1941 - 1942 Arctic Operations.

When in June 1941. German armies invaded Russia. the British. Government at once promised all possible aid to that country, but it was not until 29 September that the first of a regular series of convoys sailed for North Russia. At first the Germans paid little attention to this traffic, but Hitler's obsession with the threat of an Allied invasion of Norway brought about a concentration of German naval strength in North Norwegian harbours of which the first sign was the stationing of the battleship Tirpitz at Trondheim in the middle of January 1942. This was followed by the recall of the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen from Brest, the following month. The 3 ships left Brest on II February and made a dramatic dash up the English Channel under an umbrella of fighter aircraft. The Admiralty was expecting the move, but poor visibility and darkness enabled the German force to sail undetected, and it was not reported until 10.30 a.m. the next day when it was well up the Channel. Despite a most gallant attempt by a Squadron of Swordfish aircraft under Lieutenant Comander E. Esmonde, R.N., who was afterwards awarded a posthumous V.C., and by destroyers of the Nore command, the ships were not hit, but later off the Dutch coast both ships were mined, the Scharnhorst twice, and the Gneisenau once, the former being severely damaged. However while in a floating dock undergoing repairs the Gneisenau was so severely damaged by aircraft of the R.A.F. Bomber command that she took no further part in the war. As a result of public uneasiness at the escape of these two ships, an enquiry was held which made recommendations for improving the co-ordination between sea and air forces. In March, during the passage to Russia of the twelfth convoy of the series, the Germans, sailed the battleship Tirpitz to intercept it. She failed to do so and was very nearly caught by the British Home Fleet under Admiral Sir John Tovey. Five ships of the convoy were sunk by U-boat and aircraft attack. On 2 May, the cruiser Edinburgh covering another convoy was torpedoed and sank later, and 11 days afterwards the cruiser Trinidad, damaged during a previous convoy, and returning after temporary repairs in Murmansk, was bombed and sank. On 4 July the greatest convoy disaster of the war occurred when 23 ships of the 34 of which convoy P.Q.l7 was composed were sunk. The threat of attack by the powerful German forces now based in the far North of Norway caused the Admiralty to order the convoy to scatter, and the resulting loss of cohesion and protection enabled enemy aircraft and U-boats to achieve an easy victory. After this disaster, convoys were suspended until the autumn, because it was evident that without strong air and surface protection convoys had little chance of getting through. The next convoy sailed on 2 September and although the most heavily protected of any yet sailed, lost 10 ships to air attack and 3 to the U-boats. But the long hours of darkness in northern latitudes enabled succeeding convoys to fare better. However, a strong German. force consisting of the pocket battleship Lutzow, the cruiser Hipper and 6 destroyers, under Admiral Kummetz, was sailed to intercept a convoy of 14 ships which had sailed from the Britain on 22 December. So successful were the aggressive tactics employed by Rear-Admiral. Burnett commanding the coveting force and Captain Sherbrooke Royal Navy commanding the escort force, that the enemy, although more powerfully armed, failed to achieve his object and lost 1 large destroyer. The British forces lost 1 small destroyer and a minesweeper, with 1 severely and 2 slightly damaged destroyers. For his gallant leadership on this occasion Captain Sherbrooke, who was severely wounded, was awarded a V.C.

1943 Arctic Operations .

Only 2 convoys were sailed to Russia during the first half of 1943, neither of which suffered loss; then it was found necessary to suspend them on account of the crisis building up in the Battle of the Atlantic. Experience had also shown that during the period of perpetual daylight the enemy's aircraft had too great an advantage to by successfully countered. On 22 September midget submarines carried out a daring and most successful attack on the battleship Tirpitz, then moored in Altenfjord in the far North of Norway. Out of the 6 which set out to attack the German fleet only 2 succeeded in reaching their target, beneath which they placed 4 heavy charges each containing 2 tons of explosive. The resulting damage put the ship out of action for 6 months. For this successful and dangerous operation the captains of the 2 midget submarines, Lieuts Place and Cameron, were awarded the V.C. Their action altered the strategic situation in these waters in favour of the allies, and convoys were resumed in November without any opposition on the part of the tiers other than by U-boats and a small number of aircraft. However, the worsening situation on the Russian front led the enemy to sail the battle cruiser Scharnhorst to attack a convoy which had left the U.K. on 22 December and which was being covered by the battleship Duke of York (flagship), the cruisers Belfast, Norfolk, Sheffield and Jamaica with 4 destroyers, under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, with Rear-Admiral Burnett in command of the cruisers. The Scharnhorst was located by the cruisers during the forenoon of 26 December and successfully shadowed by them until brought to action later in the day by the Duke of York off the North Cape. The action began in the twilight of an Arctic winter's day and continued during the dark hours, radar playing a vital part in determining the range at which to open fire. As evidence of this, the Scharnhorst was struck by her opponents' opening salvoes and this was the first indication she had of the British battleship's presence.
Although the enemy ship made an attempt to escape from the trap into which she had fallen, her speed fell away as the result of a hit aft, and she was eventually sunk by gunfire and torpedoes after an action lasting 3 hrs. Only 36 of her complement of nearly 2000 were rescued, and those lost included Rear-Admiral,. Bey, whose flagship she was. The Germans now had no more effective heavy ships in North Norway. and the problem of defending the convoys to North Russia was thereby eased.

1941-2 Indian Ocean Operations

Japan's undeclared entry into the war on the side of the Axis powers on 7 December 1941 and the success of her attack on the U.S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor followed by the sinking of the British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle-cruiser Repulse by torpedo and bomber aircraft off Malaya on 10 December completely undermined the allied position in the Far East. After the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, mixed forces of British, Australian, Dutch and U.S. ships attempted to stem the tide of Japanese. invasion as it spread southward. Losses were heavy and included the cruiser Exeter of River Plate fame, the Australian cruiser Perth, which fought to her last round of ammunition, the U.S.S. Houston and the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter and Java, all of which fought with the utmost gallantry against superior forces. On 5 April the Japanese fleet entered the Indian Ocean and struck at Ceylon, sinking the British cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall and the carrier Hermes. This was the nadir in the long list of allied misfortunes in this area. On 5 May powerful British forces seized the Vichy French held island of Madagascar in order to forestall any Japanese attempt to seize it. The operation was entirely successful, and marked the beginning of a build up of Allied strength in the area.

1943 Indian Ocean Operations

There was little activity in this area by either side during the first half of the year, although both German and Japanese submarines were active at focal shipping points and took their toil. In August, as evidence of Allied determination to regain control. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed Supreme Commander South East. Asia, and the following month the British Eastern Fleet under its C-in-C., Admiral Somerville, returned to its base in Ceylon. Preparations were now put in hand for the launching of offensive blows against the Japanese held East Indies.

1944-5 Indian Ocean Operations

Substantial reinforcements joined Admiral Somerville's command during the early part of 1944, but he was still very short of escort vessels, in consequence of which shipping losses in the area during the first 3 months of the year were heavier than any other theatre, amounting to 29 ships (188.040 tons) for a loss of 2 German and 2 Japanese submarines. in March 3 Japanese cruisers sailed from Singapore on a raiding mission in the Indian Ocean, but only 1 ship was sunk. On 19 April Admiral Somerville with a force comprising 2 battleships. 1 battle-cruiser, 1 carrier, 4 cruisers and 7 destroyers, together with the U.S. carrier Saratoga and 3 destroyers, and the French battleship Richelieu, the Dutch cruiser Tromp and 1 destroyer, the R.N.Z.N. cruiser Gambia and 4 destroyers of the R.A.N. carried out a most successful attack on enemy installations at the port of Sabang. On 17 May a similar strike was made at Soerabaya, and on 25 July another raid was made on Sabang with a force which now included 2 large British carriers in place of the Saratoga. In November the British Pacific fleet began to assemble in Ceylon, and as a preliminary to its exploits in the Far East it carried out two successful strikes on Japanese held oil refineries at Pladjoe and Soengei Gerong, before moving on to Australia where it arrived on 4 February. Meanwhile Japanese, forces began the evacuation of Burma, and early in May Rangoon was reoccupied without opposition. On 9 May a force of British destroyers overtook and sank the Japanese, cruiser Haguro during a night action 45 m. South West. of Penang. Although plans for the reoccupation of Malaya were well advanced, Japan surrendered to the Allies before these could be fully implemented.