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© Andreas Reitzig, RUSN 1070, Professor John Barnstead, March 31, 2003
Kaliningrad Oblast is
a small Russian enclave situated on the Baltic Sea, separate from mainland
Russia. Its past reflects the
bleakest chapters of twentieth century European history: World War II,
after which the territory, formerly part of German East Prussia, became Russian,
and the years of the Cold War during which it became an important Soviet
military base completely cut off from the rest of Europe. In the near future,
European history is likely to overrun Kaliningrad once more: in 2004, both
Poland and Lithuania, the countries separating it from Russia proper, are due to
join the European Union (EU). This would leave the Kaliningrad region entirely
isolated within an ever-expanding Europe. Well-aware of the impending problem,
European leaders have started discussing the fate of Kaliningrad. Even though a
preliminary solution has been approved, there is still some discussion
concerning a long-term solution. It remains yet to be seen whether the
Polish and Lithuanian citizens will vote to join the EU. But if they do, the
future of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad will be in jeopardy once more. Some
have proposed to create a special “corridor” transit route through Lithuania
whereas others favor a multiple-entry visa for Kaliningraders for better travel
to Russia. Should Poland and Lithuania join the EU, the most
viable solution for Kaliningrad Oblast would be to grant it a special autonomous
status from Russia within the EU both to allow Kaliningraders to easily travel
to Russia and to maintain their economic ties with their Polish and Lithuanian
neighbors. Cheap “facilitated transit documents” would resolve the problem
of transit between Russia and Kaliningrad but, just like the concept of a
designated corridor, would sever Kaliningrad’s ties to its neighboring
countries on whose interaction its fragile economy depends.
The research for this essay is mainly based on articles of various online news agencies. Other sources used include periodicals and books. This paper consists of four parts. The first part of the paper will illustrate Kaliningrad’s pre-World War II history when it still belonged to the German province of East Prussia (Ostpreußen). The second section will discuss the social, political, and economic developments that have occurred in the Kaliningrad region since 1946. This part of the paper is not just supposed to offer mere reflections on the immense problems that Kaliningrad has experienced. Although these problems are addressed, this section will also provide an insight into positive developments that have shaped the region. Then follows a short history of the European Union and a discussion of how likely it is that Poland and Lithuania will join the Union. The final part will consist of a debate of possible solutions to the problem that a possible expansion of the European Union may inflict on the region. In conclusion, the viability of the different approaches to the “Kaliningrad Question” will be analyzed and compared to one another.
Kaliningrad
Oblast, which covers the area of the northern part of former German East
Prussia, looks back at a turbulent history. After World War I, the Treaty of
Versailles 
of 1919, awarded
large portions of the German province of West Prussia to Poland. This act
separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany since West Prussia had connected
East Prussia with Pomerania and other parts of Germany. As Figure One shows,
former West
Prussia became known as the Polish Corridor. Being separated from mainland
Germany created a sense of insecurity among East Prussians who felt exposed to
possible invasions from Poland or Lithuania. Prior to Hitler coming to power,
his National Socialist Worker’s Party of Germany (NSDAP) took advantage of
this fear and spread false information about an impending Polish invasion to get
East Prussian votes. In addition, the East Prussian government feared that the
geographical separation from Germany would severely hurt its already sickly
economy. Indeed, investors from other areas of Germany were reluctant to invest
in East Prussia as the province was considered “an endangered area, in which
investments were only justifiable with special high risk bonuses.” (trans.
Hertz-Eichenrode 1969: 22) Therefore, shortly after World War I, the East
Prussian government requested autonomy from Germany to improve the province’s
economy. The request was never granted. Had Berlin granted autonomy or even
independence to East Prussia, history may have taken an altogether different
course for today’s Kaliningrad Oblast.
After Hitler came to power, one of his numerous
goals was the elimination of the Polish Corridor to re-connect East
Prussia with mainland Germany and re-integrate it into the German economy. The outcome of the Second World War is 
well-known and needs
not be discussed at length. Suffice it to say that after four days of heavy
British air raids, the province’s capital of Königsberg capitulated in
April 1945. Figure Two shows the destroyed downtown area of Königsberg.
The majority of the province’s German population fled from the approaching
Soviet Red Army to the area west of the rivers Oder and Neisse, which became the
new border between the newly established state of East Germany and Poland. The
fate of East Prussia was decided at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, dividing it
into a northern Soviet and a southern Polish part. In 1946, the city of Königsberg
was formally re-named Kaliningrad. The city was named in remembrance of Mikhail
Kalinin, who was a strong supporter of Stalin and a member of the Soviet
Politburo until his death in 1946. In the same year, Kaliningrad, as well as the
entire northern portion of East Prussia was formally added to Soviet territory
under the name of Kaliningrad Oblast.
Due to the enormous destruction of the city and to the wish to erase all traces of German history, Kaliningrad, unlike most other devastated cities, was never re-built. Instead, the Soviet government razed all ruins of the downtown area and erected pompous high rise buildings and parks in their place. Essentially, it can be said that modern-day Kaliningrad was built on top of the rubble of historical Königsberg. The Internet page of the city of Kaliningrad states that “only the silhouette of the main cathedral built in the 14th century reminds us of a real age of the city.” (“Kaliningrad” 2002) Therefore, other than the geographical location, the two cities have little in common. Then, between the years of 1947 and 1948, the few Germans that had remained behind were forcefully resettled to Germany or deported to Siberia.
According
to the Soviet state plan, the Kaliningrad province was supposed to be
transformed into the country’s biggest fishing region. However, the
province’s strategic location resulted in the establishment of a highly
secured and secretive Soviet naval base. That is the reason why Kaliningrad
Oblast was sealed off from 
the
rest of Europe during the years of the Cold War. Figure Three shows a map of the
Kaliningrad region after 1946. The harbor of Baltiysk (Pillau), west of Kaliningrad,
provided the Soviet Union with its only year-round ice-free naval access to the
Baltic Sea. The headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet were established at
Kaliningrad with Baltiysk as a nearby naval base. According to the Federation of
American Scientists, it was “estimated that the total Kaliningrad garrison
includes as many as 200,000 military personnel.” (“Baltic Fleet” 2002)
However, after the dissolution of the USSR, Kaliningrad Oblast became separated
from the rest of Russia when Lithuania, Kaliningrad’s neighbor to the north
and east, proclaimed its independence. As a result, the Russian navy was slowly
downsized due to an uncertainty about the future of the Kaliningrad region. As of
August 2001, the number of troops stationed in the province has been reduced to
only 25,000. (Rüesch 2001) Ever since 1991, Kaliningrad has unsuccessfully
struggled to cope with its situation. In 1999, its “per capita gross domestic
product was five times lower than Lithuania’s, eight times lower than
Poland’s, and forty times lower than the EU average.” (Burbank 2002:
421) Since Moscow realized that it was unrealistic to maintain Kaliningrad as
a military stronghold, the Russian government attempted to improve the
province’s economic situation by attracting foreign investment instead.
In
1992, Kaliningrad Oblast was turned into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to
attract foreign investors. However, the free trade policy was abolished in 1995
only to be reinstated in 1996. This policy allows foreign investors to set up
plants in Kaliningrad Oblast and export their produce, whether abroad or to
mainland Russia, without having to pay any form of customs duties. In addition,
the agreement offers the possibility to import goods duty-free into the region
from abroad. This makes Kaliningrad one of the cheapest sites for companies in
Europe. But the hoped-for level of investments remained below the Russian
expectations. Instead, declaring Kaliningrad an SEZ had unhoped-for
consequences. According to Andreas Rüesch of the Neue Züricher Zeitung,
“Kaliningrad’s status as a Special Economic Zone with numerous tax and
customs privileges has led to a flourishing trade in smuggling with neighboring
countries.” (Rüesch 2001) Thus, in addition to attracting few foreign
investors, the new agreement has made it easier for private persons to earn
extra money by illegally shipping goods like cigarettes across the border to
Poland where they sell for a considerable price. In the Russian mainland,
“the average per capita income is one third higher than in Kaliningrad.” (Rüesch 2001) EU reports even indicate that “trafficking in drugs, cars, amber and
human beings, provides half of the enclave’s wealth.” (“EU Visit” 2001)
Therefore, smuggling is not the only problem that Kaliningrad’s regional government faces.
In fact, the region suffers from innumerable problems. Among others, “Kaliningrad is a
favourite transit route for criminal gangs trading in drugs and women.” (Roxburgh
2001) Besides, diseases like HIV, tuberculosis, and diphtheria are rampant among
its inhabitants. In addition, Kaliningrad’s obsolete industry and
infrastructure has inflicted severe and possibly irreparable damage to the
environment. John Burbank, a specialist on Russia and Easter Europe, maintained
that “within the city of Kaliningrad itself, air pollution is five to six
times greater than anywhere else in the Russian Federation, which itself has
levels far greater than any EU country.” (Burbank 2002: 421) All of these
were problems Kaliningrad’s government had hoped to solve through their status
as a free trade zone. In fact, as pointed out, only few companies took the
opportunity to invest in Kaliningrad. Russian politicians have suggested various
plans to bring the local economy back on its feet. Liberal politicians have
advocated the idea to turn Kaliningrad into a “Russian Hong Kong on the Baltic.”
(Roxburgh
2001) However, considering the widespread problems that Kaliningrad
is facing, it is unlikely that this dream will come true any time in the near
future. Radical thinkers have even proposed to sell “the Kaliningrad region in
exchange for writing-off Russia’s debt in Germany.” (Eke 2001) Obviously,
this solution was never considered by the Russian government.
Although Russia realizes the importance of economic investments, some people have suspiciously watched how German companies like the car producer BMW have accepted Kaliningrad’s invitation to invest in the region and to set up plants there. Some, like author Jacob Heilbrunn of The New Republic, believe there is a danger that Germany will take advantage of Kaliningrad’s economic backwardness to ‘re-Germanize’ the region through German investments. (Heilbrunn 1995: 14) First off, it needs to be remarked that Heilbrunn’s article is explicitly anti-German. But, because this is such an important topic, it is necessary to analyze his arguments more closely. Heilbrunn describes how German “homesick tourists” (Heimwehtouristen) visited their former homes. Many of those traveling to Kaliningrad today still have memories of when the region was German. Since the region had been off limits for any Westerner during the Cold War, it seems natural that now that it is possible to go there, many take the chance to travel to Kaliningrad to see their former homes once more. However, what Heilbrunn and others fails to recognize is the difference between traveling their and wanting to re-settle the area. As pointed out, the Heimwehtouristen are emotionally attached to the area because they can still remember how it used to be prior to the war. Despite that, most of them recognize that sixty years of Soviet and Russian history have passed since they left and transformed the Ostpreußen they knew into the Kaliningrad that we know today. On a legal basis, the German government has officially surrendered all claims to its former territories in the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975. Therefore, it seems implausible that Germany would attempt to re-Germanize the area through investments especially since there is virtually no German population left in the region that would benefit from such a ‘re-Germanization.’ Even though they visit the region once in a while, the German people are long gone and the only thing that reminds that they were ever there are a few historical buildings that have survived over the years.
Currently,
however, Kaliningrad is 
experiencing a reawaking of history. Today’s
Kaliningraders, who had come as
settlers from all over the Soviet Union and have no historical ties to their new
homeland, are gaining an increasing interested in the rich history of the region
that they now inhabit. Alexander Kwiatkowski of BBC News tells the story of
Avenir Osyanov who was among the people who, in 1957, “blew up the remaining
parts of Königsberg Castle [Figure Four], already partially destroyed by allied
bombing.” (Kwiatkowski 2002) Now, over forty years later, he has returned to
the site to restore the remains of the castle. Osyanov told BBC News that “up
until the 1990s … ancient history was banned. In all official publications
about the Kaliningrad region and about the city, history began in 1945.” (Kwiatkowski 2002) Hence, now that the numbing years of Socialism are over, the Russians
begin to honor the long years of history that had shaped Prussia for more than
seven hundred years before Kaliningrad became Russian. This move is especially
significant since the Soviet government had attempted to erase all memories of
Kaliningrad’s pre-Russian era. But, just like the German Heimwehtouristen
are interested in finding out what has become of Kaliningrad, so are the
Kaliningraders interested in finding out more about the history of the region
they inherited.
Kaliningrad’s newly
discovered history and its geographical isolation from Russia has caused many
Kaliningraders to
become more closely affiliated to Europe. It is especially the young generation that
openly admits to feel not only Russian but also European. According to Caroline
Wyatt of BBC News, “only 15% of young people there have been to Russia while
80% have been to Europe—and that is where many see their future.” (Wyatt
2002) With respect to Kaliningrad’s isolation, European politicians have
advised Kaliningrad to loosen ties with Moscow to improve the local economy.
Some Kaliningrader’s approve of this suggestion because they realize
that this might be a way to improve their standard of living. Thus, the Russian government is worried that if Kaliningrad becomes
even more autonomous and pro-European, the local population might consider
secession from Russia. Of course, this would be unacceptable. A small minority
of Kaliningraders favor turning the province into a “fourth Baltic
country.” (“Between Two Worlds” 2002: 48) A few others have even started a campaign
“to return Kaliningrad to its original name of Königsberg.” (Wyatt
2002)
Actions like these show that Kaliningrad’s young generation would like to
establish closer ties with neighboring Europe. This does not mean that they seek
separation form Russia. But they are trying to remain Russian while becoming
European at the same time. Therefore, if Poland and
Lithuania decide to join the European Union, Kaliningraders are determined not
to be left out.
Delegates from the EU have since met multiple times with their Russian counterparts to discuss Kaliningrad’s future status should Lithuania and Poland vote in favor of the European Union. Kaliningrad’s governor Vladimir Yegorov has advocated to award a special status to his province because of its unique location. Yegorov seems to be mostly optimistic about the future as he compared the possible EU expansion to the expansion of NATO a few years ago. He said that “you can express things one of two ways—either that Nato is surrounding Kaliningrad or that Kaliningrad is becoming the centre of Nato.” (“EU Visit” 2001) Western politicians, however, first remained skeptical about the ways in which Russia sought to deal with a potential EU expansion. Some news reports from 2001 even asserted that the Russian government had moved strategic nuclear weapons into the enclave to underscore the permanence of the Russian claim to its westernmost province. However, the Russian government has always denied the truth of these assertions. An article in The Economist of 2002 also addressed the issue and confirmed that, indeed, nuclear weapons are moved in and out of the region on a regular basis. (“Between Two Worlds” 2002: 48) Fortunately, this has not become an impediment to EU-Russian talks.
A History of the European Union and the Views of the EU Applicant States of Poland and Lithuania
Beginning
after World War II, Western Europe began to grow together increasingly tightly.
The entity now known as the European Union had its origins in 1951. Then, the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded to maintain peace in Europe
by bringing both “victors and vanquished together within an institutional
structure which would allow them to cooperate as equals.” (Fontaine 2002) Only
six countries, including, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the
Netherlands, were part of the ECSC. Six years later, in 1957, the original six
decided to form an economic union, which was established in Rome as the European
Economic Community (EEC). Since the treaty proved to be successful, Denmark,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom applied for membership but were only admitted in
1972. Greece was awarded membership in 1981 and Spain and Portugal followed in
1986. At this point, the European Community became significant as an
international player. Over a time period of thirty years it had doubled its
membership and provided permanent peace among the previously hostile European
states.
The
fall of the iron curtain that had marked the border between Capitalist Western
Europe and the Communist Warsaw Pact states provided European Community members
with the unique opportunity to create a union of European states that would go
far beyond economic relations. In 1993, the European Community became the
European Union. Its goals were a “monetary union by 1999, new common policies,
European citizenship, a common foreign and security policy and internal
security.” (Fontaine 2002) Some of these goals have materialized already. Austria, Finland, and Sweden were the last states
to join the EU in 1995. For 2004, there are ten new states in line for EU
membership. Most of them are former Warsaw Pact states that are now seeking to
take their rightful place in Europe. However, throughout the years of its
existence, the European Union has come to be seen as an elitist club of rich
European countries. Thus, some countries are only seeking entry into the EU to
gain prestige. Unfortunately, many are ill-prepared to face the consequences the
entry would entail.
Although the discussion about the Kaliningrad question is well under way, it remains to be seen whether the countries surrounding the province will actually vote to join the EU. Lithuania is due to vote on a possible entry into the EU between 10 and 11 May 2003. Poland will decide one month later, on 8 June 2003. So far, it has been widely assumed that both will vote yes. However, many Poles and Lithuanians would lose out if their country entered into the EU. Therefore, in both countries, the vote on the entry into the EU has become a very controversial issue. Hence, it is essential to first discuss both countries’ stand on the EU. This will be helpful in determining the likelihood of the Kaliningrad region becoming a true problem that needs to be resolved.
Of the thirteen applicant
states (CC 13), only ten, the so-called “Laeken 10,” have been officially allowed to
vote on a possible EU
membership. Figure Five illustrates the diversity of opinions on the EU among
citizens of all thirteen applicants. Both Poland and Lithuania
seem very divided on the issue. Only 52 and 48 percent respectively believe that
entering into the EU 
would be a good thing for
their country. The Polish people were the ones who had
initiated the struggle against the Communist regime under Lech Wałesa’s
Solidarity (Solidarność) movement some ten years ago. They had
fought Communism in hope for a better future. In fact, for many things have
become even worse since the downfall of Communism. Polish
farmers are most afraid of the expansion of the EU. Farming is subsidized in EU
countries making it easier for European farmers to compete on the market.
However, Polish farmers “are being offered only 25% of the direct payments
handed out in the West. This will mean the end of the Polish agriculture.”
(Franks 2002) The
economic downturn has gravely affected the
working population. By 2001, unemployment had soared to 17 percent with numerous
factories laying off thousands of workers. If Poland joined the EU, Polish
producers would have to compete with big European companies, which would
ultimately result in an even bigger increase in unemployment. In addition,
Poland’s eastern border would become the border of the EU and would have to be
properly secured. The problem is that the Polish fear to sever ties with their
Ukrainian ally by having to restrict border crossings of goods and people. And,
the border traffic to and from Kaliningrad Oblast would have to be restricted as
well. The implications of that will be discussed at length later on.
Similar to concerns voiced among Russians in Kaliningrad, some Poles are afraid that the German population that had been forcefully removed from their homes may take the opportunity and use their right of free movement and decide to re-settle former German areas. Some believe that “nowadays, they [the Germans] don’t have to manufacture tanks and guns. Euros and dollars are enough.” (Franks 2002) There is no denying that some Germans would indeed make use of the opportunity to buy property in Poland and move there. At the same time, due to Poland’s sickly employment situation, it is likely that many Poles will move to Western Europe where they will be able to find jobs. In that sense, movements and benefits will be reciprocal. Of course, this is not to say that the German government or the German people intend to reclaim former German areas. But it is meant to suggest that the EU also incorporates free movement for all citizens within its borders. The European peoples will never be able to become properly integrated if terrible mistakes committed by past regimes remain an obstacle to free movement. Thus, why should free movement apply to Poles but not to Germans? Essentially, the argument that Germans are not welcome to settle in Poland is one-sided.
Lithuania’s
concerns about entry into the EU are similar to the Polish ones. As of October
2002, the unemployment level was at 16.5 percent. In addition, also Lithuania
has a large agrarian sector just like Poland. Supposedly, Brussels has only
accepted Lithuania’s application for EU entry so that all three Baltic states
would have the opportunity to join the EU at the same time. But Lithuanians,
just like the Poles, are concerned that their economy would suffer greatly from
an entry into the European Union. Another problem that Lithuania’s entry would
entail is the isolation of Kaliningrad Oblast located to its southwest. All of these
issues will have an influence on the outcome of the Lithuanian referendum in
May. Therefore, it is by no
means certain that either Poland or Lithuania will choose to become EU members. In the end, the outcomes
of the Polish and Lithuanian referenda will determine the necessity of a
solution to a possible isolation of the province of Kaliningrad.
Kaliningrad’s Future in a European Context
In
preparation for the case that both countries do vote for EU entries, European
and Russian envoys have met numerous times to deliberate on the best course of
action with respect to Kaliningrad. The first of the two main
proposals seriously considered was awarding Kaliningrad citizens a special
status and allowing them to purchase cheap multiple-entry EU visas enabling them
to better travel to Russia. The second suggestion was a corridor through
Lithuanian territory based on the model of the Polish Corridor between Pomerania
and East Prussia between the two World Wars and the transit routes that existed
between West Germany and West Berlin during the Cold War. This section of the
paper will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of both proposals.
Furthermore, the section will highlight the viewpoints of the various political
actors and the reasons for why they hold their specific views.
Among the first solutions proposed by the EU was to incorporate Kaliningrad province into the EU’s Schengen Agreement should Poland and Lithuania join the Union. The Schengen Agreement allows for free movement of EU citizens within the borders of member states without having to worry about border controls or the like. When Kaliningrad governor Yegorov was asked his opinion on this proposal, he remarked that it was “an attempt to initiate a drift of the Kaliningrad region away from Russia.” (Nuyakshev 2002: 1) He believed that any solution to the problem would have to be valid not only for citizens of Kaliningrad Oblast but also for Russians from the mainland. Russian President Vladimir Putin supported Yegorov’s position. Referring to citizens of Russia proper wanting to travel to Kaliningrad Oblast, he stressed that “citizens wanting to travel around their own country [should not] need permission from a foreign official.” (“Between Two Worlds” 2002: 48) The EU, on the other hand, has emphasized that Putin’s proposal “is unacceptable and that there can be no exceptions to its visa rules.” (“Hot Seat” 2002: 1) Those were the original positions of the two parties at the start of the debate over Kaliningrad.
Despite the differences between the two entities, President Putin has generally welcomed the expansion of the European Union. Putin said that the expansion would hopefully lead to a closer collaboration between EU countries and Russia, which would be especially beneficial for Russia because the EU is its main trade partner. However, up until then, the talks of a possible enlargement of the EU had led to widespread agitation among Russians because they believed the integrity of the state of Russia was at stake. But still, Putin remained confident that an acceptable solution could be found. Throughout the negotiations, Lithuania was in an awkward position because it is due to join the EU and make its borders more secure. At the same time the country is highly dependant on energy supplies from Russia. This is one of the reasons why Lithuania has been willing to negotiate special transit agreements with Russia in case of an EU entry. Poland’s Prime Minister Leszek Miller, on the other hand, “has said that his country will adopt the EU visa regime, and will not make any exceptions.” (“Hot Seat” 2002: 1) Therefore, if Poland adopted the EU regulations and Lithuania allowed Russians to travel across its territory, the problem of free movements of Russians between the different parts of the country would be solved. The impact on the domestic economy, however, would still be damaging because most of the small-scale trade and smuggling that has helped boost Kaliningrad’s economy largely depends on open borders with neighboring Poland.
Problems with transit between Kaliningrad and Russia had already arisen long before the Baltic countries were officially admitted into the EU. In 2001, the government of Latvia, north of Lithuania, decided to require Russian citizens to obtain visas for traveling through its territory. That affected the train traffic between Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, which had run through Latvia until then. Hence, it was decided to bypass Latvia and redirect trains through Lithuanian territory. This makes travel between the two locations 300 kilometers and 11 hours longer. Fortunately, the price for tickets went down by 80 rubles, which at least makes it more affordable to buy tickets. In that sense, the concern of Russian officials is understandable. If the Baltic states all become EU members, the temporary solution to bypass Latvia will not be available any longer as Lithuania will have to comply with EU standards on visas as well. Consequently, to prevent a further division between Kaliningrad and Russia, the solution should allow for easy transit traveling. This is what Putin was advocating.
President Putin’s
stance on Kaliningrad enjoyed widespread support among his government and the
Russian people. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov confirmed
that an easy accession of Euro visas for Kaliningraders was not enough to
satisfy the Russians. Like Putin, he compared Kaliningrad’s isolation form the
mainland to West Berlin’s isolated geographical situation from West Germany
until 1989. Back then it was necessary for travelers to obtain a special transit
visa (Transitvisum) that allowed the traveler to cross through the
territory of the German Democratic Republic to reach West Berlin or West
Germany. Figure Six shows an image of such a Transitivisum. A later part
of the paper will discuss the issue of West Berlin in more depth. Essentially,
German citizens were allowed to travel to and from West Berlin but were required
to first obtain such visas. It is open to discussion what “free movement”
entails. But the simple fact that travel between the two parts of West Germany
were not permitted without the transit visa is an indication that movement was
in fact not all that “free.” Foreign Minister Ivanov (and President Putin as
well) made exactly that argument that travel between Kaliningrad and Russia
needed to be free and not dependant on the acquisition of such visas. Thus, by
quoting the situation of West Berlin, Ivanov and Putin in fact undermined their
argument for visa-free movement. At the same time, this is not to say that the Soviet Union
had wanted to
impede traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. However, it is to suggest
that the government of Eastern Germany under Soviet hegemony wanted to regulate
free movement, which was only possible after the visa had been granted.
Regulating traffic is not a bad idea and the European Union should have the
right to determine which persons are allowed to obtain the right to enter EU
territory. This is a simple matter
of safety.
Ivanov signaled to the EU
officials that he acknowledged their concern about security. That is why he
suggested that “if somebody is concerned about security issues, we are
prepared to closely cooperate in this field.” (“Simpler Visa” 2002: 1) On
that basis, Russia showed its willingness to negotiate an acceptable solution
for both sides. Also the EU was willing to come to a compromise that would
guarantee the security of the European states and assure free movement of
Russian citizens. Therefore, a number of alternatives to the multiple-entry visa
and the incorporation of Kaliningrad Oblast into the Schengen Agreement were put
forth. The second
major proposal discussed was to establish a corridor between Kaliningrad and
Russia proper. A ‘corridor’ would allow Russian citizens to travel between
Russia and Kaliningrad on designated routes through Lithuania and possibly
Latvia as well. The debate about a possible creation of a corridor has sparked
numerous controversies. Some contend that the word ‘corridor’ bears a
negative connotation as it reminds many of the Polish Corridor. Therefore, it
was agreed to use the word ‘transit routes’ instead. But the name of the
proposed solution was not the people’s only concern. Many believe that travel
via transit routes would alienate Kaliningraders from their neighboring
countries. As was pointed out earlier, Kaliningraders on average have closer
ties with their European neighbors which stems for the province’s geographical
location. The closest point of mainland Russia lies some 500 kilometers east of
Kaliningrad Oblast’s eastern border whereas Poland and Lithuania or other
central European countries are much closer.
The main argument is that even though a transit
agreement would solve the problem of free movement for Russian citizens within
Russian borders, the agreement would contribute to severing crucial ties between
Kaliningraders and the Polish and Lithuanians. Nevertheless, the proposal has
received significant attention during the Russo-European negotiations. However,
the government of Lithuania strongly objected to the idea of a corridor. The
Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas commented that “his country
could not envisage such a link across its territory.” (“Lithuania Rejects
Corridor” 2002) Brazauskas
did not elaborate what exactly he found objectionable about the plan. If transit
routes were to be created, it would be hard to control whether travelers between
Kaliningrad and Russia would in fact stay on the designated routes. In the case
of West Berlin, East German police kept the transit routes under constant
surveillance to ensure that no one from West Germany would leave the routes
without permission. Lithuania would have to face similar measures to secure the
routes. This is probably one of the reasons why Lithuanians feel uncomfortable
with the idea of a transit route. Most likely, Vilnius
“fears becoming the weak link in the Schengen chain.” (O’Rourke 2002)
In
addition, it is questionable whether a transit route would lead to the outcome
desired by Russians—keeping Kaliningrad as close to Russia as possible. Once
again, the example of Berlin may help understand the problem. During the Cold
War, West Berlin always maintained a special status as an autonomous region
although it formally belonged to West Germany. For example, West Berlin issued
its own stamps and West Berliners were not drafted into the army. This means
that despite transit routes and despite the formal attachment to West Germany,
West Berlin remained an entity of its own until 1990. If Kaliningrad Oblast is
to be connected to Russia via transit routes, this may have similar affects,
namely increasing autonomy and alienation from mainland Russia. Since that is
exactly what Russia wants to prevent they should consider alternate plans.
Furthermore, it seems like there is one inherent problem that exists with the
creation of corridors. The Polish Corridor lasted for about twenty years and the
transit routes to West Berlin lasted for about forty years. In the first case,
World War II changed the maps of Europe and in the latter case, the breakdown of
Communism brought the separation of East and West Germany to an end. It can be
argued that transit routes may not provide a viable solution for Kaliningrad
because they have not provided viable solutions in past circumstances. If at
all, transit routes can be a short-term solution.
At
the EU-Russia summit in Copenhagen on 11 November 2002, Russia and the EU agreed
to introduce a “cheap multi-entry obtainable ‘facilitated transit document [FTD].’”
(“Kaliningrad Deal” 2002) In essence, this outcome is a compromise that is
more favorable to the EU than to Russia. Throughout the negotiations, Russia had
insisted on visa-free transit between Kaliningrad and Russia. Although the new
transit document is not called a visa, that is essentially what it is. The EU
explained that these travel documents were a necessity to be able to monitor
transit travelers and to assure that they would not illegally immigrate into the
EU. The FTD would be a necessary transit document for travelers by car whereas
those traveling by non-stop busses or trains would not need to apply for the FTD.
In the latter two cases, the European Commission requires lists of travelers and
withholds the right to turn away suspect travelers. Up until 2004, the FTDs need
to be accompanied by an internal Russian pass whereas after that time, only
international Russian passports will be accepted. According to Evgeny Vinokurov
of The Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, “the probable outcome
might include following aspects: (a) issuing FTDs for frequent travelers only
(business, families), (b) the cost of 5 Euros, (c) transit time of 24 hours
maximum, (d) valid for three years, (e) Lithuanian consulates in charge of
issuing FTDs.” (Vinokurov 2003) This solution would help Lithuania to maintain
a maximum of sovereignty over its own borders. Nevertheless, Lithuania remains
skeptical whether the new visa regime will be effective in preventing illegal
immigration. If it does not, Lithuania fears to be excluded from the Schengen
Agreement, which is highly desired. So far, both Russia and the EU seem
satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. For the long term, the EU and
Russia envision a more sophisticated solution than this short-term visa regime.
During the European-Russian talks, delegates have suggested to build special
train tracks that could allow sealed high speed trains to connect Kaliningrad
with the mainland. These trains would not be allowed to stop in EU territory and
would, therefore, make it hard for people to get into the European Union
illegally. This project is seen as a viable long-term solution by both Russia
and the EU.
The facilitated transit document agreement is supposed
to enter into force on 1 July 2003. Then it will become apparent whether the
agreement will allow for easy travel between Kaliningrad and Russia. It
is uncertain how hard or easy it will actually be to obtain the visas. After
all, the facilitated transit document has been agreed upon to make transit easy
for Russians. So far, Lithuania only has one consulate in Kaliningrad
where Kaliningraders could apply for the document. Therefore, Lithuania has
started talks with the Russian government whether they could open another
consulate in the city of Sovetsk to allow for better access to the document. For
travelers by train, the document will be available at the border. The Russian
authorities seem satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. However, the
European Union has announced that “other candidates besides Lithuania are free
to decide whether to grant transit rights through their territory to Russian
citizens carrying an FTD.” (Lobjakas 2002) In the end, even though the
facilitated transit document is a form of multiple-entry EU visa, it does not
allow Kaliningraders to easily travel to EU countries like Poland. On
the contrary, it is much more based on the concept of a corridor or transit
routes.
In
light of the current political situation in Europe, the above described solution
is surely a clever way out. The Russian government is satisfied because
it has accomplished its goal for easier transit between Kaliningrad and Russia.
The EU is satisfied because it did not have to entirely give in to the Russian
request of free movement for Russians. Furthermore, it is able to maintain a level
of control over who is to cross future EU territory, which decreases the danger
of illegal immigrants into the EU. But what about the Kaliningraders? Most
Kaliningraders do not posses international passports and many cannot be
classified as “frequent travelers.” For many, the enlargement of the EU will
become an obstacle to unrestricted traveling between Kaliningrad and Russia. In
addition, the agreement leaves several issues unsolved: “there is no visa-free
transit, communication will cost money and time; visa-free travel to Poland and
Lithuania which Kaliningraders enjoyed throughout the last 10 years will be over
in several months. The residents of Kaliningrad will have to … receive regular
visas for Poland and Lithuania; economic consequences of the EU enlargement
remain unclear and by no means bright.” (Vinokurov 2003) Given these facts, it
becomes questionable whether the deal on Kaliningrad really resolves the
problem.
Apparently, it does not. But, as hinted above, it is currently the best solution that is politically acceptable. A better solution would be for Russia to allow Kaliningrad to become more autonomous. Kaliningraders could be allowed to purchase special long-term Euro visas that would not limit them to transiting to Russia but also help them maintain their economic ties with neighboring Poland and Lithuania. Moreover, Kaliningrad’s economy is likely to suffer if the ties with the Baltic states and Poland are severed through the EU expansion. This would not benefit Russia, the EU, or Kaliningrad. Therefore, it should be in everyone’s best interest to support the Kaliningrad region and incorporate it to some extent into the EU network while maintaining its status as a Russian province. It is time that both the EU and Russia acknowledge that Kaliningrad is a special region with a special history. Following from that, it should not receive the same treatment as the rest of Russia simply because of its unique status and geographical isolation. At the same time, it should not become a part of the Schengen Agreement, as was suggested at the beginning of the negotiations. Instead, Kaliningrad has the potential to become a model region for European-Russian cooperation, integration, and friendship. The European Union stands for free movement and a growing together of European nations. Its expansion should not be allowed to result in the exclusion and isolation of Kaliningrad because that would go contrary to the idea of increasing ties among European states.
Consequently, should Poland and Lithuania join the EU, the most viable solution for Kaliningrad Oblast would be to grant it a special autonomous status from Russia within the EU both to allow Kaliningraders to easily travel to Russia and to maintain their economic ties with their Polish and Lithuanian neighbors. Cheap “facilitated transit documents” would resolve the problem of transit between Russia and Kaliningrad but, just like the concept of a designated corridor, would sever Kaliningrad’s ties to its neighboring countries on whose interaction its fragile economy depends. Over the course of the twentieth century, the status of the Kaliningrad region has been subject to constant change. After the fall of the iron curtain, the region has struggled to come to terms with its unique situation. Despite the manifold problems that have set back necessary development and advancements, Kaliningrad has recently managed to achieve a growing gross regional product through trade and investments. This may provide a basis for an alleviation of the province’s problems and an increasing standard of living for its population. However, it is uncertain whether investments and economic growth will continue if Kaliningrad becomes an island within Europe only connected to its motherland by transit routes. After World War I, East Prussia certainly saw a decrease in German investments after it was separated from the rest of Germany. It remains to be seen whether history will repeat itself once more.
Hertz-Eichenrode, Dieter. Politik und Landwirtschaft in Ostpreußen 1919-1930: Untersuchung eines Strukturproblems in der Weimarer Republik. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969.
Hertz-Eichenrode examines East Prussia structural problems between 1919 and 1930 brought about by its geographical isolation from the German mainland.
Herzog, Uwe. “Die Toten von Königsberg Müssen einen Platz im Geschichtsbuch Finden.” 18 March 2002. Bergakademie Freiberg. 28 Feb. 2003 <http://www.chemie.tu-freiberg.de/~herzog/Ostpreussen/Die_Toten_von_Koenigsberg.htm>.
Herzog describes the fate of the people of Königsberg and their city.
“Historical Background of the Region.” 2003. Kaliningrad Regional Administration. 12 March 2003 <http://www.gov.kaliningrad.ru/en_history.php3>.
The page offers a historical account of East Prussia beginning in ancient history all the way to modern times.
Malone, Jerry. “Polish Corridor.” 2000. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 4th ed. 28 Feb. 2003 <http://www.bartleby.com/61/30/P0413000.html>.
The Polish Corridor was one of the main causes of the German invasion of Poland in 1939.
“Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin.” 1 Aug. 2000. National Politics Web Guide. 3 March 2003 <http://lego70.tripod.com/rus/kalinin.htm>.
The web page describes the life of Mikhail Kalinin, the namesake of Kaliningrad.
“Baltic Fleet.” 7 Sep. 2000. Federation of American Scientists. 4 March 2003 <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/mf-baltic.htm>.
Kaliningrad Oblast has become the home of the Russian Baltic Fleet.
Burbank, John. “What to Do About Kaliningrad?” Europe. 421 (2002): 18-19.
The Kaliningrad region poses problems to the EU expansion because of its crime and pollution levels and a lack of a solutions as to how its citizens will be able to travel to mainland Russia.
Eke, Stephen. “Kaliningrad: Proud Past, Uncertain Future.” 15 Feb. 2001. BBC News. 5 Feb. 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1172075.stm>.
Kaliningrad is looking for ways to prevent complete isolation in case Poland and Lithuania join the EU.
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European delegates meet with Russians to discuss the problems and the future of Kaliningrad.
Heilbrunn, Jacob. “Homesick.” The New Republic 212.16 (1995): 14.
Increasing numbers of former East Prussians visit Kaliningrad, creating the fear that the region will become “Germanized” once more.
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The city of Kaliningrad is portrayed with respect to its economy, culture, history, and ecology.
Kruijt, Rob. “Neue und Alte Türme.” 2003. Das Ordensschloß von Königsberg in Preußen. 10 March 2003 <http://www.geocities.com/Vienna/1664/koenschloss/outside6.htm>.
The page gives a short account of the history of the castle of Königsberg.
Kwiatkowski, Alexander. “Kaliningrad Rediscovers its History.” 16 Sept. 2002. BBC News. 5 Feb. 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2261036.stm>.
After almost sixty years, citizens of Kaliningraders make an effort to excavate relics of German history.
Roxburgh, Angus. “Russia’s Enclave of Grim Problems.” 15 Feb. 2001. BBC News. 5 Feb. 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1172463.stm>.
Aids, unemployment, and drug trafficking in Kaliningrad become increasing concerns for the expanding EU.
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Even lagging behind mainland Russia, Kaliningrad seeks to attract investors, decrease rampant crime rates, and deal with an uncertain future.
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The page shows a map of Kaliningrad Oblast and offers a few basic demographics.
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Wyatt explains Kaliningrad’s worries about future isolation from the Russian mainland and points out that the region’s inhabitants have increasingly closer ties with Europe.
A History of the European Union and the Views of the EU Applicant States of Poland and Lithuania
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Poles fear a worsening of their economic and social status if Poland was to join the EU.
Arnold, James. “At-A-Glance: EU Enlargement.” 8 Oct. 2002. BBC News. 15 Feb. 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2299095.stm>.
James Arnold introduces the thirteen EU applicant states.
“Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002: First Results.” 2002. European Commission Directorate General Press and Communication: Public Opinion Analysis. 14 March 2003 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2002/cceb_2002_highlights_en.pdf>.
The study shows analyzes public opinion of citizens of countries that have applied to join the EU in 2004.
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Fontaine summarizes the history of the European Union, its institutions, and its policies.
Franks, Tim. “Poles Defiant Over EU Entry.” 22 Aug. 2002. BBC News. 5 Feb. 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2210079.stm>.
Many Polish people oppose their country’s entry into the EU because they are afraid of increasing unemployment and of Germans resettling the area.
Lubowiecki, Wojciech. “Poland Sheds its EU Illusions.” 2 Dec. 2002. BBC News. 5 Feb. 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2528953.stm>.
The Polish population is split between uncertainty and opposition to EU membership.
“Between Two Worlds; Mainland Russia, Kaliningrad and the EU.” The Economist 363.8279 (2002): 48.
To prevent isolation from the EU and Russia, various visa and transit regulations are discussed.
Blagov, Sergei. “Politics-Russia: Some Leaders Fear Another Division.” Global Information Network. (2002): 1.
The EU and Russia are searching for a solution for safe traveling between Kaliningrad and Russia without jeopardizing European security.
“Communication From the Commission to the Council: The EU and Kaliningrad.” Commission of the European Communities. Brussels: COM, 2001. 6 Feb. 2003 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/com2001_0026en01.pdf>.
Problems caused by the possible EU expansion and options for their solution are discussed.
“EU and Russia Reach Kaliningrad Deal.” 11 Nov. 2002. BBC News. 16 March 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2440275.stm>.
The two parties have agreed to resolve the Kaliningrad Question by allowing Russian citizens to travel between the mainland and Kaliningrad with special multiple-entry visas.
“Europe: Cut Off; Kaliningrad.” The Economist 365.8304 (2002): 68-69.
For years, Kaliningrad has attempted to attract foreign investors, but its status as a trade free zone has only resulted in high corruption, crime, and HIV rates.
“Hot Seat: Debate Heats Up Over Kaliningrad.” NEFTE Compass 24 July 2002: 1.
If Poland and Lithuania entered the EU, Kaliningraders would be forced to obtain special visas for traveling between the Kaliningrad region and mainland Russia.
“Lithuania Rejects Russia-Kaliningrad Corridor.” 3 May 2002. BBC News. 5 Feb. 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1966961.stm>.
Lithuania seeks for an alternative to a possible corridor between Kaliningrad and the Russia mainland.
Lobjakas, Ahto. “EU: Russian Demands Win Out on Kaliningrad Transit” 18 Sept. 2002. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 21 March 2003 <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/09/18092002143204.asp>.
Russia and the EU may agree to resolve their differences over Kaliningrad by introducing facilitated transit documents.
Michigan State University. 17 March 2003 <http://www.msu.edu/user/okadakat/E_Europe/pics/transvis.jpg>.
The page shows an image of a transit visa used for traveling between West Berlin and West Germany during the Cold War years.
“Moscow Will Never Agree to Separation of Kaliningrad: Putin.” ITAR-TASS News Wire 24 June 2002: 1.
President Putin suggests a travel agreement between Russia and the EU similar to the transit routes between Germany and West Berlin during the Cold War.
Nuyakshev, Vladimir. “Kaliningrad Governor Insists on Visa-Free Regime.” ITAR-TASS News Wire 10 June 2002: 1.
Citizens of the Kaliningrad region should not have to obtain visas in order to travel to mainland Russia.
O’Rourke, Breffni. “EU: Have Kaliningrad’s Transit Problems Been Solved?” 14 Nov. 2002. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 20 March 2003 <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/11/14112002153650.asp>.
“Facilitated Transit Documents” are supposedly the solution to the problem of transit between Kaliningrad and Russia.
“PM Favours Automatic Border-Crossing Mode For Kaliningrad.” ITAR-TASS News Wire 10 June 2002: 1.
Prime Minister Kasyanov maintained that Kaliningraders should be allowed to cross over to Russia automatically.
“Russia: St. Petersburg-Kaliningrad Trains to Bypass Lithuania.” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Economic 9 June 2001: 1.
Beginning in June 2001, trains between Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg have been redirected to travel through Poland and Belarus.
Schroedter, Elisabeth. “Lösungssuche für Kaliningrad-Transit.” Oct. 2002. Elisabeth Schroedter, MdEP. 21 March 2003 <http://www.elisabeth-schroedter.de/downloads/in-02-10-01.pdf>.
Member of the European Parliament, Elisabeth Schroedter, outlines the positions of the EU and Russia on the Kaliningrad problem.
“Simpler Visa Regime Won’t Settle Kaliningrad Problem - Ivanov.” ITAR-TASS News Wire 12 June 2002: 1.
Foreign Minister Ivanov argued that the problem of Kaliningrad Oblast should be solved like the problem of West Berlin during the Cold War.
Vinokurov, Evgeny. “Kaliningrad After the Last EU-Russia Summit.” Feb. 2003. The Centre for European Policy Studies--Thinking Ahead for Europe. 21 March 2003 <http://www.ceps.be/Commentary/Feb03/Vinokurov.php>.
Vinokurov shows that there are still numerous problems with the Kaliningrad-Russia transit after the November 2002 agreement.
Voskoboinikova, Veronika. “Putin Criticizes EU Stand on Kaliningrad Region.” ITAR-TASS News Wire 29 May 2002: 1.
Putin emphasizes the importance of favorable inter-Russian travel conditions for Kaliningrad citizens.
