At the chantilly conference in december 1915it was agreed to launch a combined Franco-British offensive the following year. however, due to German attack on verdum in Febuary 1916 and the premature conclusion of a Russian offensive in June, the actual Allied operation was mounted in a different sector and on a smaller scale than originally intended. The Somme valley was elected mainly because that river marked the junction of the British and French armies on the west front. strictly speaking, the British area of operations was centered on the acre, a tributary of the Somme following through the main staging post of Albert. there was noobvious stratigic objective on this sector and it was unpropitious for an allied offensive because the Germans had constructed formiddable defences above and below ground on the dominating heights.
under desprate French pressure to create a diversion from Verdum, the British commander in cheif sir Douglas Haig was obliged to take over more of the line and attack at a time and a place not of his choosing. thus the british became the senior partner in the first subsstantial intervention of the kitchener volunteer armies in a hastily improvised offensive which was widely publicized as the decisive battle or, more colloquially,the big push.
Haig did indeed anticipate a breakthrough in witch General sir Henry Rawlinson,s fourth army whould over run the German first and second defence line, thus gaining the high ground between Ginchy Poizers and Miraument. this whould leave only a flimsey third line to be cleared to permit Sir Hubert Gough,s reserve army to capture Bapaume and roll up the enemy lines toward Arras.
Rawlinson, who planned the offensive in detail, was pesimistic about chances of a breakthrough, preffreing a methodical ;bite and hold; advance with an intense artillery bombardment preparing each short step forward. also, doubting the tactical flexibility of the new army soldiers, he allowed a rigid battle plan to be imposed on the corpse concerened, including the fateful decision that the infantry should advance in long and orderly lines.
A week long artillrey bombardment failed either todestroy the German wire in many places or to harm the defenders in their deep dug outs on the escarpment. The offensive, launched in bright sunlight at 7:30 on the morning of July 1st, failed disastrously on most sectors of the 18 mile front. Even the explosion of several huge mines under the German front line did not prevent their machine-gunners emerging tocreate havoc among the waves of british infantry and artillery attacks enabled 18th and 30th divisions to take all their objectives, as did the 5 French divisions straddling the Somme. in the centre, too, the 36th (Ulster)division performed heroically to seize the schwaben reboubt on thiepval ridge, but the survivors were forced to retreat later in the day due to the lack of support on their flanks. In the northern half of the attack sector of beaumont hamel to Sierre and Gommecourt virtually no progress was made. Many battilions were virtually annihilited. The causualtys in this tragic offensive totalled 57,470,the biggest ever suffered by the British army in a single day
Somme lessons were learnt from this bitter experience as the New Armies demonstrated in a suprise dawn attack without a long prepatory bombardment on July 14th. this attack captured a wide sector of the German second line between Longueval and Bazentin le petit, and there was even a fleeting opportunity for the cavalry-unfortunatly positioned too far back-to make a breakthrough into the open country beyond high wood. In the centre, Poizeres was taken by the Austrailians in late July but the two formiddible barriers, Deville and high woods, held up further advance untill September, by which time the the operation had degenerated into a grim battle of attrition. In the opening days of the battle German casualtys had been comparaively light, but their propensity to launch repeated counter-attacks soon caused their losses to equal those of the attacker.
A new era in warfare began on 15 of September when British used tanks for the first time. Only about 40 were available and many of these failed to reach the start line. Those that did were parcelled out in twos and threes among attacking formations. A Few spectular advances were made by these terrifying monsters, notably atFlers and Courcelette, but the tanks were too slow, unreliable, and few in number to make a significant tatical-as distinct from a sycological-impact.
The offensive continued, in truly appauling muddy conditions for which the campaign became notorious, untill mid-november when the high ground beyond Beaumont Hamel was at last taken. The cratered, desolate landscape, glutinous pools, and splintered woods provided an enduring image of the battle. at the norman end of the attack zone the village of sierre, a first day objective, remained in german hands, as did the more distant objective of baupaume.
It was therefor impossible to justify the protracted campaign in terms of the ground gained, though the Germans retreat to the prepared defences of the Hindenburg line Febuary 1917 suggested that they too suffered heavily. the issue of success or failure has consequently focused on comparitive causaulty statistics, but these are inconclusive due to defective evidence and different critiria on the two sides. British and imperial causaulties between July 1 and November 19, 1916 totalled approximatly 420,000 while the French just over 200,000. German losses have been variously estimated as between 450,000 and 680,000depending on the word ,wounded, and the exact territorial limits and dates of the battle. British historians have been preoccupied with allied losses but contemporary German sources, including newspapers revaeal that their armies had been seriously,perhaps fatally,weakened by the campaign. In conclusion, the over all result may be termed a costly draw which served to deminstrate to allied commanders that drastic improvments in all arms cooperation and training would be nessecary to overcome the defenders advantages.
In terms of histography and in popular culture,the bittre dissappointment and uniquely heavy losses on the first day have caused july 1st to represent ;The Battle Of The Somme; for all but a few military historians. In recent years, however, some of the latter have suggested that, despite the dreadful conditions and serious tactical failings, the campaign as a whole does contain evidence of a ;learning curve; particularly in the imployment of artillery, which whould contriboute to the remarkable victory in 1918.