REVENUE OF THE CROWN.

The power of the Norman kings was also much supported by a great revenue; and by a revenue that was fixed, perpetual, and independent of the subject. The people, without betaking themselves to arms, had no check upon the king, and no regular security for the due administration of justice. In those days of violence, many instances of oppression passed unheeded; and soon after were openly pleaded as precedents which is was unlawful to dispute or control. Princes and ministers were too ignorant to be themselves sensible of the advantages attending an equitable administration, and there was no established council or assembly which could protect the people, and, by withdrawing supplies, regularly and peaceably admonish the king of his duty, and ensure the execution of the laws.

The first branch of the king's stated revenue was the royal demesnes or crown-lands, which were very extensive, and comprehended, beside a great number of manors, most of the chief cities of the kingdom. It was established by law, that the king could alienate no part of his demesne, and that he himself or his successor could at any time resume such donations; but this law was never regularly observed, which happily rendered in time the crown somewhat more dependent. The rent of the crown-lands, considered merely as so much riches, was a source of power; the influence of the king over his tenants and the inhabitants of his towns, increased this power; but the other numerous branches of his revenue, besides supplying his treasury, gave, by their very nature, a great latitude to arbitrary authority, and were a support of the prerogative, as will appear from an enumeration of them.

The king was never content with the stated rents, but levied heavy talliages at pleasure on the inhabitants both of town and country, who lived within his demesne. All bargains of sale, in order to prevent theft, being prohibited, except in boroughs and public markets, he pretended to exact tolls on all goods which were there sold. He seized two hogsheads, one before, and one behind the mast, from every vessel that imported wine. All goods paid to his customs a proportionable part of their value: passage over bridges and on rivers was loaded with tolls at pleasure; and though the boroughs by degrees bought the liberty of farming these impositions, yet the revenue profited by these bargains; new sums were often exacted for the renewal and confirmation of their charters, and the people were thus held in perpetual dependence.

Such was the situation of the inhabitants within the royal demesnes. But the possessors of land, or the military tenants, though they were better protected both by law and by the great privilege of carrying arms, were, from the nature of their tenures, much exposed to the inroads of power, and possessed not what we should esteem, in our age, a very durable security. The Conqueror ordained that the barons should be obliged to pay nothing beyond their stated services, except a reasonable aid to ransom his person if he were taken in war, to make his eldest son a knight, and to marry his eldest daughter. What should on these occasions should be deemed a reasonable aid, was not determined; and the demands of the crown were so discretionary.

The king could require in war the personal attendance of his vassals, that is, of almost all the landed proprietors; and if they declined the service, they were obliged to pay him a composition in money, which was called a scutage. The sum was, during some reigns, precarious and uncertain; it was sometimes levied without allowing the vassal the liberty of personal service; and it was a usual artifice of the king's to pretend an expedition, that he might be entitled to levy the scutage from his military tenants. Danegelt was another species of land-tax levied by the early Norman kings, arbitrarily, and contrary to the laws of the Conqueror. Moneyage was also a general land-tax of the same nature, levied by the two first Norman kings, and abolished by the charter of Henry I. It was a shilling paid every three years by each hearth, to induce the king not to use his prerogative in debasing the coin. Indeed it appears from that charter, that though the Conqueror had granted his military tenants an immunity from all taxes and talliages, he and his son William had never thought themselves bound to observe that rule, but had levied impositions at pleasure on all the landed estates of the kingdom. The utmost that Henry grants is, that the land cultivated by the military tenant himself, shall not be so burdened; but he reserves the power of taxing the farmers; and as it is known that Henry's charter was never observed in any one article, we may be assured that this prince and his successors retracted even this small indulgence, and levied arbitrary impositions on all the lands of all their subjects. These taxes were sometimes very heavy, since Malmesbury tells us, that in the reign of William Rufus, the farmers, on account of them, abandoned tillage, and a famine ensued.

The escheats were a great branch both of power and of revenue, especially during the first reigns after the conquest. In default of posterity from the first baron, his land reverted to the crown, and continually augmented the king's possessions. The prince had indeed by law a power of alienating these escheats; but by this means he had an opportunity of establishing the fortunes of his friends and servants, and thereby enlarging his authority. Sometimes he retained them in his own hands, and they were gradually confounded with the royal demesnes, and became difficult to be distinguished from them. This confusion is probably the reason why the king acquired the right of alienating his demesnes.

But besides escheats from default of heirs, those which ensued from crimes, or breach of duty towards the superior lord were frequent in ancient times. If the vassal, being thrice summoned to attend his superior's court, and do fealty, neglected or refused obedience, he forfeited all title to his land. If he denied his tenure, or refused his service, he was exposed to the same penalty. If he sold his estate without licence from his lord, or if he sold it upon any other tenure or title than that by which he himself held it, he lost all right to it. The adhering to his lord's enemies, deserting him in war, betraying his secrets, debauching his wife or his near relations, or even using indecent freedoms with them, might be punished by forfeiture. The higher crimes, rape, robbery, murder, arson, &c. were called felony; and being interpreted want of fidelity to his lord, made him lose his fief. Even where the felon was vassal to a baron, though his immediate lord enjoyed the forfeiture, the king might retain possession of his estate during a twelvemonth, and had the right of spoiling and destroying it, unless the baron paid him a reasonable composition. We have not here enumerated all the species of felonies, or of crimes by which forfeiture was incurred; we have said enough to prove, that the possession of feudal property was anciently somewhat precarious, and that the primary idea was never lost, of its being a kind of fee or benefice.

When a baron died, the king immediately took possession of the estate; and the heir, before he recovered his right, was obliged to make application to the crown, and desire that he might be admitted to do homage for his land, and pay a composition to the king. This composition was not at first fixed by law, at least by practice: the king was often exorbitant in his demands, and kept possession of the land till they were complied with.

If the heir were a minor, the king retained the whole profit of the estate till his majority; and might grant what sum he thought proper for the education and maintenance of the young baron. This practice was also founded on the notion that a fief was a benefice, and that while the heir could not perform his military services, the revenue devolved to the superior, who employed another in his stead. It is obvious, that a great proportion of the landed property must, by means of this device, be continually in the hands of the prince, and that all the noble families were thereby held in perpetual dependence. When the king granted the wardship of a rich heir to any one, he had the opportunity of enriching a favourite or minister; if he sold it, he thereby levied a considerable sum of money. Simon de Mountfort paid Henry III. 10,000 marks, an immense sum in those days, for the wardship of Gilbert de Umfreville. Geoffrey de Mandeville paid to the same prince the sum of 20,000 marks, that he might marry Isabel, countess of Gloucester, and possess all her lands and knights fees. This sum would be equivalent to 300,000, perhaps 400,000 pounds in our time.

If the heir were a female, the king was entitled to offer her any husband of her rank he thought proper; and if she refused him, she forfeited her land. Even a male heir could not marry without the royal consent; and it was usual for men to pay large sums for the liberty of making their own choice in marriage. No man could dispose of his land, either by sale or will, without the consent of his superior. The possessor was never considered as full proprietor; he was still a kind of beneficiary, and could not oblige his superior to accept of any vassal that was not agreeable to him.

Fines, amerciaments, and oblatas, as they were called, were another considerable branch of the royal power and revenue. The ancient records of the exchequer, which are still preserved, give surprising accounts of the numerous fines and amerciaments levied in those days, and of the strange inventions fallen upon to exact money from the subject.. It appears that the ancient kings of England put themselves entirely on the foot of the barbarous Eastern princes, whom no man must approach without a present, who sell all their good offices, and who intrude themselves into every business, that they may have a pretence for extorting money. Even justice was avowedly bought and sold the king's court itself, though the supreme judicature of the kingdom, was open to none that brought not presents to the king; the bribes given for the expedition, delay, suspension, and, doubtless, for the perversion of justice, were entered in the public registers of the royal revenue, and remain as monuments of the perpetual iniquity and tyranny of the times. The barons of the exchequer, for instance, the first nobility of the kingdom, were not ashamed to insert, as an article in their records, that the county of Norfolk paid a sum that they might be fairly dealt with; the borough of Yarmouth, that the king's charters, which they have for their liberties, might not be violated; Richard, son of Gilbert, for the king's helping him to recover his debt from the Jews; (paid 200 marks, a great sum in those days.) Serlo, son of Terlavaston, that he might be permitted to make his defence, in case he were accused of a certain homicide; Walter de Burton, for free law, if accused of wounding another; Robert de Essart, for having an inquest to find whether Roger the Butcher, and Wace, and Humphrey, accused him of robbery and theft out of envy and ill-will or not; William Buhurst, for having an inquest to find whether be were accused of the death of one Godwin, out of ill-will, or for just cause. I have selected these few instances from a great number of a like kind, which Madox had selected from a still greater number, preserved in the ancient rolls of the exchequer.

Sometimes the party litigant offered the king a certain portion, a half, a third, a fourth, payable out of the debts which he, as the executor of justice, should assist him in recovering. Theophania de Westland agreed to pay the half of 212 marks, that she might recover that sum against James de Fughleston; Solomon, the Jew, engaged to pay one mark out of every seven that he should recover against Hugh de la Hose; Nicholas Morrel promised to pay sixty pounds, that the earl of Flanders might be distrained to pay him 343 pounds, which the earl had taken from him; and these sixty pounds were to be paid out of the first money that Nicholas should recover from the earl.

As the king assumed the entire power over trade, he was to be paid for a permission to exercise commerce or industry of any kind. Hugh Oisel paid 400 marks for liberty to trade in England. Nigel do Havene gave fifty marks for the partnership in merchandise which he had with Gervase de Hanton: the men of Worcester paid 100 shillings, that they might have the liberty of selling and buying dyed cloths as formerly: several other towns paid for a like liberty. The commerce, indeed, of the kingdom was so much under the control of the king, that he erected gilds, corporations, and monopolies wherever he pleased, and levied sums for these exclusive privileges.

There were no profits so small as to be below the king's attention. Henry, son of Arthur, gave ten dogs to have a recognition against the countess of Copland for one knight's fee. Roger, son of Nicholas, gave twenty lampreys and twenty shads for an inquest, to find whether Gilbert, son of Alured, gave to Roger 200 muttons to obtain his confirmation for certain lands, or whether Roger took them from him by violence Geoffrey Fitz-Pierre, the chief justiciary, gave two good Norway hawks, that Walter de Madine might have leave to export a hundred weight of cheese out of the king's dominions.

It is really amusing to remark the strange business in which the king sometimes interfered, and never without a present: the wife of Hugh do Neville gave the king 200 hens, that she might lie with her husband one night; and she brought with her two sureties, who answered each for a hundred hens. It is probable that her husband was a prisoner, which debarred her from having access to him. The abbot of Rucford paid ten marks for leave to erect houses and place men upon his land near Welhang, in order to secure his wood there from being stolen. Hugh, archdeacon of Wells, gave one tun of wine for leave to carry 600 sums of corn whither he would. Peter de Peraris gave twenty marks for leave to salt fishes, as Peter Chevalier used to do.

It was usual to pay high fines, in order to gain the king's good-will, or mitigate his anger. In the reign of Henry II., Gilbert, the son of Fergus, fines in 919 pounds 9 shillings, to obtain that prince's favour; William de Chataignes a thousand marks, that he would remit his displeasure. In the reign of Henry III. the city of London fines in no less a sum than 20,000 pounds on the same account.

The king's protection and good offices of every kind were bought and sold. Robert Grislet paid twenty marks of silver, that the king would help him against the earl of Mortaigne in a certain plea: Robert de Cundet gave thirty marks of silver, that the king would bring him to an accord with the bishop of Lincoln Ralph do Breckham gave a hawk, that the king would protect him; and this is a very frequent reason for payments: John, son of Ordgar, gave a Norway hawk to have the king's request to the king of Norway, to let him have his brother Godard's chattels: Richard de Neville gave twenty palfreys to obtain the king's request to Isolda Bisset, that she should take him for a husband : Roger Fitz-Walter gave three good palfreys to have the king's letter to Roger Bertram's mother, that she should marry him. Eling, the dean, paid 100 marks, that his whore and his children might be let out upon bail: the bishop of Winchester gave one tun of good wine for his not putting the king in mind to give a girdle to the countess of Albemarle: Robert de Veaux gave five of the best palfreys, that the king would hold his tongue about Henry Pinel's wife. There are, in the records of the exchequer, many other singular instances of a like nature. (We shall gratify the reader's curiosity by subjoining a few more instances from Madox, p.332. Hugh Oisel ,was to give the king two robes of a good green colour, to have the king's letters patent to the merchant, of Flanders, with a request to render him 1000 marks, which he lost in Flanders. The abbot of Hyde paid thirty marks, to have the king's letters of request to the archbishop of Canterbury, to remove certain monks that were against the abbots Roger de Trihanton paid twenty marks and a palfrey, to have the kings request to Richard de Umfreville to give him his sister to wife, and to the sister that she would accept of him for a husband. William de Cheveringworth paid five marks to have the king's letter to the abbot of Persore, to let him enjoy peaceably his tithes as formerly. Matthew de Hereford, clerk, paid ten marks for a letter of request to the bishop of Landaff, to let him enjoy peaceably his church of Schenfrith. Andrew Neulun gave three Flemish caps for the king's request to the prior of Chikesand, for performance of an agreement made between them. Henry de Fontibus gave a Lombardy horse of value to have the kings request to Henry Fitz-Harvey, that he would give him his daughter to wife. Roger, son of Nicholas, promised all the lampreys he could get, to have the king's request to earl William Marshal, that he would grant him the manor of Langeford at Firm. The burgesses of Gloucester promised 300 lampreys, that they might not be distrained to find the prisoners of Poictou with necessaries unless they pleased. Jordan, son of Reginald, paid twenty marks to have the king's request to William Paniel, that he should gram him the land of Mill Nierenuit, and the custody of his heirs; and if Jordan obtained the same, he was to pay the twenty marks, otherwise not. Madox Hist.) It will, however, be just to remark, that the same ridiculous practices and dangerous abuses prevailed in Normandy, and probably in all the other states of Europe: England was not, in this respect, more barbarous than its neighbours.

These iniquitous practices of the Norman kings were so well known, that on the death of Hugh Bigod, in the reign of Henry II., the best and most just of these princes, the eldest son and the widow of this nobleman came to court, and strove, by offering large presents to the king, each of them to acquire possession of that rich inheritance. The king was so equitable as to order the cause to be tried by the great council ! But in the mean time he seized all the money and treasure of the deceased. Peter of Blois, a judicious and even an elegant writer for that age, gives a pathetic description of the venality of justice, and the oppressions of the poor under the reign of Henry; and he scruples not to complain to the king himself of these abuses. We may judge what the case would be under the government of worse princes. The articles of inquiry concerning the conduct of sheriffs, which Henry promulgated in 1170, show the great power, as well as the licentiousness of these officers.

Amerciaments or fines for crimes and trespasses were another considerable branch of the royal revenue. Most crimes were atoned for by money; the fines imposed were not limited by any rule or statute; and frequently occasioned the total ruin of the person, even for the slightest trespasses. The forest-laws, particularly, were a great source of oppression. The king possessed sixty-eight forests, thirteen chases, and seven hundred and eighty-one parks, in different parts of England; and, considering the extreme passion of the English and Normans for hunting, these were so many snares laid for the people, by which they were allured into trespasses, and brought within the reach of arbitrary and rigorous laws, which the king had thought proper to enact by his own authority.

But the most barefaced acts of tyranny and oppression were practised against the Jews, who were entirely out of the protection of law, were extremely odious from the bigotry of the people, and were abandoned to the immeasurable rapacity of the king and his ministers. Besides many other indignities to which they were continually exposed, it appears that they were once all thrown into prison, and the sum of 66,000 marks exacted for their liberty (This happened in the reign of king John.) at another time, Isaac the Jew paid alone 5100 marks; Brun, 3000 marks; Jurnet, 2000; Bennet, 500 : at another, Licorica, widow of David, the Jew of Oxford, was required to pay 6000 marks; and she was delivered over to six of the richest and discreetest Jews in England, who were to answer for the sum. Henry III. borrowed 5000 marks from the earl of Cornwall, and for his repayment consigned over to him all the Jews in England. The revenue arising from exactions upon this nation was so considerable, that there was a particular court of exchequer set apart for managing it.

COMMERCE.

We may judge concerning the low state of commerce among the English, when the Jews, notwithstanding these oppressions, could still find their account in trading among them, and lending them money. And as the improvements of agriculture were also much checked by the immense possessions of the nobility, by the disorders of the times, and by the precarious state of feudal property, it appears that industry of no kind could then have place in the kingdom. (We learn from the extracts given us of Domesday by Brady, in his Treatise of Boroughs, that almost all the borough, of England had suffered in the shock of the conquest, and had extremely decayed, between the death of the Confessor conquest, and the time when Domesday was framed)

It is asserted by Sir Harry Spelman, (Gloss. In verb. judicum Dei. The author of the Mirror des Justices complains, that ordinances are only made by the king and his clerks, and by aliens and others, who dare not contradict the king, but study to please him. Whence he concludes, laws are oftener dictated by will, than founded on eight.) as an undoubted truth, that, during the reigns of the first Norman princes, every edict of the king, issued with the consent of his privy-council, had the full force of law. But the barons, surely, were not so passive as to entrust a power, entirely arbitrary and despotic into the hands of the sovereign. It only appears, that the constitution had not fixed any precise boundaries to the royal power; that the right of issuing proclamations on any emergence, and of exacting obedience to them, a right which was always supposed inherent in the crown, is very difficult to he distinguished from a legislative authority that the extreme imperfection of the ancient laws, and the sudden exigencies which often occurred in such turbulent governments, obliged the prince to exert frequently the latent powers of his prerogative; that he naturally proceeded, from the acquiescence of the people, to assume, in many particulars of moment, an authority from which he had excluded himself by express statutes, charters, or concessions, and which was, in the main, repugnant to the general genius of the constitution; and that the lives, the personal liberty, and the properties of all his subjects, were less secured by law against the exertion of his arbitrary authority, than by the independent power and private connexions of each individual. It appears from the Great Charter itself, that not only John, a tyrannical prince, and Richard, a violent one, but their father Henry, under whose reign the prevalence of gross abuses is the least to be suspected, were accustomed, from their sole authority, without process of law, to imprison, banish, and attaint the freemen of their kingdom.

A great baron, in ancient times, considered himself as a kind of sovereign within his territory; and was attended by courtiers and dependents more zealously attached to him than the ministers of state and the great officers were commonly to their sovereign. He often maintained in his court the parade of royalty, by establishing a justiciary, constable, mareschal, chamberlain, senesclsal, and chancellor, and assigning to each of these officers a separate province and command. He was usually very assiduous in exercising his jurisdiction; and took such delight in that image of sovereignty, that it was found necessary to restrain his activity, and prohibit him by law from holding courts too frequently. It is not to be doubted, but the example set him by the prince, of a mercenary and sordid extortion, would be faithfully copied: and that all his good and bad offices, his justice and injustice, were equally put to sale. He had the power, with the king's consent, to exact talliages even from the free citizens who lived within his barony; and as his necessities made him rapacious, his authority was usually found to be more oppressive and tyrannical than that of the sovereign: he was ever engaged in hereditary or personal animosities or confederacies with his neighbours, and often gave protection to all desperate adventurers and criminals who could be useful in serving his violent purposes. He was able alone, in times of tranquility, to obstruct the execution of justice within his territories; and by combining with a few malcontent barons of high rank and power, he could throw the state into convulsions. And, on the whole, though the royal authority was confined within bounds, and often within very narrow ones, yet the check was irregular, and frequently the source of great disorders; nor was it derived from the liberty of the people, but from the military power of many petty tyrants, who were equally dangerous to the prince, and oppressive to the subject.