PART 1 OF 3
By Harav Yehuda Amita
Translated by Rabbi Dr. Michael Berger
[Note: This is the first installment of a three-part shiur.]
The commandment of tokhachah (rebuke) requires Jews to reprimand each other for sins they may commit. In an expression of mutual concern and responsibility, the Torah (Vayikra 19:27) bids every Jew to assist one another's observance of mitzvot with constructive criticism. Clearly, such an imperative assumes that the entire community subscribes to the same law and authority, an assumption considered reasonable in premodern times. But is this mitzvah normative even when it is obvious that the object of the reproof will not heed the reproach? This issue is clearly relevant in contemporary times, and a clear analysis of it is urgently needed in today's Jewish world.(1)
It would appear that this question directly depends on the more fundamental matter of whether the goal of the rebuke - helping one's neighbor to avoid sin and return to complete religious observance - is part of the very definition of the mitzvah itself, or is only the reason for the mitzvah, and therefore of no intrinsic halakhic consequence.(2) If it is considered part of the obligation itself, then the commandment cannot simply be understood as an obligation to rebuke but must be expanded to include all means of influence that could be brought to bear to help another person avoid sin. Indeed, the vast majority of rabbinic authorities follow this approach and therefore include other means, such as persuasion, under the mode of behavior required by this commandment.
Strikingly, and somewhat paradoxically, while this mode of reasoning results in expanding the parameters of the mitzvah in one respect, it circumscribes it in another. For if the purpose of the mitzvah - bringing a fellow Jew closer to God - is an intrinsic aspect of it, then it would not be required in a case where the end result will not be achieved, such as when it is known that the rebukee will not listen or respond. In fact, if it is clear that the sinner will not heed the words of the rebuker, most authorities maintain that there is no obligation to admonish. On the contrary, the obligation is to refrain from saying something that will not be heeded.(3) Others disagree and maintain that there always exists an obligation to admonish a sinner, if only once, whether it will be effective or not.(4) However, the strength of the admonition depends on whether the reprimand is directed at an individual (where more of an effort is required) or at a group. Moreover, it is likely that even these authorities maintain that if it appears probable that a reprimand will be not only ineffective but counterproductive, that it will lead the sinner wither to sin further or even only to hate the rebuker, then there is no obligation to fulfill the mitzvah of tokhahah.(5) If, for example, the sinner belongs to a community known to be unresponsive to criticism, then reprimanding him or her is treated in the same manner as communal reproof and should be avoided. In such a case, if it is clear that the collective group to which the individual belongs would not accept the reprimand, then there is no such obligation with respect to the individual within it either.
A distinction must also be made between cases where those committing the sin are aware that what they are doing is prohibited and those where they actually believe their activity to be permissible. In the latter case, their unwillingness to heed the reproacher is not due to any obstinacy or rebelliousness, but simply to the fact that they have been trained to believe that their behavior is acceptable, and the person admonishing them must be considered to be unnecessarily stringent. With respect to those who are convinced that what they are doing is correct, some authorities maintain that there is no obligation of tokhahah.(6) If, however, the sinner is merely acting out of ignorance, then the commandment to correct his or her misconception does obtain.(7) Similarly, a distinction may exist depending on the nature of the violation, whether a Torah law is at stake (in which case rebuke is more seriously required), or merely a rabbinic ordinance;(8) and whether the violation was committed willfully (bemezid) or mistakenly (beshogeg).(9)
All this, however, concerns only the obligation of an average individual Jew to reproach his or her fellow coreligionist. What about the obligation of the leaders of the community, such as rabbis, whose responsibility extends throughout the entire Jewish community? What are the limits, if any, to their obligation to rebuke?
On this subject, the insightful words of the Rashba (R. Solomon ibn Adret; c. 1235-1310) deserve careful attention:
Be aware that a soft spoken word shatters bones, and different ways will clear a path before the people to remove obstacles from them. [Therefore,] one must progress from the easy to the difficult, and not attempt the entire package all at once. These words are directed towards the intentions of the heart, and you are already familiar with that which is stated in Nazir (23b), "A sin for its own sake is greater than a good deed not performed for its own sake."
[Our Rabbis] have already shown us good and clear counsel, as it states in 'Avodah Zarah (15a) with reference to the house of Rabbi Judah the Prince which was under an obligation to send a fatted bull to the Caesar on the Roman holiday. Rabbi Judah then paid 40,000 coins to the Caesar for the concession that they would not sacrifice it at all. [The Talmud] comments on it that Rabbi Judah intended to uproot the entire practice, and therefore uprooted it slowly, bit by bit.
Furthermore, you should know that it is impossible to deal with all people equally. Recall that David, our lord and king, decided to overlook the misconduct of Joab and Shim'i, even though they deserved death,...for to everything there is an appropriate time, and ignoring something sinful is occasionally a positive commandment, and everything must be measured by the need of the hour...(10)
While the Rashba's advice certainly applies to every individual, it was clearly intended for communal leaders, who are required to adapt their actions to contemporary exigencies all the more. Even though, generally speaking, it is improper to ignore the behavior of a sinner, at times it is a mitzvah, if the situation so requires. What emerges from this is that even in a case where the normative requirements of tokhachah call for an obligation to reprimand, if the leaders of the community believe that the times require refraining from such activity, then it is their obligation to do so. Indeed, the Rashba says further in the responsum: "And if silence, employed to ultimately yield positive results, is occasionally ineffective, the use of force will only engender the opposite."
Notes:
* A more elaborate Hebrew version of this essay
appeared in Sefer Hayovel Le-Rav Mordekhai Breuer. This
translation originally appeared in Jewish Tradition and
the Non-Traditional Jew, ed. R. Jacob J. Schacter, 1992.
1. See Hagahot Maymoniyyot, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De'ot 6:3 for a preliminary discussion of the issue. However, only the views of the Yere'im and the Semak are cited there. See n.4 below.
2. This matter falls under the rubric of the more general question of whether or not we may engage in darshinan ta'ama dikra, interpreting the reason for a commandment, and investing that reason with halakhic significance. The ruling is that we are not to engage in such activity and, therefore, whatever is deemed to be only a reason for a mitzvah remains outside its halakhiboundaries. See, for example, Kiddushin 68b and the other references cited there in Masoret Hashas. The Chida, Birkei Yosef, Orach Chayyim, no. 608, makes this connection explicitly. See, too, She'elot Utshuvot Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De'ah, no. 461:4.
3. See Rambam, Sefer Hamitzvot, 'Aseh no. 205; Hilkhot De'ot 6:7; Semag, Mitzvah no. 11; Rashi, Yevamot 65b, s.v. lomar davar hanishma'; Rif and Me'iri on Yevamot 65b; Rosh, Beitzah 4:2; Tosafot, Bava Batra 60b, s.v. mutav; Shabbat 55a, s.v. ve'af 'al gav; Rabad, cited in Chida, Machazik Berakhah, Orach Chayyim 208; Shitah Mekubbetzet, Bava Metzia' 31a; Sefer Yere'im Hakatzar, no. 37; Hagahot Hagra, Orach Chayyim 608:4; Sefer Hachinukh, no. 239; Sefer Chasidim, no. 413 (no. 938, in another edition; although there the emphasis is on the negative impact such a rebuke may have [i.e., the rebukee might be motivated to sin even more], not its futility. See Magen Avraham, Orach Chayyim 608:3).
There is another related source for restricting the application of tokhachah based on the continuation of the verse "and you will not bear a sin over him" (Vayikra 19:17). Based on Targum Onkelos's interpretation, this means that a Jew will be held responsible for a sin committed by his friend only if he could have rebuked him and did not do so. This interpretation is echoed by Ibn Ezra and the Ramban in their biblical commentaries on this verse as well as by Rabbenu Yonah, Sha'arei Teshuvah 3:59, 72, 196. Such accountability is reasonable only if such a rebuke would have been successful had it been attempted (see Shabbat 54b-55a). However, if one knows in advance that his rebuke will go unheeded, he is not obligated to go through with it.
4. See Yere'im, no. 223; Semak, no. 114; Ritva and Nimmukei Yosef, Yevamot 65b; Rama, Orach Chayyim 608:2. See too Bi'ur Halakhah, ad loc.
5. See Sefer Chasidim, no. 413; Taz on Rama, Yoreh De'ah 334:3; Nekudot Hakesef, ad loc.
6. See Mordekhai, Beitzah, no. 689. This distinction is also found in a responsum attributed to Rabbenu Chanan'el, printed in Teshuvot Rashi (ed. I. Elfenbein) (New York: Shulsinger Bros., l943), no. 20, pp. 14-16; S. Hasidah, Sefer Shibbolei Haleket, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalayim, 1988), no. 47, pp. 195-196.
7. Interestingly, the Ra'avan (no. 25, end) applies the principle of mutav sheyihyu shogegin (it is better that they sin out of ignorance) to such a circumstance and does not require rebuke even in a case where the possibility exists that they may respond favorably. He requires rebuke only when the efficacy of the act is assured in advance.
8. Rama, Darkei Mosheh, Orach Chayyim 608 (based on the Sefer Ha'ittur) requires rebuke whenever an explicit law of the Torah is being violated since, as he clearly assumes, there is no one who is ignorant of the Torah's lucidly formulated written laws and, therefore, the violation must have been committed willfully (see below). The Rashba understands the distinction based on the inherent severity of the commandment, considering a biblical law to be more serious than a rabbinic one.
9. See She'elot Utshuvot Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De'ah, no. 461:4; Sefer Yere'im Hakatzar, no. 37. there is also a distinction made between whether or not the rebuker has the power to enforce his will on the recalcitrant sinner. See Bi'ur Halakhah, Orach Chayyim 608, s.v. mohin beyadam, citing Chida, Birkei Yosef, ad loc.
10. She'elot Utshuvot Harashba 5:238.
