HISTORY OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE

 In July 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, issued Joint Vision 2010.  This document established the goal for U.S. forces of “full spectrum dominance” and provided a template for how the Armed Forces will “channel the vitality and innovation of [its] people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”  This vision established a benchmark for the integration of information technology across the entire scope of military operations.  To read more about Joint Vision 2010, click here. 

 In a 1997 address to the123rd annual meeting of the U.S. Naval Institute, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, described a revolution in military affairs characterized by “a fundamental shift from what we call platform-centric warfare to something we call network-centric warfare.”  As detailed by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Mr. John Gastka in their 1997 paper titled "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future", this shift is patterned on the widespread emergence of information technology in business enterprises throughout the 1990s and seeks to exploit the power of network-centric computing.  This approach enables information-intensive interactions among very large numbers of nodes in a network.  As applied to a combat theater, this allows commanders to have continuous situational awareness when using real-time interactions among all units to make command decisions.  To read more from Cebrowski and Gastka, click here.

 The immediate hurdle to effective network-centric warfare was the inadequacy of network infrastructure to ensure “connectivity, reliability and redundancy as well as data integrity and data security.”  Mr. Bob Brewin describes these challenges in his 1997 paper titled “DOD Lays Groundwork for Network-Centric Warfare”.  In response, the services began major acquisition programs to procure new IT infrastructure.  The ongoing Navy initiative, for example, is called IT-21.  Beyond this basic need for networking capability, new technology is also required to ensure information superiority.  Examples include fast sensors, real-time displays, virtual simulation and modeling, and increasingly powerful networks.  You can learn more about this technology in the “Recent Developments” section of this site.  To read more from Brewin, click here.

 Just five years after Joint Vision 2010, U.S.-led coalition forces demonstrated the effectiveness of network-centric warfare in Operation Enduring Freedom and later in Operation Iraqi Freedom through speed of command and the ability of small units to “self-synchronize”.  Commanders led complex and rapidly shifting air, land, maritime, and special operations while communicating daily with planners in Washington, D.C.  These operations supported the Pentagon claim that network-centric warfare becomes a force-multiplier enabling smaller units with superior speed, reach and precision to achieve the same combat effectiveness as a much larger platform-based forces.  You can learn more in the “Recent Uses” section of this site.

 Many argue that network-centric warfare has become the standard for agile, precise and integrated joint combat forces.  However, skeptics agree that the impact of this technology requires the simultaneous development of appropriate operational concepts, doctrine, and organization to mitigate new risks.  You can learn more about these risks in the “Shortcomings” section of this site and see examples of implementing instructions in the “Navy Policies” section. 

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