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The militias that would eventually unite under the banner of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia began as local vigilante groups formed to protect wealthy land-owners and drug traffickers, frequent targets of kidnappers, from left-wing insurgents. By far the most notorious of these vigilante groups was Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) or “Death to Kidnappers,” formed in the early 1980’s by drug lord Pablo Escobar, and several other local leaders of the drug trade.

The burgeoning drug trade gave the paramilitaries unprecedented influence and political clout. Colombian authorities began to view the paramilitaries as a counterweight to the increasingly effective armies of the FARC and the ELN—a force capable of fighting the guerillas in ways the Colombian Armed Forces could not. Throughout the 1980’s, the paramilitaries continued to receive arms and training from the Colombian military.

In 1989, as abuses and atrocities committed by the paramilitaries mounted, the Colombian government was forced to outlaw the paramilitaries and vigilante groups. However, no significant effort was made to disband the militias, and regional groups continued to receive unofficial aid, mostly from local military commanders. According to a report entitled “The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links,” by Human Rights Watch:

As recently as 1999, Colombian government investigators gathered compelling evidence that Army officers set up a “paramilitary” group using active duty, retired, and reserve duty military officers along with hired paramilitaries who effectively operated alongside Army soldiers and in collaboration with them.

In the early 1990’s the United Self-Defense Forces of C?rdoba and Urab?, headed by brothers Carlos and Fidel Casta?o, emerged as the predominant militia group in northwestern Colombia. The ACCU formed the nucleus of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), formed in 1997 under the leadership of Carlos Castano (Fidel is now presumed dead). Current member groups of the AUC include Peasant Self-Defense Group of C?rdoba and Urab? (ACCU), Eastern Plains Self-Defense Group, Cesar Self-Defense Group, Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group, Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group, Casanare Self-Defense Group, Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group, Pacific Bloc (including the “Frente Calima” in and around Cali), Southern Bloc, and “Frente Capital” forming in Bogot?.

The AUC quickly became the main counter to the FARC rebels in northern Colombia, and has used brutal methods to crowd perceived supporters out of the lucrative coca-growing areas in other parts of Colombia as well.
 
 

Most sources estimate the AUC has between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters, although Carlos Castano claims to have up to 11,000. According to the Center for Defense Information, the AUC’s membership has tripled in the last three years, mainly due to its deepening involvement in the drug trade. The AUC is reportedly growing about five times as fast as the FARC.

AUC forces are strongest in the northwest in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar Departments. Since 1999, the group demonstrated a growing presence in other northern and southwestern departments.

Resources and Financing

The AUC is well-funded and armed, and reportedly pays its members a monthly salary. According to AUC political leader Carlos Castano some 70 percent of the AUC’s operational costs are financed by drug-related earnings, the rest from “donations” from its sponsors. In a 1999 interview with the Colombian magazine Cambio, Castano said: “We finance ourselves with what the coca growers produce, I charge them a 60 percent tax on what they earn.”

The “donations” received from landowners and drug lords are a form of “protection money” paid out to the paramilitaries in return for defense against the FARC and ELN. In testifying to a congressional subcommittee in March 2001, DEA Administrator Donnie Marshall noted that the AUC has become increasingly involved in all levels of the drug trade.

Carlos Casta?o “has recently admitted in open press that his group receives payments - similar to the taxes levied by the FARC - from coca growers in southern Colombia in exchange for protection from guerrillas. Several paramilitary groups also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Casta?o organization, and possibly other paramilitary groups, appears to be directly involved in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appears to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia.

Carlos Castano has repeatedly petitioned the Colombian government for political status for the AUC, which, in contrast to the various guerilla groups has so far not been recognized by the government as a political organization. In his campaign to have the AUC represented in on-going peace talks between the government and the leftist rebels, Castano resigned from the leadership of the AUC on 6 June 2001, saying that he would henceforth devote his energies to the “political directorate” of the AUC.

Castano was replaced—at least nominally—by a nine-member Central Command. The Central Command includes: Ram?n Isaza, Adolfo Paz, Botal?n, Mart?n Llano, Rodrigo Molano, Alejandro, Antonio Cauca, Santander Lozada and Juli?n Bol?var. What effect Castano’s resignation will have in reality is not known, and he is still acknowledged as the overall commander of the AUC.
 

The AUC is believed to be responsible for most of the atrocities committed in Colombia, in particular against the country’s civilian population. According to the Center for International Policy in Washington, “The paramilitaries are responsible for about 75 percent of all politically motivated killings and the vast majority of forced displacements in Colombia.” It’s targets include supporters or perceived supporters of left-wing groups, as well as political activists, police officials and judges.

According to human rights sources, in 2001 alone, the AUC killed more than one thousand civilians (for comparison, the largest Marxist guerilla group, the FARC, killed 197 civilians.). The AUC is notorious for carrying out wholesale massacres of remote villages, with the intention of frightening residents into leaving their homes and farms. By displacing large portions of the peasant population the AUC gains control over major coca-growing territories. The U.S. State Department noted that the AUC was responsible for about 43 percent of Colombia’s internally displaced people in 2001.
 
 

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