EVIL & EVOLUTION: A THEODICY

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that the ultimate test of any theology is its attempt to deal with the problem of evil. If this is true, then all theologies, on this score,seem to have failed.

The reasons for this apparent failure are rather complex, but they fall into two categories, the theoretical and the practical. On the practical level, "theodicy," the subdivision of theology concerned with God's justice in dealing with this world, cannot be seen as merely an exercise in intellectual abstractions. It touches people too closely for that. Sin, suffering, and death, experienced as evils, affect every human being. People may attempt to explain them away or they may attempt to ignore them, but the confrontation with these issues sooner or later must take place in everyone's life. A purely intellectual solution brings no resolution. The ultimate test for theology becomes the moment of truth for faith.

On the theoretical level, the issue becomes even more complex. While sin may appear to be easily explained by human freedom, factors such as the presumed all-powerfulness, omniscience, and the total goodness of God throw this explanation into question. At the very least it appears to contain serious contradictions. For example, if God knows that certain people will misuse their freedom, why does he create these particular persons in the first place? Or why, even on the physical level, the catastrophes that seem to serve no good purpose? Like Voltaire, whose book Candide satirized the optimism of the philosopher Leibniz after the cataclysmic Lisbon earthquake, we are driven to ponder how this could be considered the best of all possible worlds.

It is doubts such as these, in which practical issues seem to make a mockery of theoretical solutions, that tend to drive people to adopt one or the other of two extreme positions: either a stoical resignation to fate or to a flawed perception of "God's will", or else, a total rejection of the whole order of things, including God.

What, then, can be expected of this renewed attempt to wrestle with the problem? No completely exhaustive 'solution' to be sure but perhaps a kind of comprehensive view that might assure us that there is a comprehensible middle ground between the two extremes, one which is not riddled with the contradictions such moderate views are presumed to contain.

In attempting to find this middle ground in theodicy, this book will explore, the theoretical implications of some aspects of what may be called "Process Theology". By "Process Thought", however, I do not mean to refer primarily to the particular philosophical method of A. N. Whitehead or his followers, although I may make occasional use of their insights. Process theology, in this strictly Whiteheadian form is still a rather esoteric discipline, familiar mostly to certain academic specialists. It has not been without its influence in the area of theodicy however, particularly through its strong emphasis on the process of evolution in the shaping of our world. Such an emphasis on process, on becoming rather than a more static or fixed concept of being brings with it widespread implications for our understanding of all levels of existence, whether inorganic, biological, or psychological - or, as the Whiteheadians would have it, even the divine: It is at this latter point that more orthodox believers have strong reservations about this aspect of Whitehead's thought, just as he had about Christian orthodoxy. Likewise, from a scientific point of view, some philosophers may have a problem with putting much faith in a system modeled after the Quantum Theory of physics, especially as this theory is still contradicted, and with equally strong evidence, by the Field Theory.

Yet there can be little doubt that we exist within a process, a world that has evolved and probably is still doing so. Likewise, evil, or what we call evil, is very much part of the process, especially when human responsibility enters the picture.

It is because of this emphasis on the evolutionary process that I would characterize this book as a "Process Theodicy" in a broader sense. In particular I have attempted to recast some of these "Process" ideas within the evolutionary structure of thought inspired by the Jesuit paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. It was both Teilhard's use of the model of biological evolution and the extension of its philosophical implications to theology -- while retaining more traditional Christian concepts of God, that seem to offer the best possibilities for a re-thinking of theodicy within the Christian tradition. Biological transformism, or evolution in this more restricted sense, has long been accepted by most scientists as the only plausible system of understanding the varieties of organic life. That such biological development must have deeply related connections with our human psychological states -- including our choices of good or evil -- made a choice of Teilhard's type of "Process" thinking as the most obvious candidate for the task at hand.

This is not, however, a book about Teilhard's thought nor a defense of his particular system. The book is "Teilhardian" primarily to the extent that it seeks to follow his conviction that the truth is to be found only in the convergence of insights drawn from all disciplines -- the natural sciences, philosophy, theology, and, without apology, from divine Revelation itself. This interdisciplinary approach is not to be mistaken for a sloppy or facile 'concordism' which adds a little of evolutionary theory to a modified Biblical fundamentalism and concocts a superficial 'agreement' between religion and science. On the contrary, a truly converging theory of truth demands that each science or discipline be taken seriously in its own right, subject to its own specific rules and that each be taken as far as it will go as an independent discipline. However, and this is most important, these diverse elements must also be allowed to interact on a higher level, one which has the all-inclusive quality and scope of "noetic integration", if we may use Julian Huxley's phrase to describe a kind of knowledge that is unifying, processive in outlook, and capable of giving direction for human action.

To some, this idea may smack of a kind of secular mysticism. Perhaps there is something of this in it, yet I do not feel that on this count it deserves to be scorned. Mysticism, in the most universal sense of the word, seeks the higher unity which would draw all experience and understanding together. If so, all seekers of ultimate truth must have something of the mystical about them. To turn away from such possibilities is to avoid the quest for ultimate understanding, an attitude that has been long condemned as "obscurantism" by science and "culpable ignorance" by religion. The result of such an attitude is the undermining of scientific understanding and religious faith alike.

This book, therefore, is an attempt to uncover and integrate all the converging insights that bear on the subject of theodicy. Whether they concern the concept of God, the nature of evil, the responsibilities of human freedom, or the process of evolution itself, such converging truth, according to Teilhard, can be distinguished by three criteria; coherence, fecundity, and psychological dynamism.

Coherence is both the first test and the fruit of convergence. If our basic concepts of God and of evil clash in such a way that neither make sense or result in the loss of faith in God or the explaining away of the reality of evil, then something is drastically amiss in our thinking. We find ourselves wallowing in an incoherent universe, for all practical purposes paralyzed in a mire of ambivalence about the realities that should concern us most.

If, on the contrary, a broader convergence of insights is brought into play, for example, those bearing on human freedom and its relationship to the evolutionary process, then a certain fecundity or cross-fertilization of ideas can take place. If God creates through the evolutionary process, what might this tell us about the nature of God? What might this tell us about the nature of evil as well? Is all evil an absolute or are some kinds of evil only relative? In either case, what can we do about it?

Finally, if we can do something to diminish the amount of evil in this world, why should we bother or how much should we struggle to overcome it? Some evils, like suffering and death, can only be postponed. Knowing more about them or making greater sense of them does not guarantee action. Mere convergence of insights, no matter how coherent or fecund on the academic level, cannot substitute for a psychologically dynamic attitude leading to the eradication of evil wherever and whenever possible. The Messianic strain of Western Religion has spawned many movements to better the world, including even atheistic varieties, hut what guarantee is there that such movements will neither cause more evil nor die in disillusionment?

Thus, while this book may seem at times to give a preponderant place to the theoretical aspects of theodicy, it must nevertheless always be kept in mind that this is a necessary grounding for what turns out to be a very practical matter. To be practical, our treatment must be at the same time completely thorough, exploring four major dimensions of reality as they affect the subject. These four concern God, evil, human freedom, and the evolution of the world.

Accordingly, the book resembles in a way a building with four walls , each of which corresponds to one of these four elements. Chapter One will begin the construction by surveying the site and laying down the foundations for this comprehensive view of theodicy. Chapter Two, beginning the first wall, concentrates on the concept of God and his justice. Chapters Three and Four deal with both the kinds and reality of evil, thus erecting the second wall of our building. Chapter Five will begin the third wall by examining the question of human responsibility for evil, a project which cannot be completed until the fourth wall, an understanding of the evolutionary process in Chapter Six and its particular application to the origin of free will in Chapter Seven, enables us to complete these two sides of the structure together.

Actually, it should be said from the beginning that no one side will be completed in any one chapter. Rather, within the treatment of each of the four principal topics we feel constrained, somewhat like a mason, while concentrating on finishing as much as possible of one wall, to nevertheless add to each of the other walls for the sake of the security of the building as it takes shape. No one side can stand completely alone. At the same time, each addition will then give us a better idea of emerging shape of the building.

No building is complete without its roof. Theodicy remains, even with a new shape, a theological structure. It is finished only when it is capped by a renewed understanding of God and his ways and is only of use to us when we can find our way around and within the new edifice. Hence, Chapter Eight will reexamine our concepts of God as they fit this design, and Chapter Nine will conclude the book with the very practical matter of how we are to live within the world which this structure seeks to describe.

Even with this structured approach, the task of building a comprehensive theodicy is limited by the constraints of space. Each one of the four principal topics under consideration is, of course, a whole science in its own right. Thus, while I have aimed to present an approach to theodicy that in some way presents a comprehensive answer to the subject in all its aspects, the reader who may be a specialist in one or more of the areas involved in this synthesis is likely to find the treatment of his specialty to be sketchy or overgeneralized. A basic comprehensibility or general readability as well as comprehensiveness has been my aim. I hope that the limitations imposed by this approach will not prejudice the reader against the possibilities these converging insights have to offer.

The apparent failure of theology in this whole area is really not due to a breakdown within theology itself. Nor is it due to a theoretical failure of any other of the sciences involved in considering this difficult subject. Rather, it has been due primarily to the inability of these disciplines to address each other in an understandable dialogue or, when such dialogue has been attempted, a final cause of failure has been the inability to convey the results to those who need it most. Again, I hope, this book will prove to be at least a small but significant step in the process of overcoming both of these failings of the past.

Montmorency County, Michigan
July, 1980

Proceed to Chapter One

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