Synopsis
[1]
Analysis of the Sophists: Scepticism
[2]
Theory of Two Dimensions or Worlds: Radically Ideal Metaphysics
[3]
Character of Knowledge as Real & Revealed: Ontology & Epistemology
Justified
[4]
Argument from Nature of Abstract Language: Problem of Meaning
[5] Brief
Statement of Aristotle's Rejoinder
References
Bibliographical Citation
NEWMAN, C.A. (1982). On Plato's theory of forms [four arguments that Plato advances in support of his claim that there is a separate world of Forms or Ideas]. University of New England, Armidale, N.S.W. [Dept. of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts: PHIL-100-2/8].
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Plato follows the Sophists in agreeing
that sensible phenomena are the unintelligible objects of belief rather
than of knowledge. However, he insists on the reality of knowledge, and from this develops the doctrine of the separation of the 'Forms' or 'Ideas', the unchanging, intelligible
objects, from the flux of merely apparent, changing phenomena.
This separation gives rise to the doctrines of Platonic Idealism. These include:
(1) the doctrine of resemblance, and (2) theory of recollection;
(3) a doctrine of degrees of reality; and finally, (4) a theory of
universals, which states that the single Form which allows a set of things
to be covered by a concept implies its existence in another separate, distinct
world, independant of time, derivative phenomena and mental process alike.
This final doctrine, interdependent with the general theory, is developed as a
solution to the problem of abstract meaning, which Plato argues that language
entirely consists of. The reality of abstractions is outside the
physical world of sensible phenomena. Aristotle provided a different
account of Form and Substance as inseparable aspects of a single world.
Plato's theory of Forms begins from a premise about the nature of things which can be grasped by the intellect. He agrees with earlier philosophers that sensible phenomena, subject to time and false appearance, are the objects of belief rather than of knowledge. They are not really intelligible.
The sceptical conclusion of ancient Sophists and modern Nihilists is the same: that nothing is knowable. To Plato, however, this was unacceptable. His theory of Forms amounts to a defence of knowledge by examining its basic character (Guthrie, 1967: 87-93). He decided that the existence of intelligible entities, which he called Forms or Ideas, must be separate from sensible phenomena in a world apart. Only a separate world might provide the medium for knowledge which the temporal world cannot. If the concept of knowledge is examined, it is found to relate to unchanging qualities not subject to the caprices of time or the senses (Plato, 'The Republic', transl. Lee, 1974: 271-6). Conversely, those who argue that knowledge is impossible do so at the expense of rendering their own arguments nonsensical, since the ground of those arguments is knowledge. The starting point of the theory is therefore the doctrine of the separation of eternal, absolute, intelligible Forms from the sensible, temporal phenomena of the world.
As the theory of two dimensions of reality and their separation became apparent to Plato as the only solution to the problem of knowledge, he deduced related doctrines regarding the features and relationship of the two realms. The sensible phenomena are said to resemble the Forms, to be 'instances' of them in the way that copies resemble originals (Plato, 'The Phaedo', transl. Lee, 1969: 127). Our rational intellect, or 'Soul', recognises the resemblance due to a prior discarnate existence in the world of the Forms (ibid: 120-8). Particular instances of Forms, the sensible phenomena, are 'imperfect', 'defective' and 'not fully real', at once existing and not existing, whereas the Forms are fully real. Plato speaks of particular instances 'participating' or 'sharing' in the existence of their relevant Forms, as though the reality of the physical world were derivative and dependent. Moreovere, the Forms both account for and cause the characteristics of particular things. Plato explains, for instance, that 'it is by the Beautiful that beautiful things are beautiful' (ibid:159). As a 'realist' theory of universals, it means that every set of things covered by the same concept implies a single, essential nature or Form existing separately and distinctly, irrespective of both instance and mind (Franklin, 1982: Departmental Notes).
Plato's principal line of thought was concerned always with the nature of knowledge (ibid: 36). The establishment of the character of knowledge as real and revealed provided the only objective basis for any ethics or cosmology. He argued that the theory of Forms and the reality of knowledge were mutually interdependent. If one exists, then reason demands the other. As argument that demolishes its own foundations is nonsense, any argument demolishing certainty, the object of knowledge, demolishes itself. Assuming the veracity of knowledge, Forms separate from sensible phenomena are implicit in the impossibility that phenomena subject to time and appearance should be the objects of anything other than mere belief. Thus the theory of Forms answers the problem of knowledge, and the mechanics of knowledge are deduced from corollary doctrines of resemblance and a theory of recollection.
A secondary but important argument stems from Plato's consideration of the nature of abstract language (op.cit: 37), and in particular the problem of meaning. This problem arises when one word, itself not applying to any singular, sensible phenomenon, is used to apply to many different things. The problem is most apparent with qualitative words such as 'good' or 'beautiful' which purport to apply to vastly different kinds of object. Plato argues that language and meaning not only contain abstractions, but entirely consist of them. As abstractions are not sensible material substances, but qualities, the argument inevitably leads on to the separation of two levels of being ('The Phaedo': 129-30), and to the theory of Forms. To demolish the theory of separable Forms would be to demolish meaning itself, meaning relying as it does on abstractions outside the realm of sensible phenomena.
Aristotle and the Scholastic philosophers disagreed
that subjection to time and false appearances render sensible phenomena
the objects of belief rather than of knowledge, and argued that although
Form exists, it is inseparable from Substance (Flew, 1979: 114; Ogden &
Richards, 1952: 33ff).
BARKER, E. (1946). The political thought of Plato and Aristotle. New York: Dover Publications.
BERGER, P.L. & LUCKMANN., T. (1967). The social construction of reality. London: Allen Lane, pp. 77-80, 149 'society to be understood in terms of ongoing dialectical process between subjective and objective reality' [interactive dialectic].
FLEW, A (ed). (1979). A dictionary of philosophy. London: Pan Books/Macmillan Press, p.114.
FRANKLIN, W. (1982). Classical Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. Historical development of philosophy (Part I). Armidale, NSW: University of New England, p.41.
GOROVITZ, S. (1979). Philosophical analysis. New York: Random House.
GUTHRIE, W.K.C. (1967). The Greek philosophers. London: Methuen & Co./University Paperback Editions.
OGDEN, C.K. & RICHARDS, I.A. (1952). The meaning of meaning. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.33ff. '[Plato] fails to distinguish consistently between symbols & the thought symbolised.'
PLATO, transl. TREDDENICK, H. (1969 [367 BC]). The Phaedo. The last days of Socrates. London: Penguin Classics, pp.120-128, 159.
PLATO, transl. LEE, B.
(1974 [375 BC]). The Republic. London: Penguin Classics,
pp.271-276.
Title: Plato's theory of forms.
Sub-title: A brief analysis
of Plato's four principal arguments.
Author: NEWMAN,
Campbell Alexander
S/N: 8201391
Posting Date: 5 April 1982
The University of New England
Department of Philosophy /Faculty
of Arts
Tutor: FRANKLIN, Prof.
Philosophy 100: Introduction
to Philosophy
1. Philosophy; 2. History of Philosophy: Ancient Greece: Plato.