Commentary

Abdu Sharif

The Yemeni state, to distinguish it from the Yemeni nation, is not a natural outgrowth of its own environment. It is a coercive state that resorts to violence in order to preserve itself (e.g. the killing of civilian rioters in June and July 1998). Yet, it is not a strong state because it lacks what Thomas Mann called the 'infrastructural power" that could enable it to effectively penetrate society through such mechanisms as security functions and taxation. Nor does it have what Antonio Gramsci called 'the ideological hegemony" that could provide it with the tools to forge a historic social bloc that accepts the legitimacy of the ruling elite.

Could the Yemeni state then be described in corporatist terms, as Michael Hudson and others have suggested? Corporatism, if applied to Yemen, would allow for the diverse interests to make inroads within the state policies and decision-making. Yet this does not happen in today's Yemen. The Salih regime has, over the years, showed a tendency to exclude traditional business interests from the economic and political spheres of the state (e.g. the Hayel Saeed business group), thus making state-business solidarity-an important feature of corporatism- almost impossible. It is nevertheless possible to consider the corporatist model (but only in its most primitive form) applicable to the relationship between the tribes and the state. The man- ner in which the Yemeni government goes about co-opting the tribes or certain elements within the tribes can indeed present us with a simple exercise of corporatism. Yet, the state's policy of segmentation and pitting one tribe against another is definitely not a corporatist policy. By its very nature, this policy runs contrary to the concept of organic statism and group solidarity embodied in the corporatist model.

Still, there are those among Western and Yemeni scholars who view the Yemeni state in the context of the 'primordial model.' According to Fred Halliday, the Yemeni political system is defined as 'a fusion of tribal faction, military apparatus, and civilian recruitment." Such a defi- nition, no doubt, supports Mohammed Zabarah's and Sheila Carapico's notion of politics in primordial society such as that which, they say, still exists in today's Yemen. It also indicates the conditions under which Yemen's civil society exists, though the concept of primordiabsm itself remains as ambiguous and full of biases as anything can be.

Let me now turn to the current political conditions in Yemen. First, I agree with Sheila Carapico that the structure of politics in Yemen remains authoritarian. Indeed, despite parlia- mentary elections in 1993 and 1997 the political system continues to center around the person- ality of Salih and few of his tribal relatives. No transfers of 'ower have taken place, and the

p parliament is without real power. There is no accountability in the political system. Nor is there any respect for law and order by the power elite. Amnesty International's 1997 report on Yemen stated that the Yemeni regime remains a major violator of human rights. It included many cases of torture, disappearances, and detention without trial.

Second, insecurity presents a real dilemma in Yemen and has done so for many years. There is an almost complete absence of law and order in the country. Occasional fighting erupts between government forces and armed tribesmen or between one tribal group and another. Even in the capital, Sana'a, fighting erupts over ownership of land, as the government seems unable or unwilling to enforce public order. In the south, antigovernment warfare is spreading, with southern separatist groups claiming responsibility for a number of explosions and clashes with government forces. And, as in the past, in the eastern region of the country local tribesmen kidnap foreign nationals and tourists as a way to publicize their grievances against the regime. The response of the government has been, in some cases, to reward those who did the kidnap- ping. In one of those cases, it is no secret that the individual responsible for the kidnapping of the US cultural attach6 in 1993 was appointed to the post of director for security affairs in the

province of Al-jawf. More than 100 foreigners, including Americans, British, Germans, Italians, Dutch, Russians, Japanese, and others, have been kidnapped since 1992. How can that be ex- plained? There are four reasons for this security dilemma as it exists in today's Yemen:

1. The current Yemeni leaders lack the competence necessary to enforce law and order in the country;

2. The regime itself perpetuates instability by distributing firearins to the tribes and by pitting one tribe against another;

3. The government lacks political legitimacy and has no support base to depend on in time of crises; and,

4. Corruption is so overwhehning that it leaves no space for the leaders to claim any legal or moral authority.

If stability is to return to Yemen, and by implication to the region, the current regime must be replaced by a truly democratic one. The constitution, the parliament, and the judiciary all have to occupy their proper place in the political system. The role of the military must be de- fined so that it does not encroach on all aspects of civilian lives. Nor should the military and security become a privileged class at the expense of the whole nation. The country should un- dergo a process of national reconciliation and healing. Old politicians must resign and a new generation of civilian leaders need to be elected to office. The rule of law, and not the law of the privileged few, should be the governing force in the country. Civil and human rights should be respected and social and economic rights must expand to include all peoples, regardless of their ethnic, regional, tribal or religious background. In the meantime, an agreement must be reached between the government and the tribes so that armed tribesmen lay down their arms and the army is downsized to a level where state resources are allowed to provide basic infrastructure and services to the tribal areas.

Third, Islamic militants are on the rise in Yemen and, as a result, they represent a serious challenge to future stability in Yemen and the region as a whole. However, contrary to the con- ventional wisdom, these groups are armed and financed by the regime itself. In 1992 the so- called 'Yemeni Afghans' led by former sultan Tarik al-Fadhli became close allies of President Salih in the fight against their common enemy, the Yemeni Socialist Party. In 1994 this same group, in addition to another group led by Abu al-Hasan al-Muhdar, received large sums of money and arms in order to side with President Salih during the civil war. When the war ended, the Yemeni authorities helped to position these groups in special camps in the southern prov- ince of Abyan. The authorities even gave these groups free hand to go after what they called 'the infidels," meaning minorities, socialists, unveiled women, and liberal intellectuals. As a result, a number of mosques, cemeteries, and sacred sites belonging to other Muslim minorities were destroyed. The Yemeni authorities raised no voice in almost all these cases. It was only when the militants began to attract non-Yemeni recruits for training in their camps that the Egyptian government began to highlight the problem in Yemen. Needless to say, both Egypt and the United States continue to pressure the Yemeni government to do something about the problem, but with scant results.