The Relevance Principle:

One who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to set forth only reasons that are directly related to the merit of the position at issue.

The premises of a good argument must be relevant to the truth of the conclusion. This is the place where one begins because there is no reason too waste time assessing the truth or acceptability of a premise if it is not even relevant to the truth of the conclusion.

A premise is relevant if its acceptance provides some reason to believe, counts in favor of or makes a difference to the truth or falsity of the conclusion. A premise is irrelevant if its acceptance has no bearing on, provides no evidence for, or makes no difference to the truth of falsity of the conclusion.

In most cases the relevance of a premise is also determined by its relation to other premises, although in some cases additional premises may be needed to make the relevance of another premise more apparent. Most of us are familiar with the case of the television attorney who convinces an initially skeptical judge that a seemingly irrelevant question or piece of testimony is relevant by introducing other evidence or testimony.

The very first step in the reconstruction of another’s argument, then, is to check it for any obvious irrelevancies. In the context of informal discussion, we usually encounter quite a number of sometimes-colorful yet irrelevant pieces of material. Most of these features are not intended to be a part of the argument and therefore can be safely ignored. It is, however, sometimes difficult to know whether an arguer intends a particular claim to be a relevant reason for believing the conclusion to be true, it should or whether the claim is simply important background information for understanding the context of the issue under review. If the latter is true, it is not a part of the argument and should not be included as a part of its reconstruction. If the former is true, it should definitely be included, even if subsequent evaluation may show it to be irrelevant. It is entirely possible that what at first appears to be irrelevant may be shown to be quite relevant after further reflection on the matter.

In terms of traditional logic, the premises of an argument are relevant if the conclusion in some sense follows from the premises. If the argument is a deductive one, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises if the argument is patterned after a logically correct or valid form. In such cases, the premises are obviously relevant to the conclusion, because the conclusion of a correctly formed deductive argument simply spells out what is already implicit in the premises.

If the argument is an inductive one, the conclusion follows from the premises if those premises support or tend to confirm the truth of the conclusion. However, determining whether the premises of an inductive argument strongly or adequately support the truth of its conclusion depends also on how well those premises meet the other criteria of a good argument.

There are a number of typical ways that arguments fail to conform to the relevance principle. Some arguments use reasons that are simply emotional appeals, such as appealing to pity and to fear. Other arguments draw the wrong or irrelevant evidence to support the conclusion. Appeals to common opinion and to questionable authorities are other ways to use irrelevant information to support a conclusion. All arguments with these features clearly violate the relevance criterion.

There are several questions that one may want to ask in an effort to determine whether a particular premise or reason is relevant. First, would the premise’s being true in any way make one more likely to believe that the conclusion is true? If the answer is yes, the premise is probably relevant. If the answer is no, the premise is probably not a relevant one. Second, does the premise seem to have any connection to whether or not the conclusion is true? For example, could the premise be true and the conclusion be no more likely to be true than false—or no more likely to be a good thing to do than not to do? If so, then it makes no difference whether the premise is true or false, which is another way of saying that the premise is irrelevant. Finally, even if the premise is true, should it be a consideration in the determination of whether or not the conclusion of the argument is true? For example, does the fact that a new movie has enjoyed the greatest box office success in history be a consideration in the determination of the quality of the film? If the answer is no, then the premise is an irrelevant one. If the answer is yes, which is unlikely in this case, then the premise should be regarded as relevant.

The patterns of faulty reasoning are fallacies that violate the relevance criterion for a good argument, in that they employ premises that are logically irrelevant to their conclusions. A good argument must have premises that are relevant to the truth of its conclusion. A premise is relevant if its acceptance provides some reason to believe, counts in favor of, or makes a difference to the truth or falsity of the conclusion. A premise is irrelevant if its acceptance has no bearing on, provides no evidence for, or makes no difference to the truth or falsity of the conclusion.

Arguments with irrelevant premises are often called non sequiturs, which means that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. They are also sometimes called argumentative leaps, which suggests that since no connection is seen between the premises and the conclusion, a huge leap would be required to move from one to the other.

The 13 fallacies treated here display irrelevance in a variety of ways. For example, some faulty arguments make an appeal to public opinion or to inappropriate authorities, while others employ reasons that appeal to us on a purely emotional level. These fallacies are divided into two basic categories: (1) fallacies of irrelevance and (2) irrelevant emotional appeals.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to support a claim by quoting the judgement of one who is not an authority in the field, the judgement of an unidentified authority, or the judgement of an authority who is likely to be biased in some way.

An authority in a particular field is one who has access to the knowledge that he or she claims to have, is qualified by training or ability to draw appropriate inferences from that knowledge, and is free from any prejudices or conflicts of interest that would prevent him or her from formulating sound judgments or communicating them honestly.

There is nothing inappropriate about appealing to the judgment of qualified authorities in a field of knowledge as a means of supporting some particular claim related to that field. When the "authority" on whose judgment the argument rests fails to meet the stated criteria, however, the argument should be regarded as fallacious.

The fallacious appeal to authority occurs most frequently in the form of a transfer of an authority's competence from one field to another. An entertainer or athlete, for example, is appealed to as an authority on automobile mufflers or weed-killers; a biologist is called on to support some religious claim; or a politician is treated as an expert on marriage and the family. Indeed, the judgment of a famous and highly respected person is likely to be indiscriminately invoked on almost any subject.

An unidentified authority is questionable because there is no way for us to determine whether the unnamed authority is in fact a qualified one. If we do not know who the authority is, we are not in a position to know whether his or her testimony should count in favor of the claim being defended.

Another type of improper authority is a biased one. Some people may be qualified in a particular field by training, ability, and position, yet they are so vitally "interested” in or affected by the issue at stake that there would be good reason to treat their testimony with suspicion.

If an arguer uses an unqualified, unidentified, or biased authority to support a particular thesis, then he or she has used a premise that is irrelevant to the conclusion. The testimony of an unqualified or biased authority has no bearing on the truth or falsity of the conclusion. The testimony of an unidentified authority may have some bearing on the truth of the conclusion, but because it is unidentified, there is no way to know whether it does so. It must therefore be treated as if it is coming from an irrelevant or questionable authority. The same must be said in the case of contradictory testimony from what appear to be equally qualified and unbiased authorities. In this case, the proper response would be to accept the testimony of either authority, unless you have some independent evidence for accepting the testimony of one and not the other.

Attacking the Fallacy: If an argument in support of a claim invokes an unidentified authority, a first step in attacking the argument may be to ask for the authority to be identified. If the arguer is able to do this, then you would be in a position to evaluate that authority by the standard criteria. If the arguer is not able to identify the authority, and especially if the claim at issue is a serious one, you should not treat the testimony as supportive of it.

In determining whether an authority is a biased one, you should be careful not to disqualify a source too quickly by claiming that he or she is prejudiced. Unfortunately, it is all too common a practice to find or to fabricate some reason why the judgment of almost any authority might be biased. Such a charge should be registered against an authority who is otherwise qualified only when the possibility of bias is clear and might impede the discovery of the truth. If you suspect that an authority may have a conflict of interest, you might point out the presence of that possible conflict, without in any way accusing the authority of either bias or dishonesty. That will at least get the issue out on the table, so that it can be directly addressed.

Big name endorsements are a big business but, unfortunately, a fallacy-ridden business. If an argument uses an authority in one field to support a claim in another, you might use an absurd example like this: "That would be like using Michael Jordan, the former Chicago Bulls star, to support a claim about Chevrolet trucks." That should convince the arguer about the inappropriateness of his or her own move. If the response is "That's different!" ask him or her to explain just where the difference lies.

Finally, do not be intimidated when great names and respected professions are used in support of various claims. Shakespeare, Socrates, Jesus, Mark Twain, Abraham Lincoln, Will Rogers, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Walter Cronkite, and many other "famous" and well-respected people were or are experts, if at all, in very limited ranges of subject matter, and they are not at all qualified to speak authoritatively in most other areas of human concern.

Definition: This fallacy consists in urging the acceptance of a position simply on the grounds that a large number of people accept it or in urging the rejection of a position on the grounds that very few people accept it.

Two other names sometimes given to this fallacy are bandwagon fallacy and consensus gentium. The bandwagon notion suggests that an idea or action must be true or good because everyone is jumping on it as if it were a wagon full of musicians in a circus parade. Consensus gentium is literally translated "consent of the people." If a claim or idea is accepted by a majority, we are often led to believe that it is true or worthy of our belief also. However, the truth or merit of an idea is in no way dependent on the number of people who support it.

Nevertheless, we commonly infer that a film is a good one if there are long lines of people waiting to see it; or we infer that a restaurant serves good food if there are a great number of cars outside it. Remember, however, that crowds are not usually noted for sound judgments and that a number of other factors could account for the long lines and the large number of cars.

An argument that uses the number of people that accept or reject an idea as a premise for determining its merit uses an irrelevant premise. An argument that employs such a premise as its principal and perhaps only support cannot qualify as a good one, because the criteria of a good argument require that the premises have a bearing on the truth or falsity of the argument's conclusion.

Attacking the Fallacy: Since this fallacy is so tempting to commit, we perhaps should remind ourselves daily to infer nothing about anything on the basis of what large groups or even the majority of people believe. The weight of public opinion is simply not relevant to the matter of whether a claim is true.

You might also remind the arguer that public opinion is quite fickle. To illustrate your point, find some reliable poll that shows a shift in support from one candidate or side of an issue to another, and ask the arguer if the truth of a claim or the rightness of an action is likely to coincide with each shift in the polls.

If your verbal opponent still regards public opinion as representing the truth, you might ask if a true claim would become a false one if public opinion were to shift to the other side. Although it is unlikely that anyone would answer to such a question, you should be prepared to point out that such thinking could lead to the absurd conclusion that a claim is both true and false, depending on when the people are surveyed, and that such a result must surely mean that such thinking is faulty in some way.

If your opponent is unconvinced, you could remind him or her about beliefs from both science and history that were at one time held to be true by large numbers of people, yet turned out to be false. Or you could cite examples of claims that at one time most people believed to be false but that turned out to be true. Probably the best strategy would be to use examples from your opponent's own experience. You might refer, for example, to a claim that the arguer had recently and correctly assessed as false, even in the face of its being believed to be true by large numbers of people.

Definition: This fallacy consists in evaluating a thing in terms of its earlier context and then carrying over that evaluation to the thing in the present, while ignoring relevant changes that may have altered its character in the interim.

The genetic fallacy occurs when one attempts to reduce the significance of an idea, person, practice, or institution merely to an account of its origin or genesis, thereby overlooking the development, regression, or difference to be found in it in the present situation. One who commits this fallacy typically transfers the positive or negative esteem that he or she has for the thing in its original context or earlier forms to the thing in its present form.

The genetic fallacy thus exhibits a pattern of reasoning that fails to meet the relevance criterion of a good argument-that the premises must have a bearing on the truth or falsity of the claim in question. Since the origin of a thing rarely has any relevance to its present merit, an argument that uses such a premise as a basis for accepting or rejecting a claim about the thing in question should be regarded as a flawed one.

Attacking the Fallacy: Getting an arguer to disregard the origin or original context of an idea or thing is not easy. Strong emotional responses connected to those origins are particularly difficult to dismiss. Consider, for example, how difficult it is to evaluate objectively the attractiveness of a mate's suit or dress that was selected by a former lover. Where a thing comes from tends to have a rather potent effect on the way we evaluate it. Nevertheless, it is important to try to dismiss such factors in our deliberations about their worth. When an opponent uses such considerations, it would be appropriate to ask what there is about the thing itself that he or she finds either objectionable or worthwhile.

To demonstrate the appropriateness of separating the worth of a thing from how it started, consider an emotional issue such as one's love for a mate.-Ask the arguer if he or she would feel any differently about his or her mate if it were just discovered that their first meeting or “date” was part of an elaborate practical joke or, even worse, a case of mistaken identity. Such an undesirable beginning surely would be regarded as irrelevant to the assessment of the present worth of the relationship. If the arguer can make that kind of separation in this case, he or she should be able to do it with regard to other matters.

If you need an absurd example to consider another of the irrelevance of origins, try this: "You say that Jacob is a great chef, but I remember how as a kid, he used to make pies out of mud. I'm not about to eat any food prepared by him. There's no telling what might be in it." No person would consider Jacob's mud pie past as relevant to the present, but the form of the argument is no different from many other arguments that some persons unfortunately seem to find convincing.

Definition: This fallacy consists in using plausible-sounding but usually fake reasons to justify a particular position that is held on other less respectable grounds.

Rationalization is properly described as a violation of the relevance criterion of a good argument, because the argument's fake premises are not relevant to the conclusion. The stated premises have little or no relationship to the conclusion, because they are not the real reasons for the conclusion drawn. Because of embarrassment, fear, or some other unknown cause, the real reasons are unstated or concealed.

The general character of rationalization has to do with defending an action or belief rather than with trying to determine whether it is true. Rationalization, then, is a kind of dishonest substitute for good reasoning. In good arguments, the belief or conclusion follows from the evidence. In rationalization, the "evidence" comes after the belief has already been determined. The rationalizer is simply using premises that make his or her questionable position or action appear to be rationally respectable.

Some instances of this fallacy could be construed as also violating the acceptability criterion of a good argument. Since the premises are simply "made up" for the purpose of defending an action or propping up a belief arrived at on other grounds, they are not likely to be true or acceptable ones, which is another reason why they do not support the conclusion.

Attacking the Fallacy: Let your rationalizing opponent know that you have reason to believe that you have not heard the real argument. You may ask for the arguer to give you the real reasons for the action or belief, but since the rationalizer is probably engaging in a bit of face-saving behavior-the very reason for the rationalization -- it is not likely that you will get a straight story. The rationalizer has a vested interest to protect, and revealing the actual reasons would jeopardize that interest. Therefore, you will probably have to concentrate your attack on the stated argument.

Another strategy is to ask if the arguer would still hold to the belief or defend the action if the stated premises turned out to be false or irrelevant. If the arguer answers “yes,” he or she is admitting that the premises are not relevant to the conclusion drawn and the argument is therefore a faulty one. If the arguer answers "no," you might try to find some way of demonstrating that the premises are false or irrelevant in order to call what you think is the rationalizer's bluff. If the attack is successful, the best result would be for the arguer to either abandon the belief or alter the action.

Since rationalization could be justifiably construed as an act of deliberate dishonesty, the rationalizer perhaps deserves to suffer moral embarrassment at being caught giving fake and therefore irrelevant reasons for holding a belief or engaging in a particular action. However, since our main purpose is to get at the truth, we ought to focus all our efforts on finding the real reasons rather than on exposing the arguer's dishonesty. We would then be in a position to evaluate the real argument in terms of the standard criteria.

Definition: This fallacy consists in drawing a conclusion other than the one supported by the evidence presented in the argument.

The fallacy of drawing the wrong conclusion is often referred to as the fallacy of missing the point, as in "missing the point of the evidence." The argument in its conclusion misses the main thrust of the evidence provided. Even though this is one of the fallacies of irrelevance, it is not just a typical case of an arguer using an irrelevant premise or two. This is an argument in which a well-developed evidential case for a particular conclusion is presented, at the end of which the arguer simply draws the wrong conclusion from his or her own premises. The target of the argument is poised to receive the conclusion to which the evidence seems to be leading and is startled when the arguer draws a very different one. Even though the conclusion purports to follow from the evidence, the evidence presented actually supports some other, although perhaps related, conclusion. However, the evidence has little or no bearing on the truth or falsity of the stated conclusion. For that reason, the argument violates the relevance criterion of a good argument.

In some cases, reasoning in a way that draws the wrong conclusion or misses the point of the evidence may be deliberate. An example is the prosecutor who is allegedly supporting the claim that a defendant is guilty of rape, but who presents "evidence" that supports another conclusion-namely, that the rape was a heinous crime. The prosecutor hopes, of course, that the jury will infer the stated conclusion ("the defendant is guilty of this rape") rather than the unstated one ("the rape was a heinous crime"), which is the one actually supported by the evidence presented. But the jury should not do so. If it does draw the "guilty" conclusion, it too will be drawing the wrong conclusion from the evidence.

In some cases, drawing the wrong conclusion occurs because of carelessness in the formation of the argument. However, in most cases the wrong conclusion is drawn because of the subtle, perhaps even unconscious, prejudices of the arguer. The arguer may want the conclusion to be true so much that he or she draws that conclusion, even though it is not the conclusion supported by the evidence presented. For example, if the arguer is concerned about society's unfair treatment of women, all the evidence of sexist behavior in society might be brought forth in support of a plea for a particular piece of equal rights legislation. But although that evidence may support a claim that ours is a sexist culture, it would not necessarily support the claim that a particular piece of legislation should be enacted.

This fallacy is one of the clearest expressions of the violation of the relevance criterion. Since the criteria of a good argument require that premises have a bearing on the truth or falsity of the conclusion, and since the premises in this kind of argument have little or no relevance to the truth of the conclusion, such an argument cannot be a good one. Given the evidence presented, the arguer should have drawn a different conclusion.

Attacking the Fallacy: An argument that draws the wrong conclusion can often be very persuasive, because it can still drive us to a conclusion, even though it is not the arguer’s stated one. It might even be helpful to point out what conclusion the evidence does support, in order to encourage the arguer to change his or her conclusion to the right one.

Since the arguer is not likely to agree that his or her conclusion was the wrong one to draw from the evidence, be prepared to be patient in helping him or her to line up the right evidence with the right conclusion. If the arguer is not interested in the "right" conclusion--that is, the one to which you are led by the evidence--and insists on focusing on the original conclusion, you should make clear that that conclusion requires some very different evidence.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to support a claim with reasons other than the reasons appropriate to the claim.

This fallacy may best be described as the reverse of the fallacy of drawing the wrong conclusion. The difference between the fallacy of drawing the wrong conclusion and the fallacy of using the wrong reasons is found by looking at where the emphasis lies in the context of the argument. If the arguer, in a rush to get to the favored conclusion, simply misses the point of his or her own evidence, the fallacy of drawing the wrong conclusion has been committed. But if the arguer is attempting to defend a particular conclusion, for which relevant evidence may be available, but uses some other evidence instead, he or she has committed the fallacy of using the wrong reasons. In the case of using the wrong reasons, the conclusion is usually uttered before the premises, while in the case of drawing the wrong conclusion, the conclusion is usually drawn after the presentation of the premises.

Why would arguers give the wrong reasons for their conclusions? In some instances, it could simply be a case of carelessness. Because the arguer is already convinced of the truth of the conclusion, almost any evidence that sounds related is taken as being supportive. It is also often the case that the arguer started with the conclusion and then was simply unable to find the right or relevant evidence to support it.

This fallacy is commonly committed in the area of political debate-particularly when one is arguing against something. For example, one often hears arguments against a policy or program on the grounds that it does not or would not achieve certain goals. But when these are goals that the program or policy was never designed or expected to achieve, the reasons given for the negative evaluation of the policy are the wrong reasons. The arguer has arbitrarily assigned goals and functions to a program and then criticized it for not achieving those goals.

Almost any program, policy, or piece of legislation has limitations that its designers quite readily recognize. Moreover, few programs, when implemented, are such that their most ideal consequences can be or are expected to be fulfilled. Therefore, when these results are not achieved, that is not a sufficient justification for abandoning the program. This is especially true if the program may accomplish some other goal or perform some other important function that might not otherwise be brought about. There may be some good or relevant reasons for abandoning a particular program, but those reasons must be relevant to the realistic and/or expected goals and functions of the program. Otherwise, the judgment against it uses the wrong reasons.

Attacking the Fallacy: The situation in which many of us encounter the kind of faulty reasoning that uses the wrong reasons is one in which we may tend to agree with the conclusion of an arguer, or at least find it an interesting position to consider, but not for the reasons given in his or her argument. One way to be helpful to the arguer in such a situation is to say something like this: "I find that you have an interesting idea, and it might even be a defensible one, but not for the reasons you give." You might even suggest some reasons that seem more relevant and more supportive of the claim at issue.

One way to prevent a critic from inappropriately assigning irrelevant goals and functions to proposed programs and policies as a basis for a negative evaluation is to make every effort to specify up front the limited goals of the program or policy. It might even be helpful to remind your listener of your awareness of such limitations as often as possible. The critic may thereby be prevented from taking a "cheap shot" at the program. If the critic persists, make it clear that he or she is attacking a misrepresentation of the claim--that is, a claim that no one is making.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to persuade others of a position by appealing to their sympathy instead of to relevant evidence, especially when some more important principle or issue is at stake.

One who appeals to pity is actually exploiting emotional sensitivities rather than presenting convincing evidence that a claim is true or that an action has merit. The use of pity violates the relevance criterion of a good argument, for the pitiable consequences of a claim's being true have no bearing on the truth or falsity of the claim.

The introduction of pity into a discussion can never settle a question of fact, although feelings of pity wilt no doubt influence our action from time to time. In such cases, we should be careful not to let them cloud our judgment about that action. Even though we may respond positively to a particular appeal to pity, we should be clear in our own mind what we are doing. The effectiveness of the tug of pity should not be mistaken for relevant evidence.

A number of critics have tried to make a distinction between coming to a belief on the basis of pity and making a decision about a course of action on the basis of pity. They insist that the fallacy of appeal to pity occurs only in the case of an argument that attempts to get one to come to a belief on the basis of pity. It seems to us that if that distinction and the inference drawn from it were maintained, actual cases of appeal to pity would be quite rare, because very few people, if any, ever come to believe something to be true simply on the basis of pity.

Some critics argue that the appeal to pity is not fallacious when it involves a decision about a course of action, because in those cases the appeal to pity involves implicit moral considerations. While it is true that appeals on the basis of pitiable circumstances sometimes involve implicit moral premises, that is certainly not always the case. Moreover, even when the Principle of Charity requires us to recognize such premises, they may not be relevant ones. Neither should an arguer assume that one's own moral principles are necessarily shared by those to whom one addresses an argument. Even in cases where such principles may be shared, they may not be relevant, because a more important issue or principle could be at stake.

Admittedly, when the issue is one of action, the line between relevance and irrelevance is often blurred. There may indeed be some situations where the potential hurt to others is a relevant consideration in adopting or rejecting a course of action. Many calls to compassion are in fact moral arguments that appeal implicitly to moral principles. In such cases, the description of the pitiful situation may simply be a device used to call attention to a relevant moral principle. For example, suppose that an older employee was being terminated as part of a cost-reduction plan. If he made a case for staying on until he became eligible for his full retirement benefits in six months, he would probably be implicitly appealing to a principle of fairness to which he would assume his employer subscribed. Indeed, if he were to make such an appeal, it is not likely that anyone would think it to be a fallacious one. The appeal would simply be regarded as a rather good moral argument.

Our view, then, is that an appeal to pity, in a context in which no relevant and defensible moral premise is lurking about, exploits our vague feelings of generosity or concern for others, while usually neglecting (or at least obscuring) a more relevant principle or issue at stake. For that reason, the appeal would be a fallacious one.

Attacking the Fallacy: If you allow yourself to be overcome by the force of an emotional appeal it is important to remember that you are no less guilty of fallacious reasoning than the one who formulates the appeal. You have allowed the description or projection of a pitiable situation to count as evidence, even though, in most cases, it does not constitute any evidence at all. The possibility that someone may be disappointed or suffer some kind of mental anguish because of your failure to give a desired response to a claim or proposal is usually an irrelevant consideration in the determination of the merit of the claim or of the proposed action. To avoid appearing to be an insensitive brute, it might be wise to acknowledge your aroused feelings openly, yet to state specifically that you are not going to allow them to interfere with the process of coming to a defensible judgment. Point out that accepting a proposal primarily because of those feelings would mean, in most cases, sacrificing what may be a more important principle.

Since arguments with irrelevant premises can sometimes be altered to include relevant premises, ask the arguer to try to so modify the argument. If he or she cannot do so without appealing to pity, then not only was your original assessment of the argument probably correct, but it is not likely that the proposal itself merits your acceptance.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to persuade others of a position by threatening them with some undesirable state of affairs instead of presenting evidence for one's view.

There is nothing wrong, of course, with pointing out the consequences of a particular course of action. In fact, if certain consequences are a natural outcome of an action, calling attention to them might be very much appreciated. In some such cases, being aware of the consequences of an action might even cause one to alter one's course However if an arguer tries to force another to accept the truth of a claim or the rightness of an action by threatening some undesirable action, then the arguer is guilty of using an irrelevant appeal, which is a clear violation of the relevance criterion of a good argument.

One particular form of this fallacy is called authoritarianism. Authoritarianism consists of appealing to someone as an authority not because of that person’s skill, knowledge, or expertise in the field but because of his or her power or influence over the a case, a threat-laden demand for submission to that authority takes place of relevant evidence in behalf of the truth of a belief or the rightness of an action.

In most cases, the appeal to force is used to lead another not to a particular belief but to a course of action. For example, Tom Morris, a lobbyist for the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), asks a congresswoman not to believe something but to do something as he reminds her that the AARP represents 10,000 voters in the representative's Florida district. Similarly, a local businessman is asking that something be done, rather than believed, when he reminds the editor of the local newspaper that he spends a lot of his advertising dollars in that paper and would prefer that the story concerning his arrest for drunk driving not appear in it. In both cases, the reasons given are not relevant to the rightness of the action sought. Unfortunately, threats and other forms of intimidation can often bring about the acceptance of a conclusion, but not because good arguments were presented. There is no way that such arguments could qualify as good ones, because their premises have no bearing on the merit of their conclusions.

Attacking the Fallacy: It is sometimes difficult to withstand the pressure of a threat, particularly when it comes, as it usually does, from someone with the power to place you in a very vulnerable situation. Indeed, your ability or inclination to reject such irrelevant appeals may depend on your own sense of personal, economic, and professional security. Nevertheless, one who is guilty of appealing to force or threat should at least be exposed. One way of doing this might be to say to such a person, "I know what you,re going to do to me if I don't accept your position, but are there any good reasons for believing your position to be true or right?"

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to persuade others of a point of view by appealing to their feelings of reverence or respect for some tradition instead of to evidence, especially when there is some more important principle or issue at risk.

The comfortable or warm feelings that we may have for a particular traditional way of doing things may be one reason we revere it, but such feelings are not a reason for regarding the tradition as the best way of doing things, especially when a more important principle may be at stake. Good feelings cannot be an appropriate substitute for evidence.

Emotional attachments to the past are common and pleasant experiences for almost all of us. It is also true that many traditions perform social functions of great importance.Insofar as they embody the distilled wisdom of earlier generations, they relieve us of the burden of having to invent our own solutions to the problems created by social interaction.

But there is also a dark and negative side to many traditions. Even though most traditions might originally have had good reasons behind them, those reasons may no longer be relevant considerations. Powerful traditions can perpetuate earlier injustices and stifle creative approaches to life or to better ways of doing things. Indeed, the English philosopher John Stuart Mill claimed that "the despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance of human advancement

To point out that a particular practice has the status of a tradition sheds no light on whether it is a wise or foolish one. When there is no more important principle at stake, the appeal to tradition is neither a fallacy nor a matter that should concern us. But if holding to a tradition threatens to prevent a solution that enlightened reflection supports, then any positive aspects it may embody must be weighed against the damage that it may inflict. If a tradition has serious negative or harmful features connected with it, then the fact that it is a tradition should be a minor consideration in its support good feelings aside.

An argument that attempts to persuade by an appeal to tradition when other important considerations are at issue is using an irrelevant premise, which is a violation of the relevance criterion of a good argument. The rightness of an action or the truth of a claim in such a context is not supported by the fact that it is part of a tradition.

Attacking the Fallacy: Assure your verbal opponent that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with doing things in a traditional way. In fact, you might even admit that you, too, often feel more comfortable with traditional ways of doing things. When there is nothing else at stake, following family or cultural traditions should probably be encouraged. However, you should also point out that if there is a more important principle that is in conflict with that tradition, then there is a good reason for changing a traditional way of acting or discontinuing a particular practice. In such cases a reverence for the past is not a relevant consideration in the process of determining what to do.

Definition: This fallacy consists in urging an opponent to accept or reject a particular position by appealing solely to his or her personal circumstances or self-interest, when there is some more important issue at stake.

An argument that appeals to the personal circumstances or self-interest of another when there may be more important issues at stake is using a premise that is not relevant to the merit of the question at issue. What is usually regarded as a more important issue is one that significantly affects other people and/or one that might have a greater impact on society both now and in the future. Satisfaction of personal self-interest is not a relevant consideration when addressing those issues.

Almost all of our daily decisions and actions are legitimately motivated by a consideration of what would be advantageous to our personal life and welfare and the welfare of our family and friends. When it does not cloud or take precedence over considerations directly related to a larger issue, consideration of the effect of an action or policy on one's personal life may be quite appropriate. But when larger issues are at stake, an argument that appeals solely to personal circumstances would be a violation of the relevance criterion of a good argument. The effect that a public policy might have on one's personal life has no bearing on whether it is a good idea. For example, the fact that Senator Dawsey happens to own a second home in Washington, D.C., should not be a consideration in whether or not he votes for a tax bill that allows taxpayers to take interest on a second home mortgage as a tax deduction. If the Senator thinks that passing such a bill would have good effects on the economy and/or the general welfare, he should lend his support to it.

It is ironic that some of the same people who appeal to us with arguments based on personal circumstance or motives in order to get us to do something that they want us to do, regard it as morally questionable if we accept or reject some other proposal solely on the basis of self-interest. It would seem, therefore, that even those who use such appeals are probably aware, in their more reflective moments, that personal circumstances or interests should not be considered relevant when dealing with the merit of broader issues.

Attacking the Fallacy: If someone appeals to you on a personal level or on the level of self-interest, you can head the debate in a more positive direction if you ask for an alternative argument that makes no reference to what may be of personal benefit to you. Let it be known that you are concerned about the truth or rightness of the position at issue, not whether it will benefit you personally. If a good argument for the idea can be formulated, accept its conclusion without embarrassment, even if it does benefit you personally.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to persuade others of one's position by exploiting their strong emotions or by manipulating their positive and negative attitudes toward certain groups or ideas, instead of presenting evidence for one's view.

Other names for this fallacy are appeal to the crowd or appeal to the gallery. The “gallery” to which an appeal is made refers to the undiscriminating public, which is often easily swayed through manipulation of their strong feelings and attitudes. Such exploitation has no place in a good argument, because according to the criteria of a good argument, the premises must be relevant to or count in favor of the truth of the conclusion, and premises constituted by such manipulative devices have no bearing on the truth of a conclusion.

To exploit or manipulate feelings and attitudes is to employ clever but unfair methods to take advantage of, use, control, or play on another person's feelings and attitudes for one's own end. Some of the strong emotions that are often exploited are fear, envy, jealousy, anger, hate, love, greed, guilt, and shame. Positive sentiments that are frequently exploited are familial concerns, patriotism, national security, group loyalty, and military superiority. Negative attitudes against such things as labor unions, capitalism, liberals, conservatives, taxes, religious groups, political parties, political incumbency, gays, lesbians, racial groups, lawyers, and feminists are often manipulated as a means of persuading others to accept a particular conclusion. The arguer’s choice of which sentiment to exploits of course, determined by the constituency of the audience or gallery.

Two distinctive types of exploitation deserve special attention. One is the appeal to shame. It seeks to elicit a feeling of guilt from a person or group for holding an unpopular opinion or for acting in a particular way, without demonstrating why feelings of guilt would be warranted. The second distinctive type of exploitation uses an appeal to group loyalty. It attempts to persuade a person to accept a position because of his or her identification with a particular social group that accepts the point of view in question. Neither of these appeals, however, is relevant to the task of determining the truth of a claim or choosing an appropriate course of action.

Exploitation of strong feelings is most effective when it is directed toward the uninformed or the uncritical, but even some of the most reflective people can be aroused by appeals to their own feelings and attitudes. Nevertheless, one should make every effort not to allow such appeals to intrude in the process of making a careful judgment about an issue.

Attacking the Fallacy: Not only should we take care not to allow ourselves to be moved by appeals based on strong sentiments, we should also not let speakers who attempt to exploit our feelings and attitudes think that they have offered any relevant reason in support of a claim.

There are several ways in which this might be done. You could simply inform the arguer that you are unable to evaluate or respond to his or her claim properly unless more relevant evidence is offered in support of it. If your own sentiments correspond with those expressed by the arguer it might be a good idea to freely admit it. But you should hasten to inform him or her that you do not intend to allow your feelings to obstruct your careful scrutiny of the issue. In other words, you should make it clear that you are still waiting to be convinced on the basis of relevant evidence.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to persuade others of one's view by engaging in excessive praise of them, instead of presenting evidence for one's view.

A very effective way of persuading others is to flatter them in some way. For example, you have probably heard a speaker say something like this: "Because you are a mature audience of highly educated professionals, I’m sure that you can clearly see the merit of my proposal." High praise, of course, is not fallacious by itself. It only becomes fallacious when it is used as a substitute for evidence.

Everyone likes affirmation, but whether the device of flattery can successfully manipulate us will probably depend on how confident we are about ourselves and our way of coming to conclusions or making decisions. If we are clear about what makes a good argument, it is more likely that we will not be taken in by the cheap trickery of those who use flattery to try to control our thinking.

Attacking the Fallacy: There is no need to insult someone who gives you a compliment, but it should not be allowed to affect in any way your evaluation of the merit of a view or the rightness of an action. Even if you are convinced that the praise was designed to manipulate a particular response, you could still thank the arguer for his or her remarks and then proceed to ask the questions appropriate to a careful evaluation of the merit of the view. An alternative plan might be to ignore the praise altogether, thus disarming the arguer, and then proceed with the evaluation.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to manipulate others into accepting one's view by pointing out that the opposing view is held by those with negative esteem, instead of presenting evidence for one's position.

This fallacy involves the manipulation of the negative feelings of another by pointing out that the opposing view is held by people or groups that he or she does not like or usually disagrees with. This appeal encourages one to accept the arguer's position in order to avoid any guilt by association with those held in such negative esteem.

It would be absurd to assume that we will always agree with those whom we like and disagree with those whom we do not like. Whether we like or dislike a person who holds a view that we are contemplating could not possibly affect the truth or falsity of that view or the rightness or wrongness of an action. Hence, it makes no sense that we could be manipulated into believing or doing; something in order to avoid being identified with someone we don't like. But it happens, and those who let themselves be so manipulated are treating an argument that assigns guilt by association as if it were a good one.

If the only basis for holding a position is that it can be defended by a good argument is likely that even some people we don't like will come to the same conclusions we do on some matters. After all, it is not just likeable people or our close friends and associates who are able to evaluate accurately the merit of arguments.

Attacking the Fallacy: Since the attractiveness or likableness of the holder of a view is irrelevant to the merit of the view, you should forthrightly insist that it makes no difference to you who holds the view, if they do it for the right reasons.

Even if your close friends and associates think there must be something wrong with you if you think like the “enemy” or the unliked, you might point out that a consistent application of that principle would reduce it to absurdity. For example you might ask the arguer, “If we were to discover that the ‘enemy’ has joined our political party, what do we do? Resign? What if we discover that people that we don’t like are on the same diet plan that we are? Do we change diet plans immediately?” Surely the arguer would not want to say that the beliefs and actions that are appropriate for us are to be controlled by the whims or behaviors of our rivals.

The Acceptability Principle:

One who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to use reasons that are mutually acceptable to the participants and that meet standard criteria of acceptability.

The second test by which we determine the quality of an argument is whether the reasons set forth in support of the conclusion are acceptable. A reason is acceptable if it is the kind of claim that would be accepted by a rational person in the face of all the relevant evidence available. This criterion is similar to the criterion imposed upon jurors in a criminal trial. The judge asks the jury to accept a claim presented by the prosecutor and evaluated by the defense attorney if it is a claim that a reasonable person in the face of all the relevant evidence available would accept as true or would treat as beyond reasonable doubt.

The term “acceptable” is preferable to the more traditional term “true” for several reasons. First, the notion of acceptability stems from the very nature of argumentative interchanges. In most argumentative situations, the key to achieving agreement on the conclusion is gaining acceptance of the premises. One who presents an argument is usually trying to get a skeptic or an opponent to accept a particular conclusion. The arguer typically starts with premises that the skeptic is likely to accept or that a rational person ought to accept. Upon acceptance of the premises, assuming that the other criteria of a good argument are satisfied, the opponent is logically led to the acceptance of the conclusion.

Second, since it is notoriously difficult to establish the absolute truth of any statement, it would be an impractical requirement of a good argument that its premises must be true in any absolute sense. Indeed, if such a condition were enforced, there would be very few good arguments. The most that we can legitimately expect is what a reasonable person would accept as true.

Third, an analysis of our language suggests that in many ordinary contexts, what we typically mean by the word “true” would be more appropriately expressed by the phrase “accepted as true.” Consider, for example, the contradictory testimony from courtroom witnesses, each of whom is allegedly telling “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Rather than claiming that each of the witnesses is telling the truth, it would be more accurate to say that each is telling what he or she accepts as true.

Fourth, even if a premise were true in the absolute sense, it may be unacceptable to a particular audience because that audience may not be in a position to determine its truth. For example, the evidence for a premise may be inaccessible to them or too technical for them to understand. The truth of the premise would therefore not add anything to the practical force of the argument. An argument can be a good one only if the premises are accepted or recognized as true.

Finally, there are many somewhat minor claims that we encounter as premises in arguments, about which we have no evidence either for or against. But most of us are probably willing to accept them, because they seem to be reasonable assumptions in the context. We cannot say they are true, but we find it a practical matter to accept them as true in the absence of contrary evidence. To treat them as acceptable moves the discussion along.

For all three reasons, the notion of acceptability rather than truth seems to be the most appropriate way of understanding this second criterion of a good argument. It is very important, however, that we not give the impression that a premise is acceptable simply because one accepts it or can get others to accept it. We know too well how easy this is, especially if one is preaching to be saved, to the immature, or to the easily tricked. Neither does “acceptable” simply refer to what one finds it comfortable or easy to believe. And most certainly it does not mean whatever happens to be accepted. It has to do with what a reasonable person should accept. A claim is acceptable only if it would be the kind of claim accepted by a rationally mature person using generally agreed-upon standards of acceptability.

What seems rational to some people, of course, does not always seem rational to others. For that reason we suggest a number of specific guidelines that should be helpful in achieving greater agreement on the question of what is or not an acceptable claim. These guidelines are what might be called “standard criteria of acceptability.” One who takes on the task of assessing the acceptability of premises should carefully follow such standards, just as in criminal cases lawyers and judges must be guided by rules of evidence and juries by specific jury instructions.

Criteria of Acceptability
A premise should be acceptable to a rationally mature person if it expresses any of the following:

1. A claim that is a matter of undisputed common knowledge.
2. A claim that is a matter of one’s own personal knowledge or observation.
3. A claim that is adequately defended in the same discussion or at least capable of being adequately defended on request or further inquiry.
4. A conclusion of another good argument
5. An uncontroverted report from an expert in the field.
6. A relatively minor claim that one has no reason to question and that seems to be a reasonable assumption in the context of the argument.

Each of the fallacies discussed in this section results from some misuse of or confusion in the meaning of a key word or phrase used in the premise of an argument. According to the conditions of unacceptability, a premise that is Linguistically confusing cannot be an acceptable premise, and since the criteria of a good argument require that an argument have acceptable premises, an argument whose language is confusing is a flawed one.

Words, regardless of how carefully they are chosen, are always a potential source of misunderstanding. A change in context can cause a subtle change in the meaning of a word or even a whole sentence. If careful attention is not given to this phenomenon

Definition: This fallacy consists in directing an opponent toward an unwarranted conclusion by making a word or phrase employed in two different senses in an argument appear to have the same meaning throughout.

In a good argument, the words or phrases employed must retain the same meanings throughout the argument, unless a shift in meaning is understood or specified. One who equivocates has either intentionally or carelessly allowed a key word to shift in meaning in midargument, while giving the impression that all instances of the word have the same meaning. A failure to recognize that a word or phrase is functioning in one part of an argument in quite a different sense from how it does in another can make it look as though support is being given to the claim at issue, simply because the words have the same appearance or sound. Indeed, the argument may appear to satisfy all the criteria of a good argument. Deception of this kind is particularly difficult to detect in long arguments, in which the transition in meaning can be more easily concealed.

Once the equivocal terms are recognized, the logical connection that was assumed to exist between the premises is disrupted, because the key terms lack the uniformity of meaning that is required to relate the premises. When such confusion severs the connection between the premises, the premises are rendered unacceptable and no conclusion can logically be inferred from them.

It should be pointed out that a pun, by definition, depends on the possibility of a word's having multiple meanings. What makes a pun clever or humorous is that the listener will momentarily fail to recognize that the term in question has shifted in meaning. In no way am I suggesting that one should avoid the clever practice of punning. I would insist, however, that if you are attempting to justify a substantive claim, you should not allow the key words in your argument to shift their meaning.

Finally remember that the listener bears as much responsibility for avoiding fallacious reasoning as the person who presents the argument. For example, if you fail to recognize a shift in the meaning of a term within the context of another person's argument, you also will be guilty of committing the fallacy of equivocation, because, through your own carelessness, you are allowing a fallacious argument to function as a good one.

Attacking the Fallacy: If you have reason to believe that you are being confronted with an argument involving equivocation, there are at least three ways of dealing with its fallacious character. One way would be to identify the problematic word or phrase and point out to the arguer the two different ways the word functions in the argument in question. If there is some dispute about whether the arguer has equivocated, you might ask for precise definitions of the suspected words or phrases. If the definitions are different, then the charge will be proved.

A second way is to translate the word in one of its instances into words that clearly express what you think is the extract meaning of the term and then use the translation in its other instances. If the argument then makes no sense, it at least loses its appearance of being a good argument.

A third way to demonstrate the fallacious nature of reasoning that involves equivocation is to use the absurd example method. For example:

The equivocation on the word "man" leads to a conclusion that is obviously absurd.

Definition: This fallacy consists in presenting a claim or argument that uses a word, phrase, or grammatical construction that can be interpreted in two or more distinctly different ways, without making clear which meaning is intended.

This confusion usually arises in the presentation of the premises of an argument. If one does not know which of two or more meanings to assign to a particular premise, then it is an unacceptable one, because it makes a claim whose meaning is unclear or not known. An argument with such a flaw violates the acceptability criterion of a good argument. Hence, no appropriate conclusion can be drawn, because the truth or falsity of a conclusion depends on the acceptability of the premises.

This fallacy can be committed in two ways. First, an arguer may use a word or phrase with two or more meanings in one of the premises of an argument. This kind of ambiguity is sometimes referred to as semantic ambiguity, as it stems from confusion about a word or phrase. Since a majority of the words in our language have more than one meaning, there is obviously nothing fallacious about using a word with more than one meaning. The fallacy is committed only when the context does not make clear which of the several possible meanings of the word or phrase is intended. This lack of clarity could render the listener unable to draw any conclusion at all or perhaps cause him or her to interpret the word in an unintended way and thus arrive at a false or inappropriate conclusion. Semantic ambiguity can be remedied by clarifying the meaning of the particular ambiguous word or phrase.

Second, an arguer may present a claim that can be legitimately interpreted in two or more distinctly different ways because of its syntactical construction. This syntactical ambiguity differs from semantic ambiguity in that it can be remedied by a grammatical reconstruction of the sentence. Some of the most typical grammatical errors that render a claim syntactically ambiguous are unclear pronoun reference ("Claude never argues with his father when he is drunk"); elliptical construction, where words are omitted but supposedly understood ("John likes logic better than his wife"); unclear modifier ("I have to take my make up test in an hour"); careless use of only ("The tennis courts will be available to members only from Monday to Friday"); and careless use of all (" All of the fish Doug caught weigh at least 15 pounds"). Such ambiguous constructions arc- often referred to by grammarians as amphiboles.

A genuine case of either semantic or syntactical ambiguity makes it impossible to find a claim acceptable or to draw any conclusion, if the ambiguous premise is the only support presented for it.

Attacking the Fallacy: As in the case of the fallacy of equivocation, you should identify the word, phrase, or problematic syntactical construction and, if possible, ask the speaker for the intended meaning. Make it clear why you are asking for a clarification. Don't be deterred by the accusation that you are being "picky," for it is not being "picky" to ask for help in understanding something that you do not understand, and you obviously cannot assess the worth of an arguer's claim or argument if you do not understand it.

If the arguer is not immediately available to provide clarification, use your own knowledge of the arguer's larger perspective as a clue to the possible intended meaning. If you are unable to ask your opponent for clarification and you have no knowledge of any larger perspective, perhaps you should draw no conclusion at all. If you must do so, you might hypothesize about the intended meaning and draw a very tentative conclusion based on that speculation. If the conclusion is consciously tentative, it can be more easily changed with additional information or clarification.

Finally, be careful not to falsely accuse an opponent of ambiguity when none is present. The fallacy of ambiguity has not been committed if the context makes clear the proper interpretation of the word or sentence. One who interprets a word, phrase, or sentence in an unjustified way because of his or her deliberate disregard of or careless attention to the context commits an error that might be called "false ambiguity." For example:

Buck: How can they afford to do that?
Lila: Do what?
Buck: Give pizzas away!
Lila: What do you mean?
Buck: Belah's Pizzal lt says right here in the ad, "Belah's Pizzas Delivered Free!"

Buck has no right to make such an interpretation of the advertisement. The grammar of the ad is perfectly clear; "free" refers only to the delivery of the pizzas.

If someone draws an improper conclusion from your statement when its context makes the meaning clear and then attempts to place the blame on you, don't be intimidated. Shift the responsibility back to your opponent as quickly as possible by showing how the context of your statement does not support such an interpretation.

Definition: This fallacy consists in directing an opponent toward an unwarranted conclusion by placing improper or unusual emphasis on a word, phrase, or particular aspect of an issue or claim. It is sometimes committed by making portions of another's statement out of its original context in a way that conveys a meaning not intended by that person.

The fallacy of improper accent is found not only in advertisements and headlines but also in other very common forms of human discourse. A headline may cause the reader to infer a conclusion other than the one supported in the article that follows. An advertisement for a product may address the quality but not the exorbitant cost of a product or may focus on the advantages of a service but fail to mention an important downside of that service. A news article may tell us what one party in a court dispute said about the case but not what the other party said about the same aspect of the case. In all these cases, the writer or speaker places an accent on a selected feature of an issue that may cause another to come to an unwarranted conclusion about it.

One of the most common ways of engaging in the practice of improper accent is to lift words or statements out of their larger whole, hereby omitting important contextual meanings of, or qualifications to, their claims. For example, suppose that Professor Daigle tells Sela's roommate that Sela has to have her term paper in by today or he won’t accept it. It would be a gross case of improper accent if the roommate reported to Sela that Professor Daigle called and said that he wouldn't accept her paper.

The acceptability criterion of a good argument requires that an argument's premises be acceptable. A premise that emphasizes (or fails to emphasize) certain words or phrases in a way that creates confusion or conveys misleading information that may cause another person to arrive at a false or unwarranted conclusion is an unacceptable premise. Hence, an argument that employs such a confusing premise cannot be a good one.

Attacking the Fallacy: In most cases, one can confront the fallacy of improper accent much as one does the fallacy of ambiguity. Point out the part of the argument or claim that you suspect of being inappropriately accented and ask, where possible, for a clarification or an explanation of the larger context.

You can also guard against being led astray by improper accent by taking some precautionary measures. Always read or ask for the larger context of any statement you suspect of being accented. You might preclude the possibility of being misled by questionable headlines or titles by determining, if possible, to read the articles to which they are attached. At least you should be very cautious about drawing any inference based on a headline or title alone.

In general, it is always wise to follow the rule "When uncertain, Don’t be embarrassed to ask about something you don’t understand or suspect of being improperly accented. It is better to be a skeptic, or even run the risk of appearing naďve or uniformed, than to come to a false conclusion.

Definition: This fallacy consists in a listener’s directly inferring from a speaker’s claim some related but unstated contrasting claim by placing improper or unusual emphasis on the words or phrases in the statement.

This fallacy is one in which the listener, rather than the speaker, does some improper accenting. It is also very similar to false ambiguity, where a listener or reader interprets a claim in a way that is not justified by the context. In the case of illicit contrast, one is claiming that the speaker accented some particular part of a claim, which led to the inference drawn, even though there is no evidence that any such emphasis was introduced by the speaker. Indeed, it is the listener who has introduced the misleading emphasis. He or she has inappropriately added something to the meaning of the speaker’s claim. The listener has taken the speaker's claim that "X is true of Y" and extended it to also mean that "X is not true of the contrast of Y." For example, if the speaker claims that logic teachers are very smart, the listener would be inappropriately extending the meaning of that claim if he or she infers that the speaker is also saying that professors in other fields are not smart. In this case it is the listener who has employed an unacceptable premise, and an argument with such a premise is a flawed one.

Attacking the Fallacy: Because your opponent is falsely claiming that you have accented some particular part of a claim that led him or her to the questionable contrasting claim, you should insist that the burden of proof is on your accuser to demonstrate that the context or your voice inflection encouraged such an interpretation. You, of course, have a peculiar advantage, because you can almost always point out that the contrasting claim was not specifically uttered. But your opponent has already acknowledged that you did not actually utter the claim in question; the issue is whether you implicitly made the claim and whether you are prepared to defend it.

No person should be required to accept responsibility for any claim not made. If you think you have been mistakenly heard making a claim that you have not made, you might express your willingness to examine the unstated contrasting claim in question, while making it quite clear that your original statement had in no way implied that claim. Unless you wish to reserve judgment about the merit of the issue, you could even deny the questionable claim outright-in addition to denying that you implicitly made the claim. Denying that you made the claim and denying the claim itself are two different issues, and that point should be made clear to your accuser.

Definition: This fallacy consists in directing one's listeners to a particular, usually derogatory, conclusion by a skillful choice of words or the careful arrangement of sentences that implicitly suggests but does not assert that conclusion.

The force of this fallacy lies in the impression created that some veiled claim is true, although no relevant evidence is presented to support such a view. This method of arguing is commonly used to attack a person, group, or idea when there is little or no evidence to justify a straightforward claim or accusation. The power of suggestion is used in this way to compensate for the lack of relevant evidence. Because the implicit claim is not actually made, one who uses an argument by innuendo would probably refuse to accept responsibility for it or any other inference that might be drawn from his or her utterance.

Nevertheless, the speaker wants the target of the argument to draw the implicit or suggested conclusion. However, the conclusion of an argument by innuendo does not merit our acceptance, because the suggested claim is not only confused with the asserted claim, but the suggested claim is one for which no evidence is, or is likely to be, given. Hence, it cannot be part of a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: Although an arguer usually will not wish to take responsibility for an unspoken claim, you should perhaps spell out the conclusion to which you have been led and ask the arguer to justify it. In no case should you accept an implicit claim without being satisfied on evidential grounds, because an implicit assertion requires the same justification as does an explicit one. If the speaker is not inclined to defend the claim in question, suggest that he or she specifically deny the implicit claim and take definite steps to counterbalance the effect it has had.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to defend an action or point of view as different from some other one, which it is allegedly confused, by means of a very careful distinction of language, when in reality the action or position defended is no different in substance from the one from which it is linguistically distinguished.

Probably the most common occasion of this fallacy is one in which an arguer wishes to diminish the possible embarrassment he or she feels in holding what is probably an untenable position or in engaging in what is probably questionable behavior. One is free, of course, to stipulate the meaning of any term he or she uses, but if the new meaning functions in the same way that the original meaning functions, no difference is made by the attempted distinction. Moreover, since the fallacy is usually committed in response to some form of accusation, the alleged distinction, because it constitutes no real difference in meaning, does not blunt the force of the accusation.

An argument that rests on a fundamental confusion about the meaning of a key claim cannot be a good one, for a confusing; premise cannot qualify as an acceptable one. In the case of the fallacy of distinction without a difference, not only is it difficult to distinguish between two claims that may be confused with one another, but there is reason to believe that the claims are substantively the same. Hence, a premise asserting that they are distinguishable claims would be a questionable and therefore unacceptable premise.

Attacking the Fallacy: Because many people are unaware that their attempted distinctions are not true differences, the first step that you might take is to try to point out to them the futility of their efforts. If your verbal opponent takes issue with your assessment, which is likely, you might ask for an explanation of just how the alleged distinction differs in meaning. If you are unconvinced by this explanation, you may be inclined to offer a lesson in semantics. But as that would probably not be fully appreciated, why not settle for the absurd example method? Consider the following example: "I wasn't copying; I was just looking at her paper to jog my memory." Such an example should clearly illustrate how very different words can function in very similar ways.

It is not uncommon to encounter an argument that smuggles the arguer's position on the claim at issue into the wording of one of the premises. Such an argument may be said to beg the question. Even though the conclusion is clearly not warranted by the evidence, the listener is, in effect, "begged" to accept it anyway. There is the appearance of evidential support, but at least a part of the "evidence" is actually a form of the conclusion in disguise. Such arguments violate the acceptability criterion of a good argument--that the premises or assumptions must be acceptable. A premise cannot be acceptable, according to the conditions of unacceptability, if it is no different from the conclusion that it is used to support.

There arc many different ways of arguing that could be characterized as question-begging. Some of the most common of these types of argument will be discussed in this section.

Definition: This fallacy consists in either explicitly or implicitly asserting, in one of the premises of an argument, what is asserted in the conclusion of that argument.

The circular argument uses its own conclusion as one of its stated or unstated premises. Instead of offering proof, it simply asserts the conclusion in another form, thereby inviting the listener to accept it as settled when, in fact, it has not been settled. Because the premise is no different from and therefore as questionable as its conclusion, a circular argument violates the criterion of acceptability.

Since premises are those statements that are used to make it more reasonable to believe a conclusion, they should be at least more acceptable than the conclusions they support. If the premises in a particular argument are likely to be accepted only by someone who has already embraced the conclusion, it is obviously not those premises that make it reasonable to accept the conclusion.

Consider for example, the person who argues that God exists because he or she does not want to be sent to hell. Such a person would be concerned about the prospect of being sent to hell only if he or she already believed that there is an existing Cod who could send someone there. Therefore, such an argument is a circular one. When the conclusion appears as a premise, it is usually stated in different words or in a different form. The circularity of the argument is therefore not always easy to detect. It is particularly difficult to detect if the questionable premise and the conclusion are widely separated in the argument. Imagine the difficulty of recognizing an instance of circular reasoning that is spread over the whole of an essay a chapter, or even a book.

It should probably be pointed out that a circular argument may be formally valid, in the sense that the conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true. The validity of an argument, however does not establish the truth of its conclusion especially in the case of the circular argument, in which at least one of the premises is no different from the conclusion. It is true that if all the premises of a valid deductive argument are true, the conclusion follows necessarily, but in a good argument the premises must also be recognized or accepted as true. If the key premise is simply the not-yet-accepted conclusion in disguise, the premise is not an acceptable one and fails to provide independent support for the conclusion.

The circular argument, it could be said, only pretends to establish a claim. It uses a premise that probably would not be regarded as true unless the conclusion were already regarded as true. Therefore, once you have analyzed the basic structure of a circular argument, You will see that it says nothing more significant than "A is true, because A is true."

Attacking the Fallacy: If you are to avoid being misled by those who argue in a circle, it is necessary to keep a very keen eye on the logical structure of arguments. Make sure that no premise is simply an equivalent form of the conclusion or that no implicit or explicit premise assumes the truth of the conclusion. If the argument is a long one or one with a number of "chain links," carelessness in attention or a faulty memory may allow the sameness of premise and conclusion to go undetected.

You may attack circular reasoning directly by calling attention to the fact that the conclusion has already been assumed to be true as a part of the evidence. You will need to carefully identify for your opponent the questionable claim that is doing double duty. This can probably best be done by putting the argument into standard form. After demonstrating how the premise and the conclusion actually make the same claim, indicate why you think that the premise would not have been accepted but for the arguer's having already accepted the conclusion.

The fallacious character of arguing in a circle might also be demonstrated by an obvious or absurd instance of it. For instance, if you said, "Reading is fun, because it brings me lots of enjoyment," it should be clear to your opponent that no claim has been established by such an argument. Yet it clearly has the same form as the more subtle examples given previously-namely, "A, because A."

In many cases, those who argue in a circle will readily agree that they assume the conclusion to be true-because they are genuinely convinced of its truth. Such arguers need to be reminded that in an argument, one's personal beliefs or convictions concerning; the truth of a claim cannot be evidence for the truth of the same claim.

Definition: This fallacy consists of discussing an issue by means of language that assumes a position on the very question at issue, in such a way as to direct the listener to that same conclusion.

Question-begging language prematurely assumes that a matter that is or may be at issue has already been settled. In such cases, the listener is subtly being “begged” to infer a particular conclusion, although no good reasons are presented for doing so.

Slanted or loaded language is logically objectionable when it assumes a position or an attitude on an issue yet to be decided--without providing evidence for that position. Because prejudicial language often influences the outcome of an inquiry by generating a response other than what the facts might support, a special effort should be made to use only descriptive or neutral language when there is an important issue to be decided.

No premise is acceptable if it is as questionable as the claim to which it allegedly lends support. Hence, a premise that employs a question-begging expression cannot be an acceptable one, for it includes within itself a position on the very question at issue.

Attacking the Fallacy: Perhaps the best way to confront a person who has committed this fallacy is to point out how his or her very language might prevent the discussion of the issue from being a genuinely open or non-question-begging one.

If your opponent will not acknowledge that his or her language may prevent an objective mutual assessment of the merit of the claim, it may be an issue about which he or she cannot be objective. If, for example, your opponent insists on representing your action with words like "double-cross" or "blackmail," and genuinely believes that he or she is simply being descriptive, it may not be possible to get that person to help assess the issue impartially on the basis of the evidence available.

Above all, do not be intimidated by the language of the question-beggar, particularly when he or she introduces a claim by such phrases as "obviously," "any ten-year- old knows," or "any fool knows." This language suggests that the speaker thinks that the issue is not really one that deserves any further discussion or investigation. Such expressions function as defenses against attack, and if you wish not to be the victim of such tricks, you must risk the appearance of being naive, uninformed, or even mentally deficient by announcing, "Well, it's not obvious to me."

Definition: This fallacy consists in formulating a question in a way that presupposes that a definite answer has already been given to some other unmasked question, or in treating a series of questions as if it involved only one question.

Another name for this fallacy is loaded question, which suggests, like the term "complex," that more than one question is being asked in what appears to be a single question. One of the questions is explicit, and the others are implicit. A respondent cannot answer a complex or loaded question without granting a questionable assumption or without giving the same answer to each of the other implicit questions involved. While nearly all questions are complex in the sense that they make assumptions, a question is not a fallacious complex question if the questioner has good reason to believe that the respondent would be quite willing to grant those assumptions. The complex question begs the question when the unasked question is still an open one or when the question improperly assumes that the same answer will be given to each question in a series of questions.

In most cases, the complex question device can be construed as an unacceptable premise, because it implicitly assumes a position on a questionable issue and then uses that assumption to support the same questionable position that is part of the conclusion turns out that there are fourteen of them (Yes, Yes, Yes, No; Yes, Yes, No, Yes; Yes, No, Yes, Yes; No, Yes, Yes, Yes; and so on). If the question is not divided, the questionable assumption that is granted to the questioner is that the same answer will be given to each of the questions.

Attacking the Fallacy: You can respond to a complex question in a number of ways. First, refuse to give a straightforward yes or no to such a question. Second, point out the questionable assumption and deal with ii directly. Third, insist, if necessary, that the question be appropriately divided so that each question can be answered separately. Remember that even standard rules of parliamentary procedure provide for "dividing the question"; indeed, a motion to divide the question has a priority status.

If you yourself are accused of asking a loaded question, make sure that your accuser is using the term "loaded" correctly. Sometimes when a person does not want to answer a question because the answer might be personally embarrassing, he or she will accuse the questioner of asking a loaded question. In logic, however, a question is not loaded unless it contains an unwarranted assumption. There is nothing fallacious about asking a question that might be personally embarrassing for the respondent to answer.

Definition: This fallacy consists in "planting" a proposed answer to a question at issue by the manner in which the question is asked.

A leading question usually involves asking only one question. This question contains an unsupported claim, in that it unjustifiably assumes a position on what is probably a debatable, or at least an open, issue. The questioner is, in effect, asking another to assume the same position on the issue, yet fails to provide any adequate justification for the respondent to do so. The questioner is therefore simply "begging" or coaxing the respondent to come to the same conclusion.

As in the case of the complex question, the leading question can be construed as a case of unacceptable premise. The arguer is inviting us to accept a conclusion on the basis of a premise that is that same conclusion. The circular or question-begging character of the exchange is clear. Consider the following example of a leading question: "You will support me in my effort to get this judgeship, won't you?" This could be construed as an argument with the following form:

Since you will support me in my campaign for a judgeship,
Therefore, you will support me.

Such a premise is surely unacceptable, because it is not defended and is obviously no different from the conclusion itself. An argument that has such a premise as its only premise cannot be a good one.

Attacking the Fallacy: To confront the leading question tactic, you must find some way to reveal to the questioner that he or she is asking you to grant an assumption that is at least part of the very question at issue. If the question is really an open question, you might point out that you think the position you are being asked to support requires more evidential support than it now has, or at least that you are not now ready to support the position on the basis of the available evidence. Of course, if the position held by the questioner seems to be a reasonable one or is one you find sufficiently well supported, then from your perspective no fallacy may have been committed.

Definition: This fallacy consists in making a claim true by definition, by subtly importing a highly questionable definition of a key word into one of the premises.

By means of a question-begging definition, the arguer attempts to establish an irrefutable position. A factual or empirical claim is rendered impervious to counterevidence by being subtly, and sometimes unconsciously, interpreted by the claimant as a definitional statement. The claim at issue thereby becomes "true" by definition.

The question-begging definition begs the question at issue because it tries to settle an empirical or factual question, which supposedly can be resolved only by observation or experiment, with a highly questionable definition of a key term in the debate. A clue that such a deceptive technique is being used could be the presence of such modifying words as "truly," "really," "essentially," or "genuinely" before the key term in the discussion of an issue. Even though the speaker may strongly believe that such a term should be defined in the way that he or she has defined it, if the very definition of a key term has the effect of making a controversial empirical claim true by definition, then the fallacy of question-begging definition has been committed.

A definitional claim that poses as an empirical one cannot be- an acceptable premise. It is unacceptable for two reasons: First, it tries to settle an empirical claim by sustaining a confusion about the function of the premise—whether it provides empirical support for the conclusion or simply makes the conclusion true by definition. Indeed, its persuasiveness as a premise depends on the listener's not recognizing the confusion. Second, it tries to settle an empirical issue without a proper consideration of relevant evidence. To be acceptable, a premise of an empirical argument would not only have to be free of confusion, but also provide credible empirical evidence for the conclusion.

Attacking the Fallacy: If you suspect that an arguer has employed a question-begging definition in an argument, ask the arguer whether the conclusion is a definitional or empirical claim. If he or she is puzzled by your question, it might be necessary to explain, as simply as possible, the difference between a definitional and an empirical claim. If the claim is found to be definitional, it is obviously not subject to falsification, although the arguer should be prepared to defend the questionable definition against alternative definitions based on ordinary language or the thinking of relevant authorities. If the claim is found to be empirical, the arguer has the burden of providing empirical proof for the claim and must, of course, be willing to consider any counterevidence to the claim.

The patterns of argument discussed in this section are fallacious because they employ highly questionable, although sometimes popular, assumptions. Typically, these assumptions are implicit or unstated but nevertheless crucial to the force of the argument. Because these implicit yet unacceptable assumptions are used to support premises in arguments, the premises built on them are likewise unacceptable, for one of the conditions of unacceptability states that a premise is unacceptable if it "is based on a usually unstated but highly questionable assumption." Hence, such premises cannot serve as premises of good arguments, for they violate the acceptability criterion of a good argument.

Many of these assumptions are a part of our conventional wisdom, because they seem to have a "ring of truth" about them. They may even be true in some contexts. The problem is that in other contexts or under other circumstances, they are clearly false. Therefore, no argument can be allowed to proceed under the conviction that any one of these common assumptions is automatically true.

An argument that rests on an unwarranted or unacceptable assumption may have its faulty character blatantly exposed by spelling out the beguiling assumption as part of a reconstructed argument. Articulating the assumption in this way is by itself sometimes sufficient to convince even the arguer of its unacceptability. Once the unacceptable premise is recognized as being crucial to the force of the argument of which it is a part, then the argument too should be seen as a faulty one.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that small movements or differences on a continuum between n thing and its contrary have a negligible effect and that to make definite distinctions between points on that line is impossible or at least arbitrary.

The assumption involved in this fallacy is a very common one, and it is not always easy to persuade others of its dubious character. It is often expressed in the common claim that "it's only a matter of degree." This "only a matter of degree" kind of thinking can sometimes have the consequence of driving us to the absurd conclusion that contraries, as long as they are connected by intermediate small differences, are really very much the same. It fails to recognize the importance or necessity of sometimes making what might appear to be arbitrary distinctions or cutoff points.

A more graphic name for this fallacy might be the camel's back fallacy, as in "One more straw won't break the camel's back." Anyone who has played the child's game "The Last Straw" knows that one more straw can break the camel's back. The game rules specify that each player be given a handful of very lightweight wooden "straws." Then each player in turn places a single straw in a basket on the camel's back. The player who places the straw that breaks the camel's back--that is, causes it to collapse--loses the game. There is a straw that makes the difference between the camel’s back's breaking and not breaking. Similarly, a distinction can often be made on a continuum between one category and its contrary, even though clear distinctions between these categories are sometimes very difficult to draw. Vague words particularly lend themselves to this difficulty. At what point, for example, does a warm evening become a cool one or a girl become a woman? There is a difference between a warm evening and a cool evening, just as there is a difference between a girl and a woman. To make distinctions may in some cases seem somewhat arbitrary, but it is appropriate in some contexts that the distinctions be made. At any rate, it would be fallacious to assume in one's thinking that such distinctions could not be made.

The ancient name of this fallacy is the fallacy of the beard. Such a name probably originated in the context of an ancient debate about "How many hairs would one have to have in order to have a beard?" We would probably be reluctant-because it would appear arbitrary--to specify a certain number of hairs, but obviously there is a difference between having a beard and not having a beard. For practical purposes, then, some cutoff point has to be established.

This fallacy may be committed not only when dealing with conceptual issues, such as the questions of when death occurs or when the fetus becomes a human being, but also when dealing with questions of behavior. For example, it is often argued that if one is justified in taking a small step in a particular direction, such as drinking one more beer additional steps seem to be justified as well. There seems to be no good reason to stop at any particular point--as long as the steps are small ones. Nevertheless, to avoid the fallacy of the continuum, we must develop criteria for imposing appropriate stopping points.

The implicit premise used in the fallacy of the continuum--namely, that small differences are unimportant or that contraries connected by intermediate small changes are not significantly different--is simply false. For that reason, the premise is an unacceptable one and cannot be used as part of a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: The kind of reasoning exhibited in the fallacy of the continuum can be easily reduced to absurdity by the following strategy: Ask the person who has committed this fallacy for the definition of some vague term such as "rich person." Try to get him or her to be very specific about the amount of assets in dollars that a person would have to have in order to qualify as rich. Call that amount X. Then subtract a small amount, for example, a hundred dollars, from that number and ask if a person having X minus a hundred dollars would still be rich. Your opponent will no doubt say "yes." Repeat the question again and again, subtracting another hundred dollars or more each time. Your opponent will probably continue to say "yes" every time, until it becomes clear where the questioning is going to lead-namely, that he or she will soon be assenting to the claim that a person having X minus X dollars is rich, which is an absurd claim. The arguer should be able to recognize that it is the assumption that small differences are unimportant that renders him or her vulnerable to such manipulation. The arguer should also be able to see that the same kind of thinking is exhibited in his or her own argument and could lead to a similarly absurd conclusion. It would be naive to deny that making distinctions is sometimes very difficult, but distinctions can and sometimes must be made. For example, there must be a difference between failing and passing a course and between staying on a diet and not staying on a diet. Moreover, hot and cold are discernible distinctions, even though they are extreme points separated on a continuum by a large number of small intermediate differences. Surely your opponent would not wish to say that a hot day is really not much different from a cold day because "it's only a matter of degree."

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that what is true of the parts of some whole is therefore true of the whole.

The implicit premise used in the fallacy of composition--namely, that what is true of the parts of a whole is therefore true of the whole--is an indefensible or unwarranted assumption. Although that assumption may be true in some cases, it does not merit our acceptance as a general claim. Any premise that explicitly or implicitly employs such an unwarranted assumption cannot be an acceptable one.

This fallacy is committed principally in those cases where a "whole," because of the particular relationship of its parts, takes on different characteristics from those of its parts. For example, the fact that each of the players on a football team is an excellent player would not be a sufficient reason to infer that the football team is an excellent one. The gathering together of players with excellent individual skills might produce a team that is not so excellent if, for whatever reason, the skills are not effectively meshed into team play. One cannot attribute to a whole those characteristics that are attributed to each of its parts, simply because it is a whole made up of those parts. Such an assumption ignores or fails to understand that the way the parts relate, interact, or affect each other often changes the character of the whole.

This fallacy should not be confused with the fallacy of inferring something about a whole class of things on the basis of one or a few instances of that thing. That fallacy has to do with insufficient evidence. Rather, the fallacy of composition is using the unwarranted assumption that we can infer something about a characteristic of some whole based on a characteristic of each of its parts.

Some cases of the fallacy of composition are so obviously flawed that we have probably never heard them uttered, such as: "Look at it this way, Charles. I love spending time with you, and Nancy is my best friend and I love spending time with her, so I'm sure that if the three of us I',m sure that if the three of us took a vacation together, I would love it. It would be great." Neither are we likely to hear anyone, other than perhaps a small child, express this argument: "I love the taste of orange juice and I love raisin bran, so I think that if I put orange juice on my raisin bran rather than milk, it would taste great." Some instances of this fallacy, however, are not so easy to detect.

Attacking the Fallacy: It is important to recognize that wholes are not always different in character from their parts. For example, if every cup of punch in the punch bowl is sour, it would be entirely warranted to draw the conclusion that all the punch in the punch bowl is sour. In this case, there is nothing about a cup of this punch that, when it was mixed with all the other cups of punch, would change the taste or character of the whole bowl of punch.

In some cases, then, evidence for a claim about a whole is provided by facts about the parts. For an "attack" strategy, then, you might say to your opponent that you understand why he or she might have drawn a conclusion about a characteristic of the whole based on a characteristic of the parts, for in some cases the parts do provide evidence for a claim about the whole. At the same time, you might use an example to illustrate how such an understandable assumption can lead to absurd conclusions in other cases. Try an absurd example: If it is the case that Diana has a very pretty blouse, a pretty skirt, and pretty shoes, they will not necessarily make a beautiful outfit together. The clash of patterns or colors could render the outfit quite garish. The unwarranted assumption, you should point out, lies in assuming that a characteristic automatically passes over to a whole from the parts.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that that is true of some whole is therefore true of each of the parts of that whole.

The fallacy of division is the opposite of the fallacy of composition. Rather than assuming that a characteristic of the parts is therefore a characteristic of the whole, it makes the unwarranted assumption that a characteristic of the whole is therefore a characteristic of each of the parts. However, as we have seen, a whole often represents something quite different from its parts.

Another way of committing the fallacy of division is to infer something about a particular member of a class on the basis of a generalization about the whole class. In this case, the characteristic of the whole should not be applied to the parts because the characteristic of the whole is only a statistical generalization based on the characteristics of most of the parts. Such a characteristic of the class is attributable to many of its parts, but because it is impossible to know to which members of the class the generalization may apply, it would be fallacious to assume, without additional evidence, that the characteristic accurately describes any particular member of the class.

The implicit premise in the fallacy of division involves an unwarranted assumption and is therefore an unacceptable one. It is simply not the case that what is true of some whole is always true of each of its parts. Neither can one infer that what has been generalized to be true about a class of things is true of every member, or any particular member of that class.

Attacking the Fallacy: The attack on the fallacy of division is similar to the attack on the fallacy of composition. Say to your opponent that you understand why he or she might have drawn a conclusion about a characteristic of the parts based on a characteristic of the whole, because in some cases evidence for a claim about the parts is provided by facts about the whole. Then you might demonstrate how such an understandable assumption could lead to absurd conclusions in some cases. For example, you might point out how absurd it would be to assume that a particular state is diversified in terms of its climate simply because it is a part of the United States, which is so diversified.

To make the case against drawing conclusions about members of a class based on a generalization about the whole, you might try this example: If it is statistically the case that Maytag washing machines do not break down during their first three years of use, it would be absurd to exclude the possibility that your particular Maytag machine might break down during its first three years.

Definition: This fallacy consists in restricting too severely the number of proposed alternatives and in assuming that one of the suggested alternatives must be true.

Because a reduction in the number of alternatives often means that only two extreme alternatives are presented, this fallacy is sometimes referred to as the black-and-white fallacy. The fallacy of false alternatives, however, is not just thinking in extremes; it is an oversimplification of a problem situation by a failure to entertain or at least recognize all its plausible alternative solutions.

Thinking in extremes, of course, requires much less mental effort than looking diligently for all possible solutions to a problem. However, with a minimum of imaginative effort it is possible to demonstrate that the assumption that all plausible solutions to a problem can be reduced to a small number, usually two, is false or unwarranted. The phony "either-or" premise is therefore an unacceptable one and cannot be part of a good argument.

The fallacy of false alternatives often derives from the failure to differentiate properly between contradictories (negatives) and contraries (opposites). Contradictories exclude any gradations between their extremes. There is no middle ground between a term and its negative-for example, between hot and not hot. Contraries, on the other hand, allow a number of gradations between their extremes. There is plenty of middle ground between a term and its opposite-for example, between hot and cold.

A common way to commit the fallacy of false alternatives is to treat contraries as if they were contradictories. In the case of contradictories (a term and its negative), one of the two extremes must be true and the other false. It is either hot or it is not hot. In the case of contraries (a term and its opposite), it is possible for both extremes to be false. It could be neither hot nor cold. To assume that it must be either hot or cold would be to treat contraries as if they were contradictories and thereby commit the fallacy of false alternatives--that is, to assume too few alternatives and to assume that one of the alternatives must be true.

Attacking the Fallacy: Genuine "either-or" situations are very rare. If you are presented with one, it probably would be a good idea to treat it with a bit of skepticism--unless, of course, the either-or is a set of contradictories. In almost all other cases, more than two alternatives are available, although those additional alternatives may have been ignored by the arguer.

As a means of attacking an argument based on limited alternatives, ask the arguer two questions: First, do these alternatives that you set forth exhaust all the plausible alternatives? Second, don't you think that if we really tried, we could be imaginative enough to think of some others? If the arguer is unable or unwilling to come up with any additional alternatives, point out a number of them yourself, and challenge the arguer to show why they do not qualify as plausible solutions. Once all the plausible alternatives have been considered, then the question becomes that of determining which of the plausible alternatives is best supported by the evidence or by good reasons.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that because something is now the practice, it ought to be the practice. Conversely, it consists in assuming that because something is not now the practice, it ought to be the practice.

The is-ought fallacy is permeated by moral or value overtones. The "way things are" is regarded as ideal or "as it should be" simply because "things" are as they are. No reasons are given in support the appropriateness of a thing's being the way it is. It is simply assumed that if it is, it must be right, and if it isn't, that must be right also; the possibility of changing it is not seriously entertained.

This fallacy should not be confused with the appeal to tradition. In the case of the irrelevant appeal to tradition, it is argued that the status quo should be maintained out of reverence for the past, but in the case of the is-ought fallacy, it is argued that the status quo should be maintained simply because it is the status quo. It is assumed that if it is the status quo, then that fact alone is sufficient reason for its appropriateness.

The is-ought fallacy should also not be confused with the irrelevant appeal to common opinion. The appeal to common opinion is usually used in an attempt to establish the truth of a claim; that is, an opinion or judgment is erroneously assumed to be true, simply because it is held by a large number of people. The is-ought fallacy, however, is used to establish the rightness or appropriateness of a particular kind of behavior or practice, simply because it is presently engaged in by a large number of people. Although the distinction is sometimes very subtle, the appeal to common opinion is a faulty method of establishing the truth of a claim, whereas the is-ought fallacy is a faulty method of establishing the rightness of a practice.

A premise that embodies an unwarranted assumption is not an acceptable one, and the is-ought fallacy embodies the unwarranted assumption that because a thing is now the practice, it ought to be the practice. But the fact that a particular practice is current says nothing about its defensibly. To support a judgment about its rightness, other, independent evidence would be required.

Attacking the Fallacy: A good argument always requires evidence or good reasons to support its conclusion. If no evidence or reason is given other than the status quo, you should point out that fact and insist that some specific evidence or reasons be provided. If the arguer is able to provide such support, you can then evaluate that evidence to determine whether the conclusion merits acceptance.

As an illustration, you might point out that although some people are being discriminated against because of their gender, that fact is not an acceptable reason for continuing the practice of sex discrimination. However, if an arguer has other reasons for the view that people should be treated differently on account of their gender, then those reasons should be presented for proper evaluation.

In some cases, you may need to resort to the absurd example method. You should have no trouble finding good examples, but consider this one: "Since the majority of people do not wear their seat belts, people should not wear seat belts." The faulty character of this argument should be transparent to even the most committed users of the is-ought.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that because one wants something to be true, it is or will be true. Conversely, it consists in assuming that because we do not want something to be true, then it is not or will not be true.

All of us spend a lot of our time wishing that things were a particular way. This way of thinking becomes fallacious when one treats a wish as if it were a premise in an argument. Such a premise unwarrantedly assumes that wanting something to be so will make it so.

The fallacy of wishful thinking is sometimes difficult to distinguish from rationalization. Both the rationalizer and the wishful thinker want a claim to be true, but while the rationalizer attempts to establish that claim by means of a phony argument, the wishful thinker tries to establish it directly from his or her strong desires.

This implicit premise in a wishful thinking argument is an unwarranted assumption, because our feelings or emotions about a particular claim have no bearing on the truth or falsity of that claim. Nevertheless, many of our strong religious and other ideological beliefs seem to be built on no more of a foundation than our intense wish that those beliefs be true. Some writers have even suggested that wishful thinking could be called the fallacy of belief or even the fallacy of faith. “If you have faith,” we are sometimes told, then it wilt be true. We are even told that something can be true “for you" if you believe it to be so. Although it is possible that wanting something to be true may give you the motivation to try to help bring it into being, believing does not make anything so.

Since there is no reason to believe that our wishes affect the truth of claims, the implicit premise used in wishful thinking is an indefensible one, and an argument that uses such an unacceptable premise cannot be a good one.

Attacking the Fallacy: One method of attacking the fallacy of wishful thinking would be to offer strong evidence for a claim that is contrary to the claim at issue and to ask your opponent to evaluate that evidence. The serious believer will presumably want to find some way to counteract the force of that evidence, and in order to do so will have to abandon his or her exclusive reliance on a wish premise.

Another strategy would be to set forth a denial of the wishful thinker's belief and then cite as your only "evidence" your wish or belief that your claim is true-the same "evidence" that your opponent cites for his or her view. since your conclusions are contradictory, at least one of you must be wrong, because contradictory claims cannot both be true. Determining who is wrong may require, if all goes well, a cooperative evaluation of other, independent evidence. Finally, you might try an absurd example. Ask your opponent if his or her wish-based thinking is any different from a woman's believing that she is not pregnant, simply because she does not want to be pregnant.

Definition: This fallacy consists in misapplying a principle or rule in a particular instance by assuming that it has no exceptions. Conversely, it consists in attempting to refute a principle or rule by means of an exceptional case.

One who commits this particular fallacy overlooks the fact that there are usually implicit qualifications to almost any principle, rule, or generalization that render it inapplicable in some unusual cases. The fallacy occurs when one makes the unwarranted assumption that the principle can be applied in every case, no matter what the circumstances are, or when one assumes that unusual or exceptional cases would falsify or refute such a principle. In other words, the arguer applies a general principle or rule to a situation for which it was not intended and then draws an unwarranted conclusion. These unusual circumstances do not affect the general truth or rightness of the principle. The arguer has simply failed to take into account reasonable exceptions to the principle/s range of application.

Because this fallacy involves the problem of dealing with unusual or accidental circumstances, it is sometimes referred to as the fallacy of accident Regardless of what it is called, it is an argument that uses an unacceptable premise. The implicit premise that a general rule has no exceptions or that an unusual case can refute a general principle represents an inaccurate understanding of the nature of rules, principles, or generalizations.

Attacking the Fallacy: One way of pointing out the fallacious character of a particular misapplication of a principle is to examine very carefully the purpose of the principle or rule and then to discuss how exceptions would be in order when that purpose is not being violated or when it is superseded by some more important, conflicting principle. Then try to show in the particular case that either the exception is not inconsistent with the purpose of the principle or that there is a more important principle at stake. In other words, an attempt should be made to show that the unusual case in question really is an exception to the principle by virtue of its special or unusual circumstances.

Another line of attack might be to find some general principle with which your opponent would agree, and then find an exception to that principle with which he or she would also agree. If the arguer recognizes legitimate exceptions in your illustration, he or she should be willing to acknowledge possible exceptions to the principle being misused. For example, your opponent would probably agree that parents have the responsibility to raise their children in whatever way they think best, but he or she would probably also agree that parents do not have the right to use physical torture as part of their method.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that the moderate or middle view between two extremes must be the best or right one, simply because it is the middle view.

Another name for this bit of faulty thinking is the fallacy of moderation. It is often assumed-indeed it is a part of our conventional wisdom-that a position on an issue that is somewhere in the middle is always the best, simply because it is in the middle. In many situations, a moderate view may in fact be the best or most justifiable position to take, but it is not the best simply because it is a moderate position. In many cases, the so-called extreme or radical solution to a problem is the most defensible one. The fact that a particular position is a moderate one has nothing to do with its worth. Although it is not a fallacy to compromise in order to settle a dispute, it is a fallacy to assume, apart from evidence, that a compromise solution is the best one. It might well be the case that the position of one of the parties involved in the dispute or conflict has no legitimacy whatsoever. The implicit premise that the moderate or middle position is best is a highly questionable assumption that is not warranted by any evidence. It therefore is an unacceptable premise whose use would violate the acceptability criterion of a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: If an arguer proposes a middle position with regard to an issue, insist that he or she justify the merit of that position, without reference to its middle status. In the used refrigerator example, presumably both the offer of 9200 and the asking price of $300 could be construed as conclusions of previous arguments that could be objectively evaluated. If either one of the arguments turns out to be a genuinely good one, the "splitting the difference" option cannot be regarded as a defensible one.

It might also be helpful for all parties to keep in mind that there are two ways of understanding the notion of "best position to take" in any particular situation. A compromise may be the "best" way to resolve a difficult situation. For example, it may prevent continued economic deprivation, bloodshed, or mental anguish. However, it may not be the "best" in the sense of being the most accurate, justifiable, or morally responsible solution to the problem. Even though you may sometimes have to accept the compromise "best position to take" in order to settle the issue, you may want to make it clear that you do not think it the fair or most justifiable "best position to take."

If your direct attack upon the fallacy of the mean is unsuccessful, you can always try an absurd example. Ask your opponent if the best way to behave in the voting booth would be to "compromise" and vote for exactly one-half of the Republicans and one-half of the Democrats.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that because two things are alike in one or more respects, they necessarily are alike in some other respect.

Those who employ the faulty analogy overlook the possibility of significant differences in compared cases and therefore draw a questionable conclusion from the comparison. The compared things are alike only in trivial or superficial ways and are quite different in important ways--that is, in ways that are relevant to the issue at stake in the argument. Hence, the analogy fails to support the argument's conclusion.

Even if the premises of an analogical argument accurately identify relevant and important similarities in the compared cases, there can still be a problem with the analogy. Because analogies are by nature usually only suggestive, those who use them should be prepared to offer evidence in addition to pointing out observed similarities. If a conclusion is drawn about one case from another case, then there should be evidence presented to show precisely how the compared cases are alike in the significant way that is relevant to the claim at issue. An observed similarity, by itself, does not constitute evidence.

The implicit premise that two things alike in one or more respects are also alike in some other respect is a very dubious assumption and thus cannot qualify as an acceptable premise. Therefore, any argument concerning compared cases where an inference is drawn solely on that assumption cannot qualify as a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: One of the most effective ways of blunting the force of an argument from analogy is to formulate a counteranalogy that allows you to draw a conclusion in direct contradiction to that of the arguer. For example, you could respond to Professor Ray's argument about narrow diets with the following analogy: "Just as one might want to maintain throughout one's life that sense of comfort and good feeling experienced with those dependable things that are enjoyable and familiar, such as one's relationship to a son or daughter, sitting in a favorite chair, or talking with a lifelong friend, so it is that the dependable, enjoyable relationship with one's life partner, with whom one feels comfortable and toward whom one has good feelings, is something to be cherished and maintained throughout one's life." This counteranalogy may also be flawed, but it would at least suggest that there is an inconclusiveness in Ray's analogical argument.

If you are using a counteranalogy to make a serious counterclaim, rather than to provide an absurd example, make sure that you can provide convincing evidence that the compared cases are similar in important or significant ways. If you are not able to come up with a counteranalogy or if you are not interested in making a counterclaim, all you may be able to do, when confronted with a weak or faulty analogy, is to point out that the two compared cases resemble each other only in unimportant or irrelevant ways. Therefore, no inference should be drawn concerning the claim at issue. In no case, of course, should you allow a clever user of analogies to think that simply pointing out interesting similarities qualifies as evidence for any claim.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that a new idea, law, policy, or action is better simply because it is new.

There is nothing inherently worthwhile about something simply because it is novel. Every idea, law, policy, or action requires a defense independent of its novel character. A pattern of reasoning that assumes that whatever is novel is better would result in the absurd consequence that every proposed alternative to the present way of doing things would demand one's acceptance-because we would obviously want to accept something if it were better.

Nevertheless, such reasoning is not uncommon, although the assumption is usually not stated so blatantly. It usually takes a more subtle form. For example, many of us at one time or another have thought that the problems in our church would be solved if we got a new minister, or that our country's problems would be solved when a different administration with fresh ideas took over in Washington.

The implicit premise that whatever is new is better can be clearly shown to be an unacceptable premise. It is a claim that has often been contradicted by the evidence. Because it fails to meet the standards of premise acceptability, it cannot function as part of a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: Attacking the fallacy of novelty is not an easy task, because the advertising industry has acculturated all of us to the idea that "new" is tantamount to "improved" or "better." Indeed, it is not unreasonable to believe that energy is often expended in developing new products, legislation, or ideas primarily because of the desire to make them better. However, the fact that most new things may be better should not lead to the conclusion that every new thing is better.

The problem, then, becomes that of convincing those who commit this fallacy that they should not assume that any particular product or idea is better simply because of its newness. one way of doing this might be to confront your opponent with some new idea or product he or she would obviously find worse, or at least not better, than an earlier one. This demonstration should raise serious questions about the soundness of the opponent's "new is better" assumption and encourage him or her to eliminate novelty as a consideration in an evaluation of worth.

The Relevance Principle

One who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to set forth only reasons that are directly related to the merit of the position at issue.

The fallacies discussed in this section are particular ways in which insufficient evidence can cause an argument to go wrong. Some arguments use too little evidence or no evidence at all; others use biased evidence or only the appearance of evidence; still others omit key or crucial evidence from the mix. Arguments that commit the so-called "causal" fallacies draw conclusions about causal relationships that are not sufficiently supported by appropriate evidence.

Each of these patterns of reasoning is a way in which an argument may violate the sufficiency criterion of a good argument by failing to provide sufficient grounds for its conclusion. If the premises are not sufficient in number, kind, and weight, they may not be strong enough to establish the truth of the conclusion. Additional and/or different premises may be needed to make the case.

Definition: This fallacy consists in drawing a conclusion or generalization from too small a sample of cases.

The evidence used in a case of insufficient sample is usually acceptable and relevant, but there is not enough of it to establish the conclusion of the argument. This fallacy is sometimes called a hasty generalization, because an arguer has been too quick to draw a conclusion, given the skimpiness of the evidence.

The flaw, then, has to do with the sufficiency of the data. The quantity is too limited or the sample of data is too small to constitute evidence sufficient to lead one directly to the particular conclusion drawn. It is not uncommon for an arguer to draw a conclusion or generalization based on only a few instances of a phenomenon. In fact, a generalization is often drawn from a single piece of supporting data, an act that might be described as committing the fallacy of the lonely fact.

It is sometimes difficult to determine just what constitutes a sufficient number of instances for drawing any particular conclusion. The sufficiency of a sample is partially determined by each context of inquiry, but it should not be assumed that an increase in the number of instances means that the claim for which they are evidence will be more reliable. There is a point beyond which the increase in the number of instances has a negligible effect on the truth or falsity of the claim.

Some areas of inquiry have quite sophisticated guidelines for determining the sufficiency of a sample, such as in voter preference samples or television viewing samples. In many areas, however, there are no such guidelines to assist us in determining what would be sufficient grounds for the truth of a particular conclusion.

Attacking the Fallacy: Those who present you with an argument based on a single case or an insufficient sample are usually quite convinced of the truth of their claim. Perhaps the reason that it seems so convincing to them is that it often comes out of a significant personal experience. You should, however, find some way to make it clear that a personal insight falls far short of being a good argument.

It is possible, in some cases, that what appears to be a one-instance generalization may not be intended as an argument at all; it may simply be the expression of an opinion, accompanied by an illustration. To clarify the matter, you might even ask, "Are you just expressing an opinion, or do you have good evidence for what you say?"

If the arguer denies that he or she is just expressing an opinion, a reconstruction of his or her argument may be helpful. A reconstruction of the argument, spelling out the implicit premise that is being used-namely, that one or a few cases constitute sufficient grounds for drawing a conclusion about all cases-should clearly demonstrate to the arguer the flawed character of his or her argument. If it doesn't, an absurd example might: "Faculty kids are real brats. I babysat with one the other night, and he was spoiled, rude, and uncontrollable." If necessary, put the argument into standard form:

Since the faculty child I babysat for recently was a brat,
(and one faculty child is a sufficient sample of faculty children to determine what is true of all faculty children),
Therefore, all faculty children are brats.

It is highly unlikely that your opponent could embrace, without embarrassment, the second premise, once it is spelled out, and therefore he or she could not continue to hold to a similar premise in his or her own argument.

Definition: This fallacy consists in drawing a conclusion based on data from an unrepresentative or biased sample.

Unrepresentative data are data that are not proportionately drawn from all relevant subclasses. For example, if one wished to generalize about the opinion of the American people on a particular issue, it would be appropriate to consider data proportionately drawn from subclasses based on race, age, educational status, sex, geographical area, and perhaps even religion and political affiliation. In most cases, data from other subclasses, such as body weight and hair color, would not be relevant.

It is also important to avoid using data that may be biased. This can occur in at least two ways. First, the data collected may be tainted by virtue of the bias of the gatherer. Opinion data gathered by a political party or by an advocacy group should be immediately suspect. Second, data purporting to support claims about any matter are biased data if collected from one or only a few subgroups of the target population especially if data are collected from groups that might have strong positive or negative opinions about the matter at issue. For example, if one were interested in assessing campus opinions about college athletics, one would not survey just the members of the campus athletic teams. Neither would one survey just the nonathletes.

If one were interested in the quality of a recent film release, it would not be a case of good reasoning to form one's judgment exclusively on the basis of evaluations collected from readers of a single magazine. Subscribers to a particular magazine are a subgroup with special interests and tastes. Of course, if you already share those same tastes, and you are looking for a film consistent with them, the data may be important evidence to consider in your decision to go to or rent the film.

Another kind of atypical data might be data of differing quality. If one compared statistics gathered with modern techniques of statistical reporting and analysis with statistics gathered under very different methodological and technical conditions, almost any conclusion would be highly questionable. For example, if one were to compare statistics on the number of violent crimes committed in the United States in 2000 with statistics about similar phenomena in 1940, the comparative conclusion would be quite suspect.

Attacking the Fallacy: Suggestions for responding to arguers who use unrepresentative data are similar to those for dealing with arguers who use too small a sample. If you encounter a case in which someone has used suspect data, you might expose the flawed statistical assumption by making it part of a similar argument with an absurd conclusion. For example:

Since most of the 1,000 people in attendance at the county dog show own dogs,
and what is true of the people at the dog show is true of the entire population,
Therefore, most people own dogs.

If the arguer sees nothing wrong with the second premise, no attack against unrepresentative data may turn out to be very successful, but you might try one other strategy. Threaten the arguer with the possibility of your gathering another set of data of the same size from people living in local nursing homes as support for a claim that most people do not own dogs. If samples of equal size can support two contradictory conclusions, it should be clear that there must be something wrong with the representative quality of the data.

Definition: This fallacy consists in arguing that s claim is true (or false) because there is no evidence or proof to the contrary or because of the inability or refusal of an opponent to present convincing evidence to the contrary.

Arguing from ignorance is a tactic many people use to defend some of their favorite unsupported beliefs. They simply point out that since the view in question has not been disproved, it must be true. But this is hardly a fair way of arguing, for if an idea were so absurd or trivial that no one even bothered to address it, an arguer could win by default.

To argue from ignorance is to use the lack of evidence for a claim as positive evidence for its being false or to use the lack of evidence against a claim as positive evidence for its being true. A simpler way to put the matter is to say that a person commits this fallacy in arguing that a claim is true because there is no evidence against it or that it is false because there is no evidence for it. In both cases, the absence of evidence is treated as if it were the presence of evidence. For example, if I were to argue that the lack of evidence against the claim that all my students respect me is positive evidence that they do, I would be arguing from ignorance. In such an argument, the alleged "evidence" for the claim that my students respect me is actually no evidence at all. My conclusion would be supported by my ignorance or lack of evidence, rather than by my knowledge or positive evidence. The absence of evidence/or a claim does not constitute sufficient evidence for the opposite claim.

Another possible name for this fallacy is the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof, because it violates the principle that the burden of proof for any claim generally rests on the person who sets forth the claim. When one commits this fallacy, one is attempting to shift the obligation of proof to another person, usually to someone who is unconvinced by or skeptical about the claim. This is typically done by insisting that the critic has the responsibility to disprove the claim or provide support for the contradictory claim. There are some situations of inquiry in which this kind of reasoning seems to be There are some situations of inquiry in which this kind of reasoning seems to be acceptable. In our judicial procedure, for example, a defendant is assumed to be innocent unless proven guilty. This appears to be a case of making a claim concerning the defendant's innocence in the absence of positive evidence--indeed, in the presence of some contrary evidence. But it is not a case of arguing from ignorance. The principle of innocence until proven guilty is not actually a claim. It is a highly technical judicial construct that actually means not proven guilty. For legal purposes, it has been determined that a person should be regarded “as if” he or she were innocent unless evidence beyond reasonable doubt exists to the contrary. The situation is also not a case of shifting the burden of proof, for the burden of proof rests appropriately on the shoulders of the one who makes the positive claim—the prosecutor who says that the defendant is guilty.

This fallacy of arguing from ignorance probably gains its appearance as a good argument from its similarity b a legitimate way of arguing. For example, suppose that the owner of a house claimed that there were termites in his or her house. If a professional termite inspection revealed no evidence to support the claim, it would then be justifiable for the owner to conclude that there are no termites in the house. If a professional termite inspection revealed no evidence to support the claim, it would then be justifiable for the owner to conclude that there are no termites in the house.

This sounds like a case of arguing from ignorance, because the lack of evidence for a claim ("there are termites") is used as evidence that the claim is false ("there are no termites"), but there is a crucial difference in this case. The negative claim is not based on missing evidence but on a thorough assessment of all of the negative and/or positive evidence relevant to the question of whether there are termites in the house. In this case the lack of evidence really is evidence. Indeed, to call it a "lack of evidence" in this context may be a case of equivocation.

An argument that employs an appeal to the "evidence" of no evidence does not satisfy the sufficiency condition of a good argument. It obviously fails to provide sufficient grounds for the claim at issue, because evidence is missing altogether.

Attacking the Fallacy: If the absence of proof against a claim could be regarded as proof for it, then even the most bizarre of claims could allegedly be proved. If an arguer makes what you consider a highly questionable claim and supports it by pointing out the lack of evidence against it, you could show the faulty character of that kind of reasoning by making what you think he or she would consider an equally questionable claim and support it by the same method.

You could also show how one could be led to logically contradictory conclusions if the pattern of thinking in question were not fallacious. Suppose someone suggests that because psychokinesis has not been proved false, it must be true. Some other person could argue that because psychokinesis has not been proved true, it must be false. Such reasoning would lead us to the contradictory conclusion that psychokinesis is both true and false.

Definition: This fallacy consists in treating a hypothetical claim as if it were a statement of fact by making a claim, without sufficient evidence, about what would have happened in the past if other conditions had been present or about an event that will occur in the future.

Because empirical evidence for claims about nonexistent events is obviously not available, any alleged "evidence" must be regarded as part of an imaginative construct. Even though there is usually no way of knowing what might have been the consequences of an event that did not occur or what may be the consequences of an event that has not yet occurred, it is sometimes possible to develop a hypothetical construct about such events. Such constructs are helpful in understanding the past and in planning for, or avoiding undesirable consequences in, the future. However, it must be remembered that such constructs are only speculative and thus quite uncertain. They are at best "likely stories," and their speculative character must always be acknowledged.

This fallacy, insofar as it refers to past "events," is sometimes called "Monday morning quarterbacking." Nearly every avid football fan is known to make claims about what would have happened in last weekend's game if the quarterback had just called a different play or had executed the same play differently. But there is no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what would have happened in the past if something that did happen had not happened, or if something that did not happen had happened. The evidence for a claim that is contrary to the facts is simply not available. For this reason, the contrary-to-fact hypothesis violates the sufficiency criterion of a good argument, because it draws a conclusion without sufficient grounds for doing so.

Attacking the Fallacy: Because the formulation of imaginative constructs is a vital part of planning for the future and understanding the past, in no way would I encourage anyone to pounce on every hypothetical construct or to refrain from exercising one's own imagination. However, if you are confronted with a substantive contrary-to-fact claim that is highly questionable, I would suggest that you find some way of getting the arguer to recognize and to admit to the speculative character of the claim. Sometimes the very act of admitting that a claim is speculative will lead one to be more open to counterarguments and to take more seriously the task of supporting the claim.

One effective way of confronting an unsupported hypothetical claim might be something like this: "Well, you may be right, but I would have no way of determining that, as I am not aware of your evidence for such a claim." There is of course no "evidence" available, but the arguer will at least probably feel obligated to make some attempt to share with you the basis for his or her speculation about the claim, and that might get the discussion on a constructive track.

Definition: This fallacy consists in appealing to insights expressed in aphorisms or clichés to folk wisdom, or to so-called "common sense," instead of to relevant evidence for a claim.

The fallacy commonly takes the form of using a cliché or aphorism as a premise in an argument as if it were evidence and failing to show that the proposition expressed by the cliché is reliable. Because clichés, like analogies, are at best only suggestive, no argument wholly constituted by a clichés should be treated as a serious one. If the cliché were accompanied by other premises that explained why the cliché or aphorism expressed an important and defensible insight, the clichés itself would add nothing to the argument; it would be, at best, only a clever way of expressing the relevant premise.

The fact that many clichés or aphorisms seem to contradict each other is an additional reason for regarding a cliché as providing insufficient support for a claim. Look at the contradictory advice in the following pairs of aphorisms: (1) "Two heads are better than one" and "Too many cooks spoil the broth." (2) "Where there's smoke there's fire" and "You can't tell a book by its cover." (3) "He who hesitates is lost" and "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread." (4) "Better safe than sorry" and "Nothing ventured, nothing gained." (5) "A new broom sweeps clean" and "Many a good tune is played on an old fiddle." (6) "Where' there's a will, there's a way" and "If wishes were horses, beggars would ride." (7) "Birds of a feather flock together" and "Opposites attract." Since aphorisms or clichés are expressions of so-called "popular wisdom," and the "wisdom" expressed in many aphorisms can easily be contradicted by the "wisdom" expressed in others, there is no reason, apart from other evidence, to regard an aphorism as reliable support for any claim or course of action.

Another form of this fallacy is to appeal to the insights embedded in the folk wisdom that is perhaps passed on in the culture from generation to generation as if it were evidence for a claim. For example: "Feed a cold, starve a fever" or "An apple a day keeps the doctor away" Such claims are highly questionable and/or misleading pieces of medical or nutritional advice, and the fact that such beliefs may be widely held constitutes no evidence for a particular claim.

A third form of this fallacy often heard is the appeal to "just common sense." The use of "just common sense," however, is usually totally undefined and stripped of any evidence. Even though an arguer may be able to produce some evidence upon request, he or she often seems to believe that such evidence does not need to be presented if it is named "common sense." The words themselves seem to take on an aura that some take as sufficient reason to accept a claim in question, as in "it is just common sense to conclude that exercise is bad for your high blood pressure."

Attempts to argue by means of an appeal to a cliché, a piece of folk wisdom, or "just common sense" are clear violations of the sufficiency criterion of a good argument--that the-re be sufficient grounds presented for a claim. These substitutes for evidence do not constitute such grounds.

Attacking the Fallacy: In no way should you be intimidated by the alleged wisdom of a popular cliché. A cliché or aphorism, like any other not so cleverly expressed opinion, requires evidence support to make it worthy of acceptance. If an arguer attempts to use a cliché rather than evidence to support a claim, challenge it directly; or better yet, counter it, if possible, with a cliché that gives contradictory advice. The arguer would then have to show why his or her cliché is better founded than yours.

You should also not let yourself be intimidated by appeals to folk wisdom or "just common sense." There should be no embarrassment in simply asking, "What evidence leads you to believe that this bit of popular wisdom is true?" It is also always appropriate to ask, "Just how is it'just common sense'?" The very fact that you are in a serious discussion with the arguer indicates that you are not aware of, or at least not prepared to accept, the position at issue as "just common sense." If it were obvious that it was just common sense, the discussion would be over.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that descriptive or identifying words or phrases attached to people or things constitute a sufficient reason for drawing conclusions about the objects to which the names or descriptions refer.

Many advertisers want and expect the consumer to commit this fallacy, and they advertise in a way that lends itself to such faulty inference. The manufacturer of Super-flite golf balls would like golfers to infer, from nothing more than the name, that using such balls will lengthen their drive. The manufacturers of an auto wax would like possible users of their product to assume that the wax is simple to apply just because it has what they call an "easy applicator." And who has not been tempted to stop when a sign reads "The World's Best Cup of Coffee" or "The Best Pizza on the Planet"? While evaluative or descriptive labels may whet our appetite or increase our interest in investigating particular claims, it would be foolish, without further inquiry, to infer from them anything about the objects to which they are attached.

Attacking the Fallacy: In spite of what has been said about the folly of inferring anything from signs or descriptions, you need not be skeptical about evaluatively neutral signs such as "You are now entering Yellowstone National Park." There does not seem to be any good reason to question whether you are actually entering Yellowstone Park. However, if the sign in any way includes an evaluation or a description with evaluative overtones, then there is good reason to be skeptical about that part of the claim. For example, if the same park sign also said "The Most Beautiful Park in the World," that would not be a sufficient reason to infer anything about its relative aesthetic merit.

While you should avoid becoming a "sign skeptic," you should not fall victim to the schemes of advertisers and others who are trying to manipulate you into making faulty inferences. In other words, refrain from making any inference from descriptions, especially evaluative ones, until you have something more than a name or description on which to base your conclusion.

When others commit this fallacy, you may need to remind them that sign making is an art practiced by the advertiser to get us to buy something or to do something. The sign or description has nothing to do with reality. You might even use this real example to make your point: Many years ago a toothpaste company discovered that most people brush their teeth only twice a day, in the morning and before bedtime. They then advertised their toothpaste as "for people who can only brush their teeth twice a day." Gleam toothpaste soon became the largest selling toothpaste in the country. The consumer response has no other explanation than a willingness on the part of many of us to make an inference solely from a name or description.

Definition: This fallacy consists in drawing a conclusion based on a claim made with a kind of mathematical precision that is impossible to obtain.

It is not uncommon for an arguer to introduce statistical precision into a premise as a means of persuading others of a point at issue. A fallacy is committed when this precision is simply guessed at, when approximate data are treated as if they were precise, or when one uses data that cannot be known or obtained with the degree of precision claimed. It would not be unusual for a particular premise to exhibit all three of these features, because they are not mutually exclusive.

It is commonly assumed, and perhaps correctly so, that the more precision one can introduce into one's claims, the more likely it is that others will regard them as true. For example, if your favorite television program has just been canceled because, according to the network, not enough people were watching it, you might possibly be skeptical about such a claim. However, if the network claimed that in the last four weeks the highest proportion of the national viewing audience watching that program in any one week was 3.9 percent, you would be more likely to accept the claim as true and the cancellation as appropriate. The fact that statistical precision can have such effects is one of the reasons it is sometimes fabricated to strengthen a weak claim.

Probably no one of us is free from the tendency to introduce a kind of frivolous false precision into even the most casual of our claims. For example, it is not unusual for a parent to say something like the following: "Three-fourths of the time, my children pay no attention to what I say" or "Ninety percent of the time I don't have any idea what I have in my bank account" or "Two-thirds of the time my students have not read their assignment before coming to class." The purpose of expressing a claim with such alleged precision is probably to make the claim more pointed or dramatic. When nothing of substance is at stake, and no one takes such claims as representing accurate data anyway, the fake precision can probably be safely ignored.

However, when there is something at stake-that is, when an arguer is making a serious claim and backing it up with data that purport to be accurate, but that could only be approximate at best or virtually impossible to determine with the accuracy claimed-then the arguer has clearly committed the fallacy of impossible precision. Because the evidence is not there or not available, it only has the appearance of being sufficient evidence.

The use of impossible precision, then, is a way of reasoning that fails to satisfy the sufficiency condition of a good argument. When the claim at issue cannot be backed up by data that support the degree of precision claimed, the argument must be regarded as a faulty one.

Attacking the Fallacy: Ask some very pointed questions about the overly precise data used in support of the arguer's conclusion. For example, in response to the claim that "we use only 10 percent of our creative potential," you might ask several direct questions, such as "How did you arrive at such a precise figure as 10 percent?" or "Is it not the case that one must know what amount of creativity constitutes 100 percent in order to determine what 10 percent of such potential might be?" or "Do you really mean 10 percent, or is that just another way of saying that we use 'very little'?" This direct approach will force the arguer to respond seriously to your attack.

Definition: This fallacy consists in applying principles, rules, or criteria to another person while failing or refusing to apply them to oneself or to a situation that is of personal interest, without providing sufficient evidence to support such an exception.

Almost every example of special pleading occurs in a context in which it is assumed or understood that a rule, principle, or law applies to all persons alike in the situation. The special pleader usually accepts the relevant principle, but wishes to make himself or herself an exception to the principle at issue. However, exceptions to normal rules or principles must be justified. If a double standard is to be applied, some reason must be given for treating differently what appear to be similar cases. Special treatment is sometimes called for, but not unless a case can be successfully made for it.

Appropriate evidence for making an exception of oneself is simply missing from a special pleading argument. For that reason, the argument violates the sufficiency criterion of a good argument that says that the grounds must be sufficient in number, kind, and weight to establish the truth of the conclusion. Hence, any argument for special treatment that fails to provide sufficient evidence for that claim cannot qualify as a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: An attack that is most effective is to accuse your opponent of applying a double standard, playing favorites, or being inconsistent. Each of these charges is commonly understood outside logical circles and has strong negative connotations, with which the arguer will not wish to be associated.

There may be some situations that call for making oneself a special case, but these are rare, so the careful thinker should always be suspicious of any preferential treatment claim. Ask the arguer to spell out the reasons why he or she should be treated differently from others or why the relevant principle should not apply in this case. The arguer, of course, will almost always have reasons. The question is whether he or she can provide sufficient reason to support the preferential treatment desired. For the hard to convince, try an absurd example:

Since the law with regard to the payment of income tax should be applied in all cases,
and I am an exception because my case is not like that of others, for I need that money for other things,
Therefore, the income tax law should not be applied to me.

The second premise should sound absurd to even the most inveterate special pleader, and the arguer should be prepared to show why the special treatment he or she is requesting is not equally absurd.

This section addresses faulty reasoning related to causal relationships between events. Each of the fallacies treated is a different way of inferring causal explanations from premises that do not provide sufficient support for such explanations--a violation of the sufficiency criterion of a good argument.

Trying to understand the notion of cause has been an important and difficult philosophical problem for a long time, and this difficulty underlies a number of problems in reasoning. This section will distinguish as carefully as possible the major ways in which logical confusion has been exhibited in reasoning about causal relationships.

Causal analysis, more than any other group of fallacies, requires that we draw from the entire reservoir of our knowledge and understanding. The more we know about the nature of complex causal relationships, the more likely we are to detect a faulty analysis.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that a necessary condition of an event is also a sufficient one.

A necessary condition of an event is a condition, or set of conditions, in the absence of which the event in question cannot occur. Even though a necessary condition of an event must be present in order for that event to occur, in most cases it alone is not sufficient to produce the event. For example, since electrical power is necessary for a vacuum cleaner to work, the absence of electrical power guarantees the absence of a functioning vacuum cleaner. But electrical power alone is not sufficient for the event of a functioning vacuum cleaner.

A sufficient condition of an event is a condition, or set of conditions, in the presence of which the event in question will occur. For example, a sufficient condition of a functioning vacuum cleaner would include not only a source of electrical power, but also a vacuum cleaner that is in good working order, a bag or canister that is not completely full, and a functioning connection between the vacuum cleaner and the power source. It is not uncommon for some arguers to claim that an event will occur simply because one of its necessary conditions is present. But such thinking mistakes a necessary condition for a sufficient one. The necessary condition must be there, but its being there does not alone provide sufficient grounds for drawing any inference about the presence of the event in question. For example, it is obviously necessary to water a plant in order to make it grow and stay healthy, but it would be fallacious to argue that watering the plant would be sufficient reason to conclude that the plant would grow and stay healthy. Additional conditions, together with the watering condition, constitute the sufficient condition to bring about the growth and maintain the health of the plant. Similarly, it is necessary to read a book in order to understand it, but reading it will not guarantee understanding it. Additional conditions would have to be present to bring the reader to understanding. To assume that merely reading a book will guarantee an understanding of it is to confuse a necessary condition with a sufficient one. Therefore, to make a claim that an event will occur, based solely on the presence of a necessary condition, is to draw a conclusion without sufficient evidence, which is a violation of the sufficiency criterion of a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: Many people reason in a way that confuses a necessary condition with a sufficient condition because they do not understand exactly how the two differ. Hence, it might be helpful to clarify that distinction carefully when confronting such confusion. One of the most effective ways of doing this is to use an example that makes the difference unmistakable. Suppose a young woman were to argue that she would become a great concert pianist because she had been practicing two hours a day for 15 years. It should be plain that, although practicing the piano regularly is a necessary condition of becoming a concert pianist, it alone is not a sufficient one. The set of sufficient conditions would include not only the long hours of practice, but having a considerable amount of talent, and perhaps a good manager. When the difference between a sufficient and a necessary condition becomes clear, the arguer should recognize the problematic character of his or her own argument, which exhibits the same form as the argument in the example.

Definition: This fallacy consists in oversimplifying the relevant causal antecedents of an event by specifying causal factors that are insufficient to account for the event in question or by over emphasizing the role of one or more of those factors.

In causal explanations, it is a common practice to point to a very obvious antecedent of an event and to designate it as the cause. However, a careful analysis of the notion of cause would show that the cause, or sufficient condition, of an event in most cases includes a considerable number of antecedents that only together are sufficient to bring about the event. To point to only one of those factors in a causal explanation might very well be a case of oversimplification.

Since the typical explanation of an event rarely includes all the literally hundreds of antecedent conditions that constitute the sufficient condition of that event, it is almost always possible to question another's causal explanation. However, one should not expect a causal explanation to include every antecedent condition of the event in question. To do so would be unnecessary and an inefficient use of time and energy. Nevertheless, an argument should include enough of those factors to escape the charge of oversimplification. Otherwise, the argument fails to provide sufficient grounds for its conclusion and thus fails to satisfy the sufficiency condition of a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: It is always appropriate to remind the arguer who commits this fallacy that events are almost always the result of many factors. This is an important feature of the dialogue, because it is unlikely that the arguer would disagree with that general claim. Hence, the door is at least opened for him or her to entertain other contributing causes and even to adjust earlier inferences that he or she may have drawn.

If you suspect that a causal analysis is oversimplified, because it seems insufficient to account for the event in question or because. you think it overemphasizes the role of one or more specific factors, point out these problems to the arguer and request some further justification of the analysis. You may help, of course, by suggesting additional factors that you think should be considered in the causal analysis. Be sure to ask the arguer what he or she thinks of your suggestions, so they they cannot be ignored and the arguer will be forced to consider their merit.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming that a particular event, B, is caused by another event, A, simply because B follows A in time.

Establishing the temporal priority of one event over another is not a sufficient condition for inferring a causal relationship between those events. One cannot assume post hoc, ergo propter hoc--that an event that occurs after another event therefore occurs because of that other event. A chronological relationship is only one of the indicators of a possible causal relationship. Other indicators might include a spatial connection or perhaps some history of regularity. If temporal priority alone were sufficient to establish a causal relationship, then virtually any event that preceded another could be assumed to be the cause of it. This kind of thinking has contributed to the creation of many superstitions. Something was often considered "bad luck" for no reason other than the fact that it preceded a misfortune. Such thinking mistakes a sheer coincidence for a causal relation.

If a person commits the post hoc fallacy, the question might arise as to why it would not be just as appropriate to charge him or her with the fallacy of causal oversimplification. The post hoc fallacy, however, is not a special case of causal oversimplification. Causal oversimplification usually occurs when a particular causal antecedent is mistakenly regarded as constituting the sufficient condition of an event when ii is not by itself adequate to account for that event. In the case of the post hoc fallacy, a causal factor is not being oversimplified; rather, the question is whether the events have any causal relationship at all.

One who commits the post hoc fallacy has clearly argued in a way that fails to comply with the conditions of a good argument. The flaw is that of using insufficient grounds for the conclusion drawn. What purports to be a causal argument has a premise that expresses no clear-cut causal factor--only the temporal priority of one event in relation to another. But the temporal priority of one event to another is not a sufficient reason to infer any causal connection between the two.

Attacking the Fallacy: It is difficult to believe that anyone would really conclude that B is caused by A simply because B follows A in time. In most cases, there are probably additional factors that lie behind the causal claim. For example, the manager of the apartment house may have reason to believe that the tenant has tampered with the furnace, or the operator of the business may have strong beliefs about divine punishment. However, the arguments themselves focus simply on the temporal character of the relationship of events. Insofar as other factors or assumptions are not specified or even mentioned, it is appropriate to point out the post hoc character of such a claim and to indicate that you will regard such a causal explanation as adequate only if it is supplemented by other convincing evidence.

You should have no trouble finding absurd examples that could demonstrate the fallaciousness of post hoc thinking. Pick out any two temporally related events and claim that the prior one caused the succeeding one. For example, you might insist that the garbage truck must have caused the phone to ring, since the phone rang right after the truck passed. It would be wise to select events that the arguer knows to be temporally related but causally unrelated, so that he or she will be more likely to recognize the faulty analysis involved in your causal claim. If the arguer regards temporal priority as insufficient evidence from your causal claim, then perhaps he or she may be encouraged to abandon such grounds in his or her own argument, or at least to supplement the temporal priority with additional causal factors.

Definition: This fallacy consists in confusing the cause with the effect of an event or in failing to recognize that there may be a reciprocal causal relation between the two events in question.

When the Scarecrow asks the Wizard of Oz for a brain, the Wizard answers that he cannot give him a brain, but that he can give him a diploma from the University of Kansas. The Wizard has confused the brain with the effect of a brain, but nobody really cares, least of all the Scarecrow, because The Wizard of Oz is just an interesting story. In the real world, however, resolving such confusion can be very important, in that it can assist us in coming to an accurate understanding of our experiences and in anticipating the future.

An argument that confuses the effect with the cause of an event and then draws a conclusion about the causal relationship does not provide sufficient grounds for that conclusion. The grounds are not sufficient because the evidence is the result of a faulty causal analysis. There may indeed be a reciprocal relation between the events that could account for the causal character of the relationship. But a failure to recognize or understand this reciprocity could prompt one to draw a faulty causal inference from it as well.

Attacking the Fallacy: Any confusion that obscures the truth should be avoided or challenged. For that reason, even if a young child were to say, "Look, Daddy, that tree moving over there is making the wind blow," it should be considered less an occasion for being amused than an opportunity for giving the child a more accurate understanding of the nature of wind.

When the thinking of adults exhibits a confusion of cause and effect, then it is all the more dangerous, because the claims of adults are more likely to have an effect upon the thinking of others. Hence, any kind of causal explanation that represents what you believe to be a confusion of cause and effect should be challenged in a way that would be constructive in eliminating the confusion.

If an arguer draws a conclusion based on a confusion of cause and effect, the absurd example method may be the easiest way of exposing the error. If the Wizard of Oz example doesn't work, try the following somewhat more subtle example. One staff member to another at the unemployment office: "No wonder these people can't get jobs. Have you noticed how irritable they are?" If the arguer is able to recognize that reversing the cause and effect creates a more plausible causal understanding of the factors in this situation--that the unemployed are irritable because they are unemployed then maybe he or she will be able to do the same with regard to the faulty causal claim in question.

A confusion of cause and effect is sometimes not at all easy to detect. Even the absurd example method will not always ensure an acknowledgment by the arguer of a confusion in his or her own causal analysis. The arguer may acknowledge that there is a clear confusion in the absurd example but still insist that no such confusion exists in the case at issue. In these cases, of course, it will be necessary to explain carefully why the reversal of the cause and effect makes more sense.

Definition: This fallacy consists in failing to recognize that two seemingly related events may not be causally related at all, but rather are effects of a common cause.

When two events are found together in what appears to be a causal relation, we tend to assume that one is the cause and one the effect. Such thinking, however, can obscure another possible understanding of the relationship. One should always be open to the possibility that both events may be effects of another event or common cause. However, in order to identify such a common cause, it is often necessary to draw upon one's general store of knowledge or other information not provided in the situation. An argument that causality connects two obvious events while neglecting a third, less obvious factor or event that may be the underlying cause of each of the other events does not provide sufficient grounds for its causal claim. Neglecting what appears to be a common cause means that the arguer has failed to produce the best explanation of the event in question. Hence, the argument cannot qualify as a good one.

Attacking the Fallacy: Great care should be taken not to charge a person falsely with neglect of a common cause. In almost any causal relationship there will be peripheral factors common to the events in question, the neglect of which would constitute no fallacy. For example, if the explanation of the alleged causal relation between being an elementary school teacher and being a parent failed to mention that being an adult was causally necessary to both effects, it would not be appropriate to charge the arguer with neglecting a common cause. The common cause in this case is not a significant one. However, if one is attempting to explain an allegedly causal relationship between two things in terms of the two things themselves, and a more adequate account could be provided by appealing to an additional factor causally common to both, then it would indeed be fallacious to neglect that alternative explanation.

If you believe that the primary problem with a proposed explanation is its neglect of a common cause of the events in question, you should demonstrate just how attention to that feature could provide a more adequate explanation. The arguer should then feel obligated to scrutinize your proposal and to show, if possible, why it is not a more adequate explanation.

Definition: This fallacy consists in assuming, without appropriate evidence, that a particular action or event is just one, usually the first, in a series of steps that will lead inevitably to some specific, usually undesirable, consequence.

The name domino fallacy derives from the child's game of lining up dominoes on end about an inch apart and then pushing the first one over, causing a chain reaction of falling dominoes. The chain reaction works in the child's game, but not all events are arranged so that a falling-domino effect ensues. For each event in any so-called series of events, an independent argument must be presented. In no case should one assume that one event will lead to or cause another event or series of events without making a separate inquiry into the causal factors that might be involved in each of those events.

The domino fallacy has sometimes been referred to as the fallacy of the slippery slope. As the name suggests, when we take one step over the edge of a slope, we often find ourselves slipping on down the slope, with no place to dig in and stop the sliding. While this image may be insightful for understanding the character of the fallacy, it represents a misunderstanding of the nature of the causal relations between events. Every causal claim requires a separate argument. Hence, any "slipping" to be found is only in the clumsy thinking of the arguer, who has failed to provide sufficient evidence that one causally explained event can serve as an explanation for another event or for a series of events.

Attacking the Fallacy: If you suspect a bit of "domino thinking," insist that the arguer give an independent causal explanation for each event about which a claim is made. Another strategy might be to counter with an unsupported claim about the connections between events in some obviously absurd series of events. For example, suggest that if you use a credit card to buy things, you will soon buy more than you can afford, you won't be able to pay your bills, the bank will repossess your car because you are behind in your payments, you'll lose your job because you'll have no way to get to work, and you'll be so unhappy you will kill yourself, all because you used a credit card. It should be obvious to the arguer that there is no reason to believe that using a credit card will necessarily lead even to the second event, let alone to each of the other events in the series. Each causal connection would need a separate causal analysis. Likewise, it should become obvious that each causal relationship between the events in his or her series of events requires a separate treatment.

Definition: This fallacy consists in arguing that because a chance event has had a certain run in the past, the probability of its occurrence in the future is significantly altered.

This fallacy is typically committed by gamblers, who erroneously think that the chances of winning are better or significantly altered in their favor because of a certain run of events in the immediate past. Remember the loser who says, "I can't lose now, I'm hot," or the big loser who says, "My luck has got to change. I haven't had a single win all night. I'm betting everything on this one." Such people seem to be unaware that a chance event, such as the outcome of a coin toss or a roll of the dice, is totally independent of all the tosses or rolls preceding it. To commit the gambler's fallacy, then, is to draw an inference principally on the assumption that the probability of a chance event's turning out in a particular way is affected by the series of similar chance events preceding it.

Even though this fallacy is common among gamblers, it is not unique to them. Consider the parents who already have three sons and are quite satisfied with the size of their family. However, they both would really like to have a daughter. They commit the gambler's fallacy when they infer that their chances of having a girl are better, because they have already had three boys. They are wrong. The sex of the fourth child is causally unrelated to any preceding chance event or series of such events. Their chances of having a daughter are no better than 1 in 2--that is, 50--50.

This fallacy, which seduces virtually every one of us from time to time, is nevertheless an argument that grossly violates the sufficiency criterion of a good argument. One cannot infer anything about the probable occurrence of a single, genuinely chance event based on what has occurred with regard to similar events in the past. The grounds for such a claim are simply nonexistent. The fallacy confuses, among other things, a claim about statistical probability in a whole sequence of chance events with a predictive claim about a single chance event.

Attacking the Fallacy: An attack on this fallacy is peculiarly difficult. You could demonstrate repeatedly that in the case of a genuine chance event, the chances of correctly predicting a single event are no better than 1 in X (whatever the number of theoretical options happens to be). But such demonstrations are not likely to be effective until you can adequately explain to the arguer how almost all of us, perhaps unwittingly, tend to conflate two very different concepts--statistical probability and causality. It is your job to show that even though statistical probabilities do operate for the totality of chance events, no chance event is causally related to another. Each chance event stands alone.

Let us assume that you may be able to get the arguer to agree that chance events are not causally affected by previous chance events. You may even get the arguer to agree that statistical probabilities that operate in the context of chance events are entirely separable from the notion of a causal relation between such events. But such distinctions become fuzzy in an actual case. For example, if one were to flip a fair coin 30 times, it would probably be "heads" approximately 15 times and "tails" 15 times. Suppose that you want to demonstrate this statistical probability and start flipping a coin' If you have a run of nine "heads" in a row, someone might be sorely tempted to infer that the next flip is more likely to be "tails," simply because he or she would be thinking it must be about time for the "heads" and "tails" to start evening out so as to leach that statistically probable balance of 15 "heads" and 15 "tails" at the end of 30 flips' After all, there is only room for 6 more "heads" out of the next 21 flips. But by making that inference, the arguer is importing the notion that previous flips causally affect the outcome of subsequent flips back into the mix under the guise of statistical probability. These two notions must be kept separate. You must make it clear that while it is not a case of the gambler's fallacy to anticipate the 15-15 split, it is a case of the gambler's fallacy to assume that the 10th flip is more likely to be "tails" because of the Previous nine "heads."

Another strategy that may work on some gamblers is to show how using the gambler's fallacy can lead to contrary conclusions. Consider the once-a-month poker player who has had poor hands all evening. The longer this series of unfortunate events continues, the more such a player might be led to conclude, "This just isn't my night." But one could just as well conclude, "surely my time is coming; I'm bound to get a good hand soon." Neither conclusion is warranted, because both derive from a misunderstanding of the character of chance events. Moreover, there is apparently no good reason why a person should draw one conclusion rather than the other. The choice appears to be wholly arbitrary. At best, it would depend on what one's mood happened to be.

One who represents an argument for or against a position should attempt to provide an effective rebuttal to all serious challenges to the argument or the position it supports and to the strongest argument the other side of the issue.

The fallacies in this chapter are ways of arguing that fail to provide an effective rebuttal to the criticisms of one's own argument and of the position that it supports and to the strongest arguments on the other side of a controversial issue. This rebuttal feature of good arguments is perhaps the most neglected feature in the construction and evaluation of arguments. For that reason, we have focused attention on it in this text in a way that is not likely to be found in any other text on arguments.

Arguments fail to meet this criterion in several distinct ways. The most obvious ways are called the fallacies of counterevidence. Here the arguer either refuses to hear, unfairly minimizes, or simply ignores or omits reference to the counterevidence or arguments on the other side.

A second group of rebuttal-failing fallacies are the ad hominem fallacies. In these fallacies, the arguer attacks the critic instead of his or her criticism or counterargument. This may be done by attacking the critic in a personal, abusive way, by claiming that the critic acts or thinks in a way similar to the way being criticized, or by claiming that the criticism is poised by the impure motives or questionable circumstances of the critic.

These personal attacks are primarily ways of avoiding the obligations of providing an effective rebuttal to another's criticism or counterargument, but they also attempt to raise considerations that are irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the issue under review-a clear violation of the relevance criterion as well.

A third way of failing to address counterevidence or criticism effectively is to use one of the fallacies of diversion. These are argumentative devices that help to maneuver one into a more advantageous or less embarrassing position by directing attention away from the actual point at issue. In this way, the arguer can avoid responding to the criticism or the counterargument presented. Some common diversionary tactics are distorting or misrepresenting the criticism or counterevidence, attacking only trivial points of the criticism or counterevidence, trying to distract discussants to a side issue, or ridiculing or making a joke of the criticism or counterevidence.

An argument is not a good one if it does not satisfy the rebuttal criterion. To meet that criterion, it must effectively address the anticipated criticisms of the argument and the position that it supports and the best arguments on the other side of a controversial issue. Each of the nine fallacies treated in this chapter violates the rebuttal criterion of a good argument in a distinctive way and belongs in one of the following categories: (1) the fallacies of counterevidence, (2) the ad homienem fallacies, or (3) the fallacies of diversion.

Definition: This fallacy consists in refusing to consider seriously or in unfairly minimizing the evidence that is brought against one's claim.

A method of thinking that allows blind adherence to claims or to assumptions from which such claims may be inferred without proper attention to relevant counterevidence obstructs the discovery of truth. Such thinking also violates the principle of fallibility, which says that every nondefinitional claim has the inherent possibility of being false.

Rather than denying the counterevidence outright, the arguer will sometimes simply refuse to take it seriously or will unfairly minimize its strength. Since the arguer has to consider the possibility that counterevidence might seem credible, he or she has to find some way of "explaining it away." The counterevidence is not really evidence against the arguer's position, it is often claimed; it only appears to be counterevidence, for which there is some simple explanation.

The most radical form of this fallacy is an unwillingness to acknowledge even any conceivable evidence that might count against one's position. It is at this point that the critic will sometimes ask what it would take to make the arguer reconsider or change his or her mind about the matter. Usually the critic's "What will it take?" question is asked in desperation, after the arguer has "explained away" all the offered counterevidence. The critic is here attempting to get the arguer to identify some possible counterevidence that will be accepted as damaging to his or her position. If the arguer is willing to identify that conceivable evidence, the critic at least knows what he or she has to do. For example, if the arguer refuses to accept any of the evidence presented against his or her claim that smoking is not hazardous to human health, one might ask, "What would it take to convince you?" or "What evidence, if I could find it, would convince you that you are wrong?" If the arguer claims that no conceivable evidence could convince him or her of being wrong, then it is clear that the argument is not being conducted on evidential grounds at all and that further discussion would be fruitless.

Attacking the Fallacy: To demonstrate whether the arguer is genuinely open to countererevidence, you could ask what particular kind of evidence, if it could be produced, might seriously weaken the claim. If the arguer cannot or will not specify such evidence, it would probably be more productive and less frustrating to shift the discussion to some other issue. However, you might want to point out to the arguer the fruitlessness of carrying on a discussion with one who will entertain no counterevidence and who refuses to take seriously the principle of fallibility. However, if the arguer specifies some conceivable evidence that might tend to alter his or her opinion, then you should make a reasonable effort to find that evidence and bring it to the table.

If you are successful in getting the arguer to listen to counterevidence, ask him or her to respond to it or to evaluate it. If there is a serious attempt to do so, the violation of the rebuttal criterion is probably no longer a problem, and the discussion will have moved forward.

Definition: This fallacy consists in arguing in a way that ignores or omits any reference to important evidence unfavorable to one’s position, going the false impression that there is no significant evidence against it.

None of us wants to lose an argument, mainly because we think we are correct in what we are saying. However, most of us would not want to win an argument by "cheating"-that is, by deliberately ignoring evidence that we knew was damaging to our case--just as we would not want to win a tennis game by cheating-for example, by calling a close but "in" ball "out." It is quite possible that we might think we are really a better player than our opponent, but we could hardly justify cheating to prove it. In tennis, the best player is the one who wins the game. In reasoning, the best judgment is the one that is best supported in view of all the evidence. Nevertheless, if one holds very strongly to some position, it is tempting to ignore evidence that could that judgment into question.

It should perhaps be noted that there are at least two situations in our culture in which deliberate "slanting" or "one-sided assessment" of evidence seems to be acceptable, it is acceptable for the arguments of both the defense and the prosecution to be presented with a very deliberate neglect of counterevidence. However, it is not acceptable for the jury or the judge to neglect any evidence in coming to a fair judgment. in debating clubs and tournaments on the high school and college level. In this context, the issue is not primarily that of arriving at the best answer to the question on which the debate is focused. The more important issue is that of evaluating the relative forensic abilities of the opposing debaters. It should be noted, however, that in both judicial and debate procedures, the opposition is specifically charged with the responsibility of presenting contrary evidence. Hence, evidence from all sides will be heard in each of those contexts.

However, winning a court case or winning a debate tournament is not the principal concern of one who is interested in the truth. The truth-seeking principle requires that one investigate all sides of an issue and accept the position that is best supported by the evidence. Indeed, as truth-seekers, we. should welcome the presentation of any evidence that might point out weaknesses in our position. lf that evidence can be shown not to be damaging in any way, we can be all the more assured of the truth of our position. On the other hand, if that counterevidence is significantly damaging to our position, we should be grateful, for it may lead us closer to the truth by steering us away from an indefensible or highly questionable conclusion.

An argument that ignores relevant counterevidence fails to satisfy the rebuttal criterion of a good argument, because it fails to address effectively the possible downside Of the position being defended. “Stacking the deck” by ignoring counterevidence renders one’s own conclusion questionable, because important evidence has not been properly evaluated.

Attacking the Fallacy: Do not be surprised if someone who presents an argument fails to accompany it with all the evidence against its conclusion. It is quite possible, of course, that the arguer has considered such evidence and is of the opinion that it does no damage to the claim at issue and therefore deserves no mention. However, in view of our general tendency to ignore evidence damaging to our favorite opinions, such an assumption would probably not be warranted. Hence, it is legitimate to ask an arguer to give at least some indication that all relevant factors have been seriously evaluated.

Be careful not to be misled by some of the tactics of the deck-stacker. One clever device is to acknowledge and then dispose of a very weak objection to one’s position before going on with a one-sided assessment of the evidence. This gives the impression of objectivity and can sometimes be very disarming to the victim of this fallacy. The alert critic, however, will not let the arguer ignore the serious objections to the question at issue.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attacking one's opponent in a personal and abusive way as a means of ignoring or discrediting his or her criticism or argument.

An ad hominem argument is an argument directed "toward the person." The personal attack often takes the form of calling attention to some distasteful personal characteristic of an opponent. What that might be in any particular situation depends on what the arguer finds repugnant. A person may be abused for being messy, unshaven, fat, foreign, a failure, a pacifist, an atheist, a lawyer, a feminist, liberal, conservative, gay, lesbian, ugly, physically uncoordinated, a tobacco chewer, or any number of other things. However, the abusive ad hominem is not just a case of directing abusive language toward another person. There is nothing fallacious about calling people names or saying ugly things about them. The fallacy is committed when one engages in a personal attack as a means of ignoring, discrediting, or blunting the force of another's argument.

Although some faulty arguers may call attention to distasteful features of their opponents in order to manipulate the responses of their audience, most abusers apparently believe that such characteristics actually provide good reasons for ignoring or discrediting the arguments of those who have them. Logically, of course, the fact that any of these characteristics might fit an opponent provides no reason to ignore or discredit his or her arguments or criticisms.

It is very important, however, that a distinction be made between the argument and the testimony of a person. For example, if a known liar or psychotic is testifying or giving an opinion, the fact that he or she is a liar or psychotic is indeed relevant to the credibility of such opinions or testimonials. However, if the liar or psychotic formulates and presents an argument, that argument can and should be evaluated independently of its source. It makes no difference whether it comes from a demented mind, a convicted felon, or a Nazi; an argument can and must stand on its own. After all, even the most despicable of persons may be able to construct a good argument. We could conclude, then, that although there may be personal characteristics of a person, such as his or her bias, psychotic nature, or lack of truthfulness, that might rightly affect our assessment of his or her opinions or testimony, it should have nothing at ail to do with our evaluation of the person's arguments.

The abusive ad hominem obviously fails to meet the rebuttal criterion of a good argument, since it is primarily a device to avoid complying with the rebuttal requirement. But it could also be construed as a violation of the relevance criterion, because the personal characteristics of a critic have no bearing on the merit of his or her criticism or counterargument. Therefore, any argument that uses what the arguer finds personally distasteful about an opponent as a reason for ignoring or rejecting his or her idea cannot be a good one.

Attacking the Fallacy: When we are abusively attacked, there is a great temptation to counterattack in the same abusive way. Yielding to that temptation will not help advance the debate on the real issue. Indeed, it could slow it down considerably. The most constructive response is to point out to the arguer that he or she is being abusive and then politely ask for a response to your criticism or counterargument. Sometimes a simple "But what do you think of my argument?" will do.

If an arguer persists in a personal attack on you rather than responding to your criticisms or arguments, you should try to find a way to encourage him or her to separate evaluation of a person from evaluation of the merit of that person's ideas or arguments. You might point out that all of us are likely to encounter many unlikable people in our lifetime, many of whom will have good ideas, and if we cannot separate the person from those ideas, we will probably fail to reap the benefit of many good insights. If possible, take the first step and acknowledge, if appropriate, any merit that you might find in the abuser's position. Such behavior just might encourage similar behavior on his or her part.

Definition: This fallacy consists in rejecting a criticism or argument presented by another person because of that person’s special circumstances or improper motives.

This fallacy is called "poisoning the well" because its intended effect is to discredit the source of an argument or point of view in such a way that it precludes any need to consider the merit of that position. In other words, it "damns the source," so that nothing that comes from that source will be or can be regarded as worthy of serious consideration. Insofar as the arguer fails to address the criticism, counterevidence, or counterargument that may come from that source, he or she has violated the rebuttal criterion of a good argument.

While the appeal to irrelevant or questionable--authority does indeed caution us not to accept testimony from a questionable source, the issue in poisoning the well has nothing to do with anybody's questionable testimony. The question is whether one should refuse to consider an argument that comes from a questionable source. A person's sex, age, race, religion, profession, economic status, or political persuasion might, in some cases, prevent him or her from being a credible witness, but it should not in any way interfere with our willingness to consider his or her argument on the matter at issue. An argument, unlike testimony is entirely separable from its source. For example, if an argument in opposition to the death penalty comes from a death-row inmate, the source would not make the argument any less worthy of our consideration. Similar things can be said concerning the charge of improper motives. A person whose motives are suspect might not be a credible witness, but that should not prevent us from giving serious consideration to the merit of his or her argument. For example, the fact that a particular landowner stands to gain financially from a new highway that would go through her property does not make her argument in support of the project unworthy of consideration.

A good argument must provide an effective rebuttal to the criticism of or counterargument to the position it supports. Therefore, an argument that inappropriately poisons the source- of a counterargument or criticism, and thus prevents it from even being heard or seriously entertained, cannot be a good one.

Attacking the Fallacy: It is sometimes quite difficult to attack the poisoning the well fallacy, especially if it is your well that has been poisoned, because even your attack on such reasoning supposedly comes from a contaminated source. Perhaps the most constructive approach in such cases is to confront the issue directly: "Okay, you have decided that anything I might say is contaminated, even before I've said it. That is a very clever device, and there's not a whole lot that I can do about it. But I do not

Definition: This fallacy consists in rejecting a criticism of one's argument or actions by accusing one's critic or others of thinking or acting in a similar way.

The Latin name of this fallacy, tu quoque, translates as "You [do it] too." The arguer who commits this fallacy is implicitly saying to the critic, "Because you are guilty of doing the same thing or thinking the same way that you are criticizing me for, your argument is no good and/or I don't have to listen to you." This counterattack on the critic functions as a way of avoiding the obligation to rebut his or her criticism or counterargument. While this response is primarily a violation of the rebuttal criterion, it is also a violation of the relevance criterion, for the fact that some other person engages in a questionable practice or thought process is irrelevant to whether such a practice or way of thinking merits our acceptance.

Almost all children feel entirely justified in antisocial behavior if they can respond to the scolding parent, "But he (or she) did it first." But there are also adults who seem to feel absolved of any guilt for their behavior if they can say to a critic, "You do the same thing!" Even though most of us would agree that "two wrongs don't make a right," it almost always seems to make us feel better, when our own behavior is questioned, if we can point out that our critic, or some other person, acts in a similar way. But there is no logical way that another's fault can absolve our own guilt for the same fault, nor does the behavior of another person or group constitute any logical justification for us to behave in a similar manner.

However, those who commit this fallacy are not primarily concerned with justifying their behavior by the behavior of a critic. They are using the behavior of the critic as a reason for abdicating their responsibility to address the substance of the critic's questions or counterargument. They may indeed want us to "practice what we preach" or even think that we are hypocrites, but the inconsistency between what we say and what we do is in no way relevant to the merit of our criticisms of the arguer's position or argument. Counterarguments and criticisms deserve to stand on their own, and if the argument being criticized is to qualify as a good one, it must effectively blunt the force of those criticisms.

Attacking the Fallacy: If an arguer points out an inconsistency between your criticism and your own behavior, there is no reason to be intimidated or silenced by such a charge. It may be best to admit the charge, if true, and to confront the arguer who commits this tu quoque fallacy by insisting that he or she set aside concerns about your possible inconsistency and evaluate the merits of your criticisms or counterargument. A perceived inconsistency between a critic's words and deeds does not relieve an arguer of the responsibility to effectively rebut criticisms or counterarguments to his or her argument or to the position it defends.

Few people would defend, in principle, the view that indefensible behavior by one person justifies similar behavior by another. After all, most of us have been taught since childhood that "two wrongs don't make a right." Nevertheless, it is sometimes necessary to remind each other of the irrelevance of one person's behavior to a judgment about the appropriateness of another's. But the real issue here is whether or not an arguer will treat the inconsistency between the words and behavior of a critic as a sufficient reason for abandoning the obligation to address his or her criticisms or counterargument. Tu quoque thinking is a common and very powerful psychological response, which most of us have experienced since childhood, to the inconsistent behavior of a critic, and we often feel no obligation to respond to criticism under such circumstances. Because such thinking is so emotional convincing, its fallacious character is usually not fully recognized until it is pointedly brought to one's attention. and that, of course, is your job.

Definition: This fallacy consists in misrepresenting an opponent's position or argument, usually for the purpose of making it easier to attack.

"Straw man" is a metaphor used to describe the caricature of the opponent's argument that the faulty arguer substitutes for the flesh-and-blood original version. Since it obviously takes no strong intellectual muscles to knock down a straw-built substitute for the real argument, the attack on the argument could make it appear to be a weak one. However, for an arguer to discover a flaw in his or her own misrepresentation of the position at issue does not necessarily mean that there is a flaw in the actual position or the argument that supports ii. The straw man argument is clearly a flawed argument. According to the rebuttal criterion, a good argument must effectively address the strongest argument on the other side of an issue. Since the arguer has attacked a deliberately weakened version of that argument, he or she has failed to satisfy the rebuttal criterion.

An arguer may misrepresent an opponent's argument or position in several different ways. First, he or she may reconstruct the argument in a distorted form. Such a reconstruction might use only a part of the argument, paraphrase it in carefully chosen misleading words, or subtly include the arguer's own evaluation or commentary in it.

Second, an arguer may oversimplify an opponent's argument. A complex argument can be made to look absurd when it is stated in a simplified form that leaves out important qualifications or subtle distinctions.

Third, an arguer may extend an opponent's argument beyond its original bounds. This can be done by drawing inferences from it that are clearly unwarranted or unintended.

The principle of charity obligates us to represent fairly the arguments of others. Indeed, we arc obligated to give their arguments the best possible interpretation. Since a misrepresentation of another's argument hardly qualifies as a fair treatment of it, the straw man attack should be regarded as a violation not only of the rebuttal principle but of the principle of charity as well.

Attacking the Fallacy: It is not always possible to know if an opponent has deliberately distorted your argument or has simply failed to understand or interpret it in the way that was intended. For that reason, it might be helpful to recapitulate the basic outline of any lengthy argument you present or, better yet, ask your opponent to summarize it for you. If he or she is willing to do so, that will put you in a better position to correct any misinterpretation, misrepresentation, or omission.

If you have the opportunity, you should insist that a fruitful or constructive debate is not possible unless every attempt has been made to understand what is being said on both sides. If your opponent insists on continuing to misrepresent your position, call attention to that fact and correct the distortion in each counterresponse. In no case should you debate the issue on the distorter's terms, by allowing yourself to be forced into defending a misrepresented version of your position.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attacking an opponent's position by focusing critical attention of some minor point in the argument.

Trivial objections can take many forms. It may be an attack against a premise that bears no significant weight in an argument-a support that can be easily knocked down without doing any serious damage to the argument. It may be an attack on a minor or insignificant detail that has no important bearing on the main or basic point of the argument. It may even be a criticism of an illustration used. In such cases, the basic argument remains intact, because even if the objection is legitimate, it is trivial. The fallacy of trivial objections is not an attack on a misrepresentation or a weakened version of an opponent's argument; it is simply an attack on a minor flaw in it. But those who commit the fallacy of trivial objections treat this flaw as if it were a major one. These nitpickers seem to think that any flaw found in an argument is sufficient to destroy it.

But one who resorts to making trivial objections uses a flawed argument, for such an argument is a violation of the rebuttal criterion. By trying to dismiss an opponent's argument on the basis of trivial objections, the arguer has failed to address the strongest evidence or arguments on the other side of the issue.

Attacking the Fallacy: If a critic points out a minor problem in your argument, you should probably acknowledge it. But do not hesitate to point out that the strongest supports for your position are still intact and that you would be interested in hearing a response to them. If the critic insists that the objections raised are not trivial and do indeed damage the argument, ask for an explanation of exactly how the matters raised have any significant bearing on the truth or falsity of the basic position being defended. As always, you might remind the arguer that the rebuttal criterion puts him or her under obligation to effectively rebut the strongest feature of your position or argument.

One way to effectively disarm an opponent is to make clear in advance which are your strongest and which are your weakest supports for your claim. If the arguer the chooses to attack one of your weaker supports, you will have already acknowledged that it is a weak support, so whatever damage it may cause will probably not significantly affect the quality of your argument.

Definition: This fallacy consists in attempting to hide the weakness of a position by drawing attention away from the real issue to a side issue.

The strange name of this fallacy comes from the sport of fox hunting. A herring is cooked to a brownish-red color and its strong smell is used to train dogs to follow a scent, but it is also dragged across the fox's trail in order to test the dogs' ability to follow the fox scent. Dogs that can be easily pulled off are not ready for the real hunt. People who oppose fox hunting also use herring to pull dogs off a scent. In argument, using a red herring means consciously or unconsciously steering a debate away from one issue to a different, perhaps related issue in such a way as to make it appear that the related issue is relevant to the issue at hand, but primarily as a means of avoiding the obligation of addressing the main issue or criticism.

A very common form of red herring is empty consolidation, which seeks to draw attention away from a complaint or criticism by claiming that the complainant should be satisfied with an undesirable situation, because "things could be worse" or because the situation of some other person or group is worse. Although it is true that "things" could almost always be worse than they are, that is not the issue, and drawing attention to such a notion is simply a way to avoid dealing with the initial criticism or complaint.

Attacking the Fallacy: To "hold the reins" on a heated argument or discussion is not an easy task. Red herrings creep very subtly into the counterarguments of most people. Detecting when the focus of an argument has been maneuvered from the main issue to a side issue requires constant surveillance.

Moreover, a frequent reminder of "that's not the issue" may not always be understood by your opponent. Therefore, you should be prepared to explain how the issue has been sidetracked or why a certain issue is appropriately classified as a red herring.

Since red herrings are often not consciously, or at least not deliberately, dragged into a discussion, one should perhaps be cautious about accusing an opponent of engaging in fallacious reasoning. If the swerve to the side is innocent, you should perhaps treat it as such. You would do well to save the charge of "red herring" for those who use it as a deliberate diversionary device to avoid addressing the strongest points of an argument or counterargument.

Definition: This fallacy consists in injecting humor or ridicule into an argument in an effort to cover up an inability or unwillingness to respond appropriately to an opponent's criticism or counterargument.

Humor is one of the most effective diversionary tactics, because a clever and well-delivered remark can quickly blunt the force of an opponent's argumentative advantage in the minds of an audience, toward whom such humor is primarily directed. Moreover, it can quickly bring an audience over to one's own side, even though there is no logical justification for such a shift.

Diversionary humor can take a number of different forms. It may be a Pun created from a remark in an opponent's proposal or argument, a not-so-serious response to a serious claim or question, a humorous anecdote, or just plain ridicule of an opponent's position or remarks. Ridicule of another person is an effective device only if it is not overly cruel; that is, it must be good-humored enough to elicit some spontaneous laughter. If it is too sharp, it may tend to weaken the position of the one who uses it by creating sympathy for the target.

Most arguers who use this tactic are very much aware of its diversionary effect. They are, in effect, using a joke, pun, or bit of ridicule as a means of ignoring or discrediting the criticism or argument. By doing so, they violate the rebuttal criterion, which requires that they effectively rebut the substance of the criticism or argument. Making fun of or ridiculing the argument is clearly not a way of meeting the rebuttal criterion of a good argument.

Attacking the Fallacy: If a humorous intrusion into an argumentative context is a genuinely clever one, you could perhaps show appropriate appreciation of it, for sound arguments need not be totally cheerless. A response in kind might even be an effective move, as a means of leveling the field of play. However, at the appropriate moment your should reiterate the basic claim or criticism at issue and insist on a serious response.