THE
MORAL NATURE OF MAN
T.P.
Simmons
Man
is a moral creature. By this we mean that he is responsible for his actions.
This is one of the marks by which man is distinguished from the beast. Man is
constituted a moral creature by those faculties which make him responsible for his actions. These faculties are three:
I.
INTELLECT
The
intellect is the faculty of perception or thought. It is man's power of knowing
or receiving knowledge. Without this man would not be a moral
creature. This is taught by Jesus in John 9: 41.
II.
CONSCIENCE
From
a strictly psychological standpoint, conscience is not
regarded as a separate faculty. From this standpoint, the three faculties are
intellect, sensibility, and will; the conscience being regarded as the combined
action of these faculties giving man a consciousness of his moral responsibility
and judging between right and wrong. Yet conscience can, in a sense, be regarded
as a faculty; for it is the power of the mind to know right and wrong and to
feel obligated to do the right. Thus judgment is involved in
conscience. And reason is involved in judgment.
After
all, conscience is man's ultimate guide. It is unsound to make a distinction
between following one's conscience and following the law of God. The law of God
has no way of reaching us except through the conscience. When
we do right it can be only as the result of the prompting of conscience.
Conscience acts according to the standard accepted by the mind. Thus conscience
guides us aright only in proportion to the rightness of the standard we have
accepted as our guide. Hence the need of correct knowledge of the Word of
God.
The
will of man is defined by A. H. Strong as "the soul's power to choose between
motives and to direct its subsequent activity according to the motive thus
chosen- in other words, the soul's power to choose both an end and the means to
attain it." The same author says: "The choice of an ultimate end we call immanent preference; the choice of means we call executive
volition."
As
we have remarked in considering God's will, the will is not independent of the
nature of its possessor. It is not, as it were, another self within us. The
character of the will is the character of the individual possessing it. The will is simply a power of the soul.
The
acts of the will are determined by two factors- motives and character. We use
the term "motives" to mean reasons and inducements influencing toward certain
acts of the will. Of these two factors, character is the most dominant; for in
every act of the will we make choice between two or more motives, and it is our character that determines which motive we choose.
Every
act of will is an expression of character in view of motives. And every act of
will tends to modify or confirm character. This explains why a given choice of
the will becomes easier each time it is made.
The
question of the freedom of man's will, being such a broad subject, will be
treated in another chapter.