A deep suspicion, complaints of breach of promises by the Government of India a confusing
situation continue to bedevil the prospect of a solution to the Naga question. A
breakthrough was, however, made when the Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, made the following
announcement in Parliament on July 25, 1997:
In recent talks with the Isac Muivah group of the National Socialist
Council of Nagalim (NSCN), it has been mutually agreed to ceasefire with effect from 1st
Aug. 1997 and initiate discussions at political levels.
The terms of talks were agreed as follows:
- it shall be without conditions from both sides;
- it shall be at the highest level, that is, at the Prime
Ministerial level; and
- the venue shall be anywhere outside India.
In all fairness, it must be recognized that this became possible because of the initiative
taken earlier be the former Prime Ministers beginning with a meeting between P.V.Narasimha
Rao and the NSCN collective leadership in 1995. Again in February 1997, H.D. Deve Gowda
had a meeting with Isac Swu, the Chairman and Muivah, the General Secretary, NSCN.
In 1998, the emissary of thePrime Minister, A.B. Vaipayee, met the NSCN collective
leadership thrice at different places outside India. This was followed in September 1998
when Vaipayee held talks with the NSCN collective leadership in Paris. The Prime
Minister's new emissary, K.Padmanabhaiah, also met the collective leadership in Amsterdam
twice in 1999.
Despite some serious effort by both sides, the situation was becoming more critical,
especially because the caesefire was to expire by July 31, 2000, and no extension was
being announced. This aspect was overshelmingly impressed upon me when some of us
participated in a consultation organised by the Asia Forum, Bankok, on July 24, 2000. The
meeting appealed to both the NSCN and the Government of India to extend the ceasefire so
that the peaceful, constructive dialogue may continue.
One hurdle to the continuation of talks was the arrest and detention of Muivah by the
Thailand Government on the charge of travelling on a fake passport. We were informed by
the Thai lawyers that if the Government of India had indicated to the Thai Government that
it did not wish to have Muivah prosecuted, Bankok would have released him on humanitarian
prisoners caught with false travel documents.
The Union Home Minister, I.K Advani, was informed of this when we met him recently, I feel
that such a gesture by the Government of India, even if the thai Government does not agree
to release Muivah, will certainly help in the Union Government's intentions and facilitate
the talks.
A suggestion was given to Isac Swu and other members of the NSCN when some of us met them
in Bangkok that in the meanwhile the talks need not be stalled and Muivah could nominate a
team to continue the dialogue in his absence. A team has since been nomicated by Muivah
and talks between them and Padmanabhaiah have taken place.
However, the biggest impediment in the peace process, as the NSCN sees it, is the refusal
of the Government of India to officially extend the ceasefire to all Naga-inhabited areas,
espeecially to the four Naga-inhabited district (Ukhrul, Chandel, Senapati and Tamemglong)
in Manipur.
A top political functionary of the Union Government says the Manipur Government fears this
may be used as a device to take away these areas. This attitude appears illogical and
unhelpful. At present the most pressing need is to maintain peace - in as large an area as
possible. The question of reorganisation of State is totally irrelevant in the context of
a ceasefire.
The whole rational of ceasefire is to create an atmosphere of goodwill to facilitate the
talks. When a ceasefire was agreed to in 1997, the NSCN was operating in all Naga areas,
even those outside Nagaland. It makes little sense to say that while both parties will
hold their fire within Nagaland, they will continue to fight in areas outside the state.
Of course, the center can legitimately expect the NSCN to ensure a ceasefire in all these
areas by other groups also.
Another cause for disturbance of the peace process was the attempt on the life of the
Nagaland Chief Minister, S.C Jamir, in an ambush in November 1999. Immediately after this,
Jamir issued a memo to all police stations that all NSCN cadres be arrested, which the
NSCN considers a breach of the ceasefire. The Nagaland Government representatives also
refused to attend some meetings of the ceasefire Monitoring Groups.
Subsequently, Jamir was persuaded to relent and his representatives attended the last
meetings of monitoring group in May 2000. For some administrative reasons, meetings have
not been held in June and July, adding to the further distrust of the NSCN. The next
meeting is scheduled in the middle of September. These should, however, be an independent
enquiry into the attack on Jamir since the NSCN has denied a hand in it.
Another unfortunate incident is the killing of 12 NSCN activities by the 17 Para regiment
on July 11 in the North Cachar Hills. This has naturally caused a wave of anger amongst
Nagas, and is held up as a breach of the ceasefire. The center has a different version of
the incident, but a high-powered judicial inquiry should be ordered to defuse the
situation.
Notwithstanding this disturbing event, it was a relief when told by Rh. Raising, a member,
NCSN Steering Committee, that Nagas are totally committee to
solve the problem through peaceful means. They want to solve any problem through mutual
discussion, understanding, respect and consent.
It is not only the NSCN but many other groups and human rights activities in Naga areas
who believe that continuing violence is ruinous for everyone and that a solution has to be
found through talks.
I believe the Naga civil society is prepared to play an active, meaningful role towards
this end. It is accepted even in the highest government circles that since the ceasefire,
casualties have come down to one-third of the pre-1997 period. This alone is justification
and compulsion enough for both the center and the NSCN to continue their peace talks,
notwithstanding the provocations from some quarters on political considerations or on
wrong analyses. The gun can never solve a problem in the modern world.
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