On Plato's Republic

Throughout the Republic, Socrates makes assertions that can easily be deemed questionable and disputable. He often does not take into account every feasible scenario in a particular relationship. Socrates’ “greatest and most decisive” argument in Book IX contains various premises taken for granted: 1. that a philosopher is the “finest judge” of the three types of people in the world (i.e., truth-loving, honor-loving, and profit-loving) and the pleasures that accompany human life, 2. that the distinction between pleasure and pain is often determined by the preceding feeling (i.e., pleasure is enhanced if it directly follows pain, and vice versa) and that pleasure and pain can each be experienced without any prior definite feeling (i.e., pleasure can be felt even if it does not follow a period of pain, or pleasure), 3. that the lines drawn between kings, tyrants, oligarchs, and democrats prove to be universally applicable (i.e., apt for every thinkable situation), 4. that the exact nature of the mathematics held to be true for determining levels of pleasure – although it is acknowledged to be only rarely accurate – is not even more ridiculously idealistic than it is admitted to be, and 5. that “anyone who praises justice speaks truly and anyone who praises injustice speaks falsely.” (1) Philosophers, despite the nature of their pensive lifestyle, are still no more suited to determine anything about other members of society. Nothing intrinsically differentiates a philosopher from anyone else that better qualifies them to make a societal judgment. They have not actually experienced all three types of pleasure. The “experience” a philosopher is claimed to possess is no more specialized in the art of reason, despite what Socrates states. A different mindset does not provide a philosopher with additional “life experience,” in fact it often indicates a more secluded way of life. A philosopher, while studying and reasoning, misses out on events that an inner city teen experiences; to a lesser extreme, the philosopher does not even immerse himself in popular culture; he coops himself up in a room and reads and writes instead. The philosopher’s judgments are misguided: he believes that only philosophical pleasure is true pleasure; all other pleasure is merely the termination of pain. (2) Absolute pleasures (i.e., pleasures that provide the same feeling no matter what the circumstances) do exist, and thus Socrates’ call for the need of a preceding opposing sentiment is invalid. Certain things (such as one’s reaction to a specific stimulus – applied heat, pain, etc.) result in an identical response regardless of prior events. One may react differently based on the current conditions, but the degree of emotion is not altered (at least not significantly) by earlier occurrences. The second portion, although much less inaccurate, still does not always prove correct. While absolute pain and pleasure apply even in the absence of a preceding sense of pain or pleasure, one can still react indifferently to a certain happening. Even though it is likely that someone may unconsciously sway towards a positive response or a negative one, their conscious decisions frequently establish whether or not they experience what is considered pleasure or what is considered pain. (3) Distinguishing “how inferior” one class of people is with respect to another is certainly a difficult task in and of itself. To state that the borders between each group of people are defined as entire other groups leaves much room for speculation. This method makes it virtually impossible to make a distinction between a definite member of one group and a definite member of another. This margin of skepticism deems anyone with traits typical of two or more classes up for grabs in terms of membership. A person may be a tyrant but may also have democratic aspects to their personality and, in turn, their leadership tendencies. (4) A tyrant being "three times three removed from true pleasure" indicates a measurement very improbable, if not impossible. Measuring pleasure by quantitative means does not do the phenomenon justice. Furthermore, "squaring and cubing" a good sensation is not realistic, as one does not have the ability to numerically assess levels of euphoria. The selection of the number seven hundred and twenty-nine, in addition to being arbitrary, seems to be too precise even if it were a rough estimate. The fact that it is considered a "true" "calculation of the difference" between positive and negative emotion is a stretch. (5) The motives of any individual lauding justice may be tainted, and one may also praise injustice for good reasons. This illustrates ways in which interests may conflict and skew the "truth," or lack thereof, of each scenario. The argument is not valid. Even if the premises were true, the conclusion still would not be. Argument (2) is a prime example of a way in which Socrates contradicts himself. The two statements that make up the second premise seem to offset each other, in that the first cites a frequent need for a prior feeling, while the second states that this “need” does not exist. By claiming that the necessity of something that usually determines a future outcome is in some cases irrelevant nullifies the truth of the entire statement. The fact that there is no definite rule here eliminates the possibility of a valid conclusion, since this premise alone (and, in turn, the entire argument) does not demonstrate following-from. Consequently, the argument does not correctly evaluate the types of pleasure and the difference between them. The argument is not sound; each premise is either dubitable or false. The dubitable premises (i.e., 1 and 2) pose questions both of interpretation as well as opinion. Premise 1 raises the issue of opinion; certainly everyone would not agree that philosophers hold such high status. Premise 2 is one decided by the whims of a person and their response to particular stimuli. Premises 3, 4, and 5 are all false on the basis of application. Premise 3 surely can not be as absolute as Socrates believes. Premise 4 is an overly idealistic view of the situation, while Premise 5 can be disproved by individuals with ulterior purposes. Ultimately, the highly varied nature of people across the societal spectrum refutes some of the claims made my Socrates. The argument by no means amounts to a proof. It is invalid as well as unsound, an unsound argument altogether. It fails in compelling agreement with its conclusion of any reasonable person, as it has many loopholes for error. The arguments of this portion of Book IX relate to (i.e., depend upon and summon) those in earlier parts of the Republic in various senses. The philosopher’s status as the elite judge results from the education they are provided as a result of education. This is mentioned in Book VII within the allegory of the cave. Socrates claims that education moves a philosopher through the numerous sections of the divided line, eventually winding up at the Form of the Good. By knowing the Form of the Good, the philosopher is assumed to understand everything. This omniscience is evidently what separates the philosopher-king from everyone else in society. The introduction of the Forms in Book V makes a distinction between philosophers and all others based on the way philosophers react to the Forms. Forms account for the transformation of things we sense around us into what they are; they are not perceptible, nor are they even tangible. Rather than merely loving sights and sounds around them, philosophers mentally grasp the concepts associated therein. This added unique consciousness differentiates the philosopher from others; Socrates even goes so far as to assert that only philosophers can have knowledge. The interaction between the classes of people to which Socrates refers follows up on his initial discussion of them in Book VIII. Friedrich Nietzsche counters Plato in The Problem of Socrates from Twilight of the Idols, on the basis of his claims about judgments. Nietzsche altogether refutes the possibility of philosophers being the best judges; he actually wholly denies the value of any kind of judgment. Such opinions are solely “symptoms,” “foolish” attempts at measuring “the value of life.” The fact that Nietzsche, a philosopher himself (albeit an idiosyncratic one), objects to Socrates’ assertion of the superiority of all philosophers is in itself a “question mark” against Socrates’ views. Additionally, Socrates’ tendency to oversimplify matters into discrete equations (and numbers) is also criticized. Nietzsche cites “reason=virtue=happiness” as “the most bizarre of all equations.” The philosopher may be the worst judge of pleasure, as his way of life tends to be more reclusive and thus more sheltered. Perhaps any judgment on life, as Nietzsche believes, “can ultimately never be true.” This lack of experience and "culture" makes him less (in fact, probably the least) qualified than the others, just the opposite of what Socrates says. The degree of pleasure, or pain, is indeed a variable of the previous events in a person's life. A sunny day following a week of rain incites a much more euphoric reaction in the members of a community, just as a massage following physical soreness brightens one's day. "Joy wouldn't feel so good if it wasn't for pain." Had the weather been decent but not great prior to sunshine, the sunshine would provide a less extreme difference and thus a smaller change in emotion; this holds true for a general sense of muscular wellness followed by a relieving massage, as the extent of improvement is smaller. The direct relationship between the amount of change in conditions and the amount of change in personal response is responsible for this. The borders between classes are cloudy at best, as kings may share traits with oligarchs and tyrants with democrats. The simple fact that someone may, by nature, belong to two or more groups (i.e., exhibit characteristics not limited to a single group) complicates classifying them. Membership in more than one class alters (and essentially nullifies) decisions of inferiority. This scenario, theoretically, would make a man inferior to himself, which is clearly impossible. Quantifying pleasure is a technique that does not accurately encompass various personalities. It is not fair to the second person to measure the pleasure of the first and assess theirs as being identical "in value." Since each person reacts differently, no single comprehensive method to numerically ascertain a "pleasure equation" exists. No one's intentions are always pure; people always possess ulterior motives. Simply praising the just and denouncing the unjust do not serve as the sole factors for truthfulness, or the lack thereof. In addition to straightforward lying, people often deceive others for reasons not immediately (or ever) obvious.