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Statement of Congressman Dana Rohrabacher
U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on South Asia
April 14, 1999
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for allowing me to testify this morning. This hearing is
especially significant, because beyond the important matters of human rights
violations, especially against women, terrorism and drug proliferation, what
transpires in Afghanistan today will have a profound impact on the entire
region of Central Asia for years to come.
I have been involved with Afghanistan since the early 1980s when I
worked in the White House as a speech writer and special assistant to
President Ronald Reagan. In 1988, immediately after I was elected to
Congress I traveled into Afghanistan with mujahideen fighters and
participated in the battle of Jalalabhad against the Soviets. At that time
I learned first hand of the courage and generosity of the Afghan people. I
also learned from the Afghans that I traveled with and the villagers that
housed me that the average Afghan is not a fanatic or an religious
extremist, but to the contrary, very hospitable and generous, by the very
essence of their traditional culture. What has happened during the past few
years under Taliban rule is a tragic perversion of Afghan culture and
religious heritage.
Having been closely involved in US policy toward Afghanistan for
some twenty years, I have called into question whether or not this
administration has a covert policy that has empowered the Taliban and
enabled this brutal movement to hold on to power. Even though the President
and the Secretary of State have voiced their disgust at the brutal policies
of the Taliban, especially their repression of women, the actual
implementation of U.S. policy has repeatedly had the opposite effect. I
base this claim on the following reasons:
*In 1996, the Taliban first emerged as a mysterious force that swept
out of so-called religious schools in Pakistan to a blitzkrieg type of
conquest of most of Afghanistan against some very seasoned former-mujahideen
fighters. As a so-called "student militia,"the Taliban could not have
succeeded without the support, organization and logistics of military
professionals, who would not have been faculty in religious schools.
*The US has a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, in matters concerning Afghanistan, but unfortunately, instead of
providing leadership, we are letting them lead our policy. This began
during the Afghan war against the Soviets. I witnessed this in the White
House when U.S. officials in charge of the military aid program to the
mujahideen permitted a large percentage of our assistance to be channeled to
the most anti-western non-democratic elements of the mujahideen, such as
Golbodin Hekmatayar. This was done to placate the Pakistan ISI military
intelligence.
*In 1997, responding to the pleas of the Afghan-American community
and the recognized Afghanistan ambassador, I led an effort to stop the State
Department from permitting the Afghanistan embassy in Washington from being
taken under the control of a diplomat loyal to the Taliban. Instead, of
permitting a new ambassador who was assigned by the non-Taliban Afghan
government that is still recognized at the United Nations, the State
Department claimed "we don't take sides," and forced the embassy to be
closed against the will of the Afghanistan United Nations office.
*During late 1997 and early 1998, while the Taliban imposed a
blockade on more than two million people of the Hazara ethnic group in
central Afghanistan, putting tens of thousands at risk of starving to death
or perishing from a lack of medicine during the harsh winter months, the
State Department undercut my efforts to send in two plane loads of medicines
by the Americares and the Knightsbridge relief agencies. State Department
representatives made false statements that the humanitarian crisis was
exaggerated and there was already sufficient medical supplies in the
blockaded area. When the relief teams risked their lives to go into the
area with the medicines - without the support of the State Department they
found the hospitals and clinics did not have even aspirins or bandages, no
generators for heat in sub-zero weather, a serious lack of blankets and
scant amounts of food. The State Department, in effect, was assisting the
Taliban's inhuman blockade intended to starve out communities that opposed
their dictates.
* Perhaps the most glaring evidence of this administration's tacit
support of the was the effort made during a Spring 1998 visit to Afghanistan
by Mr. Indefurth and U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson. These administration
representatives convinced the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance not to go on
the offensive against a then-weakened and vulnerable Taliban. And instead
convinced these anti-Taliban leaders to accept a cease-fire that was
proposed by Pakistan. The cease fire lasted only as long as it took the
Paks to resupply and reorganize the Taliban. In fact, within a few months
of announcement of the U.S.-backed "Ulema" process, the Taliban, freshly
supplied by the ISI and flush with drug money, went on a major offensive and
destroyed the Northern Alliance. This was either incompetence on the part
of the State Department and U.S. intelligence agencies or indicative of the
real policy of our government to ensure a Taliban victory.
*Can anyone believe that with the Taliban, identified by the United
Nations and the DEA as one of the two largest producers of opium in the
world, that they weren't being closely monitored by our intelligence
services, who would have seen every move of the military build up that the
Pakistanis and Taliban were undertaking. In addition, at the same time the
U.S. was planning its strike against the terrorist camps of Osama bin laden
in Afghanistan. How could our intelligence services not have known that
Osama bin Laden's forces had moved north to lead the Taliban offensive,
where horrendous brutality took place.
*In addition, there has been no major effort to end the flow of
opium out of Afghanistan, which is the main source of the revenues that
enables the Taliban to maintain control of the country, even though the US
Government observes by satellite where the opium is grown.
* I am making the claim that there is and has been and is a
covert policy by this administration to support the Taliban movement's
control of Afghanistan. It is my guess, that this amoral or immoral policy
is based on the assumption that the Taliban would bring stability to
Afghanistan and permit the building of oil pipelines from Central Asia
through Afghanistan to Pakistan.
We have a choice between believing that this administration's policy
toward Afghanistan has been incompetent beyond belief, or is directed toward
achieving a covert purpose.
I believe the administration has maintained this covert goal and
kept the Congress in the dark about its policy of supporting the Taliban,
the most anti-Western, anti-female, anti-human rights regime int he world.
It doesn't take a genius to understand that this policy would outrage the
American people, especially America's women.
Perhaps the most glaring evidence of our government's covert policy
to favor the Taliban is that the administration is currently engaged in a
major effort to obstruct the Congress from determining the details behind
this policy. Last year in August, after several unofficial requests were
made of State Department, I made an official request for all diplomatic
documents concerning US policy toward the Taliban, especially those cables
and documents from our embassies in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. As a senior
Member of the House International Relations Committee I have oversight
responsibility in this area.
In November, after months of stonewalling, the Secretary of State
herself promised before the International Relations Committee that the
documents would be forthcoming. She reconfirmed that promise in February
when she testified before our Committee on the State Department budget.
The Chairman of the Committee, Ben Gilman, added his voice to the
record in support of my document request. To this time, we have received
nothing. There can only be two explanations. Either the State Department
is totally incompetent, or there is an ongoing cover-up of State
Department's true fundamental policy toward Afghanistan. You probably
didn't expect me to praise the State Department at the end of this scathing
testimony. But I will. I don't think the State Department is incompetent.
They should be held responsible for their policies and the American people
should know, through documented proof, what they are doing.
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