from the New York Times

May 8, 2001

By BUSTER OLNEY

The Yankees are running the bases so much these days that their aggressive tendencies are invading their sleep. Scott Brosius had this dream last Friday night: He was leading off first base, against Danny Darwin — a pitcher who retired three years ago — and he noticed that Darwin had a big leg kick in his delivery. Plus all the lights in the stadium were dimmed, as if he were running in a cave.

"So I was thinking that I could get a good jump, and maybe they wouldn't notice me because it was so dark," Brosius said, grinning.

Weird, but apropos. The Yankees lead the majors with 42 stolen bases, and have at least one stolen base in each of their past 17 games; they are the first American League team to accomplish that feat since the 1976 Oakland Athletics. Manager Joe Torre has pushed for the Yankees to be aggressive on the bases in every year he has managed, with a mixed response. In 1998, the Yankees swiped 153 bases; the next year, they had 104.

But their attack has been energized this season by the addition of the rookie Alfonso Soriano, who has 11 stolen bases, and the re-emergence of Chuck Knoblauch, who leads the league with 12 stolen bases. Derek Jeter has six steals. Their belligerence on the bases has infected others, as well — Paul O'Neill has five steals, and even Tino Martinez and Luis Sojo have stolen bases this year. "I want to be more aggressive with our base running," Torre said. "But the base stealing is a surprise, where we are right now."

The most important aspect of stealing bases for Soriano, he says, is focusing on the front leg of the pitcher: Soriano will break as soon as the leg moves and charge for second, unless the pitcher has curtailed his delivery with a slide-step. Jeter needs to run often to feel comfortable stealing. "It sounds funny, but if you don't run for a while, it feels like the distance to second base is longer," he said.

Knoblauch considers the circumstances — the speed of the pitcher's delivery, the strength of the catcher's arm, the score, the tendencies of the hitter, the ball-strike count — before he runs.

"I've always gone when I thought I could make it," he said. "Some people say you should feel like you should make it all the time, but I don't agree with that."

Brosius rarely runs, mostly on hit- and-run plays. But when he does, his decisions are heavily based on the time it takes the pitcher to deliver the ball to home plate. One-point- three seconds is considered average, 1.1 quick, 1.5 slothful.

The Yankees' reports will indicate the release times of opposing pitchers, but the first-base coach Lee Mazzilli holds a stopwatch during games and will relay that information to a base runner at first, leaning forward and speaking quietly into his left ear, telling him when he thinks the runner might have an opportunity.

Sometimes the base runners will indicate to Mazzilli that they think they can run, and for base runners who don't have the green light — Brosius and Jorge Posada, for example — approval must come from the bench, passed through Willie Randolph, the third-base coach.

Torre credited Mazzilli recently with developing a strong trust with the runners at first, specifically mentioning Knoblauch; Torre thinks Mazzilli has helped the runners recognize their opportunities, and if they are thrown out, Mazzilli will go to them afterward and encourage them to remain aggressive, to keep running.

Soriano, Knoblauch and Jeter are fast and quick, reaching their top speed within their first three or four steps, making them constant threats to steal. Other Yankees, from O'Neill to Bernie Williams to Martinez, rely on the element of surprise or an educated guess that circumstances are going to be optimal for a stolen- base attempt. They will wait for situations when they can be reasonably assured the pitcher is going to throw an off-speed pitch, something other than a fastball; it is far more difficult for a catcher to glove a breaking ball, set his feet and make a strong throw to second than it would be if he were catching a fastball, which is essentially predictable, moving in a straight line. A curve dives, a slider veers, a changeup fades, a split-fingered fastball drops.

The base runners make their guesses mostly based on the ball- strike count, and what they know about the pitcher and the hitter. If the count is a ball and two strikes on a good fastball hitter, like Posada, and the pitcher has a good breaking ball, it is very likely that the pitcher will try to make Posada chase a slider or curve in the dirt.

They seek other clues as they lead off first, their eyes shifting quickly from the pitcher to the catcher, hoping the angle of their lead will allow them to see the catcher's signals. Darryl Strawberry used to steal bases based on the movement of the catcher: pitchers rarely aim curveballs or sliders over the inside corner, so if a catcher shifted early and set his target over the inside corner, Strawberry thought that in almost all cases, he could expect a fastball. But if the catcher drifted over the outside corner, it was a sign that the next pitch might be a breaking ball, providing a window for Strawberry to run.

Boston catcher Jason Varitek seems particularly careful about not giving away information, masking his own movements by setting up on one side of the plate and quickly hopping to the other side just as the pitcher begins his motion toward the plate.

Recently, one of the slower Yankees took his lead, and could tell by the way the pitcher was gripping the ball — his fingers exposed outside of the webbing of his glove — that he was going to throw an off-speed pitch. After seeing this twice, the Yankee decided he would run if he saw it again, and he stole on the next pitch.

Torre does not believe the Yankees will maintain their current rate of base stealing. The heat of summer inevitably wears on the players, especially the veterans, who will play with nagging ailments, and there will be days when they won't have a burst of speed.

Advance scouts from other teams are watching from the stands, Torre noted the other day, and opponents will be more careful in how they defense the Yankee base runners, throwing to first base more often, getting their pitchers to vary their tendencies on the mound, pitching out more; that was what happened in 1998.

But these alterations will be a dividend to the Yankees, as well. A pitcher fretting about base runners cannot fully concentrate on the hitter. This is what happened in Saturday's game against Baltimore, when Willis Roberts appeared distracted by the presence of the Yankees base runners in the pivotal third inning. Catchers leery that the Yankees are about to run will be more inclined to call fastballs — a better pitch for most hitters to attack. Opponents are already making a greater effort to hold the Yankee runners at second, one infielder feinting toward the bag, and as a result, the holes in the infield defense are larger.

It's hard to quantify, with numbers, how the aggression affects the way the defense plays. But running — or representing the threat to run — always helps, Torre said.