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Politics:

Bush could learn some things from the war in Somalia

By Dan Schilling. January 27, 2002

Dan Schilling is a veteran of the battle in Mogadishu, Somalia. He assisted the author of the book "Black Hawk Down" and also consulted with the producers of the movie. He is CEO of

With the release of the film "Black Hawk Down," its producers have encountered some controversy in attempting to paint U.S. operations on Oct. 3, 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, as a victory.

We were anything but victorious. After all, the single most violent combat operation since Vietnam resulted in the loss of 18 servicemen. One would remain a POW for 11 days and two others would have their naked bodies dragged through the streets by Somali mobs in the aftermath. Within days President Bill Clinton announced the U.S. would phase out operations in Somalia and completely withdraw by March 31, 1994.

But it is the image of a soldier's body in the streets that came to define the failure of an entire campaign. The media projected the footage around the world thus further reinforcing the perception. But that image, and the operation which spawned it, was but one aspect of the larger objective, an endeavor no longer in the U.S. foreign policy lexicon: nation building. The raid in question was concerned only with the capture or elimination of belligerents obstructing UN plans for the country.

Although it is universally accepted that the U.S. and United Nations did not accomplish their larger goals in Somalia, the Special Operations Forces on the ground were methodically meeting all of their assigned objectives. From their perspective, completing the mission was an inevitability, not conjecture. There is much hard evidence supporting this and the increasingly desperate position of Mogadishu warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid, their primary target. It is unfortunate that these operations should come to be construed as part of the larger failure.

As one of the SOF operators who participated in every raid conducted in Mogadishu, I see in these operations the decisive victory that escapes many, particularly in the Oct. 3 mission, the operation on which the movie and book of the same name are based. A critical evaluation of the facts bears this out.

On that mission I was assigned to the beleaguered convoy that took the majority of the casualties. I recall many things about that day: the sweet, rotting smell of a city in decay; how blood can get on everything, even if it's not yours; the frustration of combat, where you are stressed, angry and scared at the same time.

But, consider this, roughly 200 U.S. combatants were directly involved in the raid. In broad daylight, in the most heavily defended neighborhood in an armed city teeming with more than a million people, these SOF troops successfully extracted 24 militia leaders. It was not a clean mission, which sets it apart from the other five daring raids conducted by SOF. The cost: 18 Americans killed in action, another 73 wounded, two lost Black Hawk helicopters and several vehicles. The mission objective was 100 percent successful, although two of the captured militia were killed in the crossfire during the ensuing battle.

Was it worth the cost? Is any single battle ever? The answer rests with the soldiers involved; ask any battle veteran and you'll find the answer is "no." No battle is worth the lives of your closest friends.

However, were you to place Oct. 3, 1993, in the context of Afghanistan, what would be the results? A daring raid resulting in the capture of 24 key Taliban leaders, killing between 500 and 1,000 more of their forces, a demoralizing of their military, but still costing the U.S. 18 lives and four times that in wounded. Even viewed through the dirty, dulled lense of television bias that fictional raid would be met with the solemn pride in the sacrifice of our troops and an appreciation for their successful mission.

And such should be the case in Somalia. SOF operations will succeed where they are provided clear objectives and supplied with required operational necessities.

One is left with a lingering disdain for a political ethos adverse to any casualties. Such unrealistic expectations, as exhibited by the Clinton administration in Somalia, lead to more, not fewer, dangers for our troops around the world. It emboldens our enemies and worse, it strips commanders on the scene of the tactics and sometimes weapons systems necessary to attain objectives or even protect themselves.


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