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Commentary: The Role of Yemeni Policymakers
Mohammed A. Zabarah
It is clear from the outset that the Yemeni policymakers have persistently undertaken decisions that promote their values and hence their self interest at the expense of the interests of the nation. Two clear examples suffice to explain this contention. The first is Yemen's policy decision to side with Iraq during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. The second is the border dispute with Eritrea.
With regard to the first case, the government of Ali Abdallah Salih began developing closer ties with Iraq's Saddam Hussein as early as 1987. As a consequence of that policy, the Yemeni government was soon inundated with members of the Yemeni Ba'thist Party in highly sensitive positions. Their authority to promote their political and philosophical values became evident
when Yemen joined the Arab Cooperation Council in 1988 alongside Iraq. Moreover, the Iraqi regime was quick to extend economic assistance to help develop Yemen's infrastructure. But a more ominous and potential threat to the internal harmony of Yemeni society involved the training and preparation of the National Security Apparatus and the National Guard. Both agencies were recipients of Iraqi military and intelligence equipment, and both worked closely and in association with their Iraqi counterparts. This elaborate entanglement of President Salih with Saddam Hussein implied explicitly that both leaders saw eye-to-eye on internal and regional matters. Both utilized the instruments of their intelligence networks to promote their personal grandeur and political power. And both used the power of the military (the National Guard) not only as an instrument of protection from internal antagonists, but also to expand their bases of power and promote their dictatorial ambitions.
In the wake of the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, the Yemeni government of Ali AbdaHah Salih was poised to support Saddam Hussein's policy in the region. Saddam had supplanted Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states as the most important Arab personality in the eyes of the Yemeni government. He was seen as the only Arab leader who had the power and the means to achieve the political objectives the Yemeni leadership deemed essential in promoting their political val- ues. Their values, although contrary to the interest of Yemeni society, called for the usurpation of the political establishments of the Arab states in the Gulf region.
It is a matter of public record that Yemen has suffered economically and socially for the past nine years. The cause of this suffering is undoubtedly the decision of the regime of Ali Salih to support Saddam Hussein in occupying, and later incorporating Kuwait as a province of Iraq. Yemen lost all economic assistance from the Arab states in the Gulf region. The Gulf Cooperation Council also evicted most Yemeni workers (over one million) from their respective states. The loss of huge amounts of economic aid from the GCC states and the remittances from Yemeni workers had repercussions that affected the standard of living in Yemen. It increased several- fold the inflation rate (it hovers now around 45%); decreased the purchasing power of the Yemeni riyal (the dollar was worth 20 YR in 1990, it is now 148 to the dollar); increased the unemployment rate two-fold (it presently stands at 40%), and regionally and internationally isolated Ye- men. These figures, as well as the rampant economic, administrative and political corruption being practiced from the highest level of the Yemeni government, have demoralized Yemeni society and made the country a basket case for the poor and malnourished.
With regard to the dispute with Eritrea, the Yemeni government of Ali Abdallah Salih had relegated the border problems with Saudi Arabia and others as an afterthought. This became apparent when in December 1995, Eritrea evicted the small Yemeni military personnel from the
island of Hunaish al-Kubra. The Eritrean occupation of Hunaish, a Yemeni island on the Red Sea, was not a complete surprise to the Yemeni government. Eritrea had sounded threatening as early as August 1995. However, that threat was never taken seriously by the Yemeni regime. No attempt was made by Sana'a to reinforce its military presence in the island. As a consequence, Eritrea was able to occupy the island with no serious resistance. In the following month, Eritrea took over Hunaish al-Sughra.
The Yemeni government was quick to place the blame for its failure to protect the sover- eignty of its territories on Saudi Arabia and Israel. Sana'a accused Saudi Arabia of arming the Eritreans, thus giving Eritrea the military wherewithal to attack Hunaish. It has become a common practice in Sana'a to blame policy failures on Saudi interference or Saudi meddling. This method allows the Yemeni regime to pursue two objectives at the same time:
1. To promote the values of the policymakers as opposed to the national interest; and,
2. To place less credence on the issue of its border problem with Saudi Arabia until a more favorable time arrives.
The contention of the Yemeni policymakers is that Saudi Arabia is being plagued by the same contradictions that eventually led to the demise of the Imamate regime in Sana'a in 1962. It is this contention that has made the regime of Ali Abdallah Salih an irritant to Saudi sensitivi- ties.
When it became apparent that Sana'a would not be able to militarily regain the islands of Hunaish al-Kubra and Hunaish al-Sughra, the Yemeni government accepted international arbitration to resolve the issue with Eritrea. In accepting international arbitration, the Yemeni regime portrayed itself as 'peace-loving," while, at the same time, it tried to counter all its critics, both internal and external, who had accused it of being derelict in its duties to protect the sovereignty of its territories.
