetoric has steadily shifted down from initial joyous cries that the war is won, to confident assertions that we are winning the war, to stubborn insistence that we cannot be defeated. A defeat in Iraq would be a serious and possibly fatal blow to the Bush Doctrine — and perhaps to much else besides.
The second problem has to do with international society: Is the society of states a liberal society or isn’t it? If it is, and if the U.S. is the sheriff defending that order, what are the limits on America’s sovereign power? It is all very well to argue in an American context that we need a strong sheriff to keep the peace; Americans, after all, elect that sheriff. But what about those who do not have a vote? The essence of liberal society is the limitation of power by laws made by the consent of the governed. To what laws and what consent can the Bush administration point — and what is its answer to those who challenge, on liberal grounds, the prerogatives on which it insists? The administration has a position on these questions, but it has not so far built an internationally persuasive case. This is the job Karen Hughes has been called to do. Much depends on her success. Wish her well.