Hitler made his foreign policy aims crystal clear in "Mein Kamf". To briefly summarise, they were: (a) Removal of all terms of the Versailles Treaty. This included full German rearmament, the restoration of Germany’s lost territories and Anschluss or union with Austria. (b)On the first page of "Mein Kamf" Hitler called for the creation of a Gross Deutschland or Greater Germany, which would unite all German speaking peoples in one Reich. (c) Hitler was adamant in his call lebensraum or living space in the east. The fertile grain fields of the Ukraine and the raw materials of western Russia ere to be siezed to provide for Germany’s expanding population. The Slav peoples who populated these lands, and whom Hitler equated with the Jews, were to be slaves to the German master race. These objectives were stated not only in "Mein Kamf", but also in another book not discovered until after the war and known as "Hitler’s Secret Book." The same expansionist message was reiterated in a number of speeches to military and industrial leaders. Hitler was acutely aware that a high-risk policy could lead to war, but was willing to take the chance. His confidence was boosted by the policy of appeasement followed by England and France.

The attitudes and policy of Britain and France towards Hitler was a con tributary factor in his aggrandisement. By the mid-thirties the British public strongly supported the policy of appeasement, which found its fullest expression under the premiership of Neville Chaimberlain. The Penguin Dictionary of Twentieth Century History defines appeasement as:

The roots of appeasement lie in the following factors: (a) Trench warfare and the horrors of First World War were deeply ingrained in people’s minds. This made for a deep-seated pacifism that accepted peace, almost at any price. Anti-war literature reinforced the message of the callousness and wastefulness of war. Sasoon, Graves, Gide and Henri Barbuse helped keep alive a feeling of anti-militarism in both France and England. (b)The British, in particular, felt that the Versialles Treaty had been unnecessarily harsh on Germany. High reparations, the demilitarisation of the Rhineland and the Polish Corridor caused guilty consciences in influential sections of British (c)Consequently, Chamberlain, Halifax and Butler all accepted the viewpoint that Hitler had legitimate grievancess. As these grievances were limited they could, the argument ran, be quite easily fulfilled. In addition, it was erroneously concluded, when concessions were granted, the dictators could society no longer beat their nationalist drum and would thus lose support. (d)Leading politicians in both Britain and France realised that their respective countries were unprepared for war. They were also unwilling to lesson social welfare progammes to pay for rearmament. In Britain the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935) seemed to gaurantee British security. French military strategy centered on the Maginot Line. This was a system of fortifications, called after the Minister for War who commissioned it, stretching from the eastern frontier of France to the Swiss border. It was incomplete along the Belgian frontier. It was expected that the Germans would exhaust themselves attacking it in the manner of the First World War.

Psychology it has been suggested that it engendered a sense of defeatism. Charles de Gaulle and a handful of politicians argued that the next war would depend on swiftly concentrating armoured divisions at a particular point, not on outmoded defence system. For his suggestions, in his book "Vers l’armée de Métier" he was struck from the promotions list.(e)France, as we saw in chapter 17, was engulfed in political turmoil between right and left. The slogan "Better Hitler than Blum" (French Premiere 1936-37) Indicated the poor morale of the French public.

In October 1933 Hitler made his first foreign policy move by with drawing from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. This action was precipitated by a French refusal to allow Germany immediate equality of armaments. Britain and Italy sympathised with Hitler, and France felt too weak to stand alone against Germany.

A few months later in January 1934 Hitler surprised both friends and enemies by signing a non-aggression treaty with Poland. As Poland held land that most Germans regarded as part of the Reich, the move caused some disbelief. To many it seemed that Hitler was becoming a peaceful statesman by agreeing to ten year pact accepting Poland’s frontiers. With this move he seriously weakened the France-Polish defensive alliance and any possibility of an agreement between Poland and Czechoslovakia which could have balked his long-term aims. As for the agreement he admitted to a fellow Nazi, it was of:

"temporary significance. I have no intention of maintaining a serious friendship with Poland"

Later in the year the Nazis suffered their first foreign policy setback over the Austrian question. The Austrian National Socialists had received aid and encouragement from Germany that prompted them to attempt a ‘coup d’état’ in July 1934. Prime Minister Dollfuss was killed but Mussolini came to Austrian rescue. Not yet enamoured, or reliant on his fellow dictator, Mussolini was anxious to have Austria as a buffer-zone between Italy and Germany. Italian troops were rushed to the Brenner Pass and Hitler quickly disassociated himself from the failed putsch.

The irritation suffered by this setback was alleviated somewhat by the plebiscite in the Saarland in January 1935. As a part of the Versailles Treaty this area was put under League of Nations jurisdiction for fifteen years. As part of their reparations France was allowed to work the mines. A plebiscite showed that ninety per cent of the Saarland's inhabitants wanted reunion with Germany, which duly occurred in less two months.

A short while later on 8^th March, Hitler revealed that Germany had an airforce. The following week he broke the Versailles Treaty by announcing the expansion of his army from the allowable 100,000 men to 550,000. This decision changed the relationships between Germany and other European Powers. His military strength would now pose serious problems especially to the French. In an attempt to create a diplomatic front against Hitler the prime ministers of Britain, Italy and France met at Stressa and formed a Stressa Front. They strongly condemned German rearmament.

The Stressa Front did not last very long. Hitler almost came to a naval agreement with Britain who did not want a repeat of the Naval Race of the first decade of the century. The Anglo-German Naval Convention limited German naval building to thirty five per cent of the British total. U-boats, the scourge of the waterways during the First World War were excluded from the agreement. As Britain had not informed her allies of the negotiations, relations between the signatories of the Stressa Front were seriously strained. Britain had also, in effect, agreed to a form of German rearmament thus condoning a breech in the Versailles Treaty.

The Stressa Front (as we saw in Chapter 16) finally disintegrated in the controversy over the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1938. British and French sanctions against Mussolini - who expected a free hand in Africa in return for support in Europe - led to the Italian dictator moving closer to his German counterpart.

;

Short Questions 1:

One of the books used for this essay was " The Second World War " by Martin Gilbert. Originally published by Weidenfeld in 1989 and now available in paperback, a history of the Second World War, which looks at its political, diplomatic, military and civilian aspects. There are so many good books on World War II, but Gilbert's stands out for two reasons. Martin Gilbert's masterful account of the history of the second world war. What makes this history so different from the others is the way in which Sir Martin can switch from the story of an entire offensive onslaught to tell the story of a single young private and his experience of that same battle. Somehow the results of the actions or the death of a single person or group of people can be so much more effective in explaining the true glory of war, or in debunking the great myth of the glory of war depending on your viewpoint. Sir Martin can and does give examples of both. The historical facts are still there, but so also is the humanity, with both of it's faces showing. A book for anyone with an interest in the Second World War who doesn't want just facts and casualty figures. While completing this essay the issue of bias came up. This book however gave a balanced view of the conflict, giving both sides a view.

Short Questions 2 :

While completing this research topic the following skills were learnt :

book.

Short Questions 4 :

Burleigh, M, The Third Reich, Macmillan Books, London, Oxford.

Davies, N, Europe A History, Pimlico, London, Oxford.

Fynes, E, European History 1870-1966, Folens, Tallaght, Dublin.