HALF A CENTURY LATER...

The Poland of 1945 had lost six million people in the death camps, the execution grounds, and as a result of the many battles that occurred in the country as the war front swept East and then swept back to the West. The country was also short of some one and a half million Poles who had, mostly through no fault of their own, found themselves beyond Poland's borders as Displaced Persons and members of the Polish Armed Forces.
        If Poland was to make good the devastation that five years of war had brought to it then the Poles needed all the help they could get, in particular they needed hands to work. The country could not make good the six million immediately but it could encourage as many Poles as possible to return from abroad to help in reconstruction.
        Despite the many calls for the Poles abroad to return there is still a great deal of doubt as to the good will of the Polish Provisional Government. Certainly many of the members of the Polish Repatriation Missions were honourable men whose positive efforts can not be doubted, yet even they, given time and the light of experience, came to believe that they were fighting against a hidden agenda in which the repatriates, and in particular the Polish Armed Forces in the West, were to play no part.

        The Information Bureau for Military Affairs of the Citizen's Committee for Poles announced in August, 1945:

        "The overwhelming majority of soldiers in emigration have decided to return to Poland. There are numerous cases where this figure reaches 90-100% of the total personnel of the unit. This is happening despite the anti-patriotic propaganda of General Bor-Komorowski, Kopanski, Gluchowski, Izycki and others.... The Polish soldier in emigration has understood that his place is at home, helping - in the ranks of the army or in the workshops - to build a new democratic Poland.
         Poland is being raised from her collapse and is being rebuilt. No true Pole can absent himself from this undertaking...." [1]

        The Polish Government was unequivocal in its appeal for Poles to return to Poland yet often this call fell on deaf ears - most Poles distrusted the Warsaw regime and had little faith in the promise of good treatment. What is more revealing is the attitude of many leading Poles who were prepared to work with the new regime while at the same time secretly telling anyone who would listen that all was not well in Poland. General Boruta-Spiechowicz was one senior officer who had been to the 'new' Poland and had returned to London to resign his commission before returning to Poland for good. In a top secret meeting with War Office representatives in March 1946, Boruta outlined what he considered to be Warsaw's attitude to repatriation. The WO footnote said the talks were "...of particular secrecy + Boruta's name should not be used in conjunction with information contained." Brigadier Davy's conclusions about the meeting were:

        4. Boruta considers that the present regime does not want the Polish Armed Forces back in Poland, especially before the elections. It is generally believed that the vast majority of them are supporters of Mikolaiczyk [sic]. It is not a question of their numbers and their personal votes, but rather of the moral influence they would have in favour of the Peasant Party. All the present difficulties are really intended to delay their return until the elections are over and decided in favour of the present regime.
        5. Boruta considers that the only solution which can solve our problem of disposing of the Poles and the Polish problem of ensuring freedom for Poland is for all Poles, with the exception of a few who would be unacceptable in Poland, to return to Poland unconditionally as soon as the terms are published. He fears that, encouraged by what Warsaw calls the "black reactionaries", they will at once start to stipulate that they must return as armed units or at least as armed soldiers. This would immediately give an excuse to the Warsaw authorities for further procrastination. If on the other hand they agreed to return unconditionally the Warsaw authorities could hardly refuse to receive them." [2]

These views were confirmed by another of the Poles who had gone over to the Provisional Government - the old 'ruffian' as Hancock of the FO had called him - Professor Kot, Warsaw's newly appointed ambassador to Rome:

        "I understand that Professor Kot has admitted to Major Gawronski that he is much embarrassed by the Polish Government's unwillingness to accept repatriates. He blames the Communists in Warsaw for the attitude and claims that they are opposed to the repatriation of anyone who might join M.Mikolajczyk's party". [3]

The report went on that it could not be ruled out that the Polish authorities would not allow the ships bringing the soldiers to Poland to dock. These secret views were far from the official pronouncements of the new regime. The other 'ruffian' in Rome, Warsaw's military attaché, Colonel Sidor, in his book "W Niewoli U Andersa" - wrote that:

        "The attitude of the Polish Government towards the soldiers and officers of the 2nd Corps was completely positive and remains so today [written 1947]. The Polish people condemn the criminal politics of the leaders of the 2nd Corps but still wanted the speediest repatriation of all the Polish soldiers who found themselves beyond Poland's borders." [4]

The Poles in Warsaw declared that they wanted the repatriation to go ahead; the British certainly wanted to rid themselves of the Poles in their charge and speeded the situation along, yet at the same time Warsaw appeared to be stalling the issue. There seemed to be some contradiction in the way the Poles were acting and the Foreign Office found it increasingly difficult to work out just what the Provisional Government were up to - and Hankey told Kuropieska as much in April, 1946. He, for one, could not see what the problem was and why the Poles who did want to go back were not being allowed to do so. [5]
        The staff of the Polish Legations across Europe and of the State Directorate for Repatriation [PUR] were at the front line of trying to get the Poles to return to Poland. The effectiveness of these bodies largely depended on the quality of staff that were employed. According to a PUR directive of 1945, members of military missions should be:

"Positive and Idealistic about the new political system.
a/ They should be well informed about the construction of the new system;
b/ they should be intelligent and be able to give clear and convincing answers to the most sensitive of questions;
c/ they should be fully acquainted wit both foreign and internal politics and with the state of the national economy;
d/ they should pay particular attention to their personal behaviour, especially in the consumption of alcohol." [6]

        In London Colonel Kuropieska was Warsaw's man to deal with military repatriation. He had originally been selected to be on the Polish Armed Forces General Staff after Warsaw took over command - if and when
the British let them. The Commander-in-Chief was to be General Swierczewski, his deputy and Chief of Political Affairs was Colonel Grosz, the Chief of Staff was General Mossor, Chief of the Information Department was Lt-Col. Zadrzynski, and Colonel Kuropieska was to have been the Chief of Operations. When Warsaw's plans fell through Kuropieska was sent to London as part of the Repatriation Mission under General Modelski. He was there appointed as military attaché, almost by default. The first candidate, Paris attaché Colonel Naszkowski, was offered the post but declined saying he would prefer to stay in France - ostensibly as his wife was ill. Kuropieska, a committed supporter of the new regime in Poland, seems, by his own pen at least, to have had a genuine concern for the repatriation of the Poles in the West and criticises the shortcomings of his fellow Mission members. General Modelski was criticised by him as bearing a grudge against the very people he was supposed to be encouraging to return; the naval attaché was criticised for much the same reason. According to Kuropieska Commodore Jerzy Klossowski was responsible for many sailors not going home. Before the war he had been by-passed for promotion and had retired from active service in 1934. He was unknown in the new Navy and the fact that he was sarcastic by nature did not endear him to anyone. [7] Similarly Lt-Col. Mossor seemed to be a bad choice to send to London. Kuropieska reports Mossor as saying of the officers who fought in the September Campaign that when they returned to Poland they would have "buckets of slops thrown over them." [8] Hardly words designed to encourage a mass return of the Officer Corps - and this from the proposed Chief of Staff. The only member of the Mission that Kuropieska seems to have had any respect for at all was Colonel Grosz who was, according to Kuropieska, the real head of the mission, not only intellectually but by nature of the trust put in him by the political leaders in Warsaw. [9] The impression the military attaché gives is that if the Provisional Government had wanted not to encourage repatriation then they had the right staff in London.
        The biggest complaint from Warsaw's representatives was that they were rarely told just what they were expected to do or how they were expected to do it. Kuropieska wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw with his own ideas as to why he was in London:

        "I have not been called to formulate the aims of our game with the British and - while I am sure these aims have been formulated - I am not party to their contents. For the purposes of my work here I take our aim to be the following:
1. To return to Poland as many able and morally healthy citizens as possible.
2. To return to Poland the entire intellectual
attainment of the émigré army.
3. To return to Poland the entire material attainment of the émigrés along with the military material which is so indispensable for the rebuilding of the country (also engineering, signalling and sanitation equipment; equipment for air and road transport; the scientific output of military institutions - this more so than fighting equipment) The exception to this is naval material.
4. To prevent any subversive elements entering the country.
5. To take the occasion to show the émigrés, hostile to our country, in their true light. In talks with the British to highlight the émigrés criminal actions against our people and their mistaken viewpoint - so as not only to make it more difficult for them to influence national opinion but also to discredit them in the eyes of Poland's friends abroad.
6. To ensure the most favourable conditions for talks of a financial nature...." [10]

        Even those well meaning officers who did work towards the aim of full repatriation had to contend with the unpredictable and, more often than not, unhelpful interventions from Warsaw.
        One of the biggest shocks for Kuropieska came with the news that as of the 14th of February, 1946, Warsaw was disclaiming the Polish Armed Forces in the West. He was told about the move while on a visit to Warsaw and told to inform Deputy-Foreign Minister Modzelewski, who was then on a visit in London. Because Kuropieska's plane was delayed in Brussels by bad weather Modzelewski had to read about the move from a British newspaper - it seemed that there was little or no coherent policy in Warsaw, confirmed by Kuropieska who adds that at a press conference just prior to his departure from Warsaw there had been no mention made of the move. [11]
        Opinions were divided as to the benefits of Warsaw's February declaration. The editor of the PSL paper told Kuropieska that the timing of the move was particularly bad. Apparently talks with the British were going well and that some 80% of the Polish forces may have gone back, but following the announcement Warsaw would be lucky if 10 to 15% went back. Wilk found it difficult to work out the reasoning behind the Provisional Government's thinking. Kuropieska, loyal to the regime, said that the situation had not changed and if anything it made repatriation more likely. [12]
        One of the principle reasons for denying the Polish forces in the way Warsaw did was do encourage Britain to demobilise the troops and to make the appropriate payments. Current British policy was to return Poles to Poland as soldiers and leave it up to Poland to demobilise them. In this way it was the Polish Government who were liable for demob payments and not London. This had led to many protests from the Polish Embassy accusing London of bad faith and led to the move in February that Polish Consulates would not deal with Polish soldiers but only civilians. The logic being that if the British wanted to be rid of the Poles - and Warsaw knew they did - then they would have to pay the demobilisation payments. [13]
        The question of war gratuities threatened to disrupt the whole process of repatriation. The first transport from the UK was held up for a time as soldiers protested at the way they were being sent home. It was certainly not the grand return to Poland that most had expected; if anything it had been rushed and makeshift. As the ship was about to leave on New Years Eve, 1945, - Bevin had promised Parliament that repatriation would begin that year - the Soldiers wanted to leave their weapons on the jetty as a silent protest but on contacting Warsaw Kuropieska told them that they should not go ahead with the protest. [14]
        There were very few issues on which the Poles in London and in Warsaw agreed but London's apparent
tight-fisted approach to Polish soldiers returning home was one. Major Jan Kuzniarz of the Polish (London) Demobilisation Office wrote to the Deputy Chief of Staff saying that French, Belgian, Czech and Dutch soldiers, whose contribution to the war effort had not been as great as that of the Poles and whose home situation was not as grave, had no restrictions as to what they could take home with them. Similarly a British rifleman who was being sent home from overseas could, after 5 years service, carry 100kgs of luggage, an officer could carry 250kgs all at the Governments expense. As for gratuities, other ranks were paid £100, a Lieutenant £150 and a Colonel £280. A Pole, on the other hand, received no gratuity, no civilian clothing and could not even take things he had bought with his own money unless he could carry them. Worse than this was the worry that the savings that soldiers had made might well be wasted due to a problem in the transfer of funds from British to Polish banks. [15] The kit that a Polish soldier was allowed to take with him was:

Battle dress Rations: 10 Day

Dress Coat Sterling: £5.00

Underwear x2 (or £10.00 in other currency)

Shirts x2 Baggage: Hand portable.

Blankets x3

Kit bag

Bread sack

Webbing Harness

Rifle or Pistol (no ammunition)

[16]
The issue again made it to the House of Commons when the Secretary of State for War, Mr Bellinger, was asked how many Polish soldiers in Italy had volunteered for repatriation since Bevin's 'Keynote' speech. Bellinger's answer was that 3,500 had volunteered but 2,300 had subsequently refused repatriation at the last moment, the reason for these refusals was put down to not being paid war gratuities, arrangements not having been made to move savings to Poland and the fact that new uniforms had not been issued to soldiers. [17]
        The question of the soldiers' savings was proving such a problem that the British Government had to produce a leaflet to hand to Polish soldiers explaining the financial aspects of repatriation. No Postal Orders were to be taken out of the UK, similarly US and Canadian Dollars and Swiss Francs were forbidden to be taken abroad. No more than £5.00 Sterling was allowed to be taken out of the country and any excess was to be paid into the Post Office Savings Bank and they could then take the savings book with them to Poland or they could deposit the book with the British authorities for safe keeping, the soldier would then get a receipt. The leaflet concluded with the words that "exact compliance with the above instructions will ensure the absolute security of their savings." [18]
        The British did finally concede the point of gratuities but on a discretionary basis - the 22nd May, 1946, was chosen as the date from when payments would be made. It was argued in the Foreign Office that prior to that date the British Government did not have to make payment and after that date they were only paid as a symbol of good faith to encourage the Poles to return. [19] This then prompted Warsaw's representatives to protest in the name of all the soldiers who had returned to Poland without these payments as they tried to get London to come forward with the back pay, with little success. Every Polish Soldier who had entered the Polish Armed Forces prior to the 15th of June, 1945, and had completed 180 days service was entitled, for very month served, to 10 US Dollars as a Private, 12 US Dollars as a Corporal and so on up the scale. Further to this they would be entitled to 56 days paid leave as soon as they crossed the Polish border. [20] As far as the War and Foreign Offices were concerned they were going out of their way to help the Poles get home yet the Provisional Government still appeared to be looking for a fight with London.
        One episode that confirmed London's worst fears about the positive attitude of the Poles was the protest by Marshal Rola-Zymierski that in the returning convoys only one round of ammunition was issued per man. The British were again accused of bad faith. The Foreign Office did its best to explain that the ammunition, 2,000 rounds in all, had been loaded on the ship and was never intended for individual distribution, its presence was meant to be seen as symbolic. The FO had no objection to a 'reasonable' amount of ammunition being carried per man providing the Warsaw authorities said what they considered as 'reasonable'. Dennis Allen of the FO, in a letter to Cavendish-Bentinck, could not help coming to the conclusion that: "It seems pretty clear that, whatever arrangements are made, the Polish authorities will complain about something!". Major Roberts of the WO had come to much the same opinion, writing to Hancock of the FO, he stated that: "There is no doubt that the Warsaw Poles are all out to pick upon any and every excuse for a complaint, whether one is justified or not !" [21]
        Warsaw's February 14th announcement, bombshell as it was, was also a mixed blessing for the British administration as it gave them a free hand in dealing with the Polish Armed Forces. It also gave them the reasoning that if Warsaw had given up its claim to the Polish Armed Forces it must also have given up its claim to the not insubstantial military hardware that went with a modern army, and for which Poland was making demands. Warsaw was again rapidly using up their store of British goodwill in their dealings with London.
        Kuropieska had told Hankey that the Poles wanted the planes of the Polish Squadrons of the RAF to be handed over to Warsaw's control. He further added that the planes had no military value to Poland, equipped as they were with Soviet hardware, but the gift would be seen as an earnest gesture of Britain's goodwill towards Poland. Hankey's reply was that Britain could not afford such gestures and the Provisional Government was not helping its own cause by its persecution of the PSL and by the fact that Britain had already given Poland Bailey bridges with no response from the Warsaw Poles. [22] The 'Eminence Grise', Joseph Retinger, recalled the same incident:
        "So long as the supplies were arriving, the Warsaw officials were all smiles, and I was received as a friend and benefactor. However, when I asked them to thank the British ambassador they would not do so. On the contrary, they prevented any publicity in Poland which would show that the goods were gifts from Britain. [...]
        I asked the Polish authorities a number of times to thank the British Government, and at least to pay their share of the expenses but they flatly refused. Mr Cavendish-Bentinck told me that as they could not do otherwise, they invited him to the inauguration of the Stettin Bridge, but during the ceremony not a word was said of its [sic] being a gift from Britain." [23]

The feeling of hostility towards the Warsaw Poles reached the highest level of Government - even to Bevin himself. Retinger had a first hand encounter with Bevin's true feelings.
        "Incidentally, when I was taking Mr Modzelewski along the long corridors of the House of Commons to Sir Stafford's [Cripps] room I met Ernest Bevin, who said in his very rough way: "I hear that you are bringing these bastards from Warsaw here. I agree that you ought to do your best for your country, but I am sorry that you are in such bad company." [24]

Personal feelings aside, there were more substantial reasons why the British Government was reluctant to give Warsaw more military equipment than it had to. Kuropieska recounts that the former Tory Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, had told Polish Pilot-Colonel Brzezina that the Polish Forces should not return to Poland straight away, at least not for two years, so as not to give away military secrets to a "potential adversary". Although Kuropieska had heard the exiles using such 'cold-war' rhetoric he was surprised that it had come from such a high British source. [25]
        The behaviour of the Warsaw authorities did not help their own cause in this issue. The provisions of the Yalta Agreement had not been fulfilled, as the Conservative Opposition did not fail to communicate at every opportunity in the Commons; there had not been elections in Poland and the Polish Secret Police still terrorised the opposition parties and at the same time Warsaw's military attaché was running around London telling the British that they should hand over Spitfires and warships as 'a gesture of good faith'. Needless to say this appeal was not met with open arms. Particularly revealing is a draft text from the FO to the Admiralty from March of 1946:

        "It seems to us that our best policy may well now prove to be to stall on the whole question of the return of any naval units until such time as the present provisional government is replaced by a more permanent administration as the result of elections in Poland when we might hope to secure a reasonable agreement with better hopes of it being carried out." [26]

This paragraph was removed from the text that was sent, but its meaning was clear, echoed as it was by Hankey of the FO in May, 1946: "Personally I wouldn't give Warsaw anything till they hold elections". [27]
        The Admiralty did not dispute the return of the warships that the Polish forces had brought with them, ships like the Blyskawica and Burza which had been in the Polish Navy before 1939. Other ships had been given to Poland by the Royal Navy; the Conrad and the Krakowiak had been HMS Danae and HMS Silverton respectively. Whereas the Warsaw Poles took the line that they were morally entitled to these ships - the Admiralty, not surprisingly, opposed this view. More than this the Admiralty were not prepared to hand over its newest equipment to the Communists, the old Polish ships had been extensively refitted since 1939 and it was decided that when the Blyskawica did go back to Poland it would be stripped back down to 1939 standard - another clear example, according to Kuropieska, of more bad faith from London. [28]
        The Autumn of 1946 brought a fresh wave of protest and counter-protest over the issue of Polish citizenship and the call to join the Resettlement Corps. Kuropieska highlighted the options open to Warsaw in his memo of August 8th, 1946: The first option was to protest over the creation of the PRC and to threaten to withdraw the citizenship of any Pole who joined the Corps and at the same time to be ready for a mass rise in repatriation. The other option was to go along with the idea of the Resettlement Corps as the best solution for its citizens and to try to influence the structure. By maintaining good relations with the British the Poles would then have a claim after two years to the technical material used in the PRC, the Poles would receive the best possible training and education and the Embassy could make sure that the Poles were not exploited or used for dangerous or degrading work. The first option would, according to Kuropieska, fall into the hands of the British who would like nothing more than to get rid of the Poles with the least possible expense. The second option was certainly the most favourable as regards the treatment of the Polish troops. The British had given very little thought to what would happen if the Poles stayed in the UK; someone had to influence the organisation of the Corps and by showing a kind face to the Polish troops and by demonstrating that after two years the Poles would still be welcome in their own country the troops would go back, and they would go back trained and skilled at British expense. By careful use of propaganda the Warsaw Poles could show the world and the Polish Forces that they were interested in the well being of the individual and the well being of Poland, rather than just starting a third world war as the exiles seemed to be. The Political leaders in Warsaw chose the first option and Kuropieska, then a devout Party member, says he also favoured this first option of protest at the time. Writing many years later he admits that Warsaw should have chosen the second option and it was an opportunity that was missed. The bad faith he accused the British of at the time was overstated if not completely wrong. [29]
        The propaganda machine of the Provisional Government swung into action threatening to deprive any Pole of his nationality for joining the PRC. Marshal Rola-Zymierski declared that:

        "The Polish Armed Forces, remaining to this point under British command, will be demobilised and in their place there will be created - without asking the opinion of the Government of National Unity - the so called 'Polish Resettlement Corps' which will be a unit of the British Army. Former Polish soldiers will be treated as citizens without Government and without a country. [...]
        I remind everyone that the honour of the Polish soldier will not allow a Pole to serve under a standard that is not red and white when his country needs him and call for his return home." [30]

The threat of loss of citizenship was announced by Warsaw Radio on the 12th September, 1946, in another speech by Rola-Zymierski:

        "In accordance with the Law on Polish Nationality of 1929 entry into foreign military service without the consent of the Polish Government renders the offender liable to loss of citizenship. On behalf of the Government of National Unity I want to warn you, soldiers, that entry in to the resettlement corps exposes you to the danger of losing your rights as citizens and, following from this, of losing the possibility of returning home." [31]

The move was widely reported by the British press at the time. As already mentioned certain British newspapers were hostile to the Polish forces and their treatment of certain issues was questionable to say the least. Even Hankey compared the wording of the above statement with the way it was treated in "The Times" of the 16th September. Although Warsaw had only said that the Poles could lose their citizenship but it was reported that they would lose it. The implication being - go home before it's too late.
        The threat of losing their nationality and with it the right to return to Poland was taken very seriously by many Poles - just as it was intended - and many of the senior officers did their best to allay these fears. Maj-Gen. Macleod of the PRC Advisory Staff wrote to Hankey with a paraphrase of General Anders' view on the situation:
        "Don't worry, a lot of us won't go back to Poland anyway if this Government is in Power, and if another Government comes into Power under which we may be willing to live in Poland, that Government would be almost certain to revoke the decree withdrawing your nationality." [32]

Warsaw's men were going around telling the Polish Forces in Britain not to join the PRC while knowing full well that the Poles were apprehensive about returning to Poland. The mental anguish that they created was immense and the bad feeling they created in Whitehall was also very strong. Both the FO and the WO had invested a great deal of time in creating the Resettlement Corps only to see it threatened at birth by Warsaw's latest policy decision.
        Linowski in "Trudne Powroty" states:

        "Of course the aim of Polish policy was not to make life difficult for the British authorities but rather to find a solution that was most advantageous for their particular point of view. This is something the British did not want to understand." [33]

It is doubtful that the corridors of the Foreign Office reverberated with praise for how reasonable the Warsaw Poles were being and as to their 'particular point of view' it was still an open question as to which, if any, soldiers were wanted back in Poland.
        In private and public conversation the Communist representatives could appear to be very reasonable. The following minutes were noted in a London meeting between Grosz and Cripps, with Retinger in attendance:
Grosz to Cripps: "Furthermore these people have done nothing wrong against Poland. On the contrary, they are returning covered with the glory of fighting the Germans, so what possible harm is going to come to them ?
[He than mentions the AK; that they have been recognised and are working with the full confidence of the authorities.]

Retinger: Not all of them - far from all of them.

Grosz (Categorically): All of them that don't have Polish blood on their hands." [34]

This left the door open for Warsaw to refuse to accept back any group of soldiers it did not want back. The question of the Volksliste was one that vexed many a repatriation officer. Whilst some officers like Kuropieska did their best to get all the Poles back to Poland - even those who had been on the Volksliste, his equivalent in Rome, Colonel Sidor, did the opposite. In his 1947 book he wrote about the Second Corps continuing the argument that Anders' Army were all fascists and collaborators:
        "The 2nd Corps marched into Italy with 50,000 people. In action - through death and injury - it was reduced to 15,000. When the 2nd Corps was evacuated to England it numbered 110,000 people, not counting paramilitary auxiliaries. Where did these "Soldiers" come from ?" [35]

Putting aside the inaccuracy of Sidor's calculation he answers his own question by saying that most came from the German Army and war criminals from the S.S., the Gestapo, from the Russian 'Vlassov' Army and from Lithuanian collaborators. Although there is some truth that a small number of criminals did escape justice by claiming to be Poles this was largely as a result of poor Allied screening than to a Polish desire to fill its ranks with Nazis. Nevertheless Warsaw felt obliged to point out the groups of soldiers that it did not want to see in Poland. Cavendish-Bentinck ciphered the Foreign Office in March, 1946, with news that Poland:
        "Would not receive back in Poland persons who were on the first and second categories of German Volksliste (i.e. Reichsdeutsche and persons of acknowledged German Race living in Poland before 1939), individuals who had been members of S.S. formations or Vassor [sic] Army, Ukrainians and all persons who had been on the staff of the Polish Deuxieme Bureau (STS and SOE) [Special Training School and Special Operations Executive]"

Three days after Gomulka's speech, Zygmunt Modzelewski, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, added to this that members of the Nazi S.A. were also excluded "and persons who had publicly conducted propaganda against the present Government." [36]
        This last, retrospective, category could, given ill will from Warsaw, be used to persecute repatriates. General Anders was under no illusions what awaited the Polish Soldier who returned home and he warned them to that effect:

        "They will attempt to destroy our Armed Forces. We shall all be exposed to their cunning agitation. They will call for our return to our country, but we know only too well how that would end. They will look among Polish soldiers for men of weak resolution. Their work will be easier as a result of the withdrawal of the recognition of the lawful Government of the Polish Republic, since the Polish authorities have been deprived of the means of information, even in the form of radio broadcasts from London, which broadcasts have now ceased to serve the cause of Poland.
        I do not doubt for a moment that the men of the II Polish Corps, who know why and for what Poland has been fighting for so long, will withstand all hostile attempts." [37]

The Repatriation Missions expended much effort to counter such ideas. Among the troops they had their work cut out but among the masses of Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria there was more fertile ground in which to work. Many of the Poles who had been moved West by the Germans to work in German industry had been put on the Volksliste - most often through no choice of their own - and now felt apprehensive about returning to Poland. Since Poland needed their labour they were to be encouraged to return. The Polish Repatriation Mission at Graz Klagenfurt broadcast to the DPs in 1946:
        "Recently the verification undertaken by Polish liaison officers at the request of the British authorities in certain Polish centres had led to a spread of rumours by some people, interested in covering up their 'Volksliste' past and the fact that they have no right to be DPs. The rumours say that this verification is the first step to forced repatriation. We point out that according to international principles no one will be forced to return if they are confirmed by this verification to be Poles. Poland does not need elements who do not want to be there and work there. Similarly we need not add that Poland does not go through the trouble of repatriation simply to send its citizens to another country, to imprison them or to persecute them. Land, workshops, factories and institutions are waiting for you. The Polish Repatriation Mission has no intention of forcing anyone to return. On the contrary we refuse the right to return to anyone who by collaborating with the Germans or by obtaining German citizenship have lost the right to be Poles. Do not believe the rumours that are being spread about by people who have themselves nothing to lose and try to tie their fate to yours - who try to create a rift between yourselves and the homeland." [38]

The message was that the Poles had no fear in returning and that all statements to the contrary were, as Kuropieska called them, the "vile insinuations" [39] of reactionaries who wanted to harm the interests of the new regime.
        The idea that the Provisional Government did not want mass repatriation would not go away. Even in the Autumn of 1945 Retinger - a friend of Warsaw - had come to that very conclusion in talks with Warner, then head of the FO's Northern Department, and whose words were reported to the Polish Armed Forces Committee:
        "Dr R. has come to the conclusion that the Polish Government did not want the bulk of the Polish forces under our command to return before the winter. Not only would they starve if they went back in large numbers now, but also on political grounds. Warsaw would prefer to take only picked officers and specialists at the present stage. Moreover, they had now "realised that the great majority of volunteers for repatriation in this country were Volksdeutsche". (In point of fact, the majority of the volunteers are Poles who came over from or were captured with the Germans. One would have thought that if they were Volksdeutsche they would not be keen to return to Poland in present circumstances and it seems not unlikely that the Warsaw authorities are applying this term to them as providing a more respectable excuse for refusing to accept them.)" [40]

This flew in the face of everything the military attaché was trying to achieve in London. Kuropieska highlights the case of one Sergeant who had been an NCO in the German Army but had deserted to the Poles, bringing with him a complete radio station. He had fought well in the Polish Army and had been decorated for his efforts yet he had heard from Poland that his wife had been interned in a camp for Volksdeutsche; this was hardly news to encourage soldiers to return. Kuropieska contacted Modzelewski to ask for her release and for her to write to her husband when she was free. The letter was sent from Poland by diplomatic courier as a demonstration that the ex-Wehrmacht would have nothing to fear. The Colonel also made sure that everyone knew what had happened because, as he says, there was little point hiding this particular light under a bushel. The troops had to know. [41]
        There was a smaller but perhaps more influential group of Polish soldiers who were earmarked for
particularly vitriolic denunciation - the Generals, and non more so than General Anders. An article in "Zycie Warszawy" is typical of the vilification campaign that was waged:

        "We do not want people in our country who, for their own ambition and to preserve their privilege, are ready to betray not only the lives of his own people but the interests of his country. Anders has compromised himself just as those who supported him are compromised." [42]

According to a United Press article in August, 1946, Anders had no intention of leaving Italy. According to 'Warsaw' Polish sources in the USA the General had accumulated a fortune of some $200,000 US and had bought himself a luxury villa where, after leaving the Army, he would live the life of a 'bon viveur'. This was repeated in the "Espresso" and "Il Momento" in Italy. [43] True or not, such stories were believed.
.
        The "Osadnik na Ziemiach Odzyskanych", a fortnightly paper published in Warsaw was even more specific in its attack on the old order of Poland:

        " ...the emigration of the Polish intelligentsia to do hard manual work abroad is some act of madness; some political revenge by the Potockis, the Anders, the Sosnkowskis and all the other former landowners who, today, have lost their estates in Poland to the peasants. They have set themselves up quite comfortably abroad. Anders has an estate in Ireland, Potocki in South America, Sosnkowski near Montreal. Such people we can understand, but why does an artist; why does an engineer; why does a lawyer go to Canada to work for some farmer or in the forest or on the railways ? [...]
        Thousands of Soldiers and thousands of Polish families, including those from the East as well as the West, have settled in the Recovered Territories and are devoting their skill in the jobs to the re-polonisation of the ancient Piast lands; to the area's reconstruction and economic renaissance. For three years now they have been ploughing their farms; working in factories, workshops, offices; working in the arts; teaching in schools etc.
        These people returned to their country by the shortest possible route and are now working for its benefit and their own - but the others...
        One day they will stop being white slaves on whose backs the politically and morally bankrupt are making interest and they too will find the shortest route home." [44]

Of the 181 Polish Generals who ended the war in the West (including senior commanders later promoted by the Government-in-Exile) only 11 returned to Poland. [45]

        The Generals were not welcome back in Poland and Kuropieska told the former GOC Polish Parachute Brigade, General Sosabowski, as much when they met. He was told that many officers had evaded capture during the war and found themselves in the West, yet had received no command. The situation in Poland was much the same - the Polish Armed Forces had too many senior officers and there would be no place for those in the West. According to the General, Kuropieska said this:

        "...in a serious tone that was not meant to offend, as he was merely trying to prove that on active service in the present reality as existed in Poland, even if we did decide to return to Poland, there would be no place for us." [46]

Some senior officers did find a role in the Poland, however briefly. Paszkiewicz became the Commander of the Warsaw Military District, Colonel Mossor became the head of the Krakow District, General Szarecki became head of the Polish Medical Corps, Lt-Colonel Stefan Scibor became the Second in Command of a bomber squadron in Lodz. Colonel Jerzy Kirchmayer returned to Poland to join the Army, eventually to be promoted to General. This was also the case with Colonel Franciszek Skibinski, former CO of the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade of the 1st (Polish) Armoured Division. That is not to say that General Anders' words did not come true for many of the returned senior officers.
        The 'Trial of the Generals' that took place in August, 1950 and the following year rocked the Polish Military Establishment. The process of Polish Stalinisation led to the arrest of many of those who returned to Poland. General Tatar, Colonels Mossor, Kirchmayer, Skibinski and even Kuropieska found themselves in the dock on espionage and conspiracy charges with 129 other Polish officers. As well as long prison sentences there were 19 executions handed out. Even those who might be regarded as loyal to the regime fell victim to the process - Marian Spychalski was imprisoned in 1950 and three years later Marshal Zymierski met the same fate. Although in 1956 Gomulka rehabilitated those who fell victim to the regime (he too had fallen from grace in 1948), for many it was too late. [47]
        Some Poles, for the good of the country, were prepared to go home whatever the reaction of the regime. Poland needed Poles and that was an end to the matter. Tadeusz Kochanowicz explained why he returned to Poland:

        "...I considered that as many Poles as possible should return to Poland, with the exception of those who might return in order to continue the fight against the new political system. Ruined by war and by the occupation, Poland needed people to work. Abroad there were many qualified people. No doubt they would be useful in reconstruction. A return of the greatest number of people of goodwill, politicians included, regardless of the economic conditions at home, would, in my opinion, go a long way to calm things down in Poland." [48]

There was hardly a soldier who did not feel the urge to return to Poland and to help in the rebuilding of the country. General Machalski, although he wanted to go back, would not under any circumstances.

         "I considered it was our duty to return to Poland in closed ranks, with standards unfurled and with our arms in our hands to join with our brothers who conquered Berlin and hoisted the Polish flag on the ruins of the Reichstag. Although I did think to myself that there would be problems after Anders brought our Army out of the USSR and the Sikorski-Maiski agreement broke down, the other side was not blameless. Instead of holding out their hand to us and welcoming us back in the country with bread and salt and with showers of flowers they demanded we lay down our weapons, take off our uniforms and return on consular passports. They threatened us with court processes and prisons. Having a clear conscience I had no intention of justifying myself before any procurator or to suffer for something I had not done. It did not appeal to me that I should be tolerated as a second class citizen in my own country to be maltreated and humiliated. I decided to stay abroad where I would not have to be ashamed to work as an unskilled labourer of the lowest order. I could not entertain the idea that in my own country I should have to clean streets while others, less deserving, run around in cars. I did not return to Poland, not because I did not want to return but because the authorities in the country didn't want me." [49]

The argument that it was better to be poor in Britain than in the Poles' own country was scorned by the officers trying to encourage repatriation. Kuropieska told many men that given the choice it was always better that they should break rocks on Polish roads rather than British ones. [50] Colonel Sidor was equally critical of the view that men like Machalski took. He wrote:

        "Anders preferred to use Polish officers and soldiers to dig English potatoes; to clear the rubble of London and to locate land-mines on the beaches of Great Britain rather than allow them to return to their families and help rebuild their own country." [51]

        Many thousands of Poles agreed with the view that they had to get home. As Jerzy Potocki writes, nostalgia had been eating at the troops for years but fear was the best incentive to return. Although there was a mass of propaganda telling the Poles that they should fear the Communists, many thousand feared life as an exile more. They feared the sort of manual work that they would have to do - they were qualified to do little else and they feared the xenophobia of the local population; it was the fear of dying abroad that drove many to return. [52] Many Poles were prepared to defy the propaganda; as one Polish newspaper wrote:

        "Rome. 10.1.[1946] (Polish Press Agency) On the 8th of this month in Cinecitta camp near Rome Major Stefan Count Tyszkiewicz, former director of Anders' Red Cross, arrived for a visit accompanied by several other people - supposedly under the pretext of giving assistance to the repatriates staying in the camp.
        Anders' emissaries began to campaign against returning to Poland however the mass of indignant repatriates gave them the response they so deserved. Amid cries of "You are not Poles! You have no right to do this!" the repatriates made moves to lynch Anders' representatives and to demolish their car. The Count was only saved by the energetic intervention of the officers of the Polish Repatriation Mission who prevented a kangaroo court and managed to calm the angry crowd. To shouts of "We don't want your thieves money! Murderers! You're killing hundreds of people in Poland!" and "Anders' outcasts!" the car left the camp." [53]


        As well as not wanting to be exiles many Poles were tempted by the offers put forward by repatriation officers and the State Directorate for Repatriation [PUR]. One soldier was told that he would not have to work but would receive a government grant for further and higher education. He would get accommodation and furniture from PUR in Poland, more so since he was going to the 'recovered territories'. As the son of a worker he would get priority in education and if he wanted to work he would find it straight away. Because the Germans had killed so much of the Polish intelligentsia he was told the country needed his humble qualifications more than
ever. Although his friends sneered with cynical disbelief it did seem a tempting prospect and Waclawski returned to Poland on the 8th November, 1948. [54]

        The PUR budget for propaganda to the West in 1947 was Zl 17,700,000 and was necessarily higher than the budget to the East; the Poles in the Soviet Union needed less encouragement to return home. [55] The Polish (Warsaw) Ministry of Information and Propaganda also did its best to get the regime's message across. Wojciech Albrycht, Director of the Information Ministry's Foreign Department, reported on the propaganda tools sent from Poland in November, 1945, alone in "an action to combat the political narrow-mindedness of the II Corps". [56]


PROPAGANDA TOOLS SENT TO UK FOR NOVEMBER 1945.

MATERIALS	EMBASSY IN LONDON	MILITARY ATTACHÉ	OTHER POLISH BODIES	WORLDWIDE
Periodicals	300	420	1,290	159,453
Weeklies	168	275	772	34,527
Illustrated Magazines in Polish	3	-	7	1,827
Illustrated Magazines in English	1,253	-	25	6,092
Statistical Reports	10	-	17	134
Brochures	82	-	235	10,662
Posters	30	-	8	1,124
Prospectuses	3	-	3	1,787
Photos	50	-	15	445
National Symbols	1	-	1	83
Portraits	3	-	6	132
Maps of Poland	2	-	4	71
Albums	-	-	1	15
Maps of Death Camps	-	-	1	3
Articles	-	-	-	2
Films	-	-	-	18
Gramophone Records (sets)	-	-	-	1

        The need to inform Poles of what was happening in Poland was important given the large number of them abroad. In the British Zone of Germany, occupied by 30 Corps, the Chief of the Polish Repatriation Mission, Major Starzec, presented a report on the number of Poles in the area:

27th March, 1946

UNIT	AREA	CAMPS	DPs	PWX	TOTAL (Polish Figures - British Figures)
5 DIV.	Braunschweig	178	51,811	10,247	62,058 - 62,550
1 (Pol) DIV.	Meppen	30	21,069	4,048	25,117 - 24,586
43 DIV.	Celle	10	24,579	1,640	-------- 26,219
51 DIV.	Syke	23	24,957	3,355	28,312 --------
3 (Can) DIV.	Oldenburg	7	1,052	1,301	1,353 --------
75 AA BRIG. 51 DIV.	OsnabruckSyke	2	5,883	798	6,681 --------

[57]

There were no exact figures as to the number of Poles in the 30 Corps Area, the British Authorities and Polish Mission counted differently, but there were some 148,441 to 171,673 civilian DPs and 23,232 former prisoners of war (PWX) held in 250 camps.
        Even with all the goodwill in the world the Polish Missions were fighting an uphill battle to get their message across to the Poles. Their biggest complaint was the 'hermetic' nature of the Polish camps, sealed off as they were by officers loyal to the Poles in London. If the Warsaw Poles could not get their message across then the obvious outcome would be a mass of rumours, all of them negative.

        The Mission to 30 Corps reported regularly to Warsaw. The report from the 13th March, 1946, complained that the area controlled by the 1st (Polish) Armd Div. was the most difficult to work in. Polish officers would go around trying to discourage DPs from returning to Poland. Capt. Sobanski was quoted as telling DPs that a group of repatriates going to Lubeck had been detoured into wooded ground and robbed by the British escort.
Lt. Piotrowski had spread the rumour that three children had died on one transport as no food had been given for three days. By such use of exaggeration and misinformation the seeds of doubt were sown in the minds of possible volunteers for return. [58]
        The April 1st, 1946, report noted that rumours were spreading about the fate of repatriates from Poznan and Pomorze who, it was said, were being sent to Siberia directly on arriving in Poland. All the repatriates were being forced to join the PPR and anyone who had been in Germany after 1943 was being arrested; this particularly affected many of the civilian DPs. Relations with the Soviet Union were also another source of rumour for the future. Any hold up in a transport was taken to be a sign of the imminent start of war, any Pole married to a 'Soviet Citizen' - by Moscow's definition anyone who had lived east of the Curzon Line in 1939 - would be separated from their partners who would then be deported East. [59]
        The Polish Mission had the problem that it was treated as a pariah by the London Poles who would have nothing to do with its members. The 1st March, 1946, report to Warsaw complained that the commander of the Wladyslaw Jagiello Camp in Braunschweig, 2nd Lt. Zastawnik, had told Warsaw's representative that he did not recognise the office of the Mission and would do nothing to assist them. In the 1st Division's town of Maczkow posters began to appear about the Warsaw Liaison Officer - Capt. Kukla - saying that he "Will give morning lessons in his mother tongue - Russian." [60] When Kukla was recalled to Warsaw at the end of March the situation was becoming critical. Major Starzec sent another report to Warsaw in April, 1946:

        "The region in which we have the least control is the area held by the 1st Polish Armoured Division where, temporarily, we have no liaison officer. The matter of sending one of our representatives to that area has now become urgent. In the near future the Division is awaiting demobilisation and it is essential that our liaison officer starts work there as soon as possible. On the basis of personal contacts with many soldiers and officers (particularly the younger ones) it must be said that the majority would like to return to Poland but would prefer to be demobilised first or they would like to return as organised military units." [61]

        If the Military Mission in Germany felt aggrieved at the apparent ill will of the Poles in the 1st Armoured Division this was nothing to the problems they felt they were facing from the British trying to get these very same Poles back to Poland. The Head of Mission in Bad Salzuflen wrote to the Chief of the Polish Mission in Berlin, Dr Jakub Prawin, on the 3rd May, 1945, to complain about the British attitude:

        "Despite the apparent good will of Brig. Carthew and Col. Ross from the Allied Liaison Office, to this date, it has been impossible to reach a decision regarding the organisation of a separate transport for the 1st Armd. Div.
        The British transport authorities are hiding behind apparent technical difficulties; a lack of available space at Quackenbruck and Lubeck Camps (current capacity being 400) as well as the necessity to use the transport for economic purposes. To date the question of separate transport lies on dead ground.
        The British authorities have several times underlined that unless the position of the Polish authorities undergoes some considerable change there will be a serious delay in the repatriation of 1st Armd. Div. Personally I can't see why the British are making such problems with the transport. It appears to be an unwillingness to take certain new steps and to put in the necessary investment (to enlarge transit camps, etc.) as well as trying to force us to take the soldiers of the 1st Armd. Div. out of this area as quickly as possible." [62]

The problems with moving elements of the 1st Armoured Division to Poland were not resolved until May of 1947. Whereas the Warsaw Poles blamed the British for the delay the British thought the fault lay in the Warsaw Poles who seemed to constantly put up new obstacles. The minutes of a meeting at Lancaster House in Berlin, the Headquarters of the Control Commission Germany (British Element) [CCG (BE)], show that even the first transport that was due to leave on May 1st was held up at the last minute by the Warsaw Poles demanding an extra level of screening. Repatriates were first screened at Divisional Headquarters in Meppen, then moved to Quakenbruk Camp before being moved by train to Stettin in parties of 400. They were to be kept separate from DPs and PWX. The Polish Mission demanded a secondary stage of screening at Lubeck. General Westrop, Chief of the Combined Services Division, who chaired the meeting found it difficult to work out just why the Poles were demanding this new move but agreed if the Poles would promise to keep procedures to a minimum. [63]
        The people who suffered the most due to this mutual recrimination were the Polish soldiers who, by 1947, had spent two years with an uncertain view of the future. Seemingly the officers of the Bad Salzuflen Mission were positive towards repatriation. In May, 1945, the Acting Head of Mission wrote to Prawin in Berlin with his worries:

        "Due to the protracted delay in the matter of repatriation I have noticed a decided change of mood in the area of the 1st Armd. Div. Those who have declared themselves for repatriation have to wait a long time for transport (2-3 Months). In many cases the soldiers have been subject to all manner of unpleasantness. Elements hostile to us have tried to lay the blame for the delay in repatriation on the Polish authorities - this has started various types of rumours. I have taken every step, by my contacts with officers, to counter these rumours and to explain the situation as it is. I maintain, however, that the question of repatriation needs to be moved along with all possible speed." [64]

Although this report seems sincere enough the question of repatriation was not 'moved along with all possible speed'. Almost exactly two years after the above report the first transport was ready to go. Captain Bojenko of the Meppen Consulate reported the particulars the day after the 13th of May move. The numbers to return to Poland in the transport were 399 soldiers and 37 dependants (although 12 pulled out at the last minute for various reason). Each soldier received 4 days personal ration and 7 days ration per man was also loaded on the train; they were entitled to carry 150 Kgs luggage each - this amounted to 60 tons which filled three and a half railway wagons with another being taken up with food. The troops themselves were loaded in 12 carriages. Although the transport was somewhat crowded and the train had not been disinfected since the last DP transport there were few complaints from the Poles.

        "The mood among the soldiers was good, cheerful. They were happy. I gave out newspapers to the departing soldiers. From the British authorities some Captain turned up towards the end but he didn't seem to be interested in very much. From the Division - General Rudnicki was there. He talked to groups of the soldiers asking them if they had received everything that was due to them. I can't say that he showed any signs of a heartfelt farewell. There were no speeches." [65]

General Rudnicki's attitude seemed to confirm the faith that was put in him by the War Office and bore out General Sir Ivor Thomas' view: "I have no fears at all as to what will come from Germany - I know Rudnicki will play the game in a way Anders never did." [66]

        On the 1st May, 1947, the 1st (Polish) Armoured Division was removed from the BAOR ready for demobilisation, its place being taken by the British 7th Armoured Div. As the Warsaw Liaison officers began to be withdrawn they produced closing reports on their activity in Germany. As the Consulate in Meppen was closing Major Jankowski wrote to Warsaw with a situation report praising the men of the Division for a very positive attitude towards the 'new' Poland. In particular the Division's Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Stankiewicz, and the Divisional Quartermaster, Major Micha, were mentioned for being more than helpful. Despite the efforts of well meaning officers on both sides of the political divide the troops were still not happy. Jankowski reported that there were many complaints that they were being kept in the dark and had been denied the triumphant return to Poland that they had been waiting for - they claimed that if General Maczek had still been in Command of the Division then things would have been different. Rudnicki, who had spent the war in Italy, had never gained the popularity of Maczek with the men in Germany, and shows that Maczek's removal to head the new 1st Polish Corps was a move welcomed by Warsaw.
        The repatriation rate of the Division was quite high, especially compared to front-line units in the 2nd Corps. The Jankowski report. written in November, 1947, records that in the Summer of 1946 some 1,500 soldiers returned home and then from May to October, 1947, a further 5,453 soldiers and 1,257 dependants returned. He added that many Poles returned to Poland after the unit had been shipped to the UK so that in the end only 40% of the Division did not end up in Poland - and this considering that 65% of the Divisions manpower were Class 3 Volksdeutsche from Silesia, Pomerania and Wielkopolska. As to the claim that Warsaw did not want Polish soldiers to return, Jankowski points out that the Government had only refused three applications from the Division - two Class 2 Volksdeutsche collaborators and a Ukrainian. The Consulate in Meppen had refused two - a German and a Ukrainian. There were, at the time the report was written, still 42 cases where a decision had yet to be reached. [67]
        Whereas the Polish Mission to 30 Corps did not alienate its British host to any great extent the Polish Mission in Berlin seemed to do little else. As Berlin was being divided after the war the Poles, recognised as being in the Soviet 'sphere of influence', had been assigned property in the Soviet Zone. The Poles protested and appealed directly to the British Military Government in Berlin who had then given them an empty block of flats at 42 Schlutterstrasse - much to the annoyance of the Foreign Office and CCG (BE). The Poles set up shop in the British Zone, originally claiming that they would get provisions directly from Poland - this was a claim that was not believed by the British who assumed they must be "...scrounging right and left and obtaining provender by the usual surreptitious Polish methods." [68] The FO was right in its assessment of the situation. The Poles who now had a foothold in the British Zone then appealed to them for supplies. The British refused on the grounds that the Poles should be in the Soviet Zone where they were guaranteed provisions - if the Poles didn't like it then they should leave, and the FO encouraged the Poles to do just that. Cavendish-Bentinck did put a proposition forward that it might have been prudent to feed the Poles:

        "Whilst I have no doubt that it would be tiresome for us to provide rations for [the] Polish Military Mission in Berlin, and I expect they are probably irritating people much given to complaint, nevertheless it may be a good investment to have these people dependent on us for their daily bread." [69]

This view did not gain much popularity especially when the Poles began to push their luck and asked the British for a villa for official use. The Warsaw Foreign Ministry requested that the British Military Government provide a villa with reception rooms, quarters for the mission members, rations on the same scale and permission to employ staff. The CCG were unimpressed and told the ambassador in Warsaw that the position had not changed. Since the Poles were effectively only squatters in their current building and since there was a great deal of demand for property in Berlin it was suggested that the Poles would do better not to draw attention to themselves as they might lose the building altogether. [70] This seemed to put an end to the matter.
        The Polish Mission in Germany consisted of 233 people: 104 in the British Zone; 54 in the Soviet Zone; 48 in the US Zone and 27 in the French Zone. [71] Their effectiveness was questioned by Cecil King of the CCG (BE) Main HQ's Political Division in a letter to the BAOR Advanced HQ in Berlin:
        "...there seems no doubt that the Mission are a poor lot, and Ross' [Allied Liaison Branch] view that they hinder rather than encourage repatriation is also held by our people 'on the ground'..." [72]

The Military did not need convincing about the Poles. In a report about Warsaw's Liaison Officers [LOs] by 13 Area Security Office in Schleswig-Holstein another complaint was made about the Poles.

        "HQ Mil. Gov. (DP/PWX) 8 Corps District agree that so far from being of assistance these LOs have been a sheer nuisance; they have fulfilled no useful function and have wasted the time of FS [Field Security] NCOs who have been obliged to investigate their activities." [73]

        Lt. Kossobudzki was suspected of espionage, Lt. Gawron was also suspected of espionage and of drug smuggling. Lt. Sukowski was under observation for sending non-censored mail, as was 2nd Lt. Miernik who was also under suspicion of currency irregularities.
        Even if the personalities were of questioned value the machinery of repatriation was formidable. PUR in Germany had four ships at its disposal - the SS Rotenfels that carried 1,300 people, SS Spree for 650, SS Poseidon for 800 and the SS Izar with a 3,000 capacity that replaced the SS Fischer which was withdrawn after PUR complaints about cockroach infestation and leaks in the hull. [74]
        As well as the four ships to take the DPs back from Germany arrangements had to be made for transport by sea from Britain and overland from the rest of Europe. Dr Przewanski, the Consul General in London, wrote a report to PUR:
        "As per my earlier communication - there was a Conference today in the Consulate between Consular representatives, the military attaché, the War Office and the Foreign Office to try to facilitate the repatriation of the Army by land. The following was decided: The 'Eastern Prince' will take about 1,500 on the 24th November [1947] and the rest we will send by rail - that is to say about 1,000 soldiers who are currently waiting and declared themselves later. With regards to rail transport we set down the following conditions: 1/ During transport, all the way to the Polish frontier, food is to be provided. 2/ Adequate protection is to be provided. 3/ The journey will be made without changing trains. 4/ The repatriates are to be delivered to our border crossing at Dziedzice. As it transpires, all of this is within the competence of the War Office which would have to take responsibility for the planning - knowing that they would have to provide passenger wagons for this. I also brought up the question of the 5 invalids who have died while waiting for repatriation. I asked for better conditions for the invalids and sick soldiers. For the Foreign Office the talks were led by Hancock, for the War Office - Col. Telfer. From the military attaché's office there was Col. Chojecki. There were also several advisors to both sides present. After the Conference I invited everyone for tea and cocktails where conversation about work was avoided." [75]
        The return by sea had been an available option almost as soon as hostilities had ended. In November, 1945, at a Cabinet meeting it was...
        "(1) Agreed that, subject to satisfactory assurances from the Admiralty about the safety of this route, the Foreign Secretary should inform the Polish Provisional Government that transport could be made available to repatriate by sea the 23,000 members of the Polish Armed Forces who had expressed a wish to return to Poland." [76]

Once the security aspect - namely the disposal of sea mines in Gdynia - had been cleared up, the British designated four ships to run the round trip to Poland. In May, 1946, for example, The 'Eastern Prince' sailed on the 6th with 1,507 people, including 348 dependants; on the 9th the 'Medina Victory' sailed with 1,300; on the 12th the 'Clan Lamont' sailed with 1,410; on the 17th the 'Marine Raven' sailed with 1,994. Each ship off-loaded in Poland and sailed back to Britain to be ready for its next trip. By the 24th of May the 'Eastern Prince' was ready for its second trip of the month, the 'Medina Victory' sailed again on the 27th, the Clan Lamont on the 30th and the Marine Raven on the 4th of June and so on. [77]
        The repatriations, once the teething troubles had been sorted out, went smoothly but the biggest apprehension most of the troops had was the kind of reception that awaited them in Poland. Those who were not going back had told them to expect the worst. One repatriate says that as his repatriation ship reached Poland it was approached by a motor launch with armed guards.

        "The expression on their faces was, to say the least, indifferent. Was this an omen, a foretaste of what the reactionary propaganda had warned us about - a welcome by the UB and then the labour camps ? We fell silent and our good humour left us.
        The ship slowly approached the jetty. It appeared that 'they' were right. On the jetty, every few metres, soldiers with machine guns were lined up in rows. The ship was in total silence." [78]

As it turned out Sgt. Mrowiec had little to worry about and after a short stay in a transit camp in Wrzeszcz was soon in Silesia with his family.
        As well as repatriates being apprehensive about the reception there were also complaints from the Ministry of Information and Propaganda in Warsaw that the whole repatriation was badly organised - with time the
situation got worse.

        In a series of reports by Kazimiera Ostrowska of the Ministry to her Head Office in Warsaw she traced with growing desperation how badly the authorities were organising the receptions.

        Report #8, dated 20th January, 1946, covered the 'Baufora’s' arrival in Poland with 17 officers and 1,981 other ranks:
        "The ship sailed into port to the sound of the national anthem played by the Army Orchestra from Wrzeszcz. The soldiers returning to their country were welcomed by representatives of the military authorities - Col. Sokolowski at the head, and by members of the civil authorities. As the ship moored there were many moving scenes: One of the women standing on the quay recognised her husband among a group of soldiers standing on the upper decks - another recognised her son and others recognised friends and relatives. The enthusiastic welcome given to these soldiers returning from their wanderings was returned by a rain of chocolates, cigarettes and sweets that poured onto the heads of the waiting public.
        After the gangway was lowered the officer in command of the transport - Col. Perko - stepped ashore to be greeted with flowers and a kiss from a group of ladies standing on the quay.
        The unloading of the ship was carried out most efficiently. The soldiers made their way to the parade ground of the Slowacki Street barracks where the official part of the welcome was to take place.
        After a series of long speeches it was possible to observe that the soldiers looked decidedly disheartened. Little wonder as they were tired, hungry and cold. They were only dismissed at dusk when they retired to the barracks.
        On the ship I talked to some of the repatriates. On the whole most are pleased to be back in their country. Life over there [Britain] is hard. Homesickness and inactivity are convincing more and more to return. They find British attitudes towards the Poles discouraging - this feeling is most pronounced in those who declare themselves for repatriation home." [79]

By report #32, March 1946, the Ministry representative was commenting that the reception committee for the 'Clan Lamont' turned up late. When the Head of Department, Irena Ostoja-Ostojska, went to see the 'Sobieski's' first return to Poland since 1939 she too was critical of the authorities. As the 'Sobieski' returned with 15 officers and 2,003 other ranks on the 25th March, 1946, there was no welcoming Committee at all. The families of the repatriates were not allowed on to the quay - some managed to break through the cordon and were also showered with a hail of chocolates, oranges and cigarettes. Families of the ship's crew were taken on board and fed with oranges and bananas. The biggest complaint from the people on board was that there was no official welcome. "Didn't you know we were coming?" was one question frequently asked. The conclusion of Ostoja-Ostojska was: "It does not serve us well in propaganda terms." [80]

        Kazimiera Ostrowska's report #35, 25th April, 1946, relates to a further trip by the 'Sobieski' with 947 troops from Italy (including 5 officers) and 1,032 troops from the UK (with 5 officers including General Ferek-Bleszynski). As the ship had been given a formal send off in Britain the Poles were most surprised to find that in Poland there was no orchestra and no honour guard to meet them. Even the British Consul commented that the whole affair showed a lack of organisation and general disinterest in the returning Polish troops. [81]
        Her report #36, in May, covering the next return of the ship was even more critical. The port had been sealed off to the general public by port guards, border police and security staff employed by Gdynia-American Shipping Lines. Plinius, the director of the line, said that no one, not even crew families would be allowed on board (this was due to a string of thefts during previous visits). The crew met and told the management that unless their families were allowed on board they would go ashore and not sail anymore. This serious threat of strike action forced Plinius and the GAL management to back down. [82]
        With each subsequent return of the 'Sobieski' the security became tighter and the welcome less friendly so that by report #38, May 20th, 1946, there was wide scale disquiet at the lack of welcome in Poland - especially compared to the genuinely warm send off from Britain.
        Ostrowska's next report was even more angry. As the 'Clan Lamont' docked on the 2nd June, 1946, the security was completely tight. No one, not even Ostrowska, was allowed on board. The repatriates had no official welcome as they were marched off to a barbed wire compound where they were kept under armed guard. The families were not allowed to visit the returned troops and the best they could do was look at them through the wire. As Ostrowska pointed out to the Ministry in Warsaw this did not create a favourable impression and did not help to encourage repatriation. [83]
        The PUR establishment in Warsaw, based on Rakowiecka Street No.4, was responsible for the reception of the repatriates but also for encouraging the troops to return... or at least that was the theory.
        The events that happened in Italy from 1945 and the virtual power struggle among Warsaw's representatives must surely cast doubts on the veracity of Poland's claim
to wanting her sons back.

        The PUR representative was Major Jozef Salkowski, a man, judging by the available documents, very much at odds with both the British military authorities and with his own people in the Rome Embassy and military attaché's
office.
        In one of his regular complaints to Warsaw, Salkowski repeated in his letter of 30th March, 1946, what he had been told in Warsaw his role would be - namely...

        "...your responsibilities will be the repatriation of civilians and military personnel." ?

        The question mark was added in the PUR office in Warsaw, as was the underlining of the words "military personnel". Why this addition was made to the letter is unclear but the impression it gives is that whatever Salkowski thought his mission was regarding the Polish Armed Forces in Italy, it was not a view shared by the higher echelons of PUR. [84]
        Apparently few people wanted Salkowski's mission in Italy. The British, who had had enough problems trying to contain Colonel Sidor, certainly didn't want more Communist backed Poles running around Italy making trouble and so refused to give him accreditation to AFHQ. Sidor himself didn't want Salkowski in Italy, especially since Sidor was going around calling himself "Chief of the Polish Military Mission for Repatriation, Rome" - which was actually the Major's job.
        The Polish charge d'affaires in Rome, Wyszynski, wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw informing them of the problems that were occurring in Italy - in particular the fact that Warsaw was not telling him anything, not even about the impending arrival of the newly appointed ambassador Kot.

        Secret "I was only informed about the impending arrival of the ambassador's mission in Rome when Major Salkowski arrived here. Neither PUR nor our post in Prague or Berne had informed this office that the Mission was in transit.
        Our problems have arisen primarily due to the fact that the Polish Military Mission of Col. Sidor has not been acting like the office of the military attaché and after accreditation at Casserta (as Gen. Modelski's Military Mission had done in London) they then began to present themselves to the Allied authorities in the character of a repatriation mission dealing with members of Polish Military units under British Command who wish to return/ to Poland.
        The arrival of Major Salkowski's Mission in Rome and the fact that it has so far been impossible to accredit it to AFHQ in Casserta due to its unclear relationship with the already operating Military Mission has provoked a great many rumours in this region." [85]

Wyszynski had written to AFHQ on the 15th March, 1946, to prepare them for the impending arrival of the new Mission:
         "The State Repatriation Office in Warsaw, acting on authority of the Polish Government, has appointed a special Repatriation Mission to organise the repatriation of Polish citizens, military and civilian as well, having expressed their wish to return to their country from Italy.

        This Mission, headed by Major Jozef SALKOWSKI, has been placed under the direct authority of the head of the Polish military Mission, acting in Italy since October last, and accredited to AFHQ. The Polish Repatriation Mission will therefore constitute a part of the Polish Military Mission but act on an autonomous basis as dealing with questions relating to repatriation of not only military but civilians as well." [86]

The British on the other hand were having non of this as Brigadier Napier of GHQ CMF replied to the Poles:

        "1/ This GHQ has now been informed that the Polish Mission for Repatriation which has been functioning in London, and to which the proposed Polish Repatriation Mission in Italy was to have been subordinated, has now been withdrawn, and the status of the proposed mission in Italy is now under discussion between the British and Polish Governments.
        2/ This GHQ now awaits further instruction from the War Office, London, on this matter and, pending receipt of such instructions, will continue, to regard Col. SIDOR as Polish military attaché to the Polish Embassy ROME.
        3/ In view of the change of circumstances it will be appreciated that no useful purpose would be served by calling a meeting of AFHQ representatives, and representatives from your Embassy to discuss the matter at this juncture.
        4/ Until the establishment of a Polish Repatriation Mission in Italy is possible it will not be necessary for any Polish officers to be called to ROME for attachment to the Polish Military Mission as prospective members of the proposed Repatriation Mission, and you are requested to ensure that no such attachments are made." [87]

Not only did the British not want Salkowski in Italy, but they used thinly veiled threats to make sure the Poles got the message Lt-Colonel Count De Salis, an AFHQ Liaison Officer, had a conversation with the Polish Charge which was then communicated to PUR and the Warsaw Foreign Office. According to Wyszynski, Colonel De Salis...
        "...was compelled by Order of AFHQ to communicate the view that he "could not be held responsible for the personal safety of Major Salkowski's Mission".

To my question of whether this was related to this transitional period or to the period after the eventual official accreditation he replied that he would have to ask Head Quarters, but in his opinion he judged it would relate to the whole time the mission was in Italy. In a very nervous tone he declared "we're talking too much about incidents that haven't happened" but there - may be incidents and this despite "keeping the peace by force". [88]

Colonel De Salis went on that AFHQ "...in these sort of circumstances could not give a guarantee of safety." As to the question of whether Wyszynski should tell Warsaw about the meeting he was told that as a "good diplomat" it was his duty.
        Salkowski was well aware of the precarious position he held in Italy. The British offered him no protection from the wrath of Anders' men and without recognition from AFHQ his only hope for protection was as a diplomat with the rights that went with that. On the 17th March, 1946, he contacted PUR in Warsaw: "Please forward diplomatic passports for the members of the mission. This is very important for security reasons given the present situation." [89]
        The 'present situation' for the PUR mission in Italy was a bleak one. Salkowski, unwanted, under staffed and undervalued by all sides, sent streams of letters asking for help to achieve what he had been sent to do.

        "Please send officers (at least 5) and a secretary. To this point I have to do even the smallest things myself (looking for a location for the office, looking for cars, typing, translating, etc.) My office work takes 18 hours a day. I don't like to complain but to work under such conditions is simply impossible." [90]

A month after that note was written Salkowski again complained that he could not find an office:

        "To date we still do not have a location for our office. The premises which were to be given over for the Missions use as of May 1st have, for some unknown reason, been refused. The Polish Embassy has had a hand in this although, according to the latest information, the Ministry of Finance which was disposing of the property took a negative attitude." [91]

At every turn Salkowski felt he was being hindered by the very people who should have been helping him. In September of 1946 he had asked Col. Sidor to open a mission in Bari to combat 2nd Corps propaganda. This was refused by Sidor as the British would certainly not allow it. Wyszynski had the idea that possibly a Consulate might be a better idea. Although the Poles had opened 3 - in Venice, Ancona and Naples - if Kot agreed then a fourth one could be opened. As it turned out Kot did not agree and the request was turned down by the Embassy on the 27th August, 1946. [92]
        To add further insult to an already serious injury, the staff of the mission also proved to be a hindrance to the Major - particularly the issue of Lt.Powalkowski who seemed to be doing his best to create havoc.

        On the 1st June, 1946, Salkowski wrote to both PUR and the Warsaw Foreign Office to complain:

        "At this moment a rather compromising situation has developed. Lt. Powalkowski has been guilty of insubordination and of acting without my authority. He is a disorganising influence. As evidence of his behaviour I record his saying, in the presence of representatives of the Polish Military Mission that: "Mr Salkowski is only from PUR whereas I am an officer of the General Staff."" [93]

The obvious recourse for Salkowski was to remove the troublesome Lieutenant but was told by Colonel Sidor that it was up to him who stayed and went and Sidor decided that Powalkowski would stay.

        Relations between the trio did not improve, especially after Powalkowski crashed the Missions' 'Lincoln' car in August of 1946. Colonel Sidor had suggested a tour of the various Polish camps in Italy, a round trip of some 2,000 km. On a trip of this magnitude the usual procedure would be to take the train. Leon Szybek, head of PUR's Western section, recommended a reprimand for Powalkowski, as opposed to the dismissal Salkowski had demanded. [94]

        By September, 1946, the situation was so bad that Powalkowski had to be recalled to Warsaw. Salkowski wrote to Minister Wolski again complaining. Even on his departure Powalkowski decided to take his driver, Adolf Pawla, with him - a move that caused all manner of problems for the Mission. Pawla could not get a visa for the transport that the Lieutenant was due to go on, the formalities would take at least two weeks and this would involve delaying the whole train, this was something that UNRRA would not permit. On the other hand Pawla could not go without a visa as this would break an agreement with UNRRA that once a transport list had been finalised no new names could be added to it. On the 6th of September, 1946, Salkowski had given express orders that Pawla was not to go - he left on the 7th regardless.

        In a confidential report to PUR, Salkowski wrote what his objections to Powalkowski were:

        "1/ He disregarded repatriation agreements.
         2/ That on his own authority he allowed a person, unregistered with the Repatriation Dept. of the Polish Military Mission, to join a repatriation transport.
         3/ That he lowered the authority of the Repatriation
Department, Polish Military Mission."

He had also ran off without settling his debts in Italy for food and lodgings. "This was not the behaviour of a gentleman, a citizen and an officer." [95] What was worse was that he had threatened future transports with UNRRA.
        2nd Lt. Zeromski, according to Salkowski's letter to PUR of the 17th March, 1946, was another problem for the Head of the Mission. He was a drunk who might "by his actions create a scandal and compromise the Mission in the eyes of Poles hostile to the Government." [96] But even when there were such people it was difficult for the Major to do anything about it. Not only did Col. Sidor go to great lengths not to help Salkowski but the Embassy seemed to be putting up obstacles to the Mission. In another of his long line of complaining reports to PUR the Major complained that he had to buy petrol on the black market at 75 lira/litre as his car was not registered with the Embassy whereby he could have bought cheap rate fuel at 25 lira/litre. [97]

        If this was not enough to contend with, AFHQ still would not recognise the Mission, and the erratic policy guidelines coming out of Warsaw did not help. The work of the Mission began to grind to a halt. Salkowski wrote to PUR in March, 1946:

        "The question of repatriation has fallen on barren ground. Allied Forces Headquarters in Casserta has not, to date, accredited the members of the Polish Repatriation Mission; without this it is simply impossible to resolve any matter on an official level. On the other hand the order I have received halting all transports, dated Warsaw 21.46 [sic], has also put me in a rather difficult position. At this time, a time when the 2nd Corps is being demobilised, we should be undertaking a wide plan of repatriation but given the above problems such work is impossible. Neither the Embassy nor the Military Mission have any idea as to this undertaking. Given the above - please forward suitable instructions as to our work here; sitting around waiting for an explanation from HQ will not bring any results." [98]
By May, 1946, Salkowski was so disillusioned with the situation that he was on the verge of resigning. In a secret letter to Minister Wolski at PUR the Major wrote a personal and highly critical report of the situation in Italy and virtually asked Wolski to relieve him of his post.

        12th May, 1946:

        "I am forced to describe my work in Italy to you as frankly and openly as I can. I would categorise it as a fight for truth among strangers, as well as among our own. I have never encountered such a murky and scheming environment.
         Before I come to the specific problems I would like to give light to certain incidents that have, from the moment of my departure from Warsaw, put me in a somewhat difficult and unpleasant situation.
Leaving Warsaw with two other officers (I received 20 Dollars for the whole journey for three people, forcing me to almost beg in order to reach Italy) I was assured that the rest of the team would leave within the week. To date they have yet to materialise. Lt. Powalkowski and 2nd Lt. Zeromski have committed a list of errors - perhaps through carelessness; perhaps through trying to ingratiate themselves with persons outside the Mission. Their stay has led to many unpleasant situations and has allowed certain elements to come to some far-reaching suppositions. At this moment they are in Poland and all the work rests with me. I do not like complaining but the situation is draining my enthusiasm for work and is damaging both physically and mentally.
The principle obstacle is the lack of any agreement regulating repatriation between the Government of National Unity and the British Government.
I have no independence of action, this means that I can not enter into direct talks with any individual Allied institution. The work which is being done at the moment under such circumstances will not lead to any results. Given this I would say it is a waste to maintain the whole repatriation apparatus when the Allied authorities will themselves carry out the repatriation if not sooner then later.
I would, therefore, ask for a decision in this matter, as soon as possible, as one man (namely myself) working on his own cannot be positive nor can he achieve any positive results." [99]

        It is difficult not to feel some degree of sympathy for Major Salkowski who seems to have been an honourable man stranded - if not amongst thieves, then amongst 'ruffians' who appeared to be intent on hampering his mission at every turn. How this worked out in real terms was that the Repatriation Mission in Italy did not have the positive effect that those well meaning officers who wanted Poles to return might have hoped for.
        The reasons that the Poles did not return are many but the Mission in Italy located three areas that PUR could help with in order to encourage a greater number to return. The first was the fact that the Poles in Italy had received no letters from home. PUR was asked to act as a go-between for mail to and from Poland. The idea was that a quick exchange of post would put an end to the hostile propaganda about the situation in Poland. PUR was also asked to supply a list of names of repatriates from the Soviet Union. Many of the Poles from 'beyond the River Bug' had had families deported into the Soviet Union and had received no information about their whereabouts. Lack of information about families was causing many Poles not to return. The third request to PUR was to assist in the transfer of cash to Poland. Whilst many Poles would not be returning to Poland come what may, they still wanted to send money to their families and friends. Since Poland needed all the hard currency it could get it was important to make the necessary arrangements. [100]
        This first point about the letters was identified as an important one by many of the repatriation bodies. Kuropieska notes that the biggest boost to repatriation from the UK came with the first post from home. Poles, according to Kuropieska, have a great sense of family and the letters from Poland caused a marked change in the mood of the troops. [101] This was a factor not lost on those hostile to repatriation. The (Warsaw) Polish Red Cross Delegation in Great Britain reported in 1946 that Poles loyal to the London regime were trying to hamper such contacts:

        "The soldiers, their minds clouded by the propaganda of their education officers, were afraid to send letters to their families because, it was said, their families would be deported to Siberia for such letters. Today more than one of these soldiers is in Poland.
        Soldiers in Anders' Corps - as they themselves explained in London - were punished and persecuted for writing and receiving letters from Poland. They were called traitors and renegades. They were called out in front of their units and reprimanded for their lack of patriotism.
        One soldier told me that when he received a letter from his father calling him to return home he was told by his Commanding Officer that the letter was obviously not written by his father, but by an NKVD man. When the soldier replied that he recognised his fathers handwriting his CO stated that the letter must have been dictated at the point of an NKVD bayonet." [102]

        Colonel Sidor's accusations were even more serious in that he accused the Soldiers' Welfare Section of burning 12 sacks of letters from Poland at the end of August, 1946. [103]

        The (London) Polish Red Cross also came in for criticism from its Warsaw based equivalent. On February 6th, 1946, ambassador Kot wrote to the Red Cross in Warsaw complaining about the Red Cross Delegation loyal to Anders.
        "...that I consider establishing a mission of the Polish Red Cross in Rome as absolutely essential. The Red Cross here, according to the evidence I have, is not the independent institution that it should be but merely a militarised auxiliary branch of Anders' Corps.
[...]
        This organisation must blindly carry out the orders of the head of O.II [Intelligence Service] and steers clear of anything that would bring the soldiers nearer to their country. They avoid, for example, trying to forward letters from families in Poland, we also have no guarantee that the letters passed on by us ever reach their destination (we have yet to see any replies)." [104]

The problem the Warsaw Red Cross faced was that only the London based body was recognised by AFHQ and the Italian Government, and was the only body linked to the British Red Cross. This caused rancour in Warsaw since the Government which the London body represented was no longer recognised. Sikorski's widow was still going around calling herself the 'President of the Polish Red Cross' and refusing to have anything to do with Warsaw. What made the situation even more difficult was that in London there were two bodies claiming to be the Polish Red Cross. Dr. Kostkiewicz, the official President of the (Warsaw) Polish Red Cross, wrote to Max Huber, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, in May 1946, about the fact that the London Poles were, in fact, contravening the Red Cross Convention. Kostkiewicz asked Huber for some 'ex-oficio' reaction to help rationalise the situation in London. Huber confirmed in June that only one delegation was possible and that was the one that a/ worked in its own country and b/ was recognised by its government. Whereas it was possible in wartime to have a Red Cross working in exile, the war was long over and the situation would not be allowed to continue. Huber promised to send a copy of both letters to London. [105] The London Poles did not roll over and disappear without a fight. Warsaw had to contact UNRRA to see if they could do anything to help. The (London) Polish Red Cross had refused to work with the Warsaw Red Cross in searching for relatives saying that the Warsaw people were not in fact the Red Cross "...but rather the organs of the Police and the Soviet NKVD" who were looking for information. [106]
        The Warsaw Red Cross also seemed reluctant to help in Italy with the welfare of the troops. Just over a year after Kot had first broached the subject about sending a delegation to Rome, he was again writing to Kostkiewicz:
        "I again draw your attention to a matter first put forward a year ago - a matter that as yet, unfortunately, remains unresolved. Today the matter is very urgent."

For Kot it was important...

         "...that our outpost be run so that any Pole finding himself in difficulty should turn to us and not to any other organisation; and that he should find there a more friendly reception and better provision than anywhere else." [107]

The Warsaw Red Cross' decision was far from what Kot might have expected:

         "With regards to the Polish Ambassador in Rome's repeated request for the opening of an outpost there the Board has expressed the opinion that it does not see the necessity to open the above mentioned outpost." [108]

There was certainly much that needed doing in Italy. The question of the disappearing letters was so serious that Kot had to inquire of PUR what was happening in Poland to the Post. Repatriation Transport 139, November 2nd 1946, had 3 extra railway wagons with some 700 sacks of Red Cross parcels for the families of soldiers. According to Kot it was the fifth such transport and as yet the Embassy had received no information. Major Leon Szybek, PUR Director of Western Repatriation, contacted the Warsaw Red Cross:

        "Given the propaganda being spread around Italy by Anders' agents the Directorate requests information be sent to the Polish Embassy in Rome concerning this and other previous transports and also details of the distribution of these parcels."

The Red Cross replied that it had indeed received all five transports from Italy :

7 September - 200 sacks (2 wagons)
25 September - 500 sacks (3 wagons)
17 October - 235 sacks (1 wagon)
18 October - 347 sacks (1 wagon)
7 October - 707 sacks (3 wagons)

All had been distributed in Poland. [109]

        The question of packets to Poland was another key reason for the need of (Warsaw) Red Cross representation among the troops. As the exiled authorities would have nothing to do with any body representing Warsaw so they would not recommend any services provided by these bodies. The Polish Red Cross offered parcels to Poland that were both cheaper and of a higher quality than those sold by private companies. The soldiers trying to do their best for their people back home were getting a raw deal due to the political situation. [110]
        The Polish (Warsaw) Red Cross did, eventually, open a post in Italy nearly two years after Kot's original letter. The contradiction that was found by Dr. Kazimiera Zawadska, head of the Polish fact-finding mission to Italy, was that Wyszynski "...the present charge d'affaires has taken an altogether positive attitude (as opposed to Ambassador Kot)". [111] It would seem that after two years of pushing for a Red Cross delegation in Italy Kot may not have been as in favour of the idea as his letters might suggest.
        If the Warsaw authorities wanted the Poles, both military and civilian, to return then much would depend on how repatriates were treated on their arrival and what provisions were made for their resettlement.
        In August, 1946 the UNRRA representative in Warsaw cabled London with his report about the treatment of DPs and PWX in Poland:
        "(1) ROUTE FROM US AND FRENCH ZONES THROUGH CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO RECEPTION CENTRES DZIEDZICE AND BIELSKO. THESE CENTRES ALSO USED RECEPTION REPATRIATES AUSTRIA AND ITALY. ROUTE FROM UK ZONE STETTIN BY BOAT.
(2) DZIEDZICE AND BIELSKO CENTRES SEEN SEVERAL OCCASIONS. ARRANGEMENTS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY. FACILITIES FOR MEDICAL INSPECTION, ISSUE OF IDENTITY CARDS, REGISTRATION, PROVISION OF RAILWAY TICKETS TO DESTINATION, SMALL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, THREE DAYS FOOD. STETTIN NOT SEEN BUT UNDERSTOOD ON SIMILAR LINES. CAPACITY OF CENTRES WILL BE CABLED LATER.
(3) 80 PER CENT OR MORE REPATRIATES GERMANY HAVE DECIDED ON DESTINATION IN POLAND AFTER ARRIVAL AND MERELY OBTAIN FREE RAILWAY TICKET TO APPROPRIATE PLACE WHERE THEY HAVE FRIENDS, RELATIVES. ONLY SMALL PROPORTION SETTLE IN NEW TERRITORIES, ARRANGEMENTS WROCLAW FOR SETTLEMENT SEEN AND CONSIDERED ADEQUATE IN VIEW OF LACK OF RESOURCES. AVERAGE STAY DZIEDZICE AND BIELSKO 24 HOURS. UNRA [sic] OFFICER OBSERVED RECENT PARTY FROM ITALY PROGRESSING WITHIN 12 HOURS, THENCE JOURNEY HOME 3 TO 4 DAYS ACCORDING TO DISTANCE." [112]

The Repatriation Missions tried to put every positive view forward to potential returnees. In a radio broadcast from Graz-Klagenfurt to Poles in Austria, 24th May, 1946, the Mission announced that all was well:

        "To date nearly 1 million Poles have returned to Poland from the West, at least 90 odd percent are repatriates from Western and Central Germany. After crossing the Polish frontier all the repatriates receive Polish documents, they receive medical attention, they are given tickets for their onward journey and are fed. The repatriates are not subjected to any customs search." [113]

        The Poles were careful that everything should go as smoothly as possible as the slightest whiff of scandal would have been seized upon by the London Poles and repatriation could have dried up overnight. At all costs adverse reports by escort and liaison officers had to be avoided. In particular special attention had to be paid to Alexander Kharitonoff, a US Army Major and escort officer. Dr. T. Chromecki, head of the Warsaw Foreign Ministry's Western and Northern Department, wrote a top secret and urgent note to PUR on the 20th January, 1946:

        "Our Ambassador in Rome requests all possible caution in dealing with Kharitonoff so as not to give him any cause to complain. It is assumed in Rome that he will be in charge of future transports and any negative opinions about the reception of repatriates in Italian wagons by the Polish authorities may create problems in getting further trains." [114]

Surprisingly, or perhaps not so surprisingly given the enthusiasm to be rid of the refugee problem, few Western observers reported the serious troubles that faced the repatriates. Some Polish observers involved with repatriation did make an attempt to bring the situation to the attention of those who might do something about it. One PUR representative wrote to Minister Wolski in July, 1945:
        "I have just this moment received a telephone report from the Chief of the PUR section in Katowice that in Zebrzydowice the repatriates returning from the West - in whom we have an obligation to take the closest interest - are being robbed in an unprecedented manner by border guards, customs officials etc. (Soviet)
In communicating the above I would ask the Citizen Minister for some intervention - with regards to this it has to be admitted that the repatriates, while in transit through Czechoslovakia are provided with excellent security from the authorities there but on crossing the Polish border they meet the sort of experience which I have outlined above," [115]

The report from the Ministry of Information representative to his superior about events at the transit station was even more candid and angry:

25th July, 1945. To Citizen Matuszewski.

        "What is happening here is very sad and cannot be communicated over any great distance. The Poles who are arriving in Poland are usually robbed by groups of criminal Red Army soldiers. Under various pretexts eg. checking identity or suspicion of being German - they are robbed of their last possessions and often beaten up. Instead of being welcomed back to the homeland as they should be these Poles are set upon. No one takes an interest in them nor asks them where they are travelling on to. Often, in broad daylight, women are raped on the station by various degenerates. The Security Services seem to cause them great annoyance as well. No one gives them a warm meal or a piece of bread. I wonder what
has become of the 70,000,000 [Zloty] which according to figures, the Government has /set aside for just this purpose. I think the Citizen Minister should use his influence with the military authorities so that they escort the trains arriving from the West into the interior of Poland. Regardless of this, this issue must be positively sorted out. Similarly some intervention with General Szatilov has to be made regarding the Red Army's infringement of the law. Furthermore food must be provided so that the returnees can, at the very least, have a warm meal.
I have come to the conclusion that these people are badly misinformed about the internal situation in Poland. They think that they will all be immediately sent to Siberia and that in Poland only the Soviets rule. A campaign of enlightenment must absolutely be started. For my part I do what I can but am always hampered in my task by a complete lack of manpower.
I again ask for you help in this task.

        Nowak, Kazimierz. Head of Dept.
        Ministry of Information & Propaganda
        Lignica, Lower Silesia

[116]
The remarkable thing about this confidential letter is that it is not the work of the London Poles seeking to pick faults with the Communists, but the appeal of a man, otherwise loyal to the regime, who worked at the sharp end of repatriation and could see where the problems were. A report in Krakow's "Dziennik Polski" from December 1945, shows that six children died in one night because they had been left in open lorries in the freezing cold. Somebody - as the article protests - had to be responsible for the state of affairs. [117] The Polish Minister of Justice, Henryk Swiatkowski, was also the President of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, an ironic position given the numbers of Polish women raped by Red Army soldiers. Apologists for the Soviets glossed over the massive military presence in Poland: John Ennals for the "New Statesman" wrote that he had seen fewer Russians in Warsaw than he had seen Poles in London. [118] In a similar vein the Polish Socialist Tadeusz Cwika who was on a visit to the UK publicly announced that while travelling from Warsaw to Kielce he had only seen one or two Soviet soldiers. [119] Even Kuropieska commented on the primitive nature of this type of propaganda. For years the British public had been used to seeing masses of US soldiers on the streets so few people were convinced by talk that there were no Soviet troops in Poland.
        That is not to say that such information did not leak out Westward. Some repatriates went back to Poland to see conditions for themselves and then returned to Italy and other places to inform colleagues. Roman Nowakowski, an NCO of the 10th Wolynska Rifle Battalion, rejoined his unit in Italy. His conclusions were that no true Pole would be able to stand living in the prevailing situation.

        "15/XII/1945: The transport of soldiers from 2nd Corps arrived at the collection centre at Kozy. The NKVD who had been waiting for the officers to arrive separated about 200 according to a list and took them to an unknown destination. The rest, about 800 people... were conscripted to Zymierski's Army and given a 2-3 week holiday. Persons suspected of any political activity are demobilised and whisked off for interrogation after which they do not return. No one knows what becomes of them." [120]

Zygmunt Boger, a Volksliste DP's experience was very similar to this, especially his very near conscription to the People's Army.

        "I arrived at Dziedzice. After three hours a patrol from the Polish Army turned up - the news had already got around that former German soldiers had returned. The Lieutenant from the patrol got into the railway wagon and told us that we had all been enlisted into the Polish Army. How the Silesians set upon these warriors! They wanted to go back to their families - "Our families" they shouted. Two Americans turned up at the sound of the argument. They too shouted that under no circumstances was it going to happen. First we would go to our families. The Lieutenant kept pressing and I'll never forget how the American went up to him, spat, and said "fucking Polak!" At that point the patrol left.
        We arrived in Poznan around midnight. It was silent and dark as hell. I was in American fatigues. As I was going down the station stairs towards the exit I was approached by a railwayman who had been staring at me.
- Where are you off to?
- What do you mean 'where' - home !
- Have you gone crazy - he said - stay in the station and sleep on the bench. Don't go wandering about at night or they'll get you.
- What do you mean ? The war's over. There are no more Germans.
- Worse than the Germans have arrived." [121]

Even those who were conscripted to the Polish Army on return had a surprise waiting for them. Tadeusz Czerkawski found that he had been demoted. He read on his registration form that the rank of Lieutenant had been crossed out in red ink and "conscript" had been entered instead. He approached his CO in the traditional manner using the word "Pan" - Sir:
        "- Panie Captain..." I started but he interrupted.
        - All the 'Panowie' stayed in England, here in Poland there are only citizens. Is that understood?"
        - Citizen Captain there has been a mistake: I am a 2nd Lieutenant, that was my last rank in the army...
        Again he interrupted:
        - That was not an army it was a criminal gang! Dismissed!" [122]

Adolf Worzok, a Silesian who had served in the German Army before his return, also lost his rank when he reported to the Office of Public Security. They asked him about his past and he answered with some pride that he had been a member of the Union of Poles in German, a member of the Polish Scouts and the Union of Polish Academics. To which the official shouted to one of his colleagues: "Franek! Come and have a look. One more fascist has returned to Poland!" When he was enrolled to study in Wroclaw he told the authorities that he had held the rank of Sergeant in the German Army but was told that that could not be taken into account. If he wanted to complain he would have to write to Marshal Rola-Zymierski. He was granted a "Certificate of Temporary Association to the Polish Nation" for which he had to pay 25 Zloty for the privilege - and could be revoked at any time. [123] To cap it all Worzok was left with the title of "Wehrmachtowiec". Considering the large numbers of potential repatriates who had served in the Wehrmaht this treatment would not make return more likely.
        The contribution of the Polish Armed Forces in the West was consistently undervalued in comparison to the Poles who had had fought on the Eastern front. For decades in Poland the Battle of Lenino in which Polish and Soviet units took part held a foremost place in military history: Monte Cassino and Falaise were virtually ignored. Even in 1970 the Polish Defence Ministry was writing:
        "The Battle of Monte Cassino took place in a secondary theatre of operations and the Allied victory there, bought at great cost, had no real influence on the course of, and the final victory of the war in Europe." [124]

        The only units to return to Poland as a body were the two fighting groups from France. The Polish Force in France was made up of the 19th and 21st Group - consisting of 8 Companies of 290 men each. They had been acting as occupation troops in parts of the French Zone of Germany under the French 1st Army. Their Commander, Major Boleslaw Jelen, was loyal to the new regime in Poland and refused to join the mainstream Armed Forces in the West. In October he and his men returned to Poland and were greeted with a heroes welcome - the only Polish troops from the West who were. On the 18th November, 1945, they were treated to a victory parade on the Aleje Ujazdowskie (the only victory parade attended by Poles from the West) in front of the General Staff of the 'reborn' Polish Army. Marshal Zymierski issued an Order of the Day, No. 257, on the 30th October, 1945.

        "You return to your country in closed ranks and fully armed as the first Polish units to return from the West. You who fought the Germans in France at the side of our great ally went on a glorious fighting path that has spread widely the fame of fighting Poland." [125]

Jelen's return was used as a stick to beat the other returning troops who were arriving from Italy and Britain. Zymierski's Order No. 297, 29th November, 1945, was directed at Polish units returning from Italy:

        "You return not like an organised military unit but rather as a loose group of soldiers. Your leaders, with only a few exceptions, have deserted you as they did in September, 1939. They did not want to return to Poland and with terror, threats and a slanderous campaign against their own country they prevented you from returning. As a result of this tens of thousands of your brothers have remained in Italy. Anders wants to turn them into an interventionist army against the Polish nation that would enter Poland and return the fortunes of the landowners and great industrialists.
        Your brothers, who fought by the side of the Red Army returned to Poland from the East fully equipped and with excellent weapons. They did not have their fighting material taken away from them. They did not have a plebiscite thrown at them about returning to their country. Their standards, which went on the most magnificent armed road to victory in our history, from Lenino, across the Wisla, Warsaw, Oder-Neisse, to Berlin and Dresden, have been awarded the highest Polish Orders and those of our ally the Soviet Union.
        Recently the Polish Battalions which fought by the side of the French Armed Forces returned. They returned as organised units with their arms in their hands and with their standards. They were given a heartfelt and deeply grateful send off by the French authorities. You on the other hand were sent home in such a manner and with such material and equipment that is not worthy of your efforts as soldiers or of the blood that was spilt at Tobruk and Monte Cassino." [126]

The troops who returned from Britain were treated much the same; Zymierski's Order No. 2, 3rd January, 1946:

        "You, like the soldiers of the 2nd Corps in Italy, were sent like demobilised military repatriates while those who fought by the side of the USSR and France returned with unfurled banners, in closed ranks and with formidable fighting material.
        Your brothers who still remain abroad and who, contrary to the will of the Polish nation, are under a foreign Command and are terrorised and confused by the Sanacja generals, will also return home when the truth about Poland wins over the lies of Raczkiewicz and Anders. Those who feel themselves to be Poles will return without any appeals from us. About the others - we shall not worry." [127]

It was little surprise that such criticism raised hackles with the British Foreign Office. Warsaw was complaining that enough Poles were not going back to Poland, and not returning in organised units, yet this begged the question of whose fault was that. After receiving the text of the order to 2 Corps veterans the FO contacted Cavendish-Bentinck instructing him to protest in Warsaw.

        "HMG wish to make it plain that if all the Polish troops in Italy have not been able to return to Poland in their existing units, this is solely because HMG have left the choice entirely to the individual men themselves and only some 14,000 out of 110,000 in Italy and the Middle East at present wish to return." [128]

The BBC Polish Service was instructed to send out corrections to Warsaw's allegations. The Warsaw Poles seemed to be doing everything possible to stop the Polish Forces from returning and the troops were under little illusion of what was happening at home. As they viewed developments there they became more and more depressed. Frank Savery wrote a report on the "stimmungen" of the Poles in the UK, on the 8th February, 1946, to W.D. Allen of the FO in which he described the Polish state of mind:

        "It is like a stagnant pond: there is no current of fresh water flowing through and in consequence the old, stale water smells just a little worse with every day that passes." [129]

        The Poles in the West did not know where they stood. No one seemed to want them. The British were trying to rid themselves of the Poles and the Poles in Poland seemed just as reluctant to have them. Galsworthy of the FO continued Savery's metaphor saying that Warsaw had recently stirred up the pond with its note "...disowning their troops abroad". To some extent this had calmed the anxiety of the troops "...since it increases the difficulties in the way of repatriation" and that it made "...agreement between Warsaw and ourselves less likely than ever."