The nationality question in India is not a new phenomenon. It had taken root well before the existence of India itself. On the eve of the British transfer of power to the ruled peoples in South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, a strong whirlwind of national movements did arise. The Naga movement for self-determination (to be an independent Naga nation-state) was one of them. This paper is intended to highlights the crux of the Naga problem and reflect on the prospect of peace in Nagalim (Nagaland)

The Naga movement for independence started mainly in 1946 when the Naga National Council (NNC) was launched. Even earlier there were some Naga resistance movements against the outsiders, particularly the British colonialists. But they were limited to certain tribes as, for instance, the various Naga tribes movement against the British (since 1832), the Zeliangrong movement under the leadership of Jaduanang (since 1925) to overthrow the British regime in the Naga Hills among others.

But they were not national in character in so far as the Naga nation is concerned. Although the Nagas (represented by several Naga tribes) for the first time through the "Naga Club" collectively expressed their desire to the British Simon Commission in 1929 to be excluded from the future "Reform scheme" of British India and to leave them (the Nagas) as they were before the British conquered them, it could not sustain as a mass movement among the Nagas at large. But certainly it was a great boost to the Nagas national movement for independence in the years to come.

The truth that the Nagas were not Indian or Burmese is out of issue. History is very clear about this. The Nagas were neither Indians nor Burmese in any sense. It may be reminded here that the concept of Indian statehood and Burmese statehood did not exist until their independence in 1947 and 1948 respectively. The truth that Nagas were not Indians does not require further elaboration considering the stark differences in the physical make-up and way of life between the Nagas and their counterparts (the Indians) apart from historical evidences. But for the technical (and statutory) part, as it so happened, the Government of India and the Governmentof Myanmar (erstwhile Burma) annexed the Naga Hills arbitrarily without the consent of the Nagas. The Nagas in their own way declared their independence on August 14, 1947 (that is, a day before the declaration of Indian independence). But the war between the Government of India (GOI) and the Nagas started in the early 1950's when the former sent in Indian armed forces to take control of the Naga Hills. The Nagas then began to take up arms to resist the occupation and hegemony of the GOI. The later story of the heinous crimes committed by the GOI in the Naga Hills is incredible. During the military campaign of the GOI in the Naga Hills , over hundred thousands Nagas including women and children are learnt have been killed, apart from massive human rights violations.

There are many pertinent unanswered questions that arise with respect to the interference of the GOI in the affairs of the Nagas which many tend to brush aside. What rights does the GOI have to occupy the Naga Hills in the first place? Is Nagalim a commodity that can be transferred from one state to another? Are not the Government of India (GOI) ans the Government of Myanmar (GOM) aggressors and invaders of Nagalim? What rights does the GOI have to mercilessly kill so many innocent Nagas and violate the rights of the Nagas in Nagalim? These questions are unpalatable to many but they are required to be addressed before/after engaging into the issues of the process of peace. In other words, the resolution of the Indo-Naga conflict would require meticulous understanding of the nature of the Indo-Naga conflict or for that matter the Myanmar-Naga conflict (the latter will not be, however, addressed here) failing which the initiative of peace could be just a show-piece.

The GOI claims that Nagaland is a part of the Indian Union after the British transfer of power to India since Nagalim was a part of British India. This claims of the GOI has no basis in a democracy or otherwise. India is most of all supposed to be a democratic union of peoples and nations which in any case cannot be sidelined. No state or nation-state has the right to transfer any nation to another without the consent of the people concerned. The claim of the GOI is also barbarously dangerous because if such an idea is perceived to be the right things to do, even Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar can well be included in her (India's) future mission to invade these (among others) to conquer an idea which will be incredibly unfortunate. Some may think that cases are completely different from the Naga case. But they are different only in degree, not in substance. If such notions of the right to conquer by the mightier ones are legitimized then no smaller and weaker state can ever live on earth with dignity and freedom. If such a theory is accepted, it will not be wrong for the British to claim that the whole colonies that they had conquered in the past decades belong to them (forever). How can such unreasonable claim be made in a civilised society and that too in a democratic country like India?

The GOI had been fond of trading in double-standards perhaps to impress the outside world that India is truly a democratic state and champion of human rights. For instance, Jawaharlal Nehru among others had been airing the view that India wants no people in its territory "against their will and with the help of armed forces.." and India wants "no forces marriages or forces unions". (Nehru, Indian Parliament, August 7, 1952) on September 17, 1953 Nehru made almost the same statement that reads:

Weather it is Kashmir or any part, we are not going to hold it by the strength of arms. Mature nation (sic) as we are…. We have to show our majority by trying to understand things, by saying and acting in a manner that helps, not hinders.

However, unfortunately, the situation was quite the other way in practice. The Nagas were forces to participate in the Indian Union by carving out half on Nagalim while the other half of Nagalim was annexed by Myanmar. The duo (India and Myanmar) arbitrarily drew an international boundary (in 1953) that divides many of the Naga houses and villages. This is still the case.

It may be reminded here that the Nagas had already declared their rightful independence a day before India could do it. so the theory of the right to inherit from the colonial regime is just null and void. Moreover, not even one-third of Nagalim was under the British. They were neither in Burma too. They constituted an independent entity. These are some hard facts that process should bear in the mind. The idea that "might is right" should never be given place in this civilized world. This precept should be equally applicable to the peace process in Nagalim.

There is also one main domain that needs to be highlighted. India with many good slogans within or without had made. Nagalim a military zone since the early 1950's. India had been waging a "full-scale war" (if I may use so; call it "low-intensity war" in conventional terms) to rule Naglim. The Nagas faced the massive onslaught of the GOI with humility. The underground Nagas (freedom fighters) have been fighting the war of resistance with popular support from the Naga masses while the Naga public have been conditioned to bear sufferings in silence. The crime of the Nagas is: "their (the Nagas) desire to live together in one administrative unit (homeland/Nagalim) as a nation/people and manage their own affairs by themselves without interference from outside" which they strongly feel is their due right. For this cause, the indomitable Nagas have suffered immeasurably in the hands of the GOI of which the world knows little. Whatever it may be, having mentioned some aspect of the problem, we shall now assess the prospects of peace in Nagalim.

Some Thoughts on Peace in Nagalim

The resolution of the Indo_Naga conflict will have to be based on many considerations. It is generally agreed upon that the solution of a conflict needs an atmosphere of peace itself. If the conflicting parties are themselves unable to initiate the peace process, there is the need for a third party or more that is agreeable to the conflicting parties. In the case of the peace process with regard to the Indo-Naga conflict, both the parties have agreed for the second time (the first being in 1964-1972) to a ceasefire under certain broad ground rules/guidelines to facilitate the peace talks since August 1, 1997. This is a welcome development to be appreciated by every right thinking person. This is also a process for building confidence and for developing mutual trust with each other that is expected to facilitate peaceful talks. This process may be encouraged and, if felt necessary, the Peace Monitoring Cell needs to be strengthened by involving dedicated NGOs and distinguished personalities acceptable to India and the Nagas.

As per the recent developments and even earlier, it was the interest of the GOI to involve all the Naga political organisations (freedom fighters). But it has not been successful till date for reason not known to most of us. Nevertheless, there is a apprehension of the fall-out of insisting on the involvement of all the Naga underground groups unless a collective working formula acceptable to all the organisations is well spelt out. As the situation stands now, it will be a good idea to continue to talk with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM) - the strongest and the most significant organisation that largely carries the mandate of the Nagas. At the same time, the entry of other Naga organisation (freedom fighters) into the peace talks may be welcome.

However, the single most important factor that will boost the Indo-Naga peace process is the "sincerity" on the part of both the parties, particularly the GOI. Once that sincerity is committed, the understanding of the core issues, and the exhaustive search for alternatives and negotiations thereof, on matter how long it takes, are expected to follow.

Now what should be the substance of the negotiations is the crux of the problem. It is not profitable for both the parties to issue any statement that is far removed from the historical and practical point of view unless it is made just for the heck of it. At the same time, it is the moral responsibility of the civil societies to express their feelings, opinions and/or suggestions but based on hard facts or else they will serve only to confuse the minds of the people. Even so, this article is a humble attempt to give a personal opinion on the Indo-Naga peace process.

Some Indian thinkers have expressed their opinions on the framework for resolution of the problem. Some think that the Naga case is an issue that needs to be addressed in a special way keeping the historical facts in view. For a stalwartk like Jayaprakash Narayan, India needs to settle the Naga issue outside the Constitution of India; while some others think that the Naga issue can be solved by giving maximum autonomy to the Naga people. Recently, one eminent Indian scholar, Prof B.K. Roy Burman (2000), had presented his views on the prospects of peace in Nagalim. It will be good to examine some of his suggestions.

The main tenets of Roy Burman's proposals are:

1. The Naga people undoubtedly constitute a nation. Historically they are not Indians.
2. The Nagas on volition become part of India.
3. Short-range perspective:
   1. As a confidence-building measure, the GOI should take steps among others to repeal the draconian special Armed Forces Act and the Regulations that are being imposed in the Naga areas.
   2. The GOI must assure the Nagas on the continuation of the traditional rights of the Nagas in respect of land bases resources.
   3. A non-territorial jurisdiction should be envisaged cutting across State boundaries within India with much more enhanced legislative, administrative, judicial and development oriented powers to the existing autonomous District Councils and Sixth Schedules by constituting coordinating bodies
   4. The Nagas should be allowed to have non-statutory trans-border coordinating bodies or the like to enable them to mix freely without restrictions in the de facto borders of India and Myanmar.
4. Long-range perspective:
   1. A non-territorial solution without ignoring the territorial nexuses.
   2. A limitation of the role (authority and power) of the Government of India ( and Myanmar) for greater freedom of existence for the Nagas.

While appreciating the suggestions of Roy Burman, there are some crucial matters that are missing in his assessment. His suggestions for resolution of the Indo-Naga conflict are just confined to the non-territorial. Solution. It is extremely doubtful whether such suggestions would be workable in the short or long-term perspective. It is felt that at the most such suggestions would be workable as an interim arrangement (to be worked out jointly by the GOI and GOM) before a final solution of the Naga problem is effected. The non-territorial scheme (as a temporary arrangement) that Roy Burman has proposed will of course promote better interaction among the de facto Naga family on India and Myanmar.

They other issue is certainly the question of 'voluntary participation of the Nagas in the Unoin on India'. The same proposal was made by the Peace Mission Committee on December 20, 1964 (that is about a year after the creation of the Nagaland State). But it was not acceptable to the Nagas. But Roy Burman seems to suggest that the issue is a settled and and it should not be reopened. This could be a dangerous perseption. For the acceptance of the Nagas being Indian is still a disputed issue. In 1966 at the peak of the Indo-Naga negotiations (at the Prime Ministerial level), the proposal of a Naga leader, R.Suisa (see Shimray:1996), both the GOI and the Nagas (then represented by the Federal Government of Nagaland hereafter FGN) agreed in principle to the basis for settlement of the Indo-Naga conflict. But the FGN backed out of the deal even after sending feelers to its President A.Z Phizo in London, perhaps due to the impression that the proposal of Suisa was short of self-determination of the Nagas.
The proposal of Suisa had the following main features:

1. that Nagaland and India form a federation;
2. Nagaland and India will have a pact on defence, foreign affairs, and communication;
3. some subjects of common concern to be selected if required.
4. except for the above mentioned subject, "[i]n all matters of her own affairs and self-concern, Nagaland will be sovereign",

Although the proposal was short of independence, many people in India and Nagaland felt that it was a good beginning for the negotiations.

These facts of the recent past suggest that the current proposal of Roy Burman can hardly be fitted anywhere. There is no trace of any improvement that could be made to the last agreeable basis. While the last agreement (at least in principle) was a territorial one (meaning unification of Naga territories in India) and a limited sovereignty for the Nagas with some shared subjects of concern between the Government of India (GOI) and Nagaland, Roy Burman's suggestion in stark negation is a non-territorial one maintenance of the status quo except for some improvements to be looked into of the statuses of the Sixth Schedule and District Autonomous Councils. Such a proposal may not be even acceptable to the most liberal; Naga moderate.

In my case, the main basis of the Indo-Naga peace talks will have to be the question of sovereignty of the Nagas, be it limited or otherwise. However, it will be necessary that certain subjects like foreign affairs, defence, communication are taken up for discussion for the mutual benefit and interests of India and Nagalim. In order to facilitate the peace negotiations, many confidence-building and goodwill measures can be made can be made by the GOI. For instance, the short-term transborder and non-territorial scheme proposed by Prof Roy Burman can be implemented at the earliest, of course in consultation with the Government of Myanmar (GOM). The other initiatives that the GOI can take up must include repealing of the various Special Armed Forces Acts and Regulations that are being imposed in Nagalim, the implementation of ceasefire in all the Naga areas, that is, including parts of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh (which has been a hurdle for a smooth ceasefire as agreed upon in 1997), the checking of the excesses of the armed forces in Nagalim, ensuring the release of Th.Muivah (General Secretary of the NSCN) who is now in a Thai jail so that the current peace talks can be resumed at the earliest and so on.

It will be to the benefit of both India and the Nagas to restrain in putting blames on each other that will hamper the peace process. At the same time both the parties should take maximum precaution to abstain from violations of the agreed ceasefire rules. In the end, it is my humble appeal to all the concerned leaders of the GOI and NSCN to embark on the main issues of contention without beating about the bush. It will no doubt be necessary for the civil societies to facilitate and strengthen the ceasefire process in whatever way possible.





References
Roy Burman. B.K., 2000, "Naga People and Prospects for Peace", Mainsteam, Vol. XXXVIII:31, July 22, 2000, New Delhi: Perspective Publications Private Limited. Shimray, A Nhashathing, 1996, The Legacy of R. Suisa, Imphal (Manipur): author's own publication.