Articles et al

“INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL ORIGINS OF NEUROSIS”. American Socio1ogica1 Review (August, 1944): 380—384.

This article was originally delivered as a paper to the Eastern Sociologica1 Society in April 1944 and contains Fromm's perspectives on the evolution of scientific knowledge and how to address the ideas of other thinkers. He uses Freud’s 0edipus Complex (as the origin of neurosis) as an object of “reinterpretation.” He discusses parental authority and the situatedness of the family in a particular socio-economic-political context. He critiques the atomized disunity of the interests of individuals and the interests of society, presenting his sense of a social self (“pseudo-self”) as opposed to a “core” or true self of the individual. He differentiates between “neurosis” and “defect,” the latter being a shared-experience of not attaining a sense of self (of freedom or spontaneity). If such a defect is prevalent, he calls it a “socially patterned defect,”---i.e. security within the given society or protection from individual feelings of neurosis. Thus, he introduces his social concept of the “pathology of normalcy.”

“PSYCHOANALYTIC CHARACTEROLOGY AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURE.” In S.S. Sargent and M.W. Smith, eds., Culture and Personality. NY: Viking Press, 1949.

Fromm promotes a socio-psychological approach in order to apply the findings of psychoanalysis to the problem of culture (he uses this term roughly as synonymous to society). He restates his social character theory. He rejects the “tabula rosa” conception of man’s nature. He critiques the “fetish of the Scientific Method;” and similar to Mills, points out that “methods” (especially: quantitative) exclude certain “issues” from study, with the result that the development of methods on the basis of the “issue” is retarded. He emphasizes the study of the structure of a society as a whole---of the functions of the individual in this structure, calling for development of needed methods appropriate to the problems (issues) at hand.

“THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES TO MENTAL HYGIENE.” International Congress of Mental Health Proceedings, NY: Columbia University Press, (1951): 38-42.

Fromm defines mental health as something other than mere adjustment or adaptation to a given society. He calls “mental health” primarily a social, economic, political, and ethical problem approachable by cooperation of all social scientists. Calling for a “thorough and critical appraisal of our social structure and culture” (p. 39), he critiques the present human situation as man being looked at and treated as a “thing.” He contrasts “having opinions” with “convictions.” He critiques man’s work situation and democratic pluralism (which, he maintains, eliminates actual ways of active participation). He calls for a critique of false-consciousness about pleasure and happiness. Overall, this is a phenomenological critique of “a practice of life,” or a “way of living.” This indicates Fromm’s concern with starting with the phenomena and then moving on to assess concepts and labels used to describe or portray it. Finally, this was delivered as an address to the International Congress.

“MAN-WOMAN.” In M.M. Hughes, ed., The People in Your Life: Psychiatry and Personal Relations. NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Fromm discusses his concepts of gender identity, gender roles, and sex roles; again critiquing the definition of the concept of “equality” as “sameness.” He also critiques the lived-experience of men and women as if it were between a victorious and a defeated group. He expresses a version of feminism (circa l949), yet is also critical of the “leveling” of differences, defining the relationship between men and women as one essentially between human beings, not as members of the “opposite sex.” Thus, he calls for the process of humanization which recognizes true differences (as opposed to “role” differences) and the transcending of them (not the elimination of them in the name of equality = sameness).

“THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NORMALCY.” Dissent (Spring, 1954): 139-143.

Fromm provides a critique of “sociological relativism.” He posits a “normative humanism” as phenomenologically derived from commonalities of humans across cultures/societies. He indicates that humans can live under almost any kinds of conditions---as if they were infinitely malleable. Yet, he says there are limits---man can and will react one way or another. Man, as man, will either choose to perish or change the conditions (i.e. no choice is still a choice). He restresses his conviction that one’s social environment is determinative of one’s picture of human nature. Thus, he says, a critique of society is imperative: does it promote true human needs? All of this portrays Fromm’s concern with the dialectical relation of individuals and society.

“THE HUMAN IMPLICATIONS OF INSTINCTIVISTIC “RADICALISM.” Dissent (Autumn, 1955) : 342-349.

This is one article in a series of dialogues between Fromm and Herbert Marcuse. Fromm defends himself against the attack that he is being “idealistic” by distinquishing between “mechanistic materialism” and “historical materialism.” He rejects Marcuse’s portrayal of him as a radical who defends the status quo by preaching “adjustment.” Fromm explains an analysis of “love” (the necessary conditions for it) to be “social criticism”: a presentation of the reasons for its failure in capitalistic society. He exhibits his dialectical perspective by reminding Marcuse that each “thesis1” produces its own “antithesis” within itself.

“PSYCHOANALYSIS.” In J.R. Newman, ed., What is Science?. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1955.

Fromm presents psychoanalysis as a method---a method of therapy for individuals and society. He says it is inherently a debunking method, a method of inference: about the nature and direction of forces not directly visible. This is pertinent to a critique of positivism which is concerned with only those things directly visible. Thus, Fromm is saying that positivism is incomplete, not merely “wrong.” He also describes false consciousness as a matter of “resistance” and “repression,” critiquing the process of rationalization (in a Weberian sense) as a process of ideological construction.

“FREEDOM IN THE WORK SITUATION.” In M. Harrington and P. Jacobs, eds., Labor in a Free Society. Berkeley and LA: University of California Press, 1959.

This article provides a critique of bureaucracy as the administration of men as if they were things. He distinguishes “bureaucracy” from “administration,” the latter being something any differentiated society needs. He portrays bureaucracy as a relationship between bureaucrats and their objects-people. He evidences here that he has a sense of the micro and macro; that they are the same things and that the macro emerges from the micro (interaction). He rejects the idea that bureaucracy simply is and thus, the necessity to submit to it. He presents bureaucracy as instrumentatality; the how to do things, rather than the why we do things. Overall, he critiques the “social fact” (i.e. reification) conception of bureaucracy by highlighting the dialectical/creative process it embodies. Also, he critiques the illusionary nature of people’s reaction to their “roles.”---Since everyone experiences roles similarly, no one feels “sick” or “pathological.” (Fromm’s socially patterned defect). He maintains that authentic identity is replaced by “herd” or “conformity-identity.” He critiques 20th century notions of “work,” contrasting it to that of the 19th century, questioning whether “greater participation in work” really makes for greater participation. He does so by exposing “human relations” as alienated activity which concentrates on the “human problem of industry” (where industry is the subject) rather than the “industrial problem of humanity”(where humanity is the subject which has an industrial problem). He also critiques the alienated notion of “leisure” as “consumption and passivity.” His sociology of work presents work as more than an “economical” problem---it is a profoundly human problem. He critiques “work” as defined in capitalistic society as “forced labor” instead of the need for humans to work as an expression of true freedom.

“VALUES, PSYCHOLOGY, AND HUMAN EXISTENCE.” In A.H. Maslow, ed., New Knowledge in Human Values. NY: Harper and Bros., 1959.

This article provides a good summary of Fromm’s views on nature and the “conditions of human existence.” He spells out his “normative humanism” as a phenomeological assessment, rather than as an a priori value judgment. He depicts both “destroying life” and “creating life” as means of transcending one’s creaturely existence. Also, as elsewhere, he emphasizes the human need for “relatedness”---to things and to people---thus, exhibiting his belief that “relations” (or in Weberian terms, interaction) is at the core of human existence, critiquing the distortion of such in modern society. He presents his micro-level critique of “social identity” as “roles,” rather than as the experience of an “I” as the subject of thinking activity. He says that social roles (as the equivalent of “identity”) are status identifications---illustrating this through the TST test (asking “Who I am?”). “Social role identity” leads, he says, to living on the basis of roles. He critiques the acquisition of some frame of orientation---whether it is true or false, explaining the process of rationalization in Western society---its continuing growth as a cover for irrationality. He also critiques the Cartesian split between intellect and affect, mind and body, end portrays it as being destructive of human growth---saying it is the product of our own thought (his critique of formal logic) and does not correspond to the reality of human existence. As elsewhere, he defines “objectivity” as the “faculty to see the world, nature, and other persons, and oneself as they are and not distorted by desires and fears”

Fromm repeats his critique that we produce “things” that act like “men” and “men” that act like “things.” This entire article is infused with Fromm’s humanist radicalism.

“FOREWORD.” In A.S. Neill, Summerhill-A Radical Approach to Childrearing. NY: Hart Publishing Company, 1960.

Fromm’s critique of “education” in capitalist society. He links the education system to the creation of people who fit well into an alienated society---the (re)production of the “prevailing” type of person (i.e. Mills’ third question). Also, he discusses childhood (developmentally) rather than mere adulthood. He supports Neill’s approach and distinguishes it from “permissive” approaches.

“AFTERWORD.” In George Orwell, 1984.. NY: The New American Library, Signet Classics, 1961.

Overall: Fromm warns “Western Man” that Orwell’s book is a warning to him rather than just a warning about Russian totalitarianism (i.e. Stalin). Provides a discussion of 1984 as a “negative utopia” expressing the mood of powerlessness and hopelessness in modern man---no matter which kind of society he lives in.. He mentions World War I as the end of the overall Enlightenment and relates subsequent ideas to this disillusionment. He stresses the “paradoxical historical situation” in reference to technological advance---that is, hopelessness in a period of great possibility for human advance. Further, he shows how Orwell links “preparation for war” with the sound economic functioning” of a bureaucratized society.---How political ideologies which stress fright and hatred of a possible aggressor destroys the basic attitudes of a democratic society. Fromm also presents his basic sociology of knowledge through Orwell’s term of “doublespeak” and the “definition of reality” as “truth,” linking the “power to define truth” with a “philosophical idealism” and as an “extreme form of pragmatism.” He discusses how truth is relative to one’s location---how reality is transformed into something relative to one’s own interests. He defines “ideology” as the successful manipulation of a person’s mind so that he “is no longer saying the opposite of what he’s thinking, but he thinks the opposite of what is true*”(p. 265). This all portrays Fromm’s concern with the “social construction of reality”---whether manipulated by others or chosen by oneself.

“CREATORS AND DESTROYERS.” The Saturday Review, January 4, 1964: 22—25.

Fromm details, for “popular” consumption, his theories about “biophilia” and “necrophilia” and how the latter is promoted and rewarded in a over-bureaucratized society. He inverts the notion that people “love life” and “fear death” by positing that today people either fear life or are indifferent to life,...but actually...love death. He believes that necrophilia is not inherent as a normal biological tendency, but rather, is a pathological phenomenon. He critiques intellectualization, quantification, abstractification, bureaucratization, and reification as the principles of mechanics, not of human life. He makes clear that necrophilia is not necessarily the inevitable outcome of “industrial production.” He also suggests an empirical program of research in order to portray the “bio-necro” polarity. (Including depth questionnaires, stratified sampling, correlation with expressed attitudes, and factor analyzes). Finally, he suggests that our age may be best symbolized by the “neutron bomb” (which leaves entire cities intact, but without life)---suggesting this long before widespread public knowledge of such a bomb. (1964) The entire article is a trenchant critique.

“HUMANISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS.” Contemporary Psychoanalysis Vol. I, No. l (Fall, 1964): 69—79.

Fromm surveys the meaning of “humanism” through several centuries, saying it has always been a reaction to the threat of dehumanization (which in our day is the threat of total bureaucratization of man---much the same result Weber foresaw). He says psychoanalysis is a method rooted in the spirit of humanism--starting with Freud--toward uncovering the unconscious. He reaffirms the necessity of the social (society) if man is to live. He links “social character” as the mechanism by which man learns to “want to do what he has to do.” He mentions “social taboos” which repress tendencies which are at odds with the dominant social character, relating repression to the fear of being ostracized, isolated, and alone. What is “conscious” and “unconscious” depends on the structure of society---the patterns of feelings and thoughts it produces. The content of the unconscious, for Fromm, always represents the balance of the “whole” man. “The unconscious is the whole man--minus that part of man which corresponds to his society”(p. 77). He relates what is unconscious with the fear of the “stranger”---the “other,” maintaining that to experience one’s own unconscious is to “know” the stranger because of “knowing” oneself. This is a non-sociological way of expressing the sociological concern of identity and various “others.” Thus, to not know one’s unconscious is to engage in deception of oneself and others.

“PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETING MARX.” In I.L. Horowitz, ed., The New Sociology, NY: Oxford University Press, 1964.

This is an excellent example of Fromm’s Marxist scholarship in which he discusses misinterpretations of Marx, especially relating them to the actual historical events in Russia. He shows how the “posited good” of capitalism results in the “logical altercasting” of socialism into its opposite--the “bad.” He also indicates how similar the U.S. and the USSR are in certain respects---and how non-Marxist they both are; doing so by showing how so-called socialist systems are actually based on the same principles as bureaucratic capitalism: i.e. on maximum economic efficiency and the subordination of the individual.

“THE APPLICATION OF HUMANIST PSYCHOANALYSIS TO MARX’S THEORY.” In Erich Fromm,. ed., Socialist Humanism. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965.

More Marxian scholarship.. Fromm makes fuller note of the lack of a “dynamic psychology” in Marx---maintaining there was no such thing in Marx’s day. Psychoanalysis is such a dynamic psychology and must be a social psychology---a critical one, particularly critical of man’s consciousness. The main medium of a critical social psychology is “social character.” He links social character to institutions---calling them “instruments of influence” (such as the educational system, religion, literature, songs, jokes. customs, and methods of childrearing). He refers to social character as a “character matrix” common to a group (i.e. nation, class). Fromm presents seven factors of social character theory which answer problems not dealt with adequately in Marxist theory. Further, he mentions the creation of artificial needs and the manipulation of man’s tastes, also calling them “synthetic” needs.. He calls for criteria for and study of man’s “genuine” needs. He tends towards an ethnomethodology by suggesting “projective tests” which analyze favorite jokes, songs, stories, observable behavior (i.e. “small acts”). He also discusses alienation as being more than an intellectual concept---but as an “experience” related to depression, fanaticism, and idolatry, “the degree of alienation in various social classes and the social conditions which tend to increase or decrease it”(p. 244).

“A GLOBAL PHILOSOPHY FOR MAN.” The Humanist 26(1966): 117—122.

This article contains an epistemological critique of the use of concepts. Fromm provides an analysis of the validity of human values, “...if this validity is not based upon God, revelation, or simple tradition” (p. 121). In other words, Fromm is presenting a “non-natural law” basis for a normative portrayal of human values. He maintains that an investigation of the conditions of the existence of man results in a “hierarchy of values,” saying “this is not an ideological hierarchy, but a real one.” Fromm is treating here the “spiritual problems of our existence” sociologically--that is--grounded in real life, as having materia1 effect.

“SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN PSYCHOANALYSIS: AN EDITORIAL.” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 2 (1966): 168-170.

This is a short editorial in which Fromm gives his stance on the “scientific method” and his critique of un-reflexive psychoanalytic methods, and by implication, his portrayal of his own socio-psychoanalytic methods. He critiques the application of a “general formula” (positivistic methods) to diverse phenomena---saying this is predominant because it’s easy--(like Mills’ “plotted routines”).

“INTRODUCTION.” In Ivan Illich, Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional Revolution. NY: Doubleday & Co., 1970.

There is no clearer statement by Fromm than this explanation of what he meant by “humanist radicalism” (as the unity of theory and method).

“ESSAY.” In Summerhill, For and Against. NY: Hart Publishing Co., 1970.

Fromm’s essay falls on the “For” side of the debate. In this essay he explains his theories about “authority” in relation to childrearing and specifically, education. Also, he distinguishes between “responsibility” and “duty” as well as between “structure” and “order.”

“TOWARD A HUMANIZED TECHNOLOGY.” In Steven E. Deutsch and John Howard, Where Its At: Radical Perspectives in Sociology. NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970.

This article is a revised excerpt from The Revolution of Hope (l968), interestingly enough, appearing in a book subtitled “radical perspectives in sociology.” It is a precise critique of “technetronic society” from a humanist radical perspective. In a direct sense---it is a phenomenological presentation of the actual results of Weber’s portrayal of the progressive rationalization of society. It also pertains to Mills’ third question about the types of people prevailing and coming to prevail: “Must we produce sick people in order to have a healthy economy, or can we use our material resources, our inventions, our computers to serve the ends of men? Must individuals be passive and dependent in order to have strong and well-functioning organizations?” (p. 375).

Fromm refers to the “second Industrial Revolution” as “cybernetic” in nature. He emphasizes the “unity” of thought and action---saying it is not a question of “what is first and what is second.” Thus, he emphasizes the dialectical nature of individuals and institutions, calling for the “affirmation of will” by the individual asserting himself toward managers, circumstances, and machines. He critiques the bureaucratic workplace and leisure time, contrasting “forced labor” with “free labor.” He critiques the “employment patterns” which force people to make decisions about their careers “at an age when they do not have the experience and judgment to know what activity is the most congenial to them”(p. 383). Finally, he discusses “welfare” as being unattractive because bureaucratic methods are so humiliating that people are effectively deprived of their freedom “not to accept certain working conditions.” (i.e. the power of the “social definition of the situation”)