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THE FIRST THING to question about this case is: Why was it brought at all? After all, Otto's owners (Prof. And Mrs. Ikuma, though only Mrs. Ikuma's name appeared on the indictments) had already been found NOT GUILTY by a JURY of harboring a vicious dog. Why was the dog not then immediately released back into its owners' loving and responsible care? Why was the poor dog (and, in effect, its owners) placed in double jeopardy by being tried a second time for the same alleged crime, albeit under a different name, and this time without being given the option of a jury trial? Inquiring minds, passionate for justice, want to know and will, rest assured, eventually find out. But meantime we're stuck with what we've got. Here's my analysis of the judge's opinion in the second trial (yes, I know, it was just a "hearing." Tell that to the dog on Death Row.)  The Circuit Court's Timothy Connors on April 30, 1999 opined: "Only if the dog is deemed to be a dangerous animal pursuant to the Dangerous Animal Act shall the lower Court order the dog destroyed." The first order of business is therefore to decide whether Otto had:
These, apparently, are the criteria by which the District Court was supposed to determine whether Otto was dangerous enough to be destroyed. If statement A and only statement A were true, then Otto would be a dangerous dog and should be destroyed under the law. But if any of B, C, or D were true, then Otto would not--in the eyes of the law--be a dangerous dog and should not be destroyed. No-one suggested that Alex Newton tormented Otto or attacked Otto's owners. The only legal question, therefore, was whether Newton was knowingly trespassing on the Ikumas' property. If he was, then Otto would be "not guilty" by virtue of having acted under the conditions specified in statement B above. Judge Goodridge began by summarizing the undisputed facts, of which the central ones were: 1. Alex Newton opened the Ikumas' screen door and entered the foyer, where he deposited the newspaper. 2. Otto chased the boy out of the house, "down a portion of the front walk," and bit him. 3. The bites "were significant, requiring extensive medical attention, and follow-up care." Unfortunately, the judge in her Opinion renders neither definition nor evidence of the "significance" of the bites or the extent of the medical and "follow-up" care, whatever that was. The defendants have long disputed the plaintiffs' contention that the bites were severe and traumatic (and presented supporting evidence at the first, JURY, trial, in which--remember--they were found NOT GUILTY), so it is not clear why the severity and trauma of the bites were presented as undisputed facts by the judge in this second trial. The judge then returns to the all-important legal question of whether Alex Newton had knowingly trespassed on the dog owner's property. She acknowledges, but then ignores, defense testimony that "the Ann Arbor News training manual for news carriers instructed carriers not to open doors which were the last barrier to the residence," and "that it was not customary for the carrier to open a screen door when the inside door was open." Finding that "Alex Newton testified that he thought it permissive and appropriate to open the screen door in this manner, and to place the newspaper on the foyer of the residence," the judge had no difficulty in considering Alex Newton to be a trespasser, but balked--apparently on the sole grounds that Alex Newton denied it--at calling him a knowing trespasser. Here is the key passage: "[K]nowingly" as used in this statutory definition clearly references the state of mind of the person alleged to have been trespassing. To interpret this statute otherwise would require the Court to attempt to interpret the mental state of the animal involved, which is clearly not the intent of the drafters. Alex Newton testified in this case that he believed that he had permission to be on the Ikumas' porch, and that he believed that he delivered the newspaper in an appropriate manner. He gave absolutely no indication, or testimony, that he believed he did not have authority to act as he did. [Emphasis added] Accordingly, this Court finds that Alex Newton was not a person who was knowingly trespassing, and this exception to the definition of a dangerous dog does not apply. Ah, where is that "ordinary and reasonable person" when you need him or her?! You'll often find them in juries, which is why we have a jury system and prefer not to allow single individuals act as judge, jury, and executioner. Look at the preceding passage carefully. It begins with obfuscation; with an utterly irrelevant remark to the effect that you can't expect a judge to determine whether Otto knew Alex was trespassing. It then says that because Alex would not admit to knowing he should not have gone inside the house--though he knew it was OK to be on the porch, and not in the foyer--well, ergo, it must be true, and Otto must die! Good grief. The judge then goes on to demolish any hope of getting Otto off on the other potential grounds for innocence (that he was provoked, or that he was protecting his owners' from attack. These are irrelevant findings, since the defendants were not basing their defense on these grounds. The last few paragraphs of the Opinion and Order take up the question of whether or not Otto is a "dangerous animal" as defined by Michigan law. Never mind that a Michigan jury had, clearly in effect, already found Otto to be NOT GUILTY of being a dangerous dog. What do juries know, anyway? No, instead the smart city lawyers went grubbing around in their dingy basement to dust off a long forgotten 1919 "Dog Law" that somehow overrides the more recent Dangerous Animal Act (according to the judge, and I guess I'll just have to take her word for it, not being a lawyer myself.) Apparently, using the Dog Law instead of the Dangerous Animal Act lets the judge order Otto's execution. But here's where, to my untrained nose, there are unpleasant whiffs of legal shenanigans. Remember, right at the beginning of this document we noted that one Timothy Connors of the Circuit Court directed the District Court to order that Otto be destroyed "[O]nly if [he] is deemed to be a dangerous animal pursuant to the Dangerous Animal Act" [emphasis added.] (I have a problem with the word "deemed," but let that pass.) What's odd is that in the closing paragraphs of her Opinion, the judge notes that the Circuit Court had issued "an opinion on appeal" that she "should apply the standards of the Dog Law of 1919, using the definitions found in the Dangerous Animal Act." Whoa. This gets awfully tricky, trying to mix and match standards and definitions among different laws, but apparently it's enough for Judge Goodridge to "deem" Otto into oblivion and his owners into heartbreak. So there you have it, folks. I've tried to be as dispassionate as I can in analyzing the judge's Order and Opinion, but it's perfectly obvious where my sympathies and biases lie, and it's equally obvious to any lawyer that I am not one. But neither am I on the lunatic fringe of animal activists: I am an ordinary and, I believe, reasonable man who happens to love animals, and who thinks he is capable of applying common sense to an everyday matter and concluding, intellectually as well as emotionally, that a terrible injustice has been perpetrated. That sends chills down my spine, and it should send them down yours, too. David November 2, 1999 |
