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THE BIG COMEDY OF APOLLO 13












Apollo 13 is a particular mission, for, due to the accident, there is no video of the lunar module landing on the moon, or returning to the command module, no photos or videos of astronauts making the clowns on the moon, no shadows or perspectives to analyze in the photos.
But that does not mean it is is not possible to find anomalies in this mission.
Like in the other missions, there was a mission report.
I have understood that what's most interesting in the mission reports is not the beginning, which is generally boring, but the end with the very tasty anomalies report, which contains many surprises.
I had already made two videos with the very special anomalies report of Apollo 12 which is the richest and funniest of all the missions.
So, to show that Apollo 13 was a joke too, I have chosen to analyze the anomalies report of Apollo 13, for I was knowing in advance I would find aberrations and jokes in it, and this is precisely what I found in it, and that I am going to show to you in this video.
To push the nail, I'll show you two photos taken during the so-called trip of Apollo 13 to the moon, which are incompatible with each other, and which prove without the least doubt that the mission was fake.









So, buckle your belt, I am taking you to the weird world of Apollo 13.









The weird anomalies report of Apollo 13!









The events which led to the accident of Apollo 13 happened as a chain of successive events, each one causing the next one, like a domino fall reaction chain.









The pressure increased in a tank, then decreased because the relief valved opened, and then increased again as the relief valve reseated.
They say that this caused a vibration disturbance on an accelerometer.
But an accelerometer is a device which measures accelerations (or decelerations), and it does not react to variations of pressure in a tank.









Then they say that the panel separation damaged a dish on the CSM antenna (only one, they were lucky!), and, as a result, the high-hain antenna switched from narrow beam to wide beam.
But the wide beam mode requires that all the dishes are operational, while the narrow beam can work with a dish which does not work properly.
So, it is the converse, it should have switched from wide beam to narrow beam.









They list the conditions which could have prevented the accident from happening:
- The electrical wires should have been made of stainless steel instead of aluminium.
- The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank was needing an improvement.
- the astronauts should have been warned of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves.
- There were only two cryogenic tanks in the service module instead of three.
- In the fuel cell oxygen supply valve, the polyetrafluoroethylene coated wires should have been isolated from oxygen.
- There were not enough immediate and visible warnings of anomalies of all systems.
Oh really? In an as important mission, shouldn't all this have been fixed before the mission?









Then they talk about an anomaly in the postlanding vent valve.
The postlanding ventilation inlet valve would have been found closed instead of open by the recovery personel after the landing.
This malfunction would come from the fact that the astronauts would not have completely pulled the handle of the ventilation valve on its full course, and, as a consequence, the valve would have remained closed instead of opening.
So, it was added in the Apollo operations handbook that this handle had to be pulled on its full course.
Oh really? Are we really in a top mission, or a second class one?









Then they talk about shaft fluctuations in the Zero optics mode, and they show this schema for the "Zero optics mode circuitry".
In fact this schema is completely incoherent for the reasons I am going to explain.









First we see that the output of the tachometer is first multiplied by 16 (in frequency), and then divided by 2, giving a tachometer signal multiplied by 8.









This is illogical: It would be simpler to first multiply the tachometer signal by 8, and then to multiply it by 2, to obtain a tachometer signal multiplied by 16; we would obtain the two same signals (in reverse order), but in a simpler way, using less electronics.









Then we see that a sine transformation is applied to one of the multiplied signals (but not the other one); it makes no sense to apply a sine transformation to a pulsed signal.
Then the two multiplied signals are inputs to a 2 speed switch block which must output a single signal.
Instead of that this switch block outputs two signals which both come into the motor drive amp.









The proof that this is an incoherence is that, in the same interface of Apollo 12, this block outputs a single signal, as you can see.
But that does not mean that the one of Apollo 12 is normal, it is delirious too, but in a different way.









Then there is a feedback compensation which is permanently applied, but there is also another one which is applied in case that the zero optics switch is closed; the second one is useless, as there already is the first one.









Then there are two signals inputted into the CDU from the 16X resolver.
The CDU (Coupling Data Unit) is a device which allows to transform data signals into an usable form for the computer; here it consists in counting the tachometer pulses, and giving the corresponding count to the computer.
There are two input signals, for the phase difference between these two signals allows to know in which direction the motor is turning, and thus if the pulses must be counted or decounted.
But what is abnormal is that:
1) sine and cosine functions are applied to the pulsed signals, which makes no sense.
2) the inputs should directly come from the tachometer output, and not the multiplied signal.









The motor drive amp output comes into a tachometer (circled in red).
But what is a tachometer?









A tachometer is a device which allows to generate pulses from the rotation of a wheel.
Its resolution is characterized by the number of pulses generated per full rotation of the wheel.
It allows to measure the rotation of the wheel by counting the number of generated pulses.









It also allows to measure the speed of a spinning wheel; the faster the frequency of the generated pulses, and the faster the rotation of the wheel.
It is used to measure the speed of cars, since the rotation speed of the wheels is related with the speed of the car.









It also allows to follow the displacement of a conveyor; to know how much a conveyor is moved, the number of generated pulses read is multiplied by the circumference of the tachometer wheel, and divided by the number of pulses per full rotation of the wheel, to finally obtain the distance that the conveyor has moved.









This principle is also used in mechanical mouses.
As you move the mouse, a spherical ball turns which makes turn two wheels disposed perpendicularly, which each send pulses to an electronic circuitry as they turn, which are counted or decounted to update the position in the two directions that the mouse moves.









This is how the computer can know how you move the mouse and update the position of the mouse cursor on the screen.









If we correct the interface to eliminate all the anomalies which have been show, we obtain this:
- The signal is first multiplied by 8, and then by 2, to obtain the two multiplied signals.
- The multiplied signals are inputted into the speed switch block, without applying a sine transform to one of the signals, and only one output comes out of this block.
- The redundant feedback compensation is suppressed.
- the outputs of the tachometer directly come into the CDU, without sine and output transform being applied to them.
But, if this new interface is more logical than the original one, it does not mean that it is correct for as much.









First the zero optics cannot be obtained just by looping the multiplied signals on the motor drive amp.
Indeed what does that mean making the zero on the optical system?
It means that, when the optical system is centered, the system must be warned that it must take it as a reference, and count or decount pulses from this reference.
It certainly cannot be achieved just by looping the multiplied tacho signals.
So, the multiply blocks of the tacho signal are useless, and their output signals must not be looped back on the motor drive amp.









Then what does mean the feedback compensation, and when is it used?
The feedback compensation is used when the command must produce a desired effect, and the produced effect can be measured; the desired effect and the measured effect are then differentiated and the difference is used to correct the command till the measured effect matches the desired effect.









But, in the case of the optical system, the motor drive amp does not produce a command, but just allows to generate pulses, via the tachometer, which are counted to measure the displacements of the optical system.
So, there is no point using a feedback compensation in this context.









So, finally, after having eliminated the useless parts which should not be there, we obtain this final interface:
- The tachometer generates pulses on two signals, of which the phase difference allows to know in which direction the motor wheel is turning (so to know if the pulses must be counted or decounted); these two signals are inputted into the CDU which counts (or decounts them); the computer can read the count via an I/O instruction.
- A zero switch (or pushbutton) is connected to the CDU; when this switch is set, it sends a signal to the CDU which allows to clear the pulse counter of the CDU, so that, when the computer reads zero on the counter, it knows the optical system is currently centered.
Now we have a coherent optical interface.









They show the schema of an "One-half speed resolver".
The problem with this schema is that, if there is an output (circled with red), there is no input.
An electronic interface which transforms a signal always has at least one input and one output.
This schema has one output, but no input.
Moreover, although this output is called "sine output", it has absolutely nothing to do with a sine transform; it is not that simple to obtain a sine transform.









Then they talk about a High-Gain antenna acquisition problem.
The command module pilot adjusts the antenna angles with values which have been given to him seven hours earlier by the ground.
But it happens that these values are not currently the most favorable settings.
A little explanation is necessary concerning the CSM antenna.









The CSM antenna could be rotated around two axes, a vertical axis, and a horizontal axis.
The rotation around the vertical axis is called "yaw", and the rotation around the horizontal axis is called "pitch".









Animated demonstration of a yaw rotation.









Animated demonstration of a pitch rotation.









The CSM antenna had to be oriented in direction of the earth so that the communication of the earth could be possible.
And there is only one combination of the yaw and pitch angles which could allow the correct communication.
If either the yaw angle or the pitch angle diverges too much from the correct orientation toward the earth, the communication with the earth becomes impossible.









The antenna is oriented relatively to the command module, which means that, if the attitude of the command module changes, the attitude of the antenna relatively to the command module must also be changed so that the antenna remains directed toward the earth, allowing the communication with this one.
When the ground gave to the command module pilot values for the yaw and the pitch of the antenna, they were relative to the attitude that the command module had at that time.
Seven hours later, the attitude of the command module had changed, so that the values initially given by the ground were no more good, and the pilot should have required updated values for these angles instead of using angles which were now obsolete.
Now you could say: May be the pilot was not knowing that these angles were depending on the attitude of the command module; well, if the pilot was not even knowing something as elementary, we can wonder on his level of training!









Then they show this graph.
On this graph, the horizontal coordinate represents a yaw angle, and the vertical one a pitch angle.
The white zone represents combined values of the yaw and pitch angles for which the communication with the earth is possible, while the hatched one represents combined values of these angles for which the communication with the earth becomes impossible.
This graph is completely absurd, for it implies that there are plenty of combinations of the yaw and pitch angles for which the communication with the earth remains possible, whereas in fact there is only one combination allowing this communication.
There is a curb representing the separation between the two zones, and another one, which is parallel to the later, which is the limit at which the scan limit warning lamp goes on.
This is complete fantasy.









They show this graph of the recorded signal strength, on which we can see peaks on intervals of five seconds.
On a so short period of time, the attitude of the command module does not significantly change, which means that the attitude of the antenna does not need to be updated to keep a good reception signal.
It means that the quality of the signal of this short period of time should remain constant, and not show these sudden peaks.









They talk about a malfunction on a "entry monitor system 0.05g light".
First, why would there be a warning on an acceleration (or deceleration) of 0.05 g, which is not an abnormal condition, and can happen during the travel?
Then they say that the crew, in case that this lamp would not go on, were supposed to start the system manually by switching to the backup position.
But how could the astronauts know there was a 0.05g condition, since the only visible way for them to be warned about this condition precisely was this lamp?
There was no signal on the AGC indicating this condition.
Then, they say that, when this condition was occurring, the scroll was beginning to drive, and the lrange-to-go counter was beginning to count down; but what was the relationship between the 0.05g condition and these actions?









Then they say there was a gas leak in "Apex Cover Jettison System".
They list the improvements which could have avoided the problem:
- Improvement of assembly procedures.
- Addition of a thermal barrier of polyimide sheet to the interior of the breech plenum area.
Of course, they could not have made these improvements before the mission!









They also talk about the failure on a reaction control isolation valve.
They say that, during the postflight examination, a fuel isolation valve was found open instead of closed.
The investigation revealed that the lead from the fuel valve closing coil would have been wired to an unused pin on a terminal board instead of the proper pin!
Incredible that so little care was brought to the assembly of the module!









But here is where it becomes comical:
During the tests, they saw nothing, because the bus voltage would have been high enough for the oxidizer closing coil to act by induction on the fuel closing coil, and thus close the fuel valve too.
And, during the mission, the bus voltage would have been a little lower, and this induction would then not have worked.









This explanation is completely ridiculous, for, if it could work that simple, then, when a current is sent into the fuel opening coil, there is no reason why it could not also act by induction on the closing coil, since it is closer to the fuel closing coil than the oxidizer closing coil is.
It is obvious that these coils must be isolated from each other so they cannot act by induction on each other.
So this fantasy explanation is very obviously a joke from the NASA engineers.









They say that it was observed abnormal indications of the water tank level (because of fantasy explanations, as usual).
But they say that it was not necessary to worry about these abnormal indications, for there was another way to know the level of the water in the tank: Indeed, the tank is automatically refilled with fuel cell product water, and the fuel cell water generation rates can be computed from power generation levels; the only problem is that, when the water tank is full, the fuel cell does not stop producing water, but the water it produces is diverted to the waste water tank which is periodically dumped overboard; so, without the knowledge of the quantity of water which has been diverted to the waste water tank, the knowledge of the total quantity of water produced by the fuel cell is useless (and the astronauts empty the water tank faster than the fuel cell refills it).
This is an obvious joke, for, if things had been done properly, the fuel cell would have stopped producing water when the water tank was full instead of diverting it to the waste water tank!









Then they talk about a failure in the suit pressure transducer.
They say that the most probable cause for the problem would be a poor plating adhesion to the aluminium base metal.
It would come from soldering problems, and that's why, from Apollo 15, they will make the assembly without soldering.
Oh really? And they needed several missions to make this modification?









There would have been a problem with a battery of the lunar module which would come from an electrolyte leak.
So, for the next missions, they made the following improvements:
- Coating the the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled.
- Changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics.
- The cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing.
And, no, they could not have made these improvements before the lunar missions.
It seems that the batteries that you use in your cars are safer than the ones used in the lunar module, although you cars don't land on the moon!









A battery malfunction light would have illuminated at about 100 hours with a corresponding master alarm.
This malfunction could be caused by an overcurrent or reverse-current condition.
The fact that this problem occurred is not important, what is really interesting is that they give this schema for the battery malfunction circuit.
There are three different default signals for the battery:
- A switch which connects the default signal to the ground when there is a temperature excess in the battery, and that I have circled with blue.
- A switch which connects the default signal to the ground when there is a condition of reverse current, and which is circled with green.
- And a switch which connects the default signal to the ground when there is a condition of over current, and which is circled with orange.
The default signal is connected to the master alarm when the connection of the battery closes the switch circled with red.









The problem is that the switch which connects the default signal to the master alarm should be placed last, like on this modified circuit I modified, and not between the default switches.
There can't be a condition of reverse current or over current for the battery when the battery is not connected.









During the flight, the pressure in a oxygen tank of the ascent stage of the lunar module would have increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold into the tank.
The tests made prior the flight would have been inadequate, for they could only detect reverse leakage at high pressure.
They changed the tests to be able to detect forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures.
So they send the lunar module make a very dangerous mission, with all the eyes of the world staring at it, and they are not even able to make adequate tests!









The left-hand window shade would have showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight.
The solution to this problem is that the Aclar supplier would have developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to 12 percent for the failed shades.
Oh yes? And couldn't the provider have made these improvements before the missions?
Or was he just trying to make an as big profit as possible, hoping that the shades he had provided would be found satisfactory enough?









A bumper would have separated from a camera lens during the flight.
To solve this problem, they swaged the mating surface of the bumper so as to provide an interference fit with the internal surface threads of the lens assembly.
But, no, they could not have applied this solution sooner!









The astronauts had an onboard interval timer, with two timing ranges, which they could use for routine functions like fuel cell purges.
But, of course, there had to be a problem on this timer, for the time-period set knob came off in a astronaut's hand because of a loosened set screw.
This would come from a compound which would not provide a strong enough retention force for this application.
To solve this problem, in the next missions they secured the knob to the shaft with a roll pin.
Even cheap timers you can buy in a common shop work better than the timer they were using in the command module.









If you think that this anomalies report is normal, you really have a serious level of delusion.
It means you really have a religious faith in Apollo.









Now, we don't have photos or videos of astronauts walking on the surface of the moon.
We only have photos during the travel to the moon.
But it is enough to prove the hoax.
Indeed, there are two photos of the earth, that I show on this steroscopic view, AS13-60-8597 on the left, and AS13-60-8599 on the right.
So, what is abnormal with these two photos?
Independently, nothing, but, in conjunction with each other, they prove the hoax.







Indeed, you can see that the direction of the earth's shadow turns relatively to the direction of the lit part of the earth.
It is not possible, the shadow cannot turn relatively to the earth.
It can turn on a long period, because the inclination of the earth's spin axis relatively to the solar plane changes along its orbit around the sun.
But, here, the interval between the two photos is a relatively short one, and the shadow cannot turn relatively to the earth.
If it turns, well it proves that these photos cannot have been taken during the travel of Apollo 13 to the moon.







Some people have been thinking that I was speaking about the difference of orientation of the earth, like I could have ignored that the astronaut could turn his camera between the two photos; so, in order to well show the problem, I have superposed the earths of the photos, adjusting them in size and orientation (the earth of the second photo is slightly smaller than the one of the first photo), so that the black parts would perfectly superpose on each other; and, here, on this animation, it is very clear that the lit part of the earth turns relatively to the shaded part.









The astronauts of Apollo 13 were in mortal danger after the accident.
There was a big chance they would never return to earth, that they would die in space.
Yet, they don't seem so much stressed on the video.









But, like for the other missions, God was watching over the astronauts of Apollo 13.

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