CORA

                                                                                    is watching you !

Lashkar-e-Toiba's entry into Jammu and Kashmir was first recorded in 1993 when 12 Pakistani and Afghan mercenaries infiltrated across the Line of Control in tandem with the Islami Inquilabi Mahaz, a terrorist outfit based in Poonch district of the State. Though Lashkar-e-Toiba cadre were gradually inducted in the succeeding years, it was after 1997 (Nawaz Sharief’s second term as Prime Minister of Pakistan) that the Lashkar-e-Toiba rose in the priority of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Evidence of official patronage from Pakistan came in the form of the then Information Minister, Mushahid Hussain's visit to the Lashkar-e-Toiba headquarters in Muridke near Lahore. He was accompanied by the governor of Pakistani Punjab province, Shahid Hamid, and a host of provincial ministers.
 
 

The increasing importance of this group came about after the ISI decided on shifting the focus of insurgency from the Kashmir Valley to the Jammu region. This was part of the ethnic cleansing strategy, and since most minority communities of the State were concentrated in the Jammu region, this necessitated the intensification of insurgency in the region.

The Lashkar-e-Toiba was an ideal instrument for the ISI in this campaign. Indoctrinated in orthodox terrorist Islamic ideals, the cadre (largely Pakistanis and Afghans) of Lashkar-e-Toiba had no qualms in perpetrating massacres of minorities in the State. Thus after 1997, there has been a rise in insurgent activity all along the border districts of Jammu, particularly in the districts of Poonch and Doda.

The rise of the Lashkar-e-Toiba in ISI’s priorities is also due to the Punjabi (Pakistani Punjab) base of the outfit. This helps easy mixing by Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists with the local population of Jammu, who are linguistically allied to Punjab. Thus it makes the Lashkar-e-Toiba an ideal instrument for the ISI's ethnic cleansing strategy in the Jammu region.

Lashkar-e-Toiba cadre, unlike other terrorists, prefer to die in an encounter with security forces rather than get caught. For instance, in 1997 the largest group of terrorists killed in clashes with the security forces belonged to Lashkar-e-Toiba.

The puritanism of this outfit’s cadre is characterised by a level of brutality, which surpasses that of all other terrorist groups operating in the State and sponsored by Pakistan. Mass murders of defenseless people, mainly Hindus, is this outfit’s speciality. The Lashkar-e-Toiba has carried out some major attacks in tandem with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). One instance is the cold blooded murder of 23 people in Wandhama on January 23, 1988. A second instance is the June 19, 1998, massacre in which 25 members of a wedding party in Doda, Jammu were killed. To highlight the Kashmir issue during the US Presidential visit to South Asia, Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists perpetrated the Chattisinghpora massacre where 35 people were killed on March 20, 2000. The victims, in all these cases, were either Hindus or Sikhs.

The extreme level of cold-blooded brutality, which sets Lashkar-e-Toiba apart from other terrorist organisations that operated in Kashmir before, is evident in the Wandhama massacre, where children as young as one year were murdered along with scores of women and defenceless men.

The Lashkar-e-Toiba has successfully launched several attacks on security forces bases through their suicide squads termed as fidayen. The frequency of these attacks increased after the Kargil fiasco when the ISI controlled terrorist organisations were directed to intensify attacks on security forces. The first of these suicide attacks was targeted at a residential complex of the Border Security Force (BSF) in Bandipore near Srinagar. The most spectacular of these missions was the attack on the headquarters of the Special Operations Group (SOG) on December 27, 1999. Earlier, a suicide squad of the outfit had targeted the BSF camp in Handwara on September 4, 1999.

Despite being faced with a serious setback when its J&K chief Abu Muwaih was killed on December 30, 1999, the suicide attacks continued with three such attacks in 2000 (on Surankote Army camp, January 1; Rashtriya Rifles base in Anantnag, January 12 and a BSF Camp in Srinagar, March 21).

More than the number of casualties inflicted on the security forces, the psychological impact of these attacks have helped project the image of this group. This is because security forces have resorted to extensive use of heavy fire, destroying their own buildings in the process, and causing deaths of their own men in friendly fire in each of the attacks.

Several press reports indicate that in the aftermath of the Hizb cease-fire offer, the ISI is using the Lashkar to ensure that there is no perceptible decline in violence or casualties. Going by these reports, it would appear that the Hizb and the Lashkar are only continuing their complementary role, in this case, one espousing peace and the other swearing by terrorism in the name of Jihad. The Hizb offer ensures that terrorists are able to convey, to the international community, their "committment" to peace, while the Lashkar and other predominantly Pakistani terrorist outfits continue to wage a proxy war against India.
 

BACK

HOME