The assessment as of 240300 was as follows: Iraq will continue to maintain its defense in the KTO. Iraqi ground forces are incapable of conducting an operational level offensive, although the RGFC remains capable of conducting limited counterattacks. Units will remain dispersed to enhance survivability against Coalition forces air attacks and to conserve forces for the anticipated ground attack. There are no major indications that Iraq has repositioned any of its heavy forces just prior to start of the ground campaign. Iraq will probably wait until it has identified the Coalition's main attack before repositioning its limited armored and mechanized forces (Diagram 7).

GROUND DAY

Ground offenseive combat action along the ARCENT front was initiated at 0400 on 24 February by the XVIII Airborne Corps (Diagram 8). At 0700, all key leaders met in the battalion TOC for the orders brief and issue of the FA Support Plan. At 0800, all personnel were placed in MOPP II in anticipation of possible Iraqi retaliation with chemical weapons. By 0830, the advance party, which included 25 HEMMT's filled with prep ammo, kicked out of the position along PL Vermont, moved through the berm, and headed north for the prep position (NT 719317) along PL Iowa. Artillery units poured into the area south of PL Iowa, all positioning for the breach artillery preparation to be executed the following morning. The ammo section downloaded the prep ammo at gun positions, and made the return trip to the field trains to upload the remainder of the class V UBL. It is important to note that 26 out of 27 HEMMT's carried a total of 4780 complete rounds while howitzers and FAASV's carried 3460 rounds forward during the movement to contact. The last HEMMT was deadlined and towed forward carrying major assemblies. Haul capability was closely monitored with priority always given to combat power generation.

By 1000 hours it became clear to CENTCOM HQ that the offensive was progressing much more rapidly than had been expected. 1 ID was notified to commence breaching operations at 1500 and the prep was reduced to a half hour schedule of fires to commence at 1430. 2-29 FA occupied the prep positions by 1105 and the pressure was now on the Battalion TACFIRE to get the prep targets and execute a schedule of fires. Updated prep targets were finally received from 75th FA bde at 1400. With only minutes to spare, the schedule was executed to the batteries. Seven targets were fired in the prep with 253 rounds DPICM and 110 rounds of HE RAP. The prep was awesome in execution due to the density of artillery units (18 battalions) along PL Iowa. It was a continuous barrage of rockets and artillery, and the cacophony awed the Pathfinder gunners (i.e. a significant emotional event), while simultaneously instilling confidence in the maneuver forces.

Within hours of the prep, the battalion was notified to be prepared to move north and advance parties were quickly assembled and briefed on the proposed position along PL Colorado. The battalion advance party left at 1700, moved through the breach site and enemy positions, and ultimately forward of the friendly screen line, reaching the proposed battalion goose egg (NT 780440) after darkness. The main body SP'ed at 1900, and moving in total darkness (no moon) in a battalion column six kilometers long, snaked through the breach and the 48 ID sector, reaching the new position by 2145. Alpha Battery occupied in and amongst a DPICM dudded area and several wheeled vehicles were damaged by DPICM bomblets. This experience quickly brought home the duality (good and bad) of DPICM use against enemy positions. While the munition proved extremely effective against enemy personnel and vehicles, the unexploded bomblets which were left littering the area presented a significant hazard to friendly maneuver and combat support units throughout the offensive operation. The night was filled with explosions and fireballs, as Apaches, using their night fighting capability to their advantage, slowly worked their way forward of the FLOT to engage enemy positions.

The battalion mission, effective 0647, was Reinforcing (R) to 4-3 FA. At mid-morning, the 4-3 FA TOC displaced forward into the breachhead, and mutual support operations (MSU) were conducted giving 2-29 FA control of 4-3 FA firing units. At 1050, one mass mission was fired with both battalions against vehicles and dismounted infantry. Due to the extended range, 2-29 FA engaged with 92 rounds of HE RAP while 4-3 FA fired DPICM.

LINK-UP WITH 3RD ARMORED DIVISION

At 1045 hours, the battalion received a change of mission and the order to move to the link-up point with 3 AD. MSU was performed back to 4-3 FA and the battalion departed for the link-up point (NT 766566) at 1100 hours. At the link-up point, air and ground cavalry units were continuing their fight with a flurry of activity against an enemy bunker. 4-7 Cavalry and 3 AD representatives were at the site and provided a briefing on the current situation, and a grid to effect link-up with 3 AD. As the battalion moved in battery wedge, battalion column formation to the link-up site, the 5KW generator trailer behind the S-2 M577 caught fire. Unable to unhook the trailer, the M577 also became engulfed in flames and became a total loss. Yes, thermite grenades do work! Although it was thought that this was the last to be seen of the S-2 track, much to the chagrin of all involved, 2-29 FA was ordered to recover this heap of slag after the war, and drag it south across the Saudi border. The battalion continued to move and departed the link-up point at 1300 hours enroute to 3 AD. Once forward of 1 ID's screen line, the battalion formed a battalion wedge and moved out smartly to link-up with 3 AD, falling into the 1st Brigade (Ready First Combat Team) modified diamond formation at 1500 hours, continuing movement until nightfall when the division lagered in place along the route of march (PT 089947).

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

An Intsum as of 252110L stated that 52 AD had repositioned as a blocking force for the Tawakalna Division with two bde sized elements between PV 3904 and PT 5193. The third bde was located vic PV 7537. The 50th Ar Bde and the 37th Ar Bde of the 12th AD had moved into a blocking position tied with the 52 AD, location unknown. Tawakalna Mech Division repositioned as follows: 9 Ar Bde at PT 6496, A Mech Bde at PU 7605, B Mech Bde at PU 7213. no identification of movement of the RGFC Al Medina or Hammburabi or the 17th AD.

MISSION

2-29 Fa's mission was Reinforcing (R) 2-3 FA and coordination was effected that evening with 2-3 FA in preparation for the movement and battles to come. A Frago received that evening had 3 AD and the RFCT conducting a forward passage of lines through 2 ACR at PL Cairo the following morning then orienting east-southeast and continuing the attack toward the Tawakalna Division. On order, continue the attack against the 17th and 52nd Armored Divisions (Diagram 9).

By 0430 on 26 February, the battalion was up and prepared to resume movement to contact toward the 3 AD Objectives, Dorset and Minden. It had rained all night and visibility was poor that morning. RFCT movement commenced at 0750, and by mid-morning was subjected to a driving sandstorm with visibilty reduced to less than 200 meters.

RFCT was moving in a brigade wedge that had closed to seven kilometers in width with 3-5 Cavalry in the lead with a mission t0 find and fix the enemy, develop the situation, and then lay down a base of fire while the Bde Cdr, COL Nash, maneuvered either TF 4-32 from the left or TF 4-34 from the right to destroy the enemy. At approximately 1000, RFCT halted temporarily to issue a Frago ordering the RFCT to attack in zone to PL Tangerine, destroying enemy in zone and on order continuing the attack to Objectives Dorset South and Minden South. 2-29 FA was emplaced at 1408 at PU 494172, but by 1520 was moving again. finally, at 1702, just west of PL Bullet, 3-5 Cavalry hit prpeared defensive positions of the forward elements of the Tawakalna Division and the fight began in earnest.

FIRST CONTACT

The battalion was emplaced at PU 656144 by 1715 and began firing numerous battalion mass missions of DPICM into the enemy position. The enemy was emplaced in a bunker complex along a ridge line with dug-in infantry and armor vehicles. The battle raged throughout the evening and night with direct fire engagements, attack helicopters, CAS and artillery raining steel on the Tawakalna. HE and white phosphorus proved particularly effective in the neutralization and destruction of the bunker complexes and associated ammunition caches, as attested by the spectacular secondary explosions. During the evening, the POL tankers were brought forward to feed the hungry vehicles and three ammo HEMMTs were pushed to each firing battery to assist in satiating the need of the howitzers for more bullets.

A sitrep at 0500 on the 27th indicated that 1 AD in the north was in contact with Tawakalna, as was 1 ID in the south. At 0904, the battalion received a Frago from RFCT stating that the enemy was defending from prepared positions, and that 3 AD would press the attack to Objectives Dorset and Minden.

Mopping up along PL Bullet continued, and RFCT began moving out to the east by 1030 hours. Movement continued until 1415, when the battalion occupied at PU 829122 and fired what would be the last fire missions of the war for 2-29 FA as the RFCT hit enemy armor in revetments in Objective Dorset South. The battalion was occupied directly behind the Bde TAC and COL Nash used the Pathfinders in a recon by fire role deep in the enemy lines. Within 40 minutes the battalion had fired five missions with 258 DPICM and 46 HE, with infantry and armor kills confirmed by the lead maneuver elements.

RUNNING THE GAUNTLET

By 1700, the RFCT was again on the move with the artillery tucked tightly into the RFCT formation in what was now being termed an exploitation by VII Corps. Night became an inferno as the RFCT continued movement using marching firs in the Bde wedge toward Kuwait and Objective Minden South.

At 2130, the battalion was impeded by a berm 5 kilometers west of the Kuwait border which presented a major obstacle to the wheeled vehicles and several became stuck. As the remainder of the RFCT continued to move, recovery operations took on an increased urgency with the realization that the battalion was deep in enemy territory with pockets of Iraqi troops, intentions unknown, throughout the area. Finally, the battalion was over and moving again, threading through enemy minefields, to catch up with the RFCT. The direct fire battle raged to the front and sides of the Pathfinders as enemy vehicle after vehicle became a burning hulk. Ammo and fuel continued to cook off as the battalion wedge moved throught the night and the red glow of tracers and main gun rounds could be seen knifing across the horizon splashing with fiery explosions into enemy vehicles as the RFCT ran the gauntlet. Realizing the vunerability of his brigade trains element at the berm, RFCT Cdr dispatched two tank companies back to the berm for flank security/protection of support elements as they transited the area. Needless to say, executive officers earned their pay overseeing the trail party operations that night.

A dense fog deepened as midnight approached adding an eerie and unsettling feeling to the Pathfinders as visibility dropped to almost zero. Reports from tank main gun firing could still be heard echoing throughout the night, but now even the limited security of seeing where the engagements took place had been eliminated. Despite the fear of the unknown in the fog around them, the battalion crossed into Kuwait and reached Objective Minden without incident. The battalion occupied in a tight position to provide mutual security at QT 121990 with all elements and equipment closed in position by 0100.

CEASE-FIRE

At 0415, the RFCT informed the battalion that there was a temporary cease fire effective 280800 February. Although feeling great pride for a job well done, the battalion knew it was still in imminent danger from trapped and desperate Iraqi forces, and all were cautioned about the uncertainty of the word "temporary".

Daylight broke on 28 February with dense fog still covering the area. The RFCT continued to secure the brigade sector out to PL Kiwi, destroying any enemy vehicles found. The mission of 3 AD was to transition from offensive operations to force protection operations in zone and prepare to defend northern Kuwait. MOPP level 0 went into effect at 0800, wartime rules of engagement were still in effect.

From 28 February through 11 March the battalion conducted maintenance, accountability and refit operations in a TAA, vicinity Objective Minden South. The battalion had maintained 25 of 25 howitzers firing for the duration of the campaign and traveled in excess of 1000 kilometers. One additional move was made on 3 March to reposition units within the RFCT sector to better provide coverage (QT 091011) throughout the sector. The primary threat to the force during this phase was the many artillery and air delivered duds and destroyed enemy munitions which littered the entire area. Strict travel and souvenir hunting rules were enforced to protect soldiers.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

One armored battalion and three artillery battalions are conducting rear guard operations along the Demarcation Line. A mechanized division (-) is conducting counterinsurgency operations in the Basrah Pocket with the remainder of Iraqi forces moving north along Basrah, Al Qurnah-Al Kut line of communication. Counterinsurgency operations continue throughout Iraq against the Kurdish rebellion in the north and Shi'ite rebellion in the south.

OCCUPATION OF IRAQ'S DEMARCATION LINE

On 11 March the battalion received a warning order from 42nd FA Bde to be prepared to move north to provide reinforcing fires to 4-82 FA, 2nd Bde defense along the Demarcation Line in southern Iraq (Diagram 10).

On 12 March, the battalion execute the 100 kilometer roadmarch to new positions in the 2nd Bde sector in southern Iraq (QU 060720). The mission was to defend in sector, interdict Highway 8 and destroy Iraqi equipment and munitions. The battalion supported this mission from widely dispersed battery positions necessitated bt the 70 km wide brigade front, through 22 March. The area being occupied had been an RGFC stronghold and evidence of the Iraqi forces were everywhere. Destroyed vehicles, bunkers, berms and fighting positions became significant obstacles to movement within the sector. The area also contained huge ammunition storage ares (probably the RGFC theater reserves) with tons of ammunition of all types widely dispersed in sector. Maneuver forces and engineers set out to methodically destroy the massive complex and earth shaking explosions and billowing black plumes of smoke became common place.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

Iraqi government forces have shifted their counterinsurgency focus to the revolt in Kurdistan. Large numbers of government forces have begun to move north along the Basrah-Al Amarah line of communication. An aggressive heliborne air campaign has begun with all available forces in and around several major cities in Kurdistan.

DEFENSE OF KUWAIT

On 22 March, the battalion was repositioned to the south along the western Kuwait border along with 3-8 Cavalry to set the Kuwait defense (Diagram 11). The 140 kilometer roadmarch was accomplished in six hours with all units set in their new positions (QU 022881) by 1300 hours. Lengthy road marches had become a routine occurence, with everyone doing their job to make it happen. Although calls for fire support were very unlikely, the battalion retained it's full combat capability around the clock. During this time frame, the battalion medics, augmenting 2nd Bde's assets, treated Iraqi/Kuwaiti soldiers and refugees, many of whom had just recently been injured by Sadam Hussein's military as they attempted to contain civil strife in Iraq. This opportunity to treat war wounds while also providing humanitarian relief was particularly rewarding for the medics involved.

On 2 April, 2nd Bde rotated off line and was replaced by 3rd Bde. The 2-29 FA was given a mission of GSR to 2-82 FA and repositioned further north to be more readily available for contingency requirements. Movements and occupations were made in platoon formation, under battery control as the battalion began to focus on decentralized European tactics and techniques in preparation for redeployment. Battalion center of mass was vicinity QT 260990. Maintenance, property accountability, and ammo turn-in began in earnest as personnel sensed the draw down and the long awaited redeployment.

CEASEFIRE AGGREEMENT

On 12 April the battalion was infromed that Iraq had signed the United Nations Ceasefire Agreement. Peacetime rules of engagement were placed in effect and VII Corps units began redeployment in earnest.

REDEPLOYMENT

Redeployment for the battalion began with movement from Northern Kuwait back to KMMC on 16 april. the Pathfinder Battalion's support of combat operations in the Kuwait Theater of Operation extended over a three month period, traveled over 1500 km/and 3000 km, for tracks and wheels respectively, and provided quality fire support for three divisions. the battalions performance across the board was impeccable, and is reflected in the unit's motto, "Battle Ready".

"This is Pathfinder Six, Out."